Foreman v. Santeiro
Filing
46
OPINION AND ORDER granted in part and denied in part re: 32 MOTION to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint . All claims arising from Plaintiff's placement in a confinement cell after he suicide attempt are dismissed without prejudic e for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; Plaintiff's claims for compensatory and punitive damages are dismissed without prejudice under 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e); and Defendant Santeiro shall file an answer to Plaintiff's remaining claim within twenty-one (21) days from the date on this Order. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 8/28/2014. (SLU)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
MARTY LAMONE FOREMAN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:13-cv-735-FtM-38CM
JOSE SANTEIRO,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER1
This matter comes before the Court on the following:
Defendant Jose Santeiro’s (“Defendant's”) Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 32, filed March 17, 2014); and
Plaintiff Marty LaMone Foreman’s (“Plaintiff’s”) Response in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 39, filed
April 21, 2014).
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, initiated this action as a prisoner at the Everglades
Correctional Institution in Miami, Florida by filing a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). In his complaint, Plaintiff sues psychiatric doctor Jose Santeiro
based upon Defendant Santeiro’s alleged indifference to Plaintiff's serious mental health
needs. Id. Defendant seeks dismissal of the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 32 at 1). Plaintiff has filed a response in
opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss (Doc. 39), and it is now ripe for review. For
1
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the reasons set forth in this Opinion and Order, Defendant's motion is granted in part and
denied in part. In addition, Plaintiff's claims for compensatory and punitive damages are
dismissed under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).
I.
Pleadings
A.
Complaint
The facts, as alleged in Plaintiff's complaint and its attachments, surround events
that occurred at the Desoto Correctional Institution Annex in Arcadia, Florida on April 9,
2013. The facts are alleged as follows:
On April 9, 2013, Plaintiff was ordered placed into administrative confinement
pending disciplinary charges (Doc. 1 at 5). While being transported to administrative
confinement, Plaintiff declared a psychological emergency and informed his attending
nurses that he would commit suicide as soon as he was freed from his hand restraints.
Id. Nurse Thomas, who is not a defendant in this case, questioned Plaintiff in order to
fill out a “self-harm threat admission form.” Id. Nurse Wilson, who is not a defendant in
this case, telephoned Defendant Santeiro, the on-call mental health practitioner, to report
Plaintiff's threat. Id. Thereafter, Nurse Wilson stated that Defendant told her not to place
Plaintiff on Self-Harm Observation Status (“SHOS”) or extend mental health treatment.
Id. at 6.
Rather, Nurse Wilson was instructed “to allow security (DOC officials,
correctional) to do as they pleased with the plaintiff instead.” Id.
Plaintiff was escorted to the Desoto Annex’s confinement building where his hand
restraints were removed, and he was ordered to remove his clothing in preparation for a
strip search (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff removed his pants and immediately attempted to hang
himself by tying one end of the pants to the shower’s cell door and the other end around
his neck. Id. “[S]ecurity immediately responded by one officer grabbing a hold onto the
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end of the pants leg that was tied around the bars and began pulling it up to create slack
in the pants to prevent the plaintiff from being able to hang from the bars any further[.]”
Id. Another officer used chemical agents to subdue Plaintiff until he “ceased his selfharming behavior and again submitted to hand restraints.” Id. at 9.
Plaintiff was given a decontamination shower and was again met by Nurse Wilson
who conducted a post use-of-force medical examination (Doc. 1 at 9). Plaintiff told Nurse
Wilson that he would attempt suicide again as soon as his hand restraints were removed.
Id. Nurse Wilson re-contacted Defendant who instructed Nurse Wilson not to admit
Plaintiff to the SHOS or extend mental health treatment, but to allow security to deal with
him instead. Id.
Plaintiff was taken to the confinement building and placed into a property restriction
cell for 72 hours that contained no bedding or clothing except for Plaintiff's boxer shorts
(Doc. 1 at 9-10). Plaintiff asserts that the cell was very cold because the window was
open, and Plaintiff became sick as a result of the temperature and suffered mental and
emotional distress. Id.
Plaintiff asserts that had Defendant examined his medical records when Nurse
Wilson called him, he would have seen that he (Plaintiff) has an “extensive mental health
history” and had attempted suicide “numerous” times prior to the April 9, 2013 incident
and had been admitted into the Florida Department of Corrections Crisis Stabilization Unit
and Trauma Care Unit to undergo “extensive mental health observation and treatment.”
(Doc. 1 at 10).
Plaintiff filed numerous grievances regarding the occurrences on April 9, 2013
which he attached to his complaint (Doc. 1-1; Doc. 1-2; Doc. 1-3; Doc. 1-4; Doc. 1-5; Doc.
1-6; Doc. 1-7). In response to his April 17, 2013 grievance, Plaintiff was informed that
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“Dr. Santeiro was called two (2) times less than an hour apart and [] gave orders for
[Plaintiff] to remain in confinement.” (Doc. 1-2 at 2). In his April 23, 2013 grievance,
Plaintiff complained of the conditions in his property restriction cell (Doc. 1-3).
In
response, it was noted that, “on April 9, 2013, force was used on inmate Foreman to
prevent an attempt of self-harm by hanging himself. Inmate was seen by medical who
deemed him to be a security issue. Inmate Foreman was given a mattress. However,
he was placed on property restriction due to the attempted self-harm.” Id.
In his May 21, 2013 and June 26, 2013 grievances, Plaintiff asserted that two
months prior to his suicide attempt, Defendant had referred him to a psychologist at
Charlotte Correctional Institute with a recommendation that he be placed on psychotropic
medication (Doc. 1-5 at 1). Plaintiff asserts that he refused to accept the medication
offered him at Charlotte Correctional (Doc. 1-6 at 2). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant had
previously stated that Plaintiff had various mental illnesses and should not be housed at
DeSoto Correctional Institution. Id. Both grievances were returned without action as
improperly filed (Doc. 1-5 at 2; Doc. 1-6 at 3). Plaintiff repeated his allegations against
Defendant in another June 26, 2013 grievance which was denied because the warden
could not corroborate Plaintiff's allegations (Doc. 1-7 at 2-4).
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious medical
needs by refusing to immediately treat his mental illness and by failing to place him on
suicide watch to prevent him from attempting self-harm (Doc. 1 at 5).
He seeks
compensatory and punitive damages of $230,000, a jury trial, and any additional relief
deemed just and proper. Id. at 7.
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B.
Motion to Dismiss
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint (Doc. 32). He asserts that
Plaintiff has failed to allege facts indicating that he was deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical condition. Id. at 1. Specifically, Defendant asserts that his decision to
handle Plaintiff as a security risk was a matter of medical judgment, that Plaintiff did not
have the desire or means to commit suicide, and that Plaintiff has alleged no injuries
resulting from Defendant's alleged failure to offer mental health treatment to Plaintiff after
his suicide attempt. Id. at 10-11.
II.
Standards of Review
A.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
Defendant's motion to dismiss is asserted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc. 32 at 1). Under this rule, dismissal of a claim is proper if
the plaintiff fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Id. When considering
a motion to dismiss, “all facts set forth in the plaintiff's complaint ‘are to be accepted as
true and the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto’.”
Alvarez v. Attorney General for Fla., 679 F.3d 1257, 1259 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting
Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000)). Further, this
Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations in the
complaint. Stephens v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir.
1990) ("On a motion to dismiss, the facts stated in [the] complaint and all reasonable
inferences therefrom are taken as true.").
Prior to Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), a court could dismiss a
complaint only if it is was clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that
could be proved consistent with the allegations. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46
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(1957). This language as it relates to the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, was expressly rejected
in Twombly wherein the Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff’s obligation to provide
the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and “a
formulaic recitation of the causes of action’s elements will not do. Factual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555.
The Supreme Court reinforced the Twombly standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-79 (2009) when it reiterated that a claim is insufficiently pleaded if it offers only
labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly.
First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the
allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause
of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice. . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure
from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era,
but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff
armed with nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a
motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint states a
plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals
observed, be a context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common
sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged-but it has not shown that the pleader is
entitled to relief.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79 (internal citations, quotations, and punctuation omitted). In the
case of a pro se action, the Court should construe the complaint more liberally than it
would pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980).
B.
Deliberate Indifference
Prisoners have the right “to receive medical treatment for illness and injuries, which
encompasses a right to psychiatric and mental health care, and a right to be protected
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from self-inflicted injuries, including suicide.” Cook ex rel. Estate of Tessier v. Sheriff of
Monroe County, Fla., 402 F.3d 1092, 1115 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Belcher v. City of
Foley, Ala., 30 F.3d 1390, 1396 (11th Cir. 1994)). To establish liability for a prisoner's
suicide, or attempted suicide, under § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the jail official
displayed “deliberate indifference” to the prisoner's taking of his own life or attempting to
do so. See Cook, 402 F.3d at 1115. “[D]eliberate indifference requires that the defendant
deliberately disregard ‘a strong likelihood rather than a mere possibility that the selfinfliction of harm will occur.’” Id. The mere opportunity for a prisoner to commit suicide,
without more, “is clearly insufficient to impose liability on those charged with the care of
prisoners.” Tittle v. Jefferson Cnty. Comm'n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994) (en
banc). To be deliberately indifferent to a strong likelihood that a prisoner will commit
suicide, the official must be subjectively aware that the combination of the prisoner's
suicidal tendencies and the feasibility of suicide in the context of the prisoner's
surroundings creates a strong likelihood that the prisoner will commit suicide. See Gish
v. Thomas, 516 F.3d 952, 954–55 (11th Cir. 2008).
The Eleventh Circuit recognizes a three-prong test to establish a prima facie case
of deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Plaintiff must show: (1) that he
has a serious medical need;2 (2) that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference
to that need; and (3) as with any other tort claim, that he suffered an injury from the
For the purposes of this motion to dismiss, the Court will assume, without deciding, that Plaintiff’s
alleged mental illness was a “serious medical need.” See Jacoby v. Baldwin County, Case No. 12-0197WS-M, 2013 WL 2285108 (S.D. Ala. May 22, 2013) (“The Court concedes that a mental illness is an
objectively serious medical need.”); Bozeman v. Orum, 199 F.Supp.2d 1216, 1232 (M.D. Ala. 2002)
(“Psychiatric needs can constitute serious medical needs[.]”).
2
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defendant’s wrongful conduct. Goebert v. Lee County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir.
2007) (citing Hale v. Tallapoosa County, 50 F.3d 1579, 1582 (11th Cir. 1995)).
III.
Analysis
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Santeiro was deliberately indifferent to his serious
mental health needs on two separate occasions.
First, he asserts that Defendant
showed deliberate indifference when he failed to have Plaintiff sent to a suicide watch cell
and provided with mental health treatment immediately after he declared a medical
emergency and threatened to commit suicide. Next, he asserts that Defendant was
deliberately indifferent to his serious mental health needs by failing to have Plaintiff sent
to a suicide watch cell and provided with mental health treatment immediately after his
suicide attempt (Doc. 39 at 7-8).
A.
Plaintiff has stated a plausible deliberate indifference claim regarding
Defendant’s reaction to his initial suicide threat
Plaintiff argues that Defendant Santeiro’s failure to order that he be sent to suicide
watch and provided immediate mental health treatment after his initial suicide threat
caused him (Plaintiff) to attempt suicide in full view of the officers at the facility (Doc. 1 at
9). The officers immediately subdued Plaintiff physically and with the use of chemical
agents. Id. Plaintiff alleges that the use of the chemical agents caused him “pain and
suffering.” Id.
As noted above, for a health care professional to be deliberately indifferent to a
strong likelihood that a prisoner will attempt suicide, the professional must be subjectively
aware that the combination of the prisoner's suicidal tendencies and the feasibility of
suicide in the context of the prisoner's surroundings creates a strong likelihood that the
prisoner will attempt self-harm. Gish v. Thomas, 516 F.3d at 954–55.
According to the
attachments to Plaintiff's complaint, Defendant had treated Plaintiff on prior occasions
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and had concluded that he had an “extensive psychological history.” (Doc. 1-5 at 1). The
Court will not speculate why (or if) Defendant did not order mental health treatment after
Plaintiff's first suicide threat or believed Plaintiff’s April 9, 2013 threats to be a security
issue rather than a mental health concern. Nor can the Court conclude, based solely
upon the pleadings before it, that Defendant’s determination that Plaintiff's behavior was
a security issue was based upon medical judgment. Finally, although Defendant argues
that Plaintiff had neither the intent nor the means to actually commit suicide (Doc. 32 at
11), this argument is appropriate in a motion for summary judgment, not in a motion to
dismiss where the Court must accept all of the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true.
At this stage of the proceedings, the Court cannot conclude, based solely on the
allegations in the complaint and its attachments, that Plaintiff has not stated a plausible
deliberate indifference claim against Defendant based upon his inaction immediately
following Plaintiff's initial suicide threat. Accordingly, Plaintiff's deliberate indifference
claim as it relates to the first incident on April 9, 2013 will be allowed to proceed.
However, for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff will not be allowed to recover
compensatory or punitive damages for Defendant’s alleged deliberate indifference.
B.
Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages arising from
the pain and suffering associated with Plaintiff's suicide attempt are
dismissed under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e)
No 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action “may be brought by a prisoner confined in a jail, prison,
or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody
without a prior showing of physical injury[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); Mitchell v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 294 F.3d 1309, 1312-13 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that “to avoid
dismissal under § 1997e(e), a prisoner's claims for emotional or mental injury must be
accompanied by allegations of physical injuries that are greater than de minimis”). The
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facts as alleged by Plaintiff in his complaint show that he was prevented from going
forward with his suicide attempt “immediately” by corrections officers, and that he suffered
no physical harm as a result thereof (Doc. 1 at 6). Plaintiff's formulaic allegations of pain
and suffering associated with the chemical agents used to subdue him after his suicide
attempt fail to satisfy this threshold § 1997e(e) requirement. Plaintiff alleges no physical
injury at all, much less injury that is more than de minimis, as a result of the chemical
agent application. See Beecher v. Jones, Case No. 3:08cv416/MCR/EMT, 2010 WL
5058555 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2010) (finding that prisoner who alleged no physical injury
arising from use of chemical agents failed to show requisite physical injury under §
1997e(e)); Palmer v. Walker, Case No. 2:09cv401, 2011 WL 836928, at *8 (M.D. Fla.
Mar. 9, 2011) (prisoner who suffered temporary eye irritation as the result of application
of chemical agents failed to show more than a de minimis physical injury under §
1997e(e)); Jennings v. Mitchell, 93 F. App'x 723, 725 (6th Cir. 2004) (prisoner who
suffered the discomfort of pepper spray had shown only de minimis injury, insufficient to
satisfy section 1997e(e)); Kirkland v. Everglades Correctional Inst., Case No. 12-22302CIV, 2014 WL 1333212, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 31, 2014) (temporary chemical burns and
minor respiratory problems from exposure to a chemical agent were only minor de
minimis injuries).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims for compensatory and punitive damages related to
his suicide threat and suicide attempt are dismissed. However, the Eleventh Circuit has
concluded that § 1997e(e) does not bar suits by prisoners who have not alleged a physical
injury if they seek only nominal damages. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th
Cir. 2003); Nix v. Carter, Case No. 5:10–cv–256 (CAR), 2013 WL 432566, at *2 (M.D.
Ga. Feb. 1, 2013) (“Nominal damages are appropriate if a plaintiff establishes a violation
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of a fundamental constitutional right, even if he cannot prove actual injury sufficient to
entitle him to compensatory damages.”) (citing Hughes, 350 F.3d at 1162).
Nominal damages do not generally exceed one dollar.
Therefore, the Court
cannot construe Plaintiff's $230,000 damages requests as a request for nominal
damages.
Liberally construed, however, Plaintiff's complaint may state a claim for
nominal damages because he asked for “[a]ny additional relief this court deems just,
proper, and equitable” (Doc. 1 at 7). Therefore, Plaintiff may seek token damages on
this claim. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266–67 (1978) (holding if plaintiffs were
entitled to nominal damages for the mere violation, the damages should not exceed one
dollar); Kyle v. Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[N]ominal damages, of
which $1 is the norm, are an appropriate means of vindicating rights whose deprivation
has not caused actual, provable injury.”); Harrison v. Myers, Case No. 10–0566–KD–N,
2011 WL 3204372, at *7 (S.D. Ala. July 13, 2011) (prisoner's request of $2,500 was not
for nominal damages inasmuch as nominal damages implies a mere token or trifling).
C.
Plaintiff’s claims arising from his confinement on property restriction
are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted
Plaintiff claims that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to his serious mental
health needs by failing to have him sent to a suicide watch cell and provided with mental
health treatment immediately following his suicide attempt (Doc. 39 at 8).
Plaintiff
asserts that he suffered harm as a result of Defendant's alleged failure because the
confinement unit to which he was sent was cold, unpleasant, and caused him to become
ill due to its temperature (Doc. 1 at 10).
Plaintiff states that he was being escorted to administrative confinement for a
disciplinary charge at the time he made his initial suicide threat (Doc. 1 at 5). After his
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suicide attempt, Plaintiff was “deemed to be a security issue[,]” kept on administrative
confinement, and placed on property restriction because of his attempt at self-harm (Doc.
1-3 at 1). Plaintiff admits that it was Captain Ellis, not Defendant, who ordered that he
be placed in a strip cell on property restriction after his suicide attempt. Id. Plaintiff does
not allege that Defendant is responsible for the conditions in, or the temperature of, the
prison’s confinement cells (Doc. 39 at 11).
Presumably then, Plaintiff attempts to
attribute liability to Defendant because he did not demand that Captain Ellis remove
Plaintiff from administrative confinement as a result of his suicidal behavior.
Plaintiff's second deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Santeiro fails on
the third prong of the Eleventh Circuit’s deliberate indifference test because Plaintiff
cannot show that he suffered any injury caused by Defendant's wrongful conduct. See
Goebert, 510 F.3d at 1326. Moreover, Plaintiff has not stated any constitutional claim
resulting from his disciplinary confinement. That Plaintiff would have preferred to be
placed on suicide watch where “inmates are provided with a nylon made shroud to wear
to cover the upper and mid part of their torso, which also keep them warm” is clear (Doc
39 at 7). However, the constitution does not guarantee a prisoner comfortable prisons.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981). Plaintiff was on disciplinary confinement
for only 72 hours; a confinement that was ordered prior to Plaintiff's suicidal activity (Doc.
39 at 7). The property restriction was ordered as a result of Plaintiff's attempt at selfharm. A short-term placement in a confinement cell such as the one alleged by Plaintiff
does not constitute an atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the
ordinary incidents of prison life. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995)
(disciplinary confinement of inmates does not implicate constitutional liberty interests);
Brown v. Parnell, Case No. 5:09-CV–P159–R, 2010 WL 1418735, at *5 (W.D. Ky. April
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7, 2010) (prisoner did not allege a cognizable § 1983 claim against them where jail
officials feared for prisoner's safety and placed him in isolation).
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff asserts that his mental health treatment was
unconstitutionally delayed because Defendant did not immediately treat him, the claim
fails. “[D]elay in medical treatment must be interpreted in the context of the seriousness
of the medical need, deciding whether the delay worsened the medical condition, and
considering the reason for delay.” Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1189
(11th Cir. 1994), abrogated on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
Although Plaintiff asserts that he never received mental health treatment from Defendant
Santeiro (Doc. 39 at 9), it is clear in his complaint that he received mental health treatment
from someone soon after his suicide attempt. Plaintiff complained in a grievance that he
was placed on self-harm observation status as early as May 24, 2014 (Doc. 1-6 at 1). In
addition, Plaintiff filed his June 26, 2013 grievance from the crisis stabilization unit at the
South Florida Reception Center where he was undergoing mental health treatment (Doc.
1-6 at 2). As a prisoner, Plaintiff is not entitled to the mental health treatment of his
choice. See Hamm v. Dekalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Although
Hamm may have desired different modes of treatment, the care the jail provided did not
amount to deliberate indifference.”); Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988)
(“Although the Constitution does require that prisoners be provided with a certain
minimum level of medical treatment, it does not guarantee to a prisoner the treatment of
his choice.”).
Plaintiff has not alleged that he has not received mental health treatment or that
his mental health condition was worsened by any action of Defendant Santeiro; thus,
Plaintiff's claim arising from his confinement after his suicide attempt are dismissed.
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IV.
Conclusion
Construing all allegations in the complaint in Plaintiff's favor, Defendant Santeiro’s
motion to dismiss is granted as to Plaintiff's claims arising from the conditions in his
confinement cell. Fed. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff's claims for compensatory and
punitive damages are dismissed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) because Plaintiff has
not alleged more than a de minimis physical injury.
Plaintiff's claim that Defendant
Santeiro failed to respond to Plaintiff's initial suicide threat will be allowed to proceed, but
he may recover nominal damages only.
Accordingly, it is now ORDERED.
1.
The Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Santeiro (Doc. 32) is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part;
2.
All claims arising from Plaintiff's placement in a confinement cell after his
suicide attempt are dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted;
3.
Plaintiff's claims for compensatory and punitive damages are dismissed
without prejudice under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e); and
4.
Defendant Santeiro shall file an answer to Plaintiff's remaining claim within
TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS from the date on this Order.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 28th day of August, 2014.
SA: OrlP-4 8/28/14
Copies: Marty LaMone Foreman
Counsel of record
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