Santiago Manuel A. v. Jamison et al

Filing 269

OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and otherwise denying as moot 148 Brian Botts' motion to dismiss; granting in part and otherwise denying as moot 149 Edison State College's motion to dismiss; granting 150 Dale Jamison's moti on to dismiss; granting in part and otherwise denying as moot 151 School Board of Lee County's motion to dismiss. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law caus es of action. Therefore, Counts V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XIV, and XV are dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate all remaining motions and deadlines as moot, and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 4/8/2016. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
SANTIAGO MANUEL A.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:13-cv-781-FtM-29CM

DALE JAMISON, BRIAN BOTTS,
Dr.,
School
Principal
(Edison
Collegiate
High
School),
EDISON
STATE
COLLEGE, Lee Campus, and
SCHOOL BOARD OF LEE COUNTY,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Brian Botts'
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #148), defendant Edison State College’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #149), defendant Dale Jamison’s Motion to
Dismiss (Doc. #150), and defendant School Board of Lee County’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #151) filed on May 18, 2015.

Plaintiff

filed Responses to each of the motions on June 1, 2015.

(Docs.

## 153-156.)
I.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

This obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not

do.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(citation omitted).

To survive dismissal, the factual allegations

must be “plausible” and “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.”

Id. at 555.

See also Edwards v.

Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010).
“more

than

an

accusation.”

unadorned,

Ashcroft

v.

This requires

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
Iqbal,

556

U.S.

662,

678

(2009)

(citations omitted).
II.
The

Second

Amended

Complaint

(Doc.

#146)

alleges

that

plaintiff Manuel A. Santiago (plaintiff or Santiago) was born in
Cuba and is a naturalized citizen residing in Lee County, Florida.
Defendant Dr. Brian Botts (Botts) is the Principal at Edison
Collegiate High School (Edison High), a Charter School operated by
Edison State College (Edison College).

The High School is managed

and operates under the authority of the Lee County School Board
(School Board).

Defendant Dale Jamison (Jamison) is a Social

Studies Teacher at Edison High.
Plaintiff alleges that his son was disciplined at school for
conduct during Jamison’s class.

On or about April 26, 2012,

plaintiff met with Botts and Jamison regarding the disciplinary
actions.

As a result of the meeting, plaintiff’s son’s 10 days

out of school suspension for leaving class was reduced to 2 days
of lunch time detention; however, Santiago’s son was also excluded

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from

participation

in

Induction Ceremony.

the

National

Honor

Society

Inaugural

After the meeting, plaintiff contacted the

Director of Grand and Liaison Charter Schools for the School
District, who declined to conduct an investigation.

Plaintiff

also wrote a letter to the President of Edison College, who sought
statements from other unnamed students in Jamison’s class prior to
meeting with plaintiff.

Copies of the original statements were

not provided to Santiago so he could verify the belief that one of
the students who made a statement was not even present at the time
of the incident.

On May 17, 2012, the President e-mailed Botts

to support his decision to not comply with plaintiff’s public
records requests.
Plaintiff alleges that he was deprived of the knowledge of
mentoring

opportunities

for

his

son

and

incurred

expenses, late fees, and other costs for tests.
alleges

that

he

has

suffered

health

unnecessary

Plaintiff also

consequences,

a

loss

of

enjoyment of life, severe emotional distress, mental anguish, and
financial loss as a result of the treatment of his son.

Plaintiff

states that he exhausted his remedies, and received no responses
from School Board member Jeanne S. Dozier, District Superintendent
of Schools Dr. Nancy Graham, or members of the Board of Trustees
for Edison College before finally filing suit.

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III. Motions to Dismiss - Generally
In

the

Second

Amended

Complaint

(Doc.

#146),

plaintiff

addressed the shotgun pleading issue by deleting the incorporation
and re-incorporation of all counts into each subsequent count.

As

a result, none of the Counts reference or incorporate any of the
factual allegations, and each count includes only some repetitive
facts.

That being said, plaintiff otherwise articulates a short

and plaintiff statement as to his claims, if one considers the
unincorporated general allegations, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2),
and his pro se status.

Therefore, the motions to dismiss will be

denied on this basis.
IV.
(1)

Motions to Dismiss - Specific Counts

Counts I and III - 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In Count I, plaintiff alleges that Jamison was not engaged in
a discretionary function and clearly violated and interfered with
a

well-established

education.

right

of

his

son

to

a

beneficial

public

Plaintiff alleges that Jamison, acting under color of

state law, abused his authority by refusing to close the window
blinds in the classroom when asked to by plaintiff’s son, and that
it was for racially motivated reasons.

Plaintiff further alleges

that Jamison was not eligible to teach because he is a convicted
felon,

and

therefore

is

not

entitled

to

qualified

immunity.

Plaintiff asserts damages as a result of his son’s deprivation of
civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including past and future

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medical expenses, loss of enjoyment of life, emotional distress,
mental anguish, and financial loss.
In Count III, plaintiff alleges that Botts exceeded his
authority under the School Board’s Code of Conduct to deprive his
son of equal access to educational programs, including scheduled
classes, for racially motivated reasons.

Plaintiff alleges that

imposing an unjustified 10 days of suspension on his son without
notifying plaintiff in violation of the Code of Conduct deprived
Santiago of his civil rights causing damage, including past and
future medical expenses, loss of enjoyment of life, emotional
distress, mental anguish, and financial loss.
(a)

Plaintiff’s Standing

Standing is a “threshold jurisdictional question which must
be addressed prior to and independent of the merits of a party’s
claims.”

Dimaio v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 520 F.3d 1299, 1301

(11th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
to

have

suffered

an

injury

in

Standing requires plaintiff

fact,

which

is

concrete

and

particularized and actual or imminent; with a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of; and it must be
likely, not merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.
555, 560-561 (1992).

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

To show an “injury in fact”, plaintiff must

allege an imminent injury, or one that is real and immediate, or
a future injury that is likely to occur but is not too speculative.

- 5 -

31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1265 (11th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff could have standing on behalf of another if he falls
within the “zone of interests protected by the law invoked”, and
his “injuries are proximately caused by violations of the statute.”
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1377, 1388 & 1390 (2014).
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “[e]very person who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured. . . .”

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section “1983 ‘is

not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a
method

for

vindicating

federal

rights

elsewhere

conferred.’”

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144, n.3 (1979)).

“The first inquiry in

any § 1983 suit, therefore, is whether the plaintiff has been
deprived of a right ‘secured by the Constitution and laws.’”
Baker, 443 U.S. at 140 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

Plaintiff

alleges discrimination against his son based on national origin as
the basis for his § 1983 equal protection claim.
Plaintiff

alleges

that

Jamison

singled

out

and

sent

plaintiff’s son to the Principal’s Office because he is Hispanic,
and that the Principal called his son a troublemaker and imposed

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disciplinary measures that had a disparate impact on his son and
deprived his son of a right to an education and access to certain
benefits.
support

a

None of the allegations in the Second Amended Complaint
claim

that

plaintiff’s

constitutional

rights

were

violated.
Additionally, to state a cognizable claim, plaintiff must
show a threat of immediate or future injury to himself.

Once

plaintiff’s son graduated for high school, plaintiff’s claims
against the School Board became moot because plaintiff could not
or would not have any continuing interest in the School Board’s
actions, unless he has other children in the school district, which
is not alleged in this case.

Doremus v. Bd. of Ed. of Borough of

Hawthorne, 342 U.S. 429, 433 (1952).

“Simply stated, a case is

moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties
lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.”

Powell v.

McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969); Steele v. Van Buren Pub. Sch.
Dist., 845 F.2d 1492, 1495 (8th Cir. 1988).

Merely asserting

incalculable emotional and physical damages from the stress of
observing a constitutional violation is insufficient.

The motions

to dismiss will be granted as to defendants Jamison and Botts as
to Counts I and III for lack of standing.
(b)

Qualified Immunity

“Qualified immunity protects government actors performing
discretionary

functions

from

being

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sued

in

their

individual

capacities.”
2003).

Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069, 1077 (11th Cir.

It offers complete protection so long as the government

actor’s “conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

To

receive qualified immunity, a government official first must prove
that he was acting within his discretionary authority.”
v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357 (11th Cir. 2003).

Cottone

A discretionary

function is a legitimate job-related function that is within the
government employee’s power to execute.
v.

Harland,

370

F.3d

1252,

1265

Holloman ex rel. Holloman

(11th

Cir.

2004).

Once

established, the burden then shifts to plaintiff to show that
defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity.

To do so,

plaintiff must show that defendant violated a constitutional right
that was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.
Id. at 1264 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s allegations relate to conduct directed toward his
son, and there are no allegations that these or other acts were
committed against plaintiff.

Further, there are no allegations

that actions by Jamison or Botts as the Principal were anything
outside of the normal, permissible, discretionary functions of a
teacher

1

and

principal,

and

no

1

allegations

that

a

clearly

Plaintiff argues that Jamison could not have been acting
within his discretionary function because he was improperly hired

- 8 -

established

constitutional

right

of

plaintiff

was

violated.

Therefore, even if plaintiff could establish standing, the Court
finds that defendants Jamison and Botts are entitled to qualified
immunity as to Counts I and III.
(2)

Title VI Claims - Counts II, IV, VII, XII

Under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Section 601).
be

brought

under

discrimination.

this

A private cause of action may

authority

only

for

intentional

To establish liability, plaintiff must show that

defendants are recipients of federal financial assistance, and
that

defendants

intentionally

excluded

plaintiff

from

participation in benefits or to benefits 2 on the basis of national
origin.

Alexander

v.

Sandoval,

532

U.S.

275,

280

(2001).

“Discriminatory intent may be established by evidence of such

in the first place. Even if Jamison should not have been hired,
discipline in the classroom is within the discretionary function
of a teacher. See, e.g., Peterson v. Baker, 504 F.3d 1331, 1337
(11th Cir. 2007) (use of force to block middle school student from
leaving classroom was not obviously excessive); Holloman, 370 F.3d
at 1267 (maintaining decorum in the classroom a discretionary
function).
2

See also 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b) (specific discriminatory
actions prohibited).

- 9 -

factors

as

discriminatory

substantial
official

disparate
actions,

impact,

procedural

a
and

history

of

substantive

departures from the norms generally followed by the decisionmaker.”

Elston v. Talladega Cty. Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394,

1406 (11th Cir. 1993).

No private cause of action exists under

Section 601 to enforce regulations having a disparate impact.

Id.

at 285.
(a)

Individual Defendants

In Counts II and IV, plaintiff asserts claims against Jamison
and Botts under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because
Edison High receives federal funding.

Plaintiff alleges that

Jamison, as a teacher, has access or control of school funds, and
that Botts as school principal was the one who applied for federal
grants, and received, planned, and monitored Edison High’s budget.
Even liberally construed, the Second Amended Complaint does
not show that Jamison and/or Botts were the direct recipients of
the federal funding, only that they are individuals who benefited
from the funds, and this is insufficient for liability.

Shotz v.

City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161, 1169-1170 (11th Cir.
2003).

Further, nothing supports plaintiff’s standing to assert

a violation of Title VI for the deprivation of access to programs
or activities by his son on the basis of his son’s national origin.
The motions to dismiss will be granted, with prejudice, as to the
individual defendants as to Counts II and IV.

- 10 -

(b)

Entity Defendants

In Counts VII and XII, plaintiff asserts the same Title VI
claims against
defendants

Edison

being

College

recipients

and
of

the

School

federal

Board

based

assistance

and

on
the

“intentional discriminatory actions” that occurred at Edison High.
(Doc. #146, ¶¶ 89, 122.)
that

Edison

College

More specifically, plaintiff alleges

was

deliberately

indifferent

to

the

discriminatory practices of Edison High, and Edison College knew
about past discriminatory disciplinary sanctions “against less
disadvantaged members of the protected class.”
Plaintiff

asserts

that

Edison

College

(Id., ¶¶ 90, 93.)

was

aware

that

the

disciplinary practices of Edison High had a disparate impact on
minority groups.

(Id., ¶ 91.)

Plaintiff alleges that Edison

College’s actions were intentional, and had a disproportionate
effect on individuals of a specific race or national origin.
¶ 94.)

(Id.

Plaintiff alleges that Edison College receives financial

assistance through federal grants, and is accountable for the
violations of its employees.

(Id., ¶ 15.)

Plaintiff also alleges

that Edison College sets and implements the policies and practices
of Edison High.

(Id., ¶ 14.)

As to the School Board, plaintiff alleges that School Board
member

Dozier

and

District

Superintendent

Dr.

plaintiff and acted with deliberate indifference.

Graham

ignored

(Id., ¶ 123.)

Plaintiff alleges that the School Board intentionally violated

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Title

VI

after

deliberately

failing

to

monitor

and/or

to

investigate the violations at Edison High despite timely notice.
(Id., ¶ 124.)

Plaintiff alleges that the School Board’s actions

were intentional, and had a disproportionate effect on individuals
of a specific race or national origin.
alleges

that

the

School

Board

(Id. ¶ 125.)

receives

financial

Plaintiff
assistance

through federal grants, and is accountable for violations of Title
VI by charter schools in its district.

(Doc. #146, ¶ 17.)

Plaintiff also alleges that the School Board monitors and evaluates
charter schools, and their adherence to applicable statutes and
regulations.

(Id., ¶ 16.)

Even if a plausible claim is stated, the Court finds that
plaintiff has not alleged facts which establish his standing to
assert the Title VI claim against either defendant.

Plaintiff

does not allege a substantial disparate impact upon him as a
parent, or that intentional acts of discrimination were directed
at him, or prevented him from partaking in benefits subsidized by
federal assistance.

Therefore the motion to dismiss will be

granted as to Edison College and the School Board as to the Title
VI claims in Counts VII and XII.
(3)

State Law Claims

The remaining counts (Counts V, VI, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII,
XIV, XV) set forth state law claims against various defendants.
These claims are only in federal court because of the supplemental

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jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

Now that the Court has

granted the motions to dismiss as to the federal claims, the Court
will decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state law
claims.

28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(2), (3).

All the federal question

counts have been dismissed, and the remaining counts are entirely
state law claims concerning the state educational system and its
contracts and procedures.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d), the

period of limitations for the state law claims being dismissed is
tolled while the claims were pending in federal court and for 30
days after their dismissal, unless Florida law provides for a
longer tolling period.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. Defendant Brian Botts' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #148) is
GRANTED as to Counts III and IV, and otherwise DENIED as
moot.
2. Defendant Edison State College’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
#149) is GRANTED as to Count VII and otherwise DENIED as
moot.
3. Defendant Dale Jamison’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #150) is
GRANTED as to Counts I and II.
4. Defendant School Board of Lee County’s Motion to Dismiss
(Doc. #151) is GRANTED as to Count XII and otherwise DENIED
as moot.

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5. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Court declines to
exercise

supplemental

jurisdiction

state law causes of action.
IX,

X,

XI,

XIII,

XIV,

over

the

remaining

Therefore, Counts V, VI, VIII,

and

XV

are

dismissed

without

prejudice.
6. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, terminate all
remaining motions and deadlines as moot, and close the
case.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
April, 2016.

Copies:
Plaintiff
Counsel of Record

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8th

day of