West Coast Life Insurance Company v. Gorman et al

Filing 107

ORDER denying without prejudice 94 the Defendant, Helen Gorman's Motion for Summary Judgment against Thomas E. Murphy. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 4/8/2015. (LMF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
WEST COAST
COMPANY,

LIFE

INSURANCE

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:14-cv-175-FtM-38DNF

BOURKE J. GORMAN, EDWARD J.
GORMAN, III , PATRICK A.
GORMAN, THOMAS E. MURPHY
and HELEN GORMAN,
Defendants.
/
ORDER1
This matter comes before the Court on the Defendant, Helen Gorman's Motion for
Summary Judgment against Thomas E. Murphy (Doc. #94) filed on March 17, 2015. The
Defendant Thomas E. Murphy, as personal representative of the Estate of James M.
Murphy filed his Response in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.
#101) on March 30, 2015.
FACTS
The Plaintiff West Coast Life Insurance Company initiated this action seeking a
declaratory judgment to determine the rightful beneficiary of a life insurance policy (Policy)
which insured the life of the decedent James M. Murphy. The Policy number Z00817117

1

Disclaimer: Documents filed in CM/ECF may contain hyperlinks to other documents or Web sites. These
hyperlinks are provided only for users’ convenience. Users are cautioned that hyperlinked documents in
CM/ECF are subject to PACER fees. By allowing hyperlinks to other Web sites, this court does not endorse,
recommend, approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services or products they provide on their Web
sites. Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third parties or their Web sites. The court
accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink
ceases to work or directs the user to some other site does not affect the opinion of the court.

was issued on December 27, 1999, in the amount of $250,000.00. When the insured,
Thomas M. Murphy, purchased the Policy he designated himself as the insured and his
wife Eileen Gorman Murphy as the owner and beneficiary (Doc. # 53-1, pp.22-24).
On May 8, 2009, Eileen Gorman Murphy signed a Change of Beneficiary form
designating her seven children as contingent beneficiaries each receiving the following
percentages of the Policy’s payout as follows:
Edward J. Gorman, III …………………………………………………….14%
Bourke J. Gorman ………………………………………………………...14%
Erin G. Kirk ………………………………………………………………...15%
Mathew A. Gorman ……………………………………………………….14%
Kieran Gorman Cross …………………………………………………….14%
Patrick A. Gorman ………………………………………………………...14%
Lauren A. Northrop ………………………………………………………..15%
(Doc. #53, Ex. C). On May 28, 2009, West Coast sent Eileen Gorman Murphy a letter
informing her that her Change of Beneficiary failed because she did not list a primary
beneficiary. Eileen Gorman Murphy never responded to West Coast’s letter. As such,
she remained the primary beneficiary of the Policy.
On August 19, 2010, Bourke Gorman informed West Coast that Eileen Gorman
Murphy had designated him as her Power of Attorney including an Addendum to the
General Power of Attorney (POA) granting Bourke Gorman the authority to create
survivorship or inheritance rights in the Principal’s assets and/or make gifts to himself and
to others. Bourke Gorman’s POA bore the signature of Eileen Gorman Murphy and was
dated December 18, 2009. (Doc. #53, Ex. E). West Coast acknowledged the POA by
letter on August 27, 2010.
On October 4, 2011, Bourke J. Gorman submitted a Contingent Ownership form
signed by him as POA appointing himself as contingent owner of the Policy.

2

On

November 4, 2011, West Coast requested confirmation of the change of Contingent
Ownership from Eileen Gorman Murphy by letter. She never responded to West Coast’s
request.

On November 10, 2011, Bourke Gorman informed West Coast that Eileen

Gorman Murphy had passed away on October 10, 2011. On November 28, 2011, West
Coast acknowledged the Policy change transferring ownership of the Policy to Bourke
Gorman.
On January 22, 2012, Bourke Gorman submitted a Change of Beneficiary form to
West Coast signed by him as owner of the Policy naming himself and his wife Helen
Gorman as equal primary beneficiaries and his children Emily B. Gorman, Bourke J.
Gorman, Jr. and Bailey A. Gorman as equal contingent beneficiaries.

West Coast

acknowledged the change in beneficiaries by letter on February 1, 2013.
On September 4, 2013, West Coast was informed by Counsel for James M.
Murphy, Atty. Richard Lyon, the insured James M. Murphy had passed away on
September 4, 2013. Atty. Lyon sought documents regarding the Policy via subpoena
issued by a court in Montgomery County, Maryland. West Coast sent the appropriate
forms to Atty. Lyon.
On September 17, 2013, West Coast sent the necessary claims forms to Bourke
Gorman required to make a claim on the proceeds of the Policy. Helen and Bourke
Gorman submitted Claimants’ Statements to West Coast. West Coast issued a check to
Helen Gorman in the amount of $125,107.88 on September 24, 2013. A check in the
amount of $125,107.88 was also issued to Bourke Gorman on the same date.
On September 27, 2013, West Coast received a letter for Attorney T. Robert
Bulloch, the attorney representing the Estate of James M. Murphy, informing West Coast

3

that a dispute had arisen regarding the appropriate beneficiary of the Policy. West Coast
issued a stop payment on the checks issued to Helen and Bourke Gorman. The check
issued to Helen Gorman cleared the bank prior to the stop payment order, however, the
check issued to Bourke Gorman was cancelled. West Coast subsequently requested that
Helen Gorman repay the $125,107.88. To date she has not repaid the funds.
On October 23, 2013, Thomas E. Murphy (hereinafter Murphy), the son of James
M. Murphy, informed West Coast that the Estate of James M. Murphy had a claim on the
proceeds of the Policy. In his claim, Murphy alleged that Eileen Gorman Murphy lacked
the capacity to sign the POA, that Bourke and Helen Gorman had no insurable interest in
the life of the insured James M. Murphy, and that the family members of Eileen Gorman
Murphy had requested that Maryland Protective Services investigate the financial
transactions conducted on behalf of Eileen Gorman Murphy by Bourke Gorman.
Bourke Gorman declared to West Coast that he submitted a proper claim on the
proceeds of the Policy. The Policy specifically states in pertinent part, “The beneficiary
will receive the death benefit of the policy when the insured dies . . . If no beneficiary is
living when the insured dies, we will consider the policy owner to be the beneficiary. If the
policy owner is not living, we will consider the estate of the policy owner to be the
beneficiary.” (Doc. #53, Ex. A, p.5). Because of the dispute, West Coast brought the
instant declaratory action to determine the beneficiary of the Policy.
Bourke Gorman disputes that the estate of James M. Murphy has ever been the
beneficiary of the Policy. He continues that all of the Policy’s premiums were paid by
Eileen Gorman Murphy from December 27, 1999, up to October 11, 2011. (Doc. #94-2,
¶5). He states that between October 11, 2011, and September 4, 2013, that he paid all

4

of the monthly Policy premiums. (Doc. #94-2, ¶6). According to his declaration, neither
James M. Murphy nor the Estate of James M. Murphy paid any of the monthly premiums
on the Policy. Helen T. Gorman declares that neither James M. Murphy nor the Estate
of James M. Murphy have been the beneficiary of the Policy, never been an owner of the
Policy, nor have they paid any of the premiums on the Policy. (Doc. #94-3, ¶1-3).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact” and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is genuine if there is sufficient evidence
such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 U.S. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). Similarly, an
issue is material if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. Id.

The

moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265
(1986). In deciding whether the moving party has met this initial burden, the Court must
review the record and all reasonable inferences drawn from the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Whatley v. CNA Ins. Co., 189 F.3d 1310, 1313 (11th
Cir. 1999). Once the Court determines that the moving party has met its burden, the
burden shifts and the non-moving party must present specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial that precludes summary judgment. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986). “The
evidence presented cannot consist of conclusory allegations, legal conclusions or
evidence which would be inadmissible at trial.” Demyan v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of

5

Canada, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1320 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d
1572, 1577 (11th Cir. 1991)). Failure to show sufficient evidence of any essential element
is fatal to the claim and the Court should grant the summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S.
at 322-323. Conversely, if reasonable minds could find a genuine issue of material fact
then summary judgment should be denied. Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc.,
975 F.2d 1518, 1532 (11th Cir. 1992).
DISCUSSION
Helen Gorman states that there are no genuine issues of material fact and
therefore, summary judgment should be issued in her favor. The Defendant Murphy
argues the Motion for Summary Judgment is premature because discovery is still
outstanding and the discovery period does not close until May 8, 2015.
Whether the Motion for Summary Judgment is Premature
Murphy argues that he served a request for production on Helen and Bourke
Gorman as well as request for production on the Plaintiff West Coast. Discovery is still
outstanding. Murphy further states that a handwriting expert is going to review the
signature of James M. Murphy on the life insurance application to determine if that
signature is in reality that of James M. Murphy. Additionally, Murphy states he is in the
process of scheduling the deposition of Sharon Krohn, the insurance agent who originally
sold the Policy to James M. Murphy.
Rule 56(d) states in pertinent part:
When Facts Are Unavailable to the Nonmovant. If a
nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its
opposition, the court may:
(1) defer considering the motion or deny it;

6

(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to
take discovery; or
(3) issue any other appropriate order.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d)(emphasis in original).
Murphy’s argument is well taken. Rule 56 “implies that the District Court should
not grant summary judgment until the non-movant has had an adequate opportunity for
discovery.” Wingate v. U.S. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 2012 WL 920105, *1 (M.D. Fla.
March 19, 2012). Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit has determined that “summary
judgment may only be decided upon an adequate record.” Id. (citing Snook v. Trust Co.
of Ga. Bank, 859 F.2d 865, 870 (11th Cir.1988). The Eleventh Circuit expounded:
[S]ummary judgment should not be granted until the party
opposing the motion has had an adequate opportunity for
discovery. The party opposing a motion for summary
judgment has a right to challenge the affidavits and other
factual materials submitted in support of the motion by
conducting sufficient discovery so as to enable him to
determine whether he can furnish opposing affidavits. If the
documents or other discovery sought would be relevant to the
issues presented by the motion for summary judgment, the
opposing party should be allowed the opportunity to utilize the
discovery process to gain access to the requested materials.
Generally summary judgment is inappropriate when the party
opposing the motion has been unable to obtain responses to
his discovery requests.
Id. at 870 (internal citations omitted).
In this instance, Murphy has been unable to receive responses to his outstanding
discovery request and has not had time to have the signature on the Policy examined by
his expert. Since the discovery period has not expired and Murphy still has outstanding
discovery, the instant Motion for Summary Judgment is premature.

Upon due

consideration, the Motion for Summary Judgment is denied without prejudice as
prematurely filed.

7

Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
The Defendant, Helen Gorman's Motion for Summary Judgment against Thomas
E. Murphy (Doc. #94) is DENIED without prejudice.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida this 8th day of April, 2015.

Copies: All Parties of Record

8