Diaz v. Secretary, DOC
Filing
48
ORDER granting 47 Motion for Reconsideration to the extent that this case will be stayed until June 1, 2017. In 60 days, and every 60 days thereafter until June 1, 2017, both parties shall file a report on the status of the Florida litigation. See Order for details. The Clerk shall administratively close the file. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 8/22/2016. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JOEL DIAZ,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No: 2:14-cv-91-FtM-29MRM
SECRETARY, DOC,
Respondent.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration of the June 15, 2016 Order lifting the stay of
proceedings 1 (Doc. 47, filed June 24, 2016).
Although Petitioner
asserts that Respondent opposes the motion (Doc. 47 at 8), no
response in opposition has been filed, and the motion is now ripe
for review. For the reasons set forth in this Order, Petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration is granted, and this case will be stayed
until June 1, 2017.
1
Although titled as a motion for reconsideration, the
arguments set forth in the motion are more suitably addressed
towards a motion to stay. In addition, Petitioner does not state
that he brings the motion under Rules 59(e) or 60(b) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, this Court will address the
pleading as a motion to stay despite its title.
I.
Background
On February 14, 2014, Petitioner, a death-sentenced prisoner
of the Florida Department of Corrections, filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus raising four claims, including two claims
asserting
that
constitutional
violations
occurred
during
the
penalty phase of his capital trial (Doc. 1).
On
January
12,
2016,
the
United
States
Supreme
Court
determined that Florida’s capital sentencing scheme violates a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in light of Ring
v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
Following the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hurst, the Florida Supreme Court issued stays of
execution in Lambrix v. State, Case No. SC16-56 and Asay v. State,
Case No. SC16-223.
Both cases are pending before the Florida
Supreme Court which will issue no decisions during its annual
summer break.
Among the issues that may be decided in Lambrix,
Asay, and other pending state post-conviction capital cases, are
the retroactivity of Hurst, whether and how harmless-error applies
to Hurst violations, and what type of resentencing proceedings
would be required for Hurst violations.
Furthermore, on March 7, 2016, House Bill 7101 was signed
into law by Governor Rick Scott.
The final Staff Analysis of the
Criminal Justice Subcommittee accompanying the bill explained its
purpose as “amend[ing] Florida’s capital sentencing scheme to
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comply with the United States Supreme Court’s ruling” in Hurst.
See House of Representatives Final Bill Analysis, HB 7101. 2
The
bill requires the jury to return a unanimous verdict finding at
least one aggravating factor and that one or more aggravating
factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances before a sentence of
death may be imposed. Id.
To recommend a sentence of death, a
minimum of ten jurors must agree with the recommendation. Id.
If
the jury recommends a sentence of death, the judge may impose death
or
life
in
prison
after
considering
each
aggravating
factor
unanimously found by the jury and all mitigating circumstances.
Id.
A judge may not override a jury recommendation of life in
prison. Id.
Questions such as whether the new provisions of House Bill
7101 made substantive changes to Florida’s capital sentencing
scheme such that it cannot be applied retroactively to a previously
death-sentenced defendant are yet to be determined by the Florida
Supreme Court. See State v. Perry, 192 So. 3d 70 (Fla. 5th DCA
2016) (certifying as a question of great public importance, “Does
Chapter 2016-13, Laws of Florida, apply to pending prosecutions
for capital offenses that occurred prior to its effective date?”).
2
Available at:
https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2016/7101/Analysis/?Tab=Analyses
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II.
Analysis
Petitioner urges that a stay of this case is warranted because
“it would be a waste of judicial resources for this Court to reach
any decision on the penalty phase issues in his case, which may
become
moot
once
the
Florida
Supreme
Court
determines
the
retroactivity of Hurst.” (Doc. 47 at 5).
The United States Supreme Court has noted that federal courts
have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the
jurisdiction given them” and that “the pendency of an action in
the state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter
in the Federal court having jurisdiction.” Colorado River Water
Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-18 (1976)
(quoting
McClellan
Nevertheless,
a
v.
Carland,
district
court
217
may
U.S.
stay
268,
its
282
hand
in
(1910)).
certain
exceptional circumstances such as when motivated by considerations
of “wise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of
judicial resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation[.]”
Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has
also recognized that “the power to stay proceedings is incidental
to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of
the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for
itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North American
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
- 4 -
A decision by the Florida Supreme Court allowing resentencing
of defendants who were sentenced to death prior to the Hurst
decision would render moot any decision(s) on the penalty-phase
claims raised in the instant habeas petition.
Consequently, the
time and resources devoted to those claims by this Court would be
wasted.
In the interests of the parties and of judicial economy,
the Court determines that a stay is warranted pending the outcome
of the litigation in the Florida Supreme Court.
Railroad Comm’n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (a federal court should abstain
where resolution of an unsettled state law question would render
unnecessary the need to decide a federal constitutional question).
In order to allow time for the Florida courts to consider the
application of Hurst on death-sentenced prisoners, this case will
be stayed until June 1, 2017 at which time the Court will consider
whether a further stay is necessary.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the order
lifting stay (Doc. 47) is GRANTED to the extent that this case
will be stayed until June 1, 2017.
2.
In SIXTY (60) DAYS, and every sixty days thereafter until
June 1, 2017, both parties shall file a report on the status of
the Florida litigation so that this Court may consider whether to
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lift or extend the stay.
If the Florida litigation is resolved
at any time prior to June 1, 2017, the parties shall immediately
file notice of such.
3.
The Clerk of Court is directed to administratively close
this file.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of August, 2016.
SA: OrlP-4
Copies: All Parties of Record
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22nd
day
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