Yzaguirre v. Zoley et al
Filing
57
OPINION AND ORDER re: granting 41 MOTION for summary judgment, denying as moot 56 MOTION for clarification. The Clerk of Court shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment accordingly, and close this case. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 9/15/2015. (SLU)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
DAVID YZAGUIRRE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:13-cv-654-FtM-38CM
FLAVIA EPPS, CAPTAIN ZAMORA,
FNU WUTDKE and FNU SAMUELS,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER1
I.
This matter comes before the Court upon review of Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (Doc. #41, Motion), filed February 11, 2015. Defendants attach
supporting exhibits including: Affidavit of Rebecca Jackson (Exh. A.), Affidavit of Latoya
Samuels (Exh. B), Affidavit of Travis Wudtke (Exh. C), Desoto County Sheriff’s Office
Complaint/Witness Affidavit Form submitted by Michael Zamora (Exh. D), Florida Civil
Commitment Center Incident Form submitted by Captain Kilgo (Exh. E), Affidavit of Carl
Kilgo (Exh. F), and Desoto County Sheriff’s Office Complaint/Witness Affidavit Form
1
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written by Plaintiff (Exh. G). Plaintiff has not filed a response to the Defendants’ Motion
and the time to do so has expired.2 See docket. This matter is ripe for review.
II.
Plaintiff David Yzaguirre, who is civilly detained at the Florida Civil Commitment
Center (“FCCC”), initiated this action proceeding pro se by filing a Civil Rights Complaint
(Doc. #1, Complaint) alleging a Fourteenth Amendment failure to protect claim against
Defendants, who are FCCC officials. The Complaint arises from an August 11, 2012
incident that occurred at the FCCC when a FCCC resident (hereinafter “CO”) attacked
Plaintiff with a homemade knife. See generally Complaint. According to the Complaint,
Plaintiff alleged that FCCC residents, who were in CO’s treatment group, heard CO say
that he had a dream about using a weapon to attempt to kill another resident. Id. at 5.
Plaintiff claims an FCCC resident anonymously slipped a note under the Captain’s door
describing what CO said during therapy. Id. Plaintiff also faults the therapy technician
for not alerting FCCC officials about CO’s threats made during therapy. Id. Concerning
the attack itself, Plaintiff claims Defendant Samuels did not call security quick enough.
Id. at 6.
Plaintiff also blames Defendants for placing him on a wing restriction at the
FCCC for fourteen days after the attack. Id.
Defendants move for summary judgment and argue inter alia that there is no
evidence showing Defendants were subjectively aware that Plaintiff, or any resident at
2The
Court advised Plaintiff about the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. See Docs.
#9, #42, #51. On August 4, 2015, the Court denied Plaintiff’s untimely motion to compel
and directed Plaintiff to file a response within seven days from the date on the Order. On
August 5, 2015, Plaintiff filed a motion for clarification concerning his prior motion for an
enlargement of time and his motion to compel. It is clear based on this record that
Plaintiff’s motion for clarification was filed prior to receiving the Court’s August 4 order.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for clarification is due to be denied as moot.
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the FCCC, was at risk from resident CO. See Motion at 2-3. Additionally, Defendants
explain that Plaintiff was placed on wing restriction after the attack for fourteen days while
the matter was under investigation pursuant to FCCC policy. Id. at 4. For the reasons
that follow, the Court finds Defendants’ motion is due to be granted.
III.
ASummary judgment is appropriate only if the movant shows there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.@
Moton v. Cowart, 631 F.3d 1337, 1341 (11th Cir. 2011)(internal quotations and citations
omitted). See also, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). AThe moving party may meet its burden to
show that there are no genuine issues of material fact by demonstrating that there is a
lack of evidence to support the essential elements that the non-moving party must prove
at trial.@ Moton, 631 F.3d at 1341 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986)). The standard for creating a genuine dispute of fact requires the court to Amake
all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment,@ Chapman
v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000)(en banc)(emphasis added), not to
make all possible inferences in the non-moving party=s favor. To avoid the entry of
summary judgment, a party faced with a properly supported summary judgment motion
Abears the burden of persuasion@ and must come forward with extrinsic evidence, i.e.,
affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and/or admissions, and Aset forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.@ Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S.
521, 529 (2006)(citations omitted); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Hilburn v. Murata Elec. N.
America, Inc., 181 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 1999). If there is a conflict in the evidence,
the non-moving party=s evidence is to be believed and Aall justifiable inferences@ must be
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drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Beard, 548 U.S. at 529 (citations omitted); Shotz
v. City of Plantation, 344 F.3d 1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2003). In doing so, the Court Amust
distinguish between evidence of disputed facts and disputed matters of professional
judgment. In respect to the latter, our inferences must accord deference to the views of
prison authorities. Unless a prisoner can point to sufficient evidence regarding such
issues of judgment to allow him to prevail on the merits, he cannot prevail at the summary
judgment stage.@ Beard, 548 U.S. at 529-30. Also, A[a] court need not permit a case to
go to a jury, however, when the inferences that are drawn from the evidence, and upon
which the non-movant relies, are >implausible.=@ Cuesta v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade
County, 285 F.3d 962, 970 (11th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). Nor are conclusory
allegations based on subjective beliefs sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact.
Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000).
AWhen
opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the
record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version
of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.@ Scott v. Harris,
550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
IV.
A. Section 1983
Title 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under color of state law,
deprives a person Aof any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws.@ To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, Plaintiff must allege that: (1) Defendants
deprived him of a right secured under the United States Constitution or federal law, and
(2) such deprivation occurred under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb County, 139
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F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. Steel, LLC v. Tieco, Inc., 261 F.3d 1275, 1288 (11th
Cir. 2001).
The Supreme Court has soundly rejected the possibility of respondeat superior as
a basis of liability in ' 1983 actions. Monell v. Dep=t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 659, 690692 (1978). Instead, supervisory liability can be imposed under ' 1983 Aeither when the
supervisor personally participates in the alleged constitutional violation or when there is
a causal connection between the actions of the supervising official and the alleged
constitutional deprivation.@ Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 671 (11th Cir. 1990); cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 933 (1991). Absent personal participation by a defendant, a plaintiff
must show an affirmative causal connection between the defendant=s acts and the alleged
constitutional deprivation. Harris v. Ostrout, 65 F.3d 912, 917 (11th Cir. 1995). The
causal connection can be established Awhen a history of widespread abuse puts the
responsible supervisor on notice of the need to correct the alleged deprivation, and he
fails to do so [,]@ or when a custom or policy of the supervisor results in deliberate
indifference to constitutional rights. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir.
2003)(quoting Gonzalez v. Reno, 325 F.3d 1228, 1234 (11th Cir. 2003)).
AThe
deprivations that constitute widespread abuse sufficient to notify the supervising official
must be obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated
occurrences.@ Brown, 906 F.2d at 671. Alternatively, facts supporting an inference that
the supervisor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that they would do so
and failed to stop them establishes a causal connection. Cottone, 326 F.3d at 1360
(quoting Gonzalez, 325 F.3d at 1234) (remaining citations omitted).
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B. Fourteenth Amendment- Failure to Protect
Plaintiff alleges a violation of his rights protected under the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution stemming from Defendants’ failure to protect him from
resident CO’s attack. See generally Complaint. Under Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures the involuntarily
civilly committed a liberty interest in reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom
from unreasonably bodily restrains, and such minimally adequate training as might be
required to ensure safety and freedom from restraint. Id. at 322. The rights of the
involuntarily civilly committed are Aat least as extensive@ as the Eighth Amendment rights
of the criminally institutionalized. Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1041 (11th Cir.
1996); Lavender v. Kearney, 206 F. App=x 860, 863 (11th Cir. 2006)(unpublished).
Therefore, the case law that has developed under the Eighth Amendment sets forth the
contours of the due process rights of the civilly committed. Dolihite, 74 F.3d at 1041.
FCCC staff have a duty to protect the civilly detained from violence at the hands of the
other civilly detained residents.
See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833
(1994)(applying analysis in a prison context); Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 909 (7th Cir.
2005)(applying Farmer analysis to a civil commitment facility); Nelson v. Shuffman, 603
F.3d 439, 446 (8th Cir. 2010)(same).
However, not every injury Atranslates into
constitutional liability.@ Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834. In Carter v. Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346
(11th Cir. 2003) the court summarized the relevant principles:
A prison official=s deliberate indifference to a substantial risk
of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.
Prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence
at the hands of other prisoners. It is not, however, every
injury suffered by one inmate at the hands of another that
translates into a constitutional liability for prison officials
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responsible for the victim=s safety. An Eighth Amendment
violation will occur when a substantial risk of serious harm, of
which the official is subjectively aware, exists and the official
does not respond reasonably to the risk. To survive
summary judgment on his section 1983, Eighth Amendment
claim, plaintiff was required to produce sufficient evidence of
(1) a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendants=
deliberate indifference to that risk; and (3) causation.
Id. at 1349 (citations and quotations omitted). In other words, Afor an involuntarily civillycommitted plaintiff to establish a ' 1983 claim for violation of his due process rights, he
must show that state officials were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk to his
safety.@ Lavender, 206 F. App=x at 863. A plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant
was aware of specific facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm exists and that the prison official drew that inference. Purcell v. Toombs
County, 400 F.3d 1313, 1319-20 (11th Cir. 2005); Carter, 352 F.3d 1346 at 1349.
To show that an official had subjective knowledge, the court is to inquire whether
the defendant was aware of a Aparticularized threat or fear felt by [the plaintiff].@ Carter,
352 F.3d at 1350. AA plaintiff=s failure to give advance notice to prison officials of a
specific threat or of his fear of an inmate is relevant to this inquiry, Carter, 352 F.3d at
1349-50, though it is not dispositive, see Farmer, 511 U.S. at 848.@ Moulds v. Bullard,
345 F. App=x 387 (11th Cir. 2009)(unpublished). Indeed, A[d]eliberate indifference can
be predicated upon knowledge of a victim=s particular vulnerability (though the identity of
the ultimate assailant not known in advance of attack), or, in the alternative, an assailant=s
predatory nature (though the identity of the ultimate victim not known in advance of
attack).@ Brown, 398 F.3d at 915. Whether an official had requisite knowledge is a
question of fact that may be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence. Farmer, 511 U.S.
at 842. Consequently, evidence of past attacks which were Alongstanding, pervasive,
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well-documented, or expressly noted by [ ] officials in the past@ may be sufficient to find
that the official had actual knowledge. Id. However, general knowledge that a particular
inmate is a problem inmate with a well-documented history of prison disobedience who
is prone to violence is not sufficient. Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349. See also McBride v.
Rivers, 170 F. App=x 648 (11th Cir. 2006)(unpublished).
Defendants move for summary judgment and argue inter alia that they were not
subjectively aware of a known risk of harm to Plaintiff by CO and there is no evidence
that any letter describing CO’s general threats during therapy were given to the Captain.
Motion at 2, 10; See also Exh. A, Aff. Jackson; Exh. B, Aff. Samuels; Exh. F, Aff. Kilgo.
The unopposed evidence of record shows that Plaintiff never made any statements, or
filed any resident communication forms advising Defendants that he was in fear of
resident CO. Id. The undisputed evidence supports the finding that this incident was
an attack that took everyone, including Plaintiff, by surprise. Motion at 2, 10; See also
Exh. G, Desoto Sheriff Form from Yzaguirre. After the fight began, security at the FCCC,
consisting of Defendants Wudtke, Zamora, and Kilgo, responded within seconds to the
code Green called by Defendant Samuels. Motion at 2; see also Exh. B, Aff. Samuels,
Exh. C, Aff. Wudtke, Exh. D, Desoto County Sheriff’s Form from Zamora; Exh. E, Incident
Report from Kilgo; Exh. F, Aff. Kilgo; Exh. G, Desoto Sheriff’s Form from Yzaguirre.
Resident CO swung his homemade knife toward responding officer Wudtke. Motion at
7; Exh. C, Aff. Wudkte; Exh. F, Aff. Kilgo. Security officials secured both resident CO
and the Plaintiff. Id. The whole incident from start to finish was less than a few minutes.
Motion at 6; Exh. C, Aff. Wudkte; Exh. F, Aff. Kilgo.
Plaintiff initially thanked the
responding FCCC officers for saving his life. Id. at 9; Exh. G, Desoto County Sheriff’s
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Form from Yzagguire.
After the incident, Plaintiff was transported to the Desoto
Memorial Hospital for treatment.
Motion at 8; Exh. D, Desoto Sheriff’s Form from
Zamora.
In this case, the uncontroverted evidence of record demonstrates that Defendants
did not act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. In
particular, there is no evidence to support an inference that a substantial risk of serious
harm existed and that the Defendants drew that inference.
Instead, the evidence
demonstrates that CO’s attack on Plaintiff was a surprise attack.
When Defendant
Samuels saw the fight, she immediately called a “Code Green” and FCCC security
officers responded within seconds. FCCC officers risked their own lives to save Plaintiff.
The entire incident from start to finish was less than a few minutes. FCCC officials
restrained resident CO and Plaintiff. Plaintiff was sent to the hospital for treatment.
FCCC officials conducted an investigation, involving the Desoto County Sheriff’s Office,
during which time they held Plaintiff on wing restriction.
This Court recognizes that it is well settled that deliberate indifference may be
found even though the specific identify of the ultimate victim is not known in advance of
the assault. See Brown, 398 F.3d at 916. However, the uncontroverted evidence in this
record does not support a finding that resident CO had a predatory nature. Instead,
Defendants provide evidence that neither the FCCC’s clinical files, nor the FCCC’s
incident reports, show any reference to CO threatening violence against either FCCC staff
members or residents.
Exh. A, Aff. Jackson.
contrary.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
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Plaintiff provides no evidence to the
ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Doc. #41) is GRANTED.
2. Plaintiff’s motion for clarification (Doc. #56) is DENIED as moot.
3.
The Clerk of Court shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment
accordingly, and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 15th day of September, 2015.
FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record
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