S.M. v. Hendry County School Board
Filing
23
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 21 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. As to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4, Defendant's Motion is DENIED. As to Count 5, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED. Thus, Count 5 is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 11/10/2014. (LMF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
S.M., individually and on behalf of L.C. a
minor
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:14-cv-237-FtM-38CM
HENDRY COUNTY SCHOOL
BOARD,
Defendant.
/
ORDER1
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint (Doc. #21) filed on October 13, 2014. Plaintiffs filed a Response in
Opposition (Doc. #22) on October 27, 2014. Thus, the matter is ripe for review.
Background
Plaintiff L.C. is a 13-year-old disabled child who receives exceptional student
education services (“ESE”) from Defendant. (Doc. #20 at 3). Defendant, Hendry County
School Board, is a governmental agency who manages and operates Hendry County
Public Schools in Hendry County, Florida. (Doc. #20 at 3). At birth, Plaintiff L.C. suffered
a severe brain disorder called holoprosencephaly, which prevented portions of his brain
from developing. (Doc. #20 at 4). As a result of this disorder, Plaintiff L.C. is missing the
1
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portions of his brain responsible for communication between brain hemispheres and the
transfer of motor, sensory, and cognitive information. (Doc. #20 at 4). In addition to his
birth disorder, Plaintiff L.C. has been diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder, Cerebral
Palsy, and Spastic Quadriplegia. (Doc. #20 at 4). Due to Plaintiff L.C.’s state, Plaintiff
L.C. requires extensive assistance for almost every aspect of his daily life, including, but
not limited to, mobility, eating, communicating, toileting, and completing academic tasks.
(Doc. #20 at 4).
Beginning in 2008, Plaintiff L.C. enrolled in the Hendry County School District, and
continued to attend schools in the district through the current academic year except for
the 2012-13 school year. (Doc. #20 at 4). Specifically, in March 2012, Plaintiff L.C.’s
mother, S.M., became disappointed with her son’s treatment while he attended schools
in the Hendry County School District. Therefore, Plaintiff S.M. attended a school meeting
and requested that her son be transferred to a private school setting that could provide
more intensive instruction. (Doc. #20 at 7). After reviewing the private school, Defendant
and Plaintiff S.M. reached an agreement that placed Plaintiff L.C. into the private school
setting and that entailed Defendant agreeing to provide transportation for Plaintiff L.C. to
the new school. (Doc. #20 at 7).
At the conclusion of the 2012-13 academic year, Defendant informed Plaintiff S.M.
that it would no longer provide Plaintiff L.C. transportation to the private school. (Doc.
#20 at 8). Because Plaintiff S.M. could not afford to provide daily transportation herself
for Plaintiff L.C. to attend the private school, Plaintiff S.M. was forced to withdraw Plaintiff
L.C. from the private school and enroll him in another Hendry County School District
school – LaBelle Middle School. (Doc. #20 at 8). Soon after, Plaintiff S.M. again became
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dissatisfied with the treatment that her son was receiving at LaBelle Middle School. As a
result, Plaintiff S.M. “filed a request for due process and a request for a Section 504
hearing.” (Doc. #20 at 11).
After filing her requests, Plaintiff S.M. avers that she was subjected to retaliatory
treatment by Defendant. In her employment as Service Coordinator of a company named
Early Steps, Plaintiff S.M. manages monthly meetings with the local ESE administration,
exclusively in Hendry and Glades Counties. (Doc. #20 at 11). Plaintiff S.M. asserts that
Lucinda Kelley, the ESE director for Defendant, became aware that Plaintiff S.M. had filed
the due process and Section 504 hearing requests. (Doc. #20 at 11). Shortly after, Ms.
Kelley allegedly sent multiple emails and made several telephone calls to Early Steps’
Director, Trina Puddlefoot, asking that Plaintiff S.M. no longer be assigned to any of
Defendant’s schools. (Doc. #20 at 11-12). When Ms. Puddlefoot did not immediately act
on this correspondence, Ms. Kelley threatened that Defendant would no longer be willing
to work with Early Steps. (Doc. #20 at 12). Because of these threats, Plaintiff S.M. avers
that Early Steps must now send an additional employee to all meetings with Defendant
out of concern for Plaintiff S.M.’s protection. (Doc. #20 at 12).
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs filed an action against Defendant, asserting four
“claims”: (1) “claim for relief under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, including
intentional discrimination and retaliation”; (2) a “claim for relief under Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act and Florida law”; (3) “claims for relief based on IDEA and
Section 1983”; and (4) “claims for relief based on Section 504 and Section 1983.” (Doc.
#1 at 20-35). In response, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing that Plaintiffs’
Complaint constituted an improper “shotgun pleading” and needed to be dismissed. (Doc.
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#12). The Court agreed and granted Defendant’s Motion, requiring Plaintiffs to file an
Amended Complaint in order to proceed with this action. (Doc. #19). Soon after, Plaintiffs
filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. #20). Defendant now brings the instant Motion,
seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. (Doc. #21).
Legal Standard
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court limits its consideration to
well-pleaded factual allegations, documents central to, or referenced in, the complaint,
and matters judicially noticed. La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th
Cir. 2004). The Court must accept all factual allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint as true
and take them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d
1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). Conclusory allegations, however, are not entitled to a
presumption of truth. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868
(2009) (discussing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal); Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d
1014, 1036 n. 16 (11th Cir.2001).
The Court employs the Twombly–Iqbal plausibility standard when reviewing a
complaint subject to a motion to dismiss. Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 708, n. 2 (11th
Cir. 2010). A claim is plausible if the plaintiff alleges facts that “allow[ ] the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 678. The plausibility standard requires that a plaintiff allege sufficient facts “to
raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that supports the
plaintiff's claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167
L.Ed.2d 929 (2007); Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1036 n. 16. Thus, “the-defendant-unlawfully
harmed me accusation” is insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173
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L.Ed.2d 868. “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further
factual enhancement.” Id. (internal modifications omitted). Further, courts are not “bound
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986).
Discussion
Defendant first seeks dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint on the basis that
it “fails to comply with Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (Doc. #21
at 4-5). Next, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff S.M. should be dismissed as a party to this
action because of her failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. (Doc. #21 at 5-7).
And finally, Defendant maintains that Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim must be dismissed
because Plaintiffs fail to cite a statute that would support an action under § 1983. (Doc.
#21 at 7-10). The Court will address each argument in turn.
A. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint Does Not Constitute a Shotgun Pleading
Defendant begins its Motion by arguing that Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint must
be dismissed because it constitutes a shotgun pleading in violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8
and 10. In support, Defendant primarily recites case law discussing shotgun pleadings
and provides two sentences of substantive argument, concluding that Plaintiffs have filed
an “impermissible ‘shotgun’ pleading” that “suffers from many of the same issues as the
original [Complaint] and should be dismissed.” (Doc. #21 at 5). Plaintiffs respond by
disputing that their Amended Complaint constitutes a shotgun pleading and by noting that
Defendant answered similar complaints at the administrative level. (Doc. #22 at 7-9).
Indeed, “[a] complaint that fails to articulate claims with sufficient clarity to allow
the defendant to frame a responsive pleading constitutes a ‘shotgun pleading.’” Lampkin-
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Asam v. Volusia Cnty. Sch. Bd., 261 F. App'x 274, 277 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing Byrne v.
Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1128-29 (11th Cir. 2001)).
Such pleadings are typically
“confusing, incoherent, and clogged with seemingly irrelevant factual allegations.” Id.
This is primarily due to the fact that shotgun pleadings “incorporate[] every antecedent
allegation by reference into each subsequent claim for relief, making it “virtually
impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claims for
relief.” Frantz v. Walled, 513 F. App'x 815, 820 (11th Cir. 2013). It is no surprise that
“[p]leadings of this nature are prohibited by Rule 8(a)(2), which requires a claim for relief
to be “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Lampkin-Asam, 261 F. App’x at 277 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
Here, Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint does not constitute a shotgun pleading. As
noted above, shotgun pleadings typically incorporate every antecedent allegation into
each subsequent claim for relief.
But this is not the case with Plaintiffs’ Amended
Complaint. Instead, Plaintiffs not only section off their general factual allegations, but
also reallege and incorporate by reference those sections in their four “claims” only when
a section is relevant. (Doc. #20 at 3-16). This organization is a stark difference from
Plaintiffs’ original Complaint, which the Court previously agreed constituted a prime
example of a shotgun pleading. (Compare Doc. #1 with Doc. #20). And courts routinely
hold that realleging and incorporating by reference a precise portion of a general factual
allegation section does not constitute a shotgun pleading. See, e.g., Small v. Amgen,
Inc., 2 F.Supp.3d 1292, 1296-97 (M.D.Fla. 2014) (holding that realleging and
incorporating a section of general factual allegations, and not legal conclusions, does not
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constitute a shotgun pleading). Accordingly, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint as a shotgun pleading must be denied.
B. Plaintiff S.M. Exhausted Her Administrative Remedies
Next, Defendant argues that Plaintiff S.M. should be dismissed from this action
because she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. As Defendant explains, all
claims asserting the rights of disabled children pursuant to the “IDEA” -- even those
brought by parents -- must first be exhausted in state administrative proceedings. (Doc.
#21 at 6 (citing M.T.V. v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153 (11th Cir. 2006)).
Defendant avers that Plaintiff “S.M. has not met [this] exhaustion requirement as she was
not a party to the prior administrative proceeding, and therefore has not asserted claims
on her behalf at any time prior to the [Amended] Complaint filed” with this Court. (Doc.
#21 at 7). Because Plaintiff S.M. failed to meet this exhaustion requirement, Defendant
asserts that Plaintiff S.M. must be dismissed from this action. (Doc. #21 at 7). In
response, Plaintiffs distinguish the cases Defendant cites and aver that Plaintiff was a
party to the prior administrative proceeding, as exhibited in the DOAH Final Order. (Doc.
#22 at 9-13). Moreover, Plaintiffs also argue that even if the Court finds Plaintiff S.M. did
not exhaust her administrative remedies, she was not required to because Defendant
waived this requirement by not offering her any other administrative hearing beyond the
one conducted. (Doc. #22 at 13-15).
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) ensures “that all children
with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education [(“FAPE”)] that
emphasizes special education and related services” and “that that the rights of children
with disabilities and parents of such children are protected.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)-
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(B). In doing so, “[t]he IDEA allows plaintiffs to seek ‘remedies available under the
constitution, the ADA, Section 504, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of children
with disabilities.” M.T.V., 446 F.3d at 1157-58 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(I)) (internal
brackets omitted). But before seeking these remedies in a civil action, plaintiffs must first
exhaust their claims in state administrative proceedings. Id. at 1158. This holds true for
“‘any matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child
or the provision of a [FAPE] to such a child.’”
Id. citing (20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)).
Therefore, a parent’s retaliation claim – contending that a school district retaliated against
them for “advocating for their son’s legal rights to receive an appropriate education and
be free from discrimination based solely upon his disabilities” – is subject to the
exhaustion requirement. Id. at 1158-159 (internal brackets and citations omitted).
With this framework in mind, the question now becomes whether Plaintiff S.M.
exhausted her administrative remedies or was excused from doing so before bringing this
civil action for retaliation against Defendant. Id. And to answer this question, the Court
finds that Plaintiff S.M. did exhaust her administrative remedies. Defendant attempts to
convince the Court otherwise by primarily relying on and analogizing M.T.V. There, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that the plaintiff parents failed to “allege [that] they ever requested
a due process hearing with respect to their retaliation claims.” Id. Instead, the plaintiff
parents “argue[d] [that] they raised the retaliation issue at other due process hearings
brought by themselves and the [defendant] [s]chool [d]istrict.” Id. In rejecting the plaintiff
parents’ argument, the Eleventh Circuit noted that the section of the IDEA that allows
parties to challenge an ALJ’s final decision provides that “‘any party aggrieved by the
findings and decision under this subsection shall have the right to bring a civil action with
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respect to the complaint presented pursuant to this section.’” Id. (quoting § 1415(I))
(emphasis in original). Consequently, in order to bring a retaliation claim, parents must
assert their claim in a complaint and exhaust all administrative remedies regarding that
complaint before filing a civil action. Id.
In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff S.M. alleges that all issues related to . . . [her
retaliation claim] have been properly raised below, exhausted, [and] sufficiently pled. . . .”
(Doc. #20 at 23, ¶ 163). And a review of the record2 confirms Plaintiff S.M.’s allegation.
Specifically, in the Amended Request for Exceptional Student Education Due Process
Hearing (“ALJ Complaint”), Plaintiffs devoted 22 of their 54 paragraphs of allegations
towards Plaintiff S.M.’s retaliation claim. (Doc. #17-5 at 6-7, ¶¶ 32-54). Defendant
answered the ALJ Complaint and addressed all of its allegations, including those related
to Plaintiff S.M.’s retaliation claim. (Doc. #17-6 at 3-4, ¶¶ 32-54). Thereafter, the ALJ
entered a Final Order that not only ruled on, but also provided nearly three pages of
conclusions of law on, the retaliation claims. (Doc. #17-8 at 41-43).
Simply stated, Plaintiff S.M. asserted her retaliation claim in the ALJ Complaint,
Defendant answered the ALJ Complaint, and the ALJ issued a Final Order on the ALJ
Complaint. Therefore, Plaintiff S.M. has exhausted the administrative remedies required
to bring her retaliation claim before this Court. See Sch. Bd. of Manatee Cnty., Fla. V.
L.H. ex rel. D.H., 666 F.Supp.2d 1285 (M.D.Fla. 2009) (finding that the plaintiff parents
exhausted their administrative requirements when they “filed an administrative complaint
listing the claims for which they [sought] redress in this litigation, presented evidence
2
“In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, the district court may consider an extrinsic document if it is (1) central
to the plaintiff's claim, and (2) its authenticity is not challenged.” Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.3d 1371, 1379 (11th Cir. 2010).
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relating to the facts underlying the claims, and obtained a final order from the ALJ relating
to the main issue at the heart of their claims”). Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss as to Plaintiff S.M. failing to exhaust her administrative remedies must
be denied.
C. Plaintiffs Do Not Allege a Sufficient Basis for Their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Claims
Defendant’s final argument asserts that Plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim must be
dismissed because § 1983 claims cannot be based solely on IDEA violations. In support,
Defendant primarily cites case law, but does provide roughly four sentences of
substantive argument, stating: (1) Plaintiffs fail to allege that Defendant denied Plaintiffs
access to a due process hearing, thereby preventing Plaintiffs from bringing a § 1983
claim based on the IDEA (Doc. #21 at 8); (2) Plaintiffs “cannot maintain a § 1983 [claim]
based on violations of the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA” either (Doc. #21 at 9); and (3)
“Plaintiffs[’] claim[] under § 1983 must be dismissed as the claim[] do[es] not state a claim
on which relief can be granted under federal law” (Doc. #21 at 10).
Plaintiffs fail to
provide an argument in response.
Historically, “the case law [was] anything but clear with respect to claims brought
pursuant to § 1983 to enforce rights provided for under the IDEA.” Sch. Bd. of Manatee
Cnty., Fla., 666 F.Supp.2d at 1296. But recently, the Eleventh Circuit provided muchneeded clarification by holding “that section 1983 actions for denial of rights conferred by
the IDEA are barred because the IDEA’s comprehensive enforcement scheme provides
the sole remedy for statutory violations.” K.A. ex rel. F.A. v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 741
F.3d 1195, 1210 (11th Cir. 2013). Here, because there are no rights at issue conferred
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by the Constitution or other federal laws and not the IDEA, Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claim,
comprising Count 5, must be dismissed. Id.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. #21) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
1. As to Counts 1, 2, 3, and 4, Defendant’s Motion is DENIED.
2. As to Count 5, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED. Thus, Count 5 is DISMISSED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida, this 10th day of November, 2014.
Copies: All Parties of Record
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