Dalton v. Severson et al

Filing 53

OPINION AND ORDER directing Clerk to correct defendant "Redneck" to Reineck; granting in part and otherwise denying 37 Motion to dismiss; terminating 43 Motion for Extension of Time to File. Defendants shall file an answer within 21 days of this Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 12/11/2014. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
RIVERS D. DALTON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:13-cv-734-FtM-29DNF

L.
SEVERSON,
Warden
at
Charlotte
State
Prison,
individually and in their
official
capacities
and
REDNECK,
Correctional
Officer at Charlotte State
Prison, individually and in
their official capacities,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
I.
This matter comes before the Court upon review of the motion
to

dismiss

(Doc.

#37,

Severson and Reineck. 1
opposition. 2

Motion)

filed

on

behalf

of

defendants

Plaintiff filed a response (Doc. #50) in

Based on the reasons that follow, the Court grants

1

Plaintiff misspells officer Reineck’s name “Redneck.”
Officer Reineck has received service of process and is aware that
the claims are against him. Accordingly, the Clerk is directed
to correct the docket accordingly.
2Plaintiff’s

response in opposition suggests that Plaintiff
believes the defendants filed a motion to dismiss converted to a
summary judgment. The Court will not covert defendants’ motion
to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment because the exhibits
defendants’ referenced were those attached to Plaintiff’s
Complaint. Also pending is Plaintiff’s motion for an enlargement
of time to file a response (Doc. #43). The Clerk shall terminate
this motion. See Doc. #52.

in part and otherwise denies defendants’ motion.

The motion is

granted only to the extent that some of Plaintiff’s requested forms
of relief (injunctive and declaratory) are now moot and the claim
for

monetary

capacities

is

damages

against

precluded

by

defendants
Eleventh

in

their

Amendment

official
immunity.

Otherwise, defendants’ motion is denied.
II.
Plaintiff Rivers Dalton initiated this action proceeding pro
se by filing a Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. #1) pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 on October 17, 2013, naming Warden Severson and
correctional officer Reineck in their individual and official
capacities as defendants.

Complaint at 1.

The Complaint alleges

an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim stemming from physical
attacks on two different occasions by two different cellmates at
Charlotte Correctional Institution.

Additionally, with regard to

the second attack, the Complaint alleges a failure to provide
medical treatment for a serious medical condition claim.
Specifically, the Complaint alleges that two of Plaintiff’s
cellmates (“Solider” and “Tyler Reed”), who were gang members,
physically assaulted him. 3
(Reed allegations).

Id. at 2-4 (Solider allegations); 4-6

Solider’s attacks on Plaintiff happened over

a period of days in October 2012.

3The

Id. at 2-4.

Tyler Reed’s

Complaint alleges physical attacks by both cellmates,
which although not entirely clear, appear to include attacks of
a sexual nature. Complaint at 8.
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attack on Plaintiff happened on October 26, 2012.

Id. at 5.

Plaintiff alleges that he told Warden Severson and correctional
officer Reineck that the cellmates threatened him with physical
harm, but defendants failed to move him, or his cellmates, until
after the cellmates attacked him.

Id. at 2-6.

Plaintiff alleges

that the October 26 attack by inmate Reed was very violent and
involved Plaintiff being hit over the head with a food tray, bit,
and stabbed with a piece of metal.

Id. at 6.

Additionally, during the second attack by Reed, Plaintiff
alleges that defendant Reineck watched outside of the cell and did
nothing to stop the attack.

Id. at 5.

Thereafter, Plaintiff

claims he was denied medical care for his wounds until he declared
a medical emergency.

Id. at 6.

Eventually Plaintiff was moved

away from the cell with Reed, but Plaintiff alleges that he still
received death threats from other gang members.

Id. at 6-7.

As

relief, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and
compensatory damages.

Id.

Defendants properly concede that the Complaint alleges a
failure to protect claim against defendant Reineck.

Motion at 3.

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), defendants
move to dismiss the action in its entirety against defendant
Severson and in part against defendant Reineck, arguing that “mere
participation in a grievance procedure is not actionable under §
1983.”

Motion

at

2.

Additionally,

defendants

argue

that

Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief because he is
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currently housed a Santa Rosa Correctional, so any relief against
Charlotte Correctional would be moot.

Id.

Finally, defendants

argue that the Complaint fails to state a deliberate indifference
to a serious medical condition claim because the exhibits attached
to the Complaint reveal that Plaintiff received medical care after
the second attack.

Id. at 3.
III.

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court
limits

its

consideration

to

well-pleaded

factual

allegations,

documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters
judicially noticed.

La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d

840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).

Thus, the Court must accept all factual

allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint as true and take them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.
F.3d

1282,

1284

(11th

Cir.

2008).

Pielage v. McConnell, 516
Conclusory

however, are not entitled to a presumption of truth.

allegations,
Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009)(discussing a 12(b)(6) dismissal);
Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n.16 (11th Cir.
2001).
The Court employs the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard
when reviewing a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss.
v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 708, n.2 (11th Cir. 2010).

Randall

A claim is

plausible where the plaintiff alleges facts that “allow[] the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the

misconduct

alleged.”

Iqbal,
- 4 -

556

U.S.

at

678.

The

plausibility standard requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient
facts “to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence” that supports the plaintiff’s claim.

Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007); Marsh, 268 F.3d at
1036 n.16.
12(b)(6)

Specifically, “[w]hile a complaint attacked by a Rule
motion

to

dismiss

does

not

need

detailed

factual

allegations . . . a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’
of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action will not do.”

Id. at 555 (citations omitted).

Thus,

“the-defendant-unlawfully harmed me accusation” is insufficient.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677.

“Nor does a complaint suffice if it

tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”
Id.

The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.”

See Twombly, 550 U.S.

544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 1968-69 (citations omitted) (abrogating
Conley, 355 U.S. 41 in part).
heightened

pleading

Additionally, there is no longer a

requirement.

Randall,

610

F.3d

at

701.

Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, his pleadings are held to
a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by an attorney
and will be liberally construed.

Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157,

1160 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Tannenbaum v. United States, 148
F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998)).

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IV.
A.

Section 1983

Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under
color of state law, deprives a person "of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws." To state a
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
defendants deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred
under color of state law.

Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865,

872 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. Steel, LLC v. Tieco, Inc., 261 F.3d
1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001).
and

establish

an

In addition, a plaintiff must allege

affirmative

causal

connection

between

defendant's conduct and the constitutional deprivation.

the

Marsh v.

Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001); Swint
v. City of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 999 (11th Cir. 1995); Tittle
v. Jefferson County Comm'n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1541 n.1 (11th Cir.
1994).
B.

Eighth Amendment Claims
1.

Failure to Protect

Defendants do not contest that they are “state actors.”

And,

as previously stated, defendants’ concede the Complaint alleges a
failure to protect claim against defendant Reineck.

The Court

finds that the Complaint also plausibly states an Eighth Amendment
claim against defendant Severson.

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The Supreme Court made clear that “prison officials have a
duty . . . to protect prisoners from violence . . . .”

Farmer v.

Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994); see also Doe v. Georgia Dep’t
of Corr., 245 F. App’x. 899 (11th Cir. 2007).

A violation of the

Eighth Amendment occurs when a prison official acts with deliberate
indifference to a substantial risk of harm to an inmate.
511 U.S. at 828.

Farmer,

“Deliberate indifference is not the same thing

as negligence or carelessness.”

Maldonado v. Snead, 168 F. App’x

373 (11th Cir. 2006)(citing Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1083 (11th
Cir. 2004)).

“Merely negligent failure to protect” an inmate from

an attack does not give rise to a § 1983 claim.

Carter v.

Galloway, 352 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2003).
A plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant was aware of
specific facts from which an inference could be drawn that a
substantial

risk

of

serious

official drew that inference.

harm

exists

and

that

the

prison

Purcell v. Toombs County, Ga., 400

F.3d 1313, 1319-20; Carter, 352 F.3d at 1349.

In other words, to

show that an official had subjective knowledge, the court is to
inquire whether the defendant was aware of a “particularized threat
or fear felt by [the plaintiff].”
failure

to

alleviate

a

Id. at 1350.

significant

risk

that

“An official’s
he

should

have

perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot .
. . be condemned as the infliction of punishment” and does not
give rise to a constitutional violation.

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Farmer, 511 U.S. at 838.

Whether an official had requisite knowledge is a question of fact
that may be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence.

Id. at 842.

Here, the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff repeatedly warned
Warden Severson (via inmate grievances) and correctional officer
Reineck of the spoken physical threats of violence against him by
other inmates, including Solider and Terry, but defendants failed
to

take

any

protective

physically assaulted.

measures

until

after

Plaintiff

was

These allegations are sufficient to state

a claim.

Defendants argue that the grievances attached to the

Complaint

show

that

Severson

granted

Plaintiff’s

October

grievance and directed that he be moved from the cell.

10

Severson

denied the October 15 grievance because Plaintiff had already been
moved.

Thus,

dismissed.

Defendant

Severson

argues

that

he

should

be

Even if the grievances attached to the Complaint that

warned Severson about the threats of physical violence are only
dated after the attack occurred, Plaintiff was not required to
attach all grievances to his Complaint.

Moreover, the Complaint

alleges that Plaintiff warned both Severson and Reineck about the
threats of physical violence prior to the attacks. Additionally,
the Complaint alleges that officer Reineck was standing outside of
Plaintiff’s cell while the attack occurred and did nothing to stop
the attack.

Thus, the claim proceeds against defendants Severson

and Reineck.

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2. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Condition
The Complaint also alleges that Plaintiff was denied or
delayed medical care for his wounds stemming from the second
attack.

“[D]eliberate indifference to [the] serious medical needs

of

prisoner

[a]

[

]

constitutes

the

unnecessary

and

wanton

infliction of pain . . . proscribed by the Eighth Amendment.”
Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003)(quoting
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)); Campbell v. Sikes,
169

F.3d

1353

(11th

Cir.

1999).

A

plaintiff

alleging

a

constitutional deliberate indifference claim “must sufficiently
allege

‘both

Defendant

an

acted

objectively
with

serious

deliberate

medical

indifference

need
to

and
that

that

a

need.’”

Harper v. Lawrence County, Ala., 592 F.3d. 1227, 1233 (11th Cir.
2010)(quoting Burnette v. Taylor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir.
2008)(footnote omitted)).

“[A] serious medical need is considered

‘one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment
or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily
recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.’”

Farrow v.

West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Hill v. Dekalb
Reg’l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994)).

In

either situation, “the medical need must be ‘one that, if left
unattended, pos[es] a substantial risk of serious harm.”
(citing Taylor, 221 F.3d at 1258)(alteration in original).

Id.
To

establish “deliberate indifference” the plaintiff must establish
that Defendant “(1) had sufficient knowledge of a risk of serious
- 9 -

harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and, (3) acted with more than
gross negligence.”

Harper, 592 F.3d at 1233 (citations omitted).

Further, the plaintiff must show that it was the “Defendant’s
conduct” that “caused [Plaintiff’s] injuries.”

Id.

To establish “sufficient knowledge,” a Defendant “‘must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [ ] must also draw
the inference.’” Id. (quoting Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265, 1272
(11th Cir. 2005)).

“[I]mputed or collective knowledge cannot

serve as the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference. Each
individual Defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of
what that person knows.”
Further,

a

Burnette, 533 F.3d at 1331.

plaintiff

must

allege

that

the

defendant

disregarded the risk of serious harm to the plaintiff with conduct
that rises beyond negligence.

Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268

F.3d 1014, 1027 (11th Cir. 2001).

“Deliberate indifference” can

include “the delay of treatment for obviously serious conditions
where it is apparent that delay would detrimentally exacerbate the
medical problem, the delay does seriously exacerbate the medical
problem, and the delay is medically unjustified.”

Taylor v.

Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1259-60 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation
omitted).

Whether the delay was tolerable depends on the nature

of the medical need and the reason for the delay.
F.3d at 1247.

- 10 -

Farrow, 320

Defendants argue that the Court should find the Complaint
fails to state a claim because that the exhibits attached thereto
show that Plaintiff received medical care after the second attack.
Motion at 2 (citing “Doc. 1-3”, Doc. #1, ¶ 26).
The Court is not persuaded by defendants’ argument.
Complaint

alleges

that

defendant

Reineck

refused

Plaintiff from the cell after the violent attack.
6.

to

The

remove

Complaint at

A reasonable inference from this allegation is that Reineck

failed to escort, or call an escort, for Plaintiff to medical after
he was hit in the head with a food tray, bit, and stabbed with a
piece

of

metal.
was

Plaintiff

Additionally,
by

seen

the

requested to see medical.
alleges

an

Eighth

the

medical
Id.

Amendment

Complaint

department

alleges
only

that

after

he

Thus, the Complaint plausibly
claim

stemming

from

deliberate

indifference to a serious medical condition stemming from the delay
in treatment.
C. Eleventh Amendment Immunity Bars Certain Monetary Damages
Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against defendants in their
individual

and

official

capacities.

See

Complaint

at

9.

Defendants argue that all claims for monetary damages against them
in their official capacities are precluded by Eleventh Amendment
immunity.
It

is

Motion at 6.
well

established

that

a

suit

against

a

defendant

governmental officer in his official capacity is the same as suit
against the entity that employs the officer.
- 11 -

See McMillian v.

Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997); Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165 (1985).

In Zatler v. Wainwright, the Eleventh

Circuit noted:
It is clear that Congress did not intend to
abrogate a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
in section 1983 damage suits.
Furthermore,
after reviewing specific provisions of the
Florida Statutes, we recently concluded that
Florida's limited waiver of sovereign immunity
was not intended to encompass section 1983
suits for damages.
802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted).
Accordingly, in Zatler, the court found that the Secretary of the
Florida Department of Corrections was immune from suit in his
official

capacity.

Id.

Consequently,

the

Court

will

grant

defendants' motion insofar as Plaintiff seeks monetary damages
against any of the defendants in their official capacities.
D.

Injunctive and Declaratory Relief is Moot

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief as a remedy.
assert

that

Plaintiff

a

has

request
been

argument is correct.

for

injunctive

transferred.

relief

Motion

at

is
6.

Defendants

moot

because

Defendants’

See McKinnon v. Talladega County, Ala., 745

F.2d 1360, 1362 (11th Cir. 1984)(“The general rule is that a
prisoner’s transfer or release from a jail moots his individual
claim for declaratory and injunctive relief.”)(citation omitted));
Cotterall v. Paul, 755 F.2d 777, 780 (11th Cir. 1985)(prisoner’s
individual claim for injunctive relief was moot and properly
dismissed, where prisoner had been transferred from county jail in

- 12 -

which unconstitutional conditions allegedly existed); Spears v.
Thigpen, 846 F.2d 1237, 1328 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[A]n inmate’s claim
for injunctive and declaratory relief in a section 1983 action
fails to present a case or controversy once the inmate has been
transferred); Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir.
1985)(“[A]n inmate’s claim for injunctive and declaratory relief
in a section 1983 action fails to present a case or controversy
once the inmate has been transferred.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

request for injunctive and declaratory relief is dismissed as moot.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.

The Clerk shall correct defendant “Redneck” to Reineck.

2. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted in part and
otherwise denied as set forth above.
3.

Defendants shall file an answer within twenty-one (21)

days from the date on this Opinion and Order.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of December, 2014.

SA: alr
Copies: All Parties of Record

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11th

day