Person v. State Of Florida
Filing
23
OPINION AND ORDER re: 1 Petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 3/9/2017. (SLU)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
RAMON A. PERSON,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No: 2:14-cv-130-FtM-38MRM
SECRETARY, DOC,
Respondents.
/
OPINION AND ORDER1
I. Status
Petitioner Ramon Person (hereinafter “Petitioner,” “Person,” or “Defendant”)
initiated this action proceeding pro se by filing a timely 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ
of habeas corpus (Doc. #1, “Petition”) challenging his judgment and conviction of robbery
with a firearm entered in the Twentieth Judicial Circuit Court in and for Lee County,
Florida. The Petition raises five grounds for relief.
Respondent filed a Response (Doc. #18, Response) opposing all grounds and
attached supporting exhibits (Doc. #20-1, Exhs. 1-20) consisting of the record on direct
1
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appeal and postconviction pleadings. Inter alia, Respondent argues that Petitioner has
not satisfied 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1)-(2).2
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Petitioner is not entitled to
habeas relief and the Petition must be denied. Because the Petition can be resolved on
the basis of the record, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted. Schriro v. Landrigan,
550 U.S. 465, 473-474 (2007) (finding if the record refutes the factual allegations in the
petition or otherwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold an
evidentiary hearing).
II. Background and Pertinent Procedural History
An amended information charged Person with the following four counts: (1)
conspiracy to commit murder; (2) tampering with a witness, victim or informant; (3)
robbery while possessing a firearm; and (4) aggravated stalking. Exh. 1.
Person proceeded to a jury trial before the Honorable Edward J. Volz, Twentieth
Judicial Circuit Judge. The jury found Person guilty on only the third count: robbery while
possessing a firearm and not guilty on the remaining counts. Exh. 1a-1b, and Exh. 1c at
60-61.
In accordance with the verdict, the judge sentenced Person to 17 years of
imprisonment under Florida Statute § 775.087(2) (the 10-20-life statute), with a minimum
mandatory 15 year sentence, with credit for time served of 803 days. Exh. 2 at 98-99; see
also Exh. 2c at 160-161. The judge subsequently granted Person’s motion to correct the
scrivener’s error, to which the state had conceded an amended sentence was required,
because Person was not sentenced under Florida’s 10-20-life statute, but was instead
2
Respondent submits that Petitioner timely filed the Petition. See Response at
5-6, n. 2.
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sentenced under the Habitual Violent Felony Offender Statute, Florida Statute §
775.084(1)(b), which
provided
the
same
minimum mandatory 15-year term.
Accordingly, the judge ordered the Clerk to enter an amended verdict and sentence to
reflect removal of the citation to the 10-20-life statute and cite instead to the Habitual
Violent Felony Offender statute. Id.
With the assistance of counsel, Person appealed, raising two grounds for relief.
Exh. 3.
The state responded.
Exh. 4.
The appellate court affirmed Person’s
judgment and sentence without written opinion. Exh. 5.
Person then pursued postconviction relief by filing a motion under Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850. Exh. 8 (initial 3.850 motion); Exhs. 11, 12 (amended 3.850
motions). The state filed a response. Exh. 10. The postconviction court entered an
order denying Person relief on his Amended Rule 3.850 motion. Exh. 13.
Person
appealed. Exhs. 15 -16. The appellate court affirmed the postconviction court’s order.
Exh. 18. Person then initiated the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas corpus
petition.
III. Applicable § 2254 Law
A. Deferential Review Required By AEDPA
Petitioner filed his Petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782,
792 (2001). Consequently, post-AEDPA law governs this action. Abdul-Kabir, 550 U.S.
at 246; Penry, 532 U.S. at 792; Davis v. Jones, 506 F.3d 1325, 1331, n.9 (11th Cir. 2007).
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Under the deferential review standard, habeas relief may not be granted with
respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the
claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011). “This is a difficult
to meet, and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands
that the state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Id. (internal quotations
and citations omitted). See also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011) (pointing
out that “if [§ 2254(d)’s] standard is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.”).
Both the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme Court broadly interpret what is meant
by an “adjudication on the merits.” Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 967-68 (11th Cir.
2011). Thus, a state court’s summary rejection of a claim, even without explanation,
qualifies as an adjudication on the merits that warrants deference by a federal court. Id.;
see also Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1146 (11th Cir. 2008). Indeed, “unless the
state court clearly states that its decision was based solely on a state procedural rule [the
Court] will presume that the state court has rendered an adjudication on the merits when
the petitioner’s claim ‘is the same claim rejected’ by the court.” Childers v. Floyd, 642
F.3d at 969 (quoting Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002)).
“A legal principle is ‘clearly established’ within the meaning of this provision only
when it is embodied in a holding of [the United States Supreme] Court.”
Thaler v.
Haynes, 559 U.S. 43, 47 (2010); see also Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 74 (2006)
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(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000)) (recognizing “[c]learly established
federal law” consists of the governing legal principles, rather than the dicta, set forth in
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the state court issues its
decision). “A state court decision involves an unreasonable application of federal law
when it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case law but unreasonably
applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner's case, or when it unreasonably extends, or
unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from Supreme Court case law to a new
context.” Ponticelli v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 690 F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotations and citations omitted). The “unreasonable application” inquiry
requires the Court to conduct the two-step analysis set forth in Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. at 86. First, the Court determines what arguments or theories support the state
court decision; and second, the Court must determine whether “fairminded jurists could
disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior”
Supreme Court decision. Id. (citations omitted). Whether a court errs in determining
facts “is even more deferential than under a clearly erroneous standard of review.”
Stephens v. Hall, 407 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005).
The Court presumes the
findings of fact to be correct, and petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption
by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
B. Federal Claim Must Be Exhausted in State Court
Ordinarily, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must first “‘exhaus[t] the
remedies available in the courts of the State,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), thereby affording
those courts ‘the first opportunity to address the correct alleged violations of [the]
prisoner’s federal rights.’” Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. 307, 316 (2011) (quoting Coleman
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v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731 (1991)). This imposes a “total exhaustion” requirement
in which all of the federal issues must have first been presented to the state courts.
Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005). “Exhaustion requires that state prisoners
must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by
invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process. That
is, to properly exhaust a claim, the petitioner must fairly present every issue raised in his
federal petition to the state's highest court, either on direct appeal or on collateral review.”
Mason v. Allen, 605 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
U.S. 838, 845 (1999) and Castile v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 351 (1989)).
To fairly present a claim, a petitioner must present the same federal claim to the
state court that he urges the federal court to consider. A mere citation to the federal
constitution in a state court proceeding is insufficient for purposes of exhaustion.
Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 7 (1983). A state law claim that “is merely similar to
the federal habeas claim is insufficient to satisfy the fairly presented requirement.”
Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 366 (1995) (per curiam). “‘[T]he exhaustion doctrine
requires a habeas applicant to do more than scatter some makeshift needles in the
haystack of the state court record.’” McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir.
2005) (quoting Kelley v. Sec’y for the Dep’t of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1343-44 (11th Cir.
2004)).
“The teeth of the exhaustion requirement comes from its handmaiden, the
procedural default doctrine.” Smith v. Jones, 256 F.3d 1135, 1138 (11th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 1136 (2002). Under the procedural default doctrine, “[i]f the petitioner
has failed to exhaust state remedies that are no longer available, that failure is a
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procedural default which will bar federal habeas relief. . . .” Smith, 256 F.3d at 1138. A
procedural default for failing to exhaust state court remedies will only be excused in two
narrow circumstances.
First, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas review of a
procedurally defaulted claim if he shows both “cause” for the default and actual “prejudice”
resulting from the asserted error. House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 536-37 (2006); Mize v.
Hall, 532 F.3d 1184, 1190 (11th Cir. 2008).
Second, under exceptional circumstances, a petitioner may obtain federal habeas
review of a procedurally defaulted claim, even without a showing of cause and prejudice,
if such a review is necessary to correct a fundamental miscarriage of justice. House,
547 U.S. at 536; Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000).
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are reviewed under the standards
established by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1183 (11th Cir.
2008). Post-AEDPA, the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984), remains applicable to the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in this
case. Newland, 527 F.3d at 1184. In Strickland, the Supreme Court established a twopart test to determine whether a convicted person is entitled to habeas relief on the
grounds that his or her counsel rendered ineffective assistance: (1) whether counsel’s
representation was deficient, i.e., “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”
“under prevailing professional norms,” which requires a showing that “counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment”; and (2) whether the deficient performance
prejudiced the defendant, i.e., there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
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unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, which
“requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; see also Bobby Van
Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 8 (2009); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1403 (2011).
States may “impose whatever specific rules . . . to ensure that criminal defendants
are well represented,” but “the Federal Constitution imposes one general requirement:
that counsel make objectively reasonable choices.” Bobby Van Hook, 558 U.S. at 9
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
It is petitioner who bears the heavy burden
to “prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel’s performance was
unreasonable.” Jones v. Campbell, 436 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2006). A court must
“judge the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed
as of the time of counsel’s conduct,” Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 477 (2000)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690), applying a “highly deferential” level of judicial
scrutiny. Id. A court must adhere to a strong presumption that “counsel’s conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689. An attorney is not ineffective for failing to raise or preserve a meritless issue. Ladd
v. Jones, 864 F.2d 108, 109-10 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970,
974 (11th Cir. 1992) (“a lawyer’s failure to preserve a meritless issue plainly cannot
prejudice a client”). “To state the obvious: the trial lawyers, in every case, could have
done something more or something different. So, omissions are inevitable. But, the
issue is not what is possible or ‘what is prudent or appropriate, but only what is
constitutionally compelled.’” Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir.
2000) (quoting Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987)).
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IV. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
The Petition raises the following five grounds:
Ground One: Defendant rejected a ten (10) year plea offer
based on the affirmative misadvise of counsel. Which
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
Ground Two: Ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of
the 6th and 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution
by misadvising Defendant as to possible sentence faced if
found guilty by the jury.
Ground Three: Ineffective assistance of counsel in violation
of the 6th and 14th Amendment to the United States
Constitution by failing to move to sever the robbery count from
the other counts.
Ground Four: Trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
enter judgments and imposed sentences in violation of the
Constitutions of Laws of the United States or the State of
Florida.
Ground Five: Trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
enter judgments imposed sentences in violation of the
Constitution of Laws of the United States and State of Florida.
See generally Petition (errors in original). The Court will address each ground for relief
in turn.
A. Grounds One and Two
The Court addresses Grounds One and Two together because they are related to
the State’s plea offer, which Petitioner did not accept and instead proceeded to a jury trial.
In Ground One, Petitioner argues counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
because he relied on the “misadvise” of counsel that he could beat the case and did not
take the plea. Petition at 5. Specifically, Petitioner states that the prosecuting attorney
offered a plea bargain of 10 years, which he rejected, and then counsel did not present a
defense for the robbery with a firearm count. Id. In Ground Two Petitioner faults trial
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counsel for not properly advising him of the sentence he would face if convicted by the
jury.
Id. at 7.
Petitioner contends that counsel told him he would face a ten-year
minimum mandatory sentence if convicted, not the fifteen-year minimum mandatory
sentence that was imposed. Id.
In Response, Respondent agrees that Grounds One and Two are exhausted to
the extent Petitioner raised the claims in his Rule 3.850 motion.
Response at 12.
Respondent argues that the postconviction court’s opinion is entitled to deference and
Petitioner has not shown how the decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application
of federal law, or an unreasonable application of the facts in light of the evidence
presented. Id. at 12-18.
Turning to Ground Two, Respondent argues that the postconviction court
reasonably and properly denied Petitioner relief because the record refuted Petitioner’s
claim that he did not know the possible minimum mandatory sentence he faced was in
fact an enhanced sentence under the habitual felony offender provisions. Id. at 19.
The Court finds Grounds One and Two are exhausted to the extent Petitioner
raised the claims in his Rule 3.850 motion and appealed the adverse result. Exh. 8 (initial
Rule 3.850 motion); Exhs. 11, 12 (Supplemental Rule 3.850’s); Exh. 16 (appeal).
In denying Petitioner relief on Ground One, the postconviction court reviewed the
law set forth in Strickland, and determined that the record conclusively refuted Petitioner’s
claim. Exh. 13 at 2-3. Specifically, the postconviction court found as follows:
In the first allegation, Defendant alleged that he rejected a 10year plea offer from the State based on counsel’s advise that
“they could beat the case” yet counsel offered no defense on
the charge of robbery while possessing a firearm. However,
Defendant’s allegation is conclusively refuted by the record.
Counsel did, in fact, present a defense to all four charges and
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two specific arguments concerning the robbery charge.
Counsel argued that Defendant lacked the requisite intent
required because the robbery was actually a falling out
between the parties over drugs, and that the victim tried to
make it appear as though a robbery had occurred. See pp.
117-118 and 229-235 of the trial transcript, attached hereto.
The fact that counsel’s trial strategy was unsuccessful as to
the charge of robbery does not demonstrate that counsel’s
representation of Defendant was inadequate. State v.
Hanania, 715 So. 2d 984, 986 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998); See also
Sireci v. State, 469 So. 2d 119 (Fla. 1985).
Exh. 13 at 2-3. In denying Petitioner relief on Ground Two, the postconviction court also
reviewed the law set forth in Strickland, and denied Petitioner relief finding as follows:
In the second allegation, Defendant alleged that counsel was
ineffective for failing to “properly communicate the states [sic]
plea offer by misinforming him of the possible sentence he
faced if found guilty.” Defendant further alleged that he was
not informed if convicted he could be sentenced to a sentence
longer than 10 years and possibly life. However, Defendant
only added this argument concerning the issue that robbery
with a firearm was punishable by life, after the State pointed
out the deficiencies in Defendant’s allegation.
Moreover, Defendant was on notice of the possible sentences
he faced, because both the original Information and the
Amended Information stated that robbery while possessing a
firearm was PBL [punishable by life].
See copies of
Information, attached hereto. Defendant also had notice that
his sentences were subject to enhancement because the
State was seeking to sentence Defendant as a HVFO
[habitual violent felony offender]. See a copy of the HVFO
Notice, attached hereto. Even though Defendant was not
sentenced to life in prison, the Court finds Defendant’s
allegation, that he did not know that he could be sentenced to
more than 10 years in prison, disingenuous based on the
number and severity of the charges he was facing at trial and
the fact that the State was seeking to enhance Defendant’s
sentence under the HVFO statute. In addition, case law
provides that a defendant who is convicted after rejecting a
plea offer would have no right to insist on being sentenced in
accordance with the offer. McDonald v. State, 751 So. 2d 56,
58 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
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Id. at 3-4. The appellate court per curiam affirmed the postconviction court’s order.
Exh. 18.
The Court finds that the State court’s denial of postconviction relief did not result
in a decision that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” Strickland,
or “in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented” in the State court. The Eleventh Circuit has recognized that
Strickland is applicable to the plea process. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-58
(1985); Coulter v. Herring, 60 F.3d 1499, 1504, n. 7 (11th Cir. 1995) (noting that Hill
applies when a defendant decided not to accept a plea offer and proceeds to trial).
With regard to Ground One, the postconviction court determined that Petitioner
could not show his counsel rendered deficient performance because counsel discussed
the plea with Petitioner and advised that he believed they could prevail at trial. With
regard to Count Two, the postconviction court determined that the record evidenced that
Petitioner was clearly aware that he could be sentenced to more than 10 years
imprisonment if the jury returned a guilty verdict based on the information and habitual
felony offender notice. Here, there is no doubt that Petitioner was aware that there was
a plea offer, but opted to proceed to trial. See Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, 834835 (11th Cir. 1991) (considering that defendant was aware of the plea offer, his after-the
fact- testimony concerning his desire to plea, without more, was insufficient to establish
that but for counsel’s alleged mis-advice or inaction, defendant would have accepted the
plea offer). Defense counsel’s performance and trial strategy in fact resulted in the jury
finding Petitioner not guilty of all, save one count, of the four-count information. The
postconviction court’s decision finding counsel did not render deficient performance and
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that Petitioner’s claim was refuted by the record was reasonable in all respects and was
not contrary to Strickland. Accordingly, Petitioner is denied relief on Grounds One and
Two.
B. Ground Three
Petitioner argues that his defense attorney rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel by failing to move to sever the robbery count from the other counts at trial.
Petition at 8. Petitioner states that the State’s evidence presented in the conspiracy to
commit murder and tampering charges “was used to dispel doubt as to his guilt in the
robbery case.”
Id.
Petitioner argues that the crimes were not related in time, nor
geographical location, and points out that the only commonality was that the victim knew
Petitioner.
In Response, Respondent points out that the underlying issue—whether the
offense was subject to severance—was one of state law. Response at 20. Respondent
submits that the state appellate court’s silent affirmance after Petitioner raised this claim
reveals counsel did not render deficient performance.
Id. Additionally, Respondent
notes that the postconviction court addressed this claim as raised in Petitioner’s Rule
3.850 motion and also denied Petitioner relief. Id. at 21. Thus, Respondent argues that
Petitioner cannot satisfy the dictates of § 2254(d) and (e).
The Court finds Ground Three is exhausted to the extent Petitioner with the
assistance of counsel raised the claim on direct appeal as his second ground for relief.
Exh. 3. The appellate court per curiam affirmed Petitioner’s judgment and conviction.
Exh. 6. Petitioner also raised the claim in his pro se Amended Rule 3.850 motion and
appealed the adverse result.
Exh. 8 (initial Rule 3.850 motion); Exhs. 11, 12
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(Supplemental Rule 3.850’s); Exh. 16 (appeal). The postconviction court cited Strickland
and denied Petitioner relief on Ground Three finding as follows:
In the third allegation, Defendant alleged that counsel was
ineffective for failing to move to sever the offenses which
resulted in undue prejudice. Defendant further alleged that
“clearly” the evidence produced by the State on the
conspiracy to commit murder and the tampering charges
compelled the jury to find Defendant guilty of the charge of
robbery.
Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.150(a) joinder of
offenses based on the same act or transactions that are
connected is proper. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.150(a). See also
Williams v. State, 40 So. 3d 89 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010);
Rodriquez v. State, 909 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 2005). All of the
charges in this case were part of a crime spree that occurred
on or between March 28, 2005, and April 3, 2005, and
involved the same victim John Swierczynski, a.k.a. Jonathan
Swierczynski. Therefore, even if counsel moved to sever the
charges, it would have been highly unlikely that the motion
would have been granted. Accordingly, counsel could not
have [been] ineffective for failing to file a frivolous motion.
See Valle v. Moore, 837 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 2002); State v.
Freeman, 796 So. 2d 574 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). Moreover,
Defendant’s defenses to the robbery charge were in relation
to the other charges as shown in the Court’s analysis of issue
one, which counsel would not have been able to raise if the
charges were severed.
Exh. 13 at 4.
The Court finds that the State court’s denial of postconviction relief did not result
in a decision that was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of” Strickland,
or “in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented” in the State court.
The postconviction court reasonably
determined that counsel’s performance could not be deemed ineffective because even if
counsel had moved to sever the charge, the trial court would have denied the motion
under Florida law. Indeed, state courts are the final arbitrators of state law, and the trial
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court determined that defense counsel would not have been successful in moving to sever
the charge. See Herring v. Sec’y Dep’t of Corr., 397 F.3d 1338, 1354-55 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 928 (2005) (finding a petitioner could not show ineffective assistance of
counsel concerning state law matter because the state court determined that such an
argument would have been unsuccessful); see also Brownlee v. Haley, 306 F.3d 1043,
1066 (11th Cir. 2002) (noting that trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
raise a meritless issues). Accordingly, Petitioner is denied relief on Ground Three.
C. Grounds Four and Five
Grounds Four and Five are related to the extent that Petitioner challenges the trial
court’s jurisdiction. Petition at 10, 12. In support of Ground Four, Petitioner contends,
although not the model of clarity, that “the trial court operates under ‘admiralty jurisdiction’
which is ‘commercial law’ and deals with ‘persons’ and is ‘contract’ admiralty/maritime
jurisdiction is can of the sea and circuit courts do[] not h ear cases that take[] place upon
the land of the country. For there are no judicial courts in America, and jurisdictions for
such claims or crimes on the land lies within a common law court.” Id. at 10. Under
Ground Five, Petitioner cites the Magna Carta and makes reference to the idea that the
trial courts exclude “sovereigns.” Id. at 12.
In Response, Respondent asserts that Grounds Four and Five raise issues
concerning only state law for which federal habeas corpus relief does not lie. Response
at 23 (citations omitted).
Additionally, Respondent argues that the grounds are
unexhausted and now procedurally defaulted because Petitioner did not fairly apprise the
State court of the constitutional dimension of his claims. Id. at 24-25.
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The Court notes that Petitioner raised claims concerning the trial court’s alleged
lack of jurisdiction in his Amended Rule 3.850 motions. The postconviction court denied
Petitioner relief on the claim, finding as follows:
Defendant’s fourth and fifth allegations are similar, in that,
Defendant alleged the trial court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to enter judgment against Defendant and to
sentence him because the trial court operates under
admiralty/maritime jurisdiction. However, both allegations
are without merit.
Subject matter jurisdiction normally
concerns the power of the court to deal with a class of cases.
Luger v. State, 983 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008). In the State
of Florida, circuit courts have exclusive original jurisdiction
over all felonies. A review of the charges against Defendant
shows that all charges are felonies. Therefore, the trial court
did, in fact, have subject matter jurisdiction to enter the
judgment against Defendant and to sentence him on the
charges.
Exh. 13 at 4-5. Thus, it appears Petitioner did exhaust the instant claim before the State
court.
The Court agrees with Respondent that generally claims concerning the trial courts
jurisdiction concern matters of state law and do not raise a claim of federal Constitutional
dimension for which federal habeas corpus relief lies. See Drawdy v. Sec’y Dep’t of
Corr., Case No. 8:09-cv-1993-T-30AEP, 2009 WL 3644626 *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 2, 2009)
(citations omitted) (finding a petitioner’s challenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the
state court based on a defective charging document concerned only a state law question
for which federal habeas corpus relief does not lie)).
Notably, Petitioner’s claims sound familiar to those asserted by followers of the
sovereign citizen movement. As background, sovereign citizens “believe that they are
not subject to government authority and employ various tactics in attempt to, among other
things, avoid paying taxes, extinguish debts, and derail criminal proceedings.” Dirden v.
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Jones, Case No. 3:15-cv-412/RV/EMT, 2016 WL 7007547 * 4 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 21, 2016)
(citing Gravatt v. United States, 100 Fed. CL. 279, 282 (2011) (citations omitted); United
States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 19 n. 12 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that sovereign citizens
“believe they are not subject to federal or state statutes or proceedings, reject most forms
of taxation as legitimate, and place special significance in commercial law.”).
In the abundance of caution, to the extent Petitioner’s claims may be interpreted
as a claim cognizable in federal habeas, the court construes them as raising federal due
process violations based on the Florida circuit court’s alleged lack of jurisdiction over
Petitioner.
See Dirden, 2016 WL 7007547 *4 (citing other district court cases that
construed such sovereign citizen claims raised in federal habeas corpus petitions as
federal due process claims).
Petitioner’s federal due process rights remain intact
because he was charged with felonies for which the circuit court properly exercised
jurisdiction. See Exh. 13 at 4-5. Moreover, as noted by several other federal courts,
sovereign citizen arguments concerning the court’s lack of jurisdiction should be
summarily rejected whenever presented. Dirden, *4-*5. Consequently, Petitioner is
denied relief on Grounds Four and Five.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #1) is DENIED for the reasons
set forth herein.
2. The Clerk of Court shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment
accordingly, and close this case.
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CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND
LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS DENIED
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of
appealability on either petition. A prisoner seeking to appeal a district court's final order
denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal but
must obtain a certificate of appealability (“COA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Harbison v.
Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 184 (2009). “A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To
make such a showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the
district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) or, that “the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further”, Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36
(2003)(citations omitted).
Petitioner has not made the requisite showing in these
circumstances. Finally, because Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability,
he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 9th day of March, 2017.
FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record
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