Hayward v. Lee County Sheriff's Office et al
Filing
62
OPINION AND ORDER granting 54 defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff, terminate all pending motions and deadlines, and close the file. See Opinion and Order for details. (AMB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
AHMAD HAYWARD,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No:
2:14-cv-244-FtM-29MRM
LEE COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE,
RYAN LOWE, KEITH DUNN, and
RICH SNYDER,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendants' Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc. #54) filed on July 20, 2017.
Plaintiff filed a Response on September 25, 2017. (Doc. #58.)
For
the reasons set forth below, defendants’ Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings (Doc. #54) is granted.
I.
On February 13, 2009, Ahmad Hayward (plaintiff), accompanied
by a friend, Patrick Towns (Towns), drove to Fort Myers Beach to
pick up money from an unknown person.
(Doc. #1, ¶¶ 7-13.)
Plaintiff was unaware that the Lee County Sheriff’s Office was
working with a confidential informant, and that the meeting was
part of an anticipated drug deal.
(Id. ¶¶ 14-17.)
Defendant
officers stopped and detained plaintiff, even though they did not
have a physical description of plaintiff and his vehicle did not
match the description of the anticipated drug supplier’s vehicle.
(Id. ¶¶ 22-23.)
When asked by officers, plaintiff denied having
drugs in the vehicle.
(Id. ¶¶ 24-25.)
did not disclose any drugs.
A K-9 search of the vehicle
(Id. ¶¶ 26-27.)
Despite not locating any drugs on plaintiff’s person, Towns’
person, or in the vehicle, defendants took Hayward and Towns into
custody and seized the vehicle.
(Id. ¶¶ 27, 29-30.)
When
questioned at the police station, plaintiff denied any involvement
with drugs and invoked his right to counsel.
(Id. ¶¶ 31-32.)
second search of the vehicle again did not reveal any drugs.
¶ 33.)
A
(Id.
Later, in exchange for immunity, Towns admitted that his
previous statement was false and confessed that drugs were hidden
in the headliner of plaintiff’s vehicle.
(Id. ¶¶ 35-37.)
Acting
on this information, defendants searched the vehicle a third time
and located heroin in the headliner.
released from custody.
(Id. ¶ 38.)
Towns was then
(Id. ¶ 39.)
Plaintiff was charged with “conspiracy to traffic, traffic in
heroin, public order crime, and driving while license was suspended
or revoked.”
(Id. ¶ 40.)
Towns subsequently signed a notarized
statement stating that he had lied to the defendants, that the
drugs found in the vehicle in fact belonged to him, and that
plaintiff had no knowledge of the drugs.
(Id. ¶ 41.)
Plaintiff
was acquitted by a jury of the drug trafficking charge on August
12, 2010.
(Id. ¶ 43.)
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On
May
5,
2014,
plaintiff
filed
a
Complaint
(Doc.
#1)
asserting claims against defendants Ryan Lowe (Lowe), Keith Dunn
(Dunn), and Rich Snyder (Snyder) for illegal search (Count I),
illegal
seizure
(Count
II),
false
arrest
(Count
III),
civil
conspiracy (Count IV), and seeking to impose respondeat superior
liability on Lee County Sheriff’s Department (Count V).
46-63.)
(Id. ¶¶
On June 30, 2017, this Court granted in part defendants’
Amended Motion to Dismiss, and dismissed Counts I and III with
prejudice.
(Doc. #52.)
On July 20, 2017, defendants filed a
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, seeking judgment on the
remaining counts — Counts II, IV, and V.
(Doc. #54.)
II.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that “[a]fter
the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a
party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
12(c).
no
Fed.
R. Civ. P.
“Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate when there are
material
facts
by considering the
in
dispute,
and
substance
any judicially noticed facts.”
of
judgment
the
Hawthorne
may
be
rendered
pleadings
v.
Mac
and
Adjustment,
Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998); e.g., Betts v. Hall,
No. 3:14cv33/MCR/EMT, 2015 WL 3447500, at *5 & n.2 (N.D. Fla. May
27, 2015).
Public records are among the permissible facts that a
district court may take judicial notice of and consider when ruling
on a motion for judgment on the pleadings. See Bryant v. Avado
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Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 1999); Blue Hill
Invs., Ltd. v. Silva, No. 1:15-CV-20733-KKM, 2015 WL 9319394, at
*2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 23, 2015).
When reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the
court must view the facts in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.
Hawthorne, 140 F.3d at 1370.
A judgment on the
pleadings can be granted only if the nonmoving party can prove no
set of facts which would allow it to prevail.
Palmer & Cay, Inc.
v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., Inc., 404 F.3d 1297, 1303 (11th Cir.
2005) (citations omitted).
Because the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court reads
his pleadings liberally and adopts a less stringent standard than
it would for one drafted by an attorney.
Jones v. Fla. Parole
Comm’n, 787 F.3d 1105, 1007 (11th Cir. 2015).
Pro se parties are
still required to conform to the procedural rules.
Hickman v.
Hickman, 563 F. App’x 742, 743 (11th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted).
Defendants request this Court to enter a judgment on the
pleadings because the remaining counts of federal false arrest,1
As previously stated, Count II alleges that defendants
illegally seized plaintiff in violation of the Fourth Amendment by
taking plaintiff into custody when the facts did not justify such
a seizure. (Doc. #1, p. 9.) This is essentially a federal claim
for false arrest, which arises when an arrest occurs without a
warrant and without probable cause. Brown v. City of Huntsville,
608 F.3d 724, 734 (11th Cir. 2010).
1
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civil
conspiracy,
and
respondeat
applicable statute of limitations.
superior
are
barred
by
the
statute
of
(Doc. #54.)
A. Length of Statutes of Limitations
As
previously
discussed,
the
applicable
limitations for each of the plaintiff’s causes of action is four
years.
(Doc. # 52, pp. 6-7); see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384,
387 (2007) (stating that the statute of limitations for a § 1983
cause of action is that “which the State provides for personalinjury torts”);
Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir.
2003) (stating “Florida’s four-year statute of limitations applies
to such claims of deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983”);
Navarro v. City of Riviera Beach, 192 F. Supp. 3d 1353, 1364–65
(S.D. Fla. 2016) (four-year statute of limitations for claims of
false arrest); Baez v. Root, No. 13-81158-CIV, 2014 WL 1414433, at
*2 (S.D. Fla Apr., 11 2014) (citation omitted) (four year statute
of limitations for civil conspiracy claims).
B. Dates of Accrual
Defendants assert that plaintiff’s claim for federal false
arrest accrued on March 12, 2009, and therefore the false arrest
claim filed on May 5, 2014 is barred by the statute of limitations.
(Doc. #54, pp. 4-5.)
It is well-established that while state law governs the length
of the statute of limitations period, federal law governs the date
it begins to run or accrue.
Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561
- 5 -
(11th Cir. 1996).
Under federal law, the statute of limitations
period accrues when the plaintiff has “a complete and present cause
of
action.”
omitted).
Wallace,
549
U.S.
at
388
(internal
citations
The statute of limitations begins to run for a federal
false arrest claim when the false imprisonment comes to an end.
White v. Hiers, 652 F. App’x 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388, 389).
“[A] false imprisonment ends once
the victim becomes held pursuant to [legal] process —when, for
example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.”
Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389 (emphasis omitted).
In their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, defendants
assert that the statute of limitations for plaintiff’s federal
false arrest claim began to run on March 12, 2009.
3-4; Doc. #54-1.)
(Doc. #54, pp.
Although this date was not within the four
corners of plaintiff’s Complaint, it is contained in public court
records from plaintiff’s state court criminal case. (Doc. #54, p.
4 n.1; Doc. #54-1.)
Therefore, the Court takes judicial notice
of the following dates, each of which is contained within the
public records of the state court:
(1) On February 14, 2009,
plaintiff had an initial appearance where the magistrate judge
reviewed plaintiff’s charges and fixed the amount of his bond, and
plaintiff was bound over for arraignment on bond; (2) On March 12,
2009,
a
public
defender
entered
a
notice
of
appearance
and
plaintiff entered a plea of not guilty; (3) On June 15, 2009,
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plaintiff waived his arraignment.
Regardless of the specific date
utilized, plaintiff did not file his Complaint until May 5, 2014,
more than a year after the applicable statute of limitations had
run for his federal false arrest claim.
White, 652 F. App’x at
786 (finding statute of limitations began to run on date magistrate
judge reviewed charges, fixed amount of bond, and plaintiff was
release on bail).
As a result, the Court finds that Count II is
barred by the statute of limitations, unless plaintiff is entitled
to equitable tolling.
Additionally,
because
the
only
remaining
portions
of
plaintiff’s claims for civil conspiracy and respondeat superior
are those relating to plaintiff’s federal false arrest claims,
counts IV and V are also barred by the statute of limitations,
unless tolled.
the
last
(Doc. #52, pp. 10-12.)
element
constituting
a
As discussed previously,
cause
of
action
for
civil
conspiracy “will necessarily be the injury to the plaintiff.”
Armbrister v. Roland Int’l Corp., 667 F. Supp. 802, 809 (M.D. Fla.
1988).
Plaintiff
bases
his
civil
conspiracy
claim
on
his
allegations of false arrest, the injury for which potentially
lasted
until
plaintiff
was
held
pursuant
to
legal
process.
Therefore, plaintiff’s claim for civil conspiracy is barred by the
statute
of
limitations.
Similarly,
any
attempt
to
assert
respondeat superior liability based on the federal false arrest
claim is also untimely unless tolled.
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C. Equitable Tolling
As previously discussed by this Court, “we look to state law
for statutory tolling rules in § 1983 actions.”
Seibert v. Comm’r,
Ga. Dep’t of Corr., 680 F. App’x 837, 839 (11th Cir. 2017).
Florida Statute § 95.051 lists the following circumstances for
which a party may be entitled to equitable tolling:
(1) The running of the time under any statute
of limitations except ss. 95.281, 95.35, and
95.36 is tolled by:
(a) Absence from the state of the person to be
sued.
(b) Use by the person to be sued of a false
name that is unknown to the person entitled to
sue so that process cannot be served on the
person to be sued.
(c) Concealment in the state of the person to
be sued so that process cannot be served on
him or her.
(d) The adjudicated incapacity, before the
cause of action accrued, of the person
entitled to sue.
In any event, the action
must be begun within 7 years after the act,
event, or occurrence giving rise to the cause
of action.
(e) Voluntary payments by the alleged father
of the child in paternity actions during the
time of the payments.
(f) The payment of any part of the principal
or interest of any obligation or liability
founded on a written instrument.
(g) The pendency of any arbitral proceeding
pertaining to a dispute that is the subject of
the action.
(h) The period of an intervening bankruptcy
tolls the expiration period of a tax
certificate
under
s.
197.482
and
any
proceeding or process under chapter 197.
(i) The minority or previously adjudicated
incapacity of the person entitled to sue
during any period of time in which a parent,
guardian, or guardian ad litem does not exist,
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has an interest adverse to the minor or
incapacitated person, or is adjudicated to be
incapacitated to sue; except with respect to
the statute of limitations for a claim for
medical malpractice as provided in s. 95.11.
In any event, the action must be begun within
7 years after the act, event, or occurrence
giving rise to the cause of action.
Fla. Stat. § 95.051.
As previously held, the Court does not find
that plaintiff has set forth allegations to warrant tolling or
estoppel.
(Doc. #52, pp. 12-15.)
Accordingly, the Court grants
defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. #54.)
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.
Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc.
#54) is GRANTED.
2.
and
The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants
against
plaintiff,
terminate
all
pending
motions
and
deadlines, and close the file.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this __30th__ day of
October, 2017.
Copies:
Parties of Record
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