Nane Jan, LLC v. Seasalt and Pepper, LLC
Filing
67
OPINION AND ORDER granting 24 Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction. Defendant Seasalt and Pepper, LLC and all those acting in concert with it are preliminary enjoined and restrained from using the SEA SALT mark in association with re staurant and bar services. Defendant shall immediately terminate its use of the SEA SALT mark in advertising and promotional materials, on signage and menus, and on websites. Defendant shall file a notice of compliance with the Court within thirty (30) days of this Opinion and Order. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c), plaintiff shall post a bond in the amount of $25,000.00, as payment of damages to which defendant may be entitled for wrongful injunction or restraint. See Opinion and Order for details. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 10/14/2014. (MAB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
NANE JAN, LLC,
Corporation,
a
Florida
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:14-cv-208-FtM-29CM
SEASALT AND PEPPER, LLC, a
Florida Corporation,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary
Injunction
(Doc.
#24)
filed
on
August
4,
2014.
Defendant filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #29) on August 18,
2014, and the Court heard oral argument on September 15, 2014.
Defendant
filed
supplemental
evidence
(Doc.
#64;
Doc.
prompting plaintiff to file rebuttal evidence (Doc. #66).
#65),
For the
reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s motion is granted.
I.
Plaintiff Nane Jan, LLC (plaintiff) owns and operates a
restaurant in Naples, Florida under the registered trademark name
“SEA SALT” (SEA SALT or the Mark).
Sea Salt opened in November
2008 and offers contemporary seafood cuisine that is prepared from
the finest seasonal, organic and sustainable ingredients that come
from local farmers and day boat fisherman whenever possible.
(Id.
¶ 7.)
Sea Salt’s clientele expect and demand the highest quality
service and pay top market rates for Sea Salt’s fine dining
experience.
Plaintiff has received a number of accolades since
opening, including Wine Spectator’s “Award of Excellence” from
2009-2013, Grub Street New York’s “101 of America’s Most Delicious
Noodle Dishes” in 2011, Gulfshore Life Magazine’s “Best VIP Dining
Service” in 2011, and Gulfshore Life Magazine’s “Best Overall
Restaurant” in 2010.
(Id. ¶ 10.)
Plaintiff began using the SEA SALT mark on November 15, 2008,
and registered it with the State of Florida on December 30, 2008. 1
(Doc. #1-1.)
The Mark was subsequently registered with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), and was added to the
principal register on March 12, 2013, for use in association with
restaurant and bar services. 2
(Doc. #1-3.)
On November 13, 2013, defendant Seasalt and Pepper, LLC,
formerly known as Sea Salt Miami, LLC (defendant), filed Trademark
Application Serial Number 86117966 with the USPTO for the standard
character mark SEASALT AND PEPPER for use with restaurant and bar
services.
(Doc.
#1-4.)
The
following
day,
defendant
filed
Trademark Application Serial Number 86118756 with the USPTO for
the stylized mark SEASALT AND PEPPER for use with restaurant and
1Florida
2U.S.
Registration No. T08000001417.
Registration No. 4,299,923.
- 2 -
(Doc. #1-1.)
(Doc. #1-3.)
bar services.
(Doc. #1-5.)
On December 7, 2013, defendant opened
Seasalt and Pepper, a restaurant located in Miami, Florida.
(Doc.
#1, ¶ 18.)
Plaintiff, upon learning of Seasalt and Pepper, notified
defendant of its federal, state, and common law trademark rights
in SEA SALT and demanded that defendant immediately cease and
desist using the name Seasalt and Pepper.
(Doc. #1-6.)
Defendant
refused to comply with plaintiff’s demands and continues to operate
under the name Seasalt and Pepper.
(Doc. #1, ¶ 21.)
On February
28, 2014, the USPTO rejected defendant’s trademark applications
due to the likelihood of confusion with plaintiff’s Mark.
(Doc.
#1-7; Doc. #1-8.)
On April 14, 2014, plaintiff filed this lawsuit alleging
claims under federal and state law for trademark infringement based
on defendant’s allegedly improper use of SEA SALT.
Plaintiff
alleges that defendant’s unauthorized use of SEA SALT constitutes
infringement, is misleading and deceptive, and is likely to cause
consumer
confusion.
It
is
further
alleged
that
defendant’s
unauthorized use of SEA SALT has caused and will continue to cause
irreparable harm to plaintiff.
II.
Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction to enjoin defendant
from using SEA SALT in connection with restaurant and bar services.
- 3 -
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must
demonstrate “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits
of the underlying case, (2) the movant will suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of an injunction, (3) the harm suffered by the
movant in the absence of an injunction would exceed the harm
suffered by the opposing party if the injunction is issued, and
(4)
an
injunction
would
not
disserve
the
public
interest.”
Odebrecht Constr., Inc. v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Transp., 715
F.3d 1268, 1273 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Grizzle v. Kemp, 634 F.3d
1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2011)).
“[A] preliminary injunction is an
extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the
movant clearly establishes ‘the burden of persuasion’ as to each
of the four prerequisites.”
Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176
(11th Cir. 2000) (quoting All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda
Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989)).
A.
Substantial Likelihood of Success on the Merits
The
first
factor
in
determining
whether
a
preliminary
injunction should issue is whether the plaintiff is likely to
prevail on the merits of its claims.
Plaintiff asserts that it
is likely to prevail on its claims for trademark infringement under
both federal and state law. 3
3Plaintiff
cites only to federal trademark law in analyzing
the likelihood of success on its claims because the analysis of
the Florida statutory and common law claims of trademark
- 4 -
Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act protects trademark owners
against the use in commerce of “any reproduction, counterfeit,
copy, or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”
15
U.S.C.
§
1114(1)(a).
To
establish
a
claim
of
trademark
infringement, a plaintiff must show that (1) it owns a valid and
protectable mark, and (2) the defendant’s use of the mark is likely
to cause confusion.
Custom Mfg. & Eng’g, Inc. v. Midways Servs.,
Inc., 508 F.3d 641, 647 (11th Cir. 2007).
Thus, plaintiff’s
success hinges upon whether SEA SALT is a protectable mark, and if
so,
whether
defendant’s
use
of
the
Mark
is
likely
to
cause
confusion.
1.
Validity of the Mark
To prevail on its claims of infringement, plaintiff must first
establish that it owns a valid mark.
Trademark protection “is
only available to distinctive marks, that is, marks that serve the
purpose of identifying the source of the goods or services.”
Knights Armament Co. v. Optical Sys. Tech., Inc., 654 F.3d 1179,
1188 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Welding Servs., Inc. v. Forman, 509
infringement is the same as a federal trademark infringement claim.
(Doc. #24, p. 10 n.5.) See also Investacorp, Inc. v. Arabian Inv.
Banking Corp., 931 F.2d 1519, 1521 (11th Cir. 1991).
- 5 -
F.3d 1351, 1357 (11th Cir. 2007)).
See also Tana v. Dantanna’s,
611 F.3d 767, 773 (11th Cir. 2010).
distinctive;
some
marks,
though
“Some marks are inherently
not
inherently
distinctive,
acquire distinctiveness by becoming associated in the minds of the
public with the products or services offered by the proprietor of
the mark; and some marks can never become distinctive.”
Forman,
509 F.3d at 1357 (citing Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 768-69 (1992)).
“Distinctiveness is a question of fact,
whether
inherent
the
question
distinctiveness.”
The
four
is
distinctiveness
or
acquired
Id.
gradations
of
distinctiveness
recognized
in
trademark law, listed in descending order of strength, are: (1)
arbitrary or fanciful; (2) suggestive; (3) descriptive; and (4)
generic.
Knights Armament, 654 F.3d at 1188.
The Eleventh
Circuit has noted that “[t]he demarcation between each category is
more blurred than it is definite.”
Saint Luke’s Cataract & Laser
Inst., P.A. v. Sanderson, 573 F.3d 1186, 1208 (11th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Coach House Rest., Inc. v. Coach & Six Rests., Inc., 934
F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1991)).
An “arbitrary or fanciful” mark bears no logical relationship
to the product it represents.
Forman, 509 F.3d at 1357.
A mark
is “suggestive” if it refers to some characteristic of the goods,
but
requires
imagination,
thought
- 6 -
and
perception
to
reach
a
conclusion as to the nature of the goods.
arbitrary,
fanciful,
or
suggestive
are
Id.
Marks that are
considered
“inherently
distinctive” because “their intrinsic nature serves to identify a
particular source.”
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768.
A “descriptive” mark identifies a characteristic or quality
of an article or service, such as its color, odor, function,
dimensions, or ingredients.
Caliber Auto. Liquidators, Inc. v.
Premier Chrysler, Jeep, Dodge, LLC, 605 F.3d 931, 938 (11th Cir.
2010).
A descriptive mark is not inherently distinctive and
receives protection only if it acquires secondary meaning.
Coach
House Rest., 934 F.2d at 1560.
The final and weakest category of
distinctiveness is “generic.”
A “generic” mark describes the
class
to
protection
which
a
because
secondary meaning.
good
it
belongs
is
not
and
is
afforded
distinctive
and
no
trademark
cannot
acquire
Knights Armament, 654 F.3d at 1188.
Registration of a trademark on the principal register of the
USPTO
is
prima
rebuttable
distinctive.
facie
presumption
evidence
of
that
the
validity
mark
and
is
establishes
protectable
a
or
15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); Forman, 509 F.3d at 1357 n.3.
“The sort of presumption appropriate depends on whether or not the
[USPTO] has required proof of secondary meaning.”
F.3d at 1357 n.3.
Forman, 509
If proof of secondary meaning is not required,
the presumption is that the mark is inherently distinctive.
- 7 -
Id.
Here, the undisputed evidence shows that the USPTO placed SEA SALT
on the principal register without proof of secondary meaning.
(Doc.
#1-3.)
Plaintiff’s
Mark
is
therefore
presumed
to
be
inherently distinctive, and the burden to show otherwise lies with
defendant.
Defendant argues that SEA SALT is merely descriptive and
should not be afforded any protection because there is no evidence
of secondary meaning.
Specifically, defendant asserts that the
evidence overwhelmingly reflects that SEA SALT is descriptive
because it identifies the ingredients and characteristics of the
food and drinks served at plaintiff’s restaurant.
In response,
plaintiff argues that the presence of salt in the food and drinks
served at its restaurant does not render the Mark descriptive
because plaintiff does not sell salt.
The Court agrees with
plaintiff.
A suggestive mark suggests some characteristic of the product
or service to which it is applied, but requires a leap of the
imagination by the consumer to determine the nature of the product
or service.
Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Int’l Select Grp., Inc.,
192 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir. 1999).
In contrast, a descriptive
mark conveys an immediate idea of the qualities, characteristics,
effect, purpose, or ingredients of a product or service.
Auto. Liquidators, 605 F.3d at 938.
- 8 -
Caliber
For example, “Vision Center”
would be a descriptive mark when used for a business that sells
eyeglasses,
and
refrigerators.
“Penguin”
would
be
a
suggestive
mark
for
Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1335.
Here, plaintiff uses SEA SALT in conjunction with a restaurant
and bar offering contemporary seafood cuisine.
Although salt
serves as a focal point at plaintiff’s restaurant, plaintiff does
not sell salt.
Due to the disconnect between the term “sea salt”
and restaurant and bar services, the Court finds that SEA SALT
does not convey an immediate idea of the services offered by
plaintiff and requires an effort of the imagination to connect SEA
SALT to restaurant and bar services.
In fact, “sea salt” is
primarily used in connection with cooking salts and spices or
packaged food, not restaurant and bar services. 4
(Doc. #44-13.)
Because a customer who sees SEA SALT could not readily discern
that plaintiff operates a restaurant and bar offering contemporary
seafood cuisine, plaintiff’s Mark is at least suggestive. 5
See
Mango’s Tropical Cafe, Inc. v. Mango Martini Rest. & Lounge, Inc.,
844 F. Supp. 2d 1246, 1253 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (finding “Mango” to be
4Defendant
has submitted evidence indicating that there are
thirty-one registered trademarks using the terms “sea” and “salt.”
Of the thirty-one marks, plaintiff is the only one to use “sea”
and “salt” for bar and restaurant services. (Doc. #44-13.)
5 The
fact that defendant
SEASALT AND PEPPER inherently
believes that SEASALT is valid
v. Wine King, LLC, 542 F. Supp.
sought trademark protection for
acknowledges that defendant also
and protectable. MNI Mgmt., Inc.
2d 389, 409 (D.N.J. 2008).
- 9 -
suggestive
when
used
identify
restaurant
and
bar
services).
Accordingly, plaintiff has met its burden of establishing that it
owns a valid and protectable mark.
2.
Likelihood of Confusion
To determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the
Eleventh Circuit has set out seven factors for consideration: (1)
the type of mark; (2) the similarity of the marks; (3) the
similarity of the services; (4) the similarity of the parties'
retail outlets, trade channels, and customers; (5) the similarity
of advertising media; (6) the defendant's intent; and (7) actual
confusion.
Custom Mfg., 508 F.3d at 647-48.
The type of mark and
evidence of actual confusion usually should be given the most
weight.
i.
Id. at 650.
Type of Mark
Classifying the type of mark a plaintiff has determines
whether it is strong or weak.
“The stronger the mark, the greater
the scope of protection accorded it, the weaker the mark, the less
trademark protection is receives.”
Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1335
(citing John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966,
973 (11th Cir. 1983)).
In gauging the strength of a mark, a Court
must first consider the distinctiveness of the mark.
Id.
Here,
plaintiff is likely to show that its Mark is at least suggestive;
- 10 -
thus, SEA SALT is entitled to considerable protection without a
showing of secondary meaning.
Another important factor in gauging the strength of a mark is
the degree to which third parties make use of the mark.
192 F.3d at 1336.
evidence
Frehling,
As previously stated, defendant has presented
indicating
that
there
are
thirty-one
registered
trademarks using the terms “sea” and “salt,” most of which bear
some relation to food or spices.
Although the terms “sea” and
“salt” are used in a number of trademarks, plaintiff is the only
trademark
holder
to
use
“sea”
restaurant and bar services.
and
“salt”
(Doc. #44-13.)
in
connection
with
Defendant has also
presented evidence of approximately six restaurants in the United
States using the terms “sea” and “salt” in their names.
#44-10; Doc. #65-1.)
of
plaintiff’s
Mark
(Doc.
This, however, does little to the strength
because
throughout the country.
the
restaurants
are
scattered
Prior to the opening of Seasalt and
Pepper, plaintiff operated the only restaurant in Florida using
“sea” and “salt” in its name.
Based on the evidence, it does not
appear that the use of “sea salt” is so extensive or widespread as
to considerably weaken plaintiff’s Mark.
Accordingly, the Court
finds that SEA SALT is a strong mark and entitled to significant
protection.
See Blackwall Grp., LLC v. Sick Boy, LLC, 771 F.
Supp. 2d 1322, 1326 (M.D. Fla. 2011).
- 11 -
ii.
Similarity of the Marks
The next factor to consider in evaluating the likelihood of
confusion is the degree to which the marks are similar.
In
undertaking such an evaluation, the court compares the marks at
issue and considers the overall impressions that the marks create,
including the sound, appearance, and manner in which they are used.
Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1337.
The more similar the marks are in
their sound, appearance, and manner, the more likely it is that a
reasonable consumer will be confused as to the source of the
product that each mark represents.
Id.
In this matter, the marks are indisputably similar in one key
way, both use the terms “sea” and “salt.”
Defendant, however,
argues that the similarity stops there because “Seasalt and Pepper”
contains additional words and is stylized in a different fashion.
A
review
of
the
marks
(shown
below)
different fonts, colors, and pictures.
confirms
that
they
use
A comparison of the marks
also reveals that the dominant focus of both marks is on the terms
“sea” and “salt.”
- 12 -
Such a focus favors similarity.
See Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1337.
As noted by the USPTO’s rejection letters (Doc. #1-7; Doc. #1-8),
the presence of a strong distinctive term as the first word in
both parties’ marks renders the marks similar.
Palm Bay Imps.,
Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d
1369, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
The
evidence
also
shows
that
both
the
media
and
Carlos
Miranda, a co-owner of Seasalt and Pepper, LLC, commonly refer to
defendant’s restaurant as “Seasalt.”
(Doc. #24-3, pp. 8, 10, 12,
16, 18-20, 22-23, 25; Doc. #64-2, p. 1.)
The Court finds this to
be indicative of similarity.
Because the marks are similar in some regards and distinct in
others,
the
Court
concludes
that
this
factor
weighs,
albeit
slightly, in favor of plaintiff.
iii. Similarity of the Services
The evidence shows that both parties provide restaurant and
bar services with a focus on seafood.
Because the services
provided are of a similar nature, the Court finds that this factor
weighs in favor of plaintiff.
iv.
Similarity of the Parties’ Retail Outlets and Customers
The fourth factor takes into consideration where, how, and to
whom the parties’ products are sold.
Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1339.
A plaintiff need not produce evidence of direct competition between
- 13 -
the parties for the weight of this factor to favor a likelihood of
confusion; however, some degree of overlap between the parties’
retail outlets and customer bases should be present.
Id.
Plaintiff contends that parties’ retail outlets and customer
bases are similar because both parties cater to high-end consumers
of seafood cuisine and offer their services at up-scale venues.
The record, however, is void of evidence suggesting any customer
overlap or similarities in the parties’ retail outlets.
As such,
the Court finds that this factor favors defendant.
v.
Similarity of Advertising Media
This factor looks to each party’s method of advertising.
Plaintiff concedes that it has no evidence as to the scope or
nature of defendant’s advertising campaigns.
The Court will
therefore construe this factor in favor of defendant.
vi.
Defendant’s Intent
The sixth factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis is
whether the defendant acted in bad faith.
This factor alone may
justify an inference of confusion if it can be shown that a
defendant adopted a plaintiff’s mark with the intention of deriving
a benefit from the plaintiff’s business reputation.
F.3d at 1340.
Frehling, 192
Plaintiff believes that discovery will establish
defendant’s intention to benefit from the good will associated
with SEA SALT because defendant continued to operate under the
- 14 -
trade name “Seasalt and Pepper” after its trademark applications
were denied by the USPTO due to the likelihood of confusion with
plaintiff’s Mark.
The record, however, is void of any evidence
suggesting that defendant acted in bad faith.
The Court finds
that this factor favors defendant.
vii. Actual Confusion
The final factor in the likelihood of confusion analysis is
actual consumer confusion.
best
evidence
of
a
Evidence of actual confusion is the
likelihood
of
confusion
but
is
prerequisite to the issuance of a preliminary injunction.
Mfg., 508 F.3d at 649.
not
a
Custom
To establish actual confusion, plaintiff
has submitted an affidavit from Tanya Buchanan (Buchanan), the
general
According
manager
to
approximately
the
at
plaintiff’s
affidavit,
thirty
restaurant.
Buchanan
inquiries
as
to
has
(Doc.
personally
whether
there
affiliation between Sea Salt and Seasalt and Pepper.
#24-4.)
received
was
an
(Id. ¶ 6.)
Approximately twenty of the inquiries raised questions pertaining
to the lawsuits in which Seasalt and Pepper is involved.
7.)
(Id. ¶
Buchanan also receives approximately ten calls per month from
people attempting to confirm or question a restaurant receipt from
“Seasalt and Pepper,” not “Sea Salt.”
(Id. ¶ 8.)
The Court finds
that this evidence is indicative of actual consumer confusion.
- 15 -
The
evidence
also
establishes
that
two
of
plaintiff’s
suppliers, Freshpoint and Prime Line Distributors, were confused
about the affiliation, or lack thereof, between “Sea Salt” and
“Seasalt and Pepper.”
#24-2, pp. 1-3.)
(Doc. #1-9, p. 1; Doc. #24-1, p. 2; Doc.
The Eleventh Circuit has noted that supplier
confusion is relevant evidence of actual confusion because a
supplier is presumably “familiar with an enterprise since he is
actually providing it with goods.”
Frehling, 192 F.3d at 1341
(quoting Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Discount Drugs, Inc., 675
F.2d
1160,
1167
(11th
Cir.
1982)).
Because
plaintiff
has
submitted evidence of consumer and supplier confusion, the Court
finds that this factor weighs heavily in plaintiff’s favor.
The Court has considered the seven factors in light of the
evidence submitted by the parties and concludes the balance of
factors
indicates
consumers
in
there
the
is
a
likelihood
marketplace.
of
Plaintiff
confusion
has
among
therefore
demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of
its trademark infringement claims.
B.
Irreparable Harm
The Eleventh Circuit has acknowledged that “once a plaintiff
establishes a likelihood of success on the merits of a trademark
infringement claim,” there is a “presumption of irreparable harm.”
N. Am. Med. Corp. v. Axiom Worldwide, Inc., 522 F.3d 1211, 1227
- 16 -
(11th Cir. 2008).
The viability of this presumption, however, has
been called into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay
Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
F.3d at 1228.
See Axiom 522
Because the Eleventh Circuit declined to resolve
this issue, a court may grant a preliminary injunction “without
the benefit of a presumption of irreparable injury,” or may “decide
that
the
particular
circumstances
of
the
instant
case
bear
substantial parallels to previous cases such that a presumption of
irreparable injury is an appropriate exercise of its discretion in
light of the historical traditions.”
Id.
The Court need not apply the presumption in this matter
because the evidence establishes a likelihood of irreparable harm.
As already discussed, plaintiff has demonstrated a likelihood of
confusion in that consumers may incorrectly associate “Seasalt and
Pepper” with “Sea Salt.”
evidence
of
defendant’s
negative
restaurant.
Plaintiff has also presented ample
press
and
(Doc.
publicity
#24-3.)
associated
The
operation
with
of
defendant’s restaurant under the name “Seasalt and Pepper” is
likely to cause irreparable harm to plaintiff’s reputation because
plaintiff will not have the ability to control the quality of the
services provided 6 or escape any harm caused by the negative
6See
Zachary Fagenson, Go to Seasalt and Pepper for the View,
but Not the Food, The Miami New Times, May 6, 2014, at
http://blogs.miaminewtimes.com/shortorder/2014/05/go_to_seasalt_
- 17 -
publicity associated with defendant’s restaurant. 7
Damage to
plaintiff’s reputation and goodwill would be difficult to quantify
and
could
not
be
undone
through
an
award
of
money
damages.
Plaintiff has therefore demonstrated a likelihood of irreparable
harm.
C.
Balance of the Harm to the Parties
The Court is satisfied that the risk to the reputation and
goodwill associated with plaintiff’s Mark should defendant’s use
of Seasalt and Pepper continue outweighs any hardship caused by
enjoining the use sea salt.
D.
Public Interest
An injunction is not adverse to the public interest because
the public interest is served by preventing consumer confusion in
the marketplace.
Davidoff & CIE, S.A. v. PLD Int’t Corp., 263 F3d
1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Doc. #24)
is GRANTED.
and_pepper_for_t.php.
(Doc. #24-3, pp. 17-21.)
7See
Zachary Fagenson, Seasalt and Pepper Chef Alfredo Alvarez
Walks
Out,
The
Miami
New
Times,
Sept.
24,
2014,
at
http://blogs.miaminewtimes.com/shortorder/2014/09/seasalt_and_pe
pper_chef_alfredo_alvarez_walks_out.php.
- 18 -
a.
Defendant Seasalt and Pepper, LLC and all those acting
in
concert
with
it
are
preliminary
enjoined
and
restrained from using the SEA SALT mark in association
with
restaurant
and
bar
services.
Defendant
shall
immediately terminate its use of the SEA SALT mark in
advertising and promotional materials, on signage and
menus, and on websites.
b.
Defendant shall file a notice of compliance with the
Court within thirty (30) days of this Opinion and Order.
c.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c), plaintiff shall post
a bond in the amount of $25,000.00, as payment of damages
to
which
defendant
may
be
entitled
for
wrongful
injunction or restraint.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
of October, 2014.
Copies:
Counsel of Record
- 19 -
14th
day
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