Moore v. Crews et al

Filing 6

ORDER OF DISMISSAL denying 2 Motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis/affidavit of indigency; dismissing complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 2/4/2014. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
STACEY DEON MOORE
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No: 2:14-cv-57-FtM-29DNF

MICHAEL D. CREWS and THOMAS
REID,
Defendants.
/
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This matter comes before the Court upon periodic review of
the file.

Stacey Deon Moore (“Plaintiff”), a prisoner currently

incarcerated at the Charlotte Correctional Institution in Punta
Gorda, Florida, initiated this action by filing a civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1, filed January 30,
2014).

Plaintiff has also filed a motion to proceed in forma

pauperis (Doc. 2).
Because Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the
Court must review Plaintiff's complaint to determine whether it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

In

essence, § 1915(e)(2) is a screening process to be applied sua
sponte and at any time during the proceedings.

For the reasons set forth in this Order, Plaintiff's Complaint
is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
I.

Complaint

The

facts

underlying

Plaintiff's

claims

are

alleged

as

follows:
On October 30, 2013, “an isolated incident occurred inside of
G-Dorm wing 3 that required immediate staff assistance.” (Doc. 1
at 8).

The incident was quickly stabilized, and the injured were

provided with medical assistance, but security failed to return to
normal operations. Id. at 8-9.

Accordingly, the entire G-Dorm

population was on lockdown status for seventy-two hours. Id. at 9.
Plaintiff asserts that this lockdown was in violation of Florida
Administrative Code Chapter 33-602.206.

Id.

Plaintiff filed grievances regarding the incident, but the
grievances were denied (Doc. 1-1).

Plaintiff was informed by the

warden that “[a]s a result of the incident on 10/30/13, the
administration deemed it necessary to restrict the movement of
inmates who were housed in G-Dorm to ensure the safety of staff
and inmates.” (Doc. 1-1 at 8).
Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the lockdown, he has
“suffered from cruel and unusual punishment without due process of
law or authority in violation of the United States Constitution.”
(Doc. 1 at 9).

As relief, he seeks a declaration that his
- 2 -

constitutional

rights

have

been

violated;

a

preliminary

and

permanent injunction forbidding future unlawful acts; and monetary
damages. Id. at 10.
II.

Legal Standards

A federal district court is required to review a civil
complaint filed in forma pauperis and to dismiss any such complaint
that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

The mandatory language

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 applies to all proceedings in forma pauperis.
Section 1915 provides:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
thereof, that may have been paid, the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that(A)

the allegation of poverty is untrue;
or

(B) the action or appeal(i)

is
frivolous
malicious;

or

(ii)

fails to state a claim on
which
relief
may
be
granted; or

(iii)

seeks
monetary
relief
against a defendant who
is
immune
from
such
relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A

complaint

may

be

dismissed

as

frivolous

under

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.
- 3 -

Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

A claim is

frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are
immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly
does not exist. Id. at 327.

In making the above determinations,

all factual allegations in the complaint must be viewed as true.
Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).

Moreover,

the Court must read the plaintiff’s pro se allegations in a liberal
fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
III. Analysis
To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that:
(1) a violation of a specific constitutional right or federal
statutory provision; (2) was committed by a person acting under
color of state law. Doe v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, Fla., 604
F.3d 1248, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010).

Construing Plaintiff's claims

in a liberal fashion, the Court determines that he seeks damages
and injunctive relief from the defendants because he was denied
due process of law prior to being placed on lockdown status for
seventy-two hours (Doc. 1 at 8-9).
Liberally construing Plaintiff's allegations in his favor and
granting him the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be derived
from the facts alleged, the Court concludes that the complaint
fails to state a federal due process claim upon which relief can
be granted.

For the defendants to have committed a due process

violation, Plaintiff must have been deprived of life, liberty, or
- 4 -

property. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).

In

determining whether a protected interest is implicated and the Due
Process Clause attaches in the prison context, the expectations
created by state regulations are not conclusive; rather, the Court
looks at the nature of the sanctions imposed. Sandin v. Conner,
515

U.S.

472,

483–84

(1995).

Sanctions

imposed

by

prison

officials on inmates do not implicate due process concerns unless
the sanctions impose an “atypical and significant hardship on the
inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.
at 484; Bass v. Perrin, 170 F.3d 1312, 1318 (11th Cir. 1999) (no
due process violation unless “a change in a prisoner's conditions
of confinement is so severe that it essentially exceeds the
sentence imposed by the court” or “the state has consistently given
a certain benefit to prisoners (for instance, via statute or
administrative
imposes

policy),

atypical

and

and

the

deprivation

significant

hardship

of

on

that

benefit

[Plaintiff]

in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” (quoting Sandin,
515 U.S. at 484)).
Here,

Plaintiff

has

not

alleged

the

infringement

protected life, liberty, or property interest.

of

a

Plaintiff does not

allege that he lost any gain time or was otherwise disciplined as
a result of the incident referenced in the complaint.

Rather,

Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of security concerns, his
entire

dormitory

was

placed

on

lockdown

- 5 -

status

which

lasted

seventy-two hours, even though the situation that instigated the
lockdown lasted only a few minutes (Doc. 1 at 8-9).
two

hour

lockdown

period

did

not

impose

such

This seventya

hardship

on

Plaintiff so as to infringe on a protected interest. Sandin, 515
U.S. at 486 (placement in segregated confinement for 30 days did
not

infringe

on

protected

liberty

interest);

Rodgers

v.

Singletary, 142 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 1998) (placement in
administrative confinement for two months does not infringe on
protected liberty interest); see also Rust v. Grammer, 858 F.2d
411, 413 (8th Cir. 1988)( lockdown of maximum security cells in
state prison to regain control of a disruptive situation did not
violate the due process clause).

Plaintiff's complaint fails to

state a due process claim related to the seventy-two hour lockdown
described in the complaint.
To the extent Plaintiff asserts that the lockdown amounted to
cruel

and

unusual

punishment

so

as

Amendment, his claim is equally flawed.

to

implicate

the

Eighth

Plaintiff concedes that

the lockdown was the result of a legitimate security concern.

A

prison security measure undertaken to control a disturbance does
not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless
officials acted in bad faith and for no legitimate purpose. Whitley
v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986).

Plaintiff has not alleged

that prison officials acted in bad faith or without legitimate
purpose; rather, he complains that the duration of the prison
- 6 -

lockdown exceeded what was necessary to restore order.

Prison

administrators are accorded wide deference in the execution of
policies and practices that “are needed to preserve internal order
and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” Bell v.
Wolfish,

441

U.S.

520,

547

(1979).

Choosing

the

optimal

“prophylactic or preventive measures” to prevent violence and
maintain

safety

is

difficult

and

not

readily

susceptible

to

judicial evaluation. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322 (1986);
Pell

v.

Procunier,

417

U.S.

817,

827

(1974)(recognizing

difficulties in “maintaining internal order”).

the

This Court will

not interfere with the prison administration’s determination that
a seventy-two hour lockdown was necessary to restore order and
ensure inmates’ safety after the security incident referenced in
the complaint.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

for cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
IV.

Conclusion

The allegations set forth in Plaintiff's complaint provide no
basis for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 recovery.

Therefore, the complaint is

dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff's

motion

for

pauperis (Doc. 2) is DENIED.

- 7 -

leave

to

proceed

in

forma

2.

Plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint is DISMISSED

without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
3.
pending

The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate all
motions,

to

close

this

case,

and

to

enter

judgment

accordingly.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of February, 2014.

SA: OrlP-4 2/4/14
Copies to: Stacey Deon Moore

- 8 -

4th

day