K.W. et al v. The Lee County School Board et al
Filing
29
OPINION AND ORDER granting 24 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. The First Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice to filling a Second Amended Complaint within fourteen (14) days of this Opinion and Order. See Opinion and Order for details. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 12/11/2014. (MAB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
K.W., a parent and guardian
and J.W., a minor,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Case No: 2:14-cv-258-FtM-29CM
THE LEE COUNTY SCHOOL BOARD,
KIRK
SWOPE,
in
his
individual
capacity,
SUE
PATTI, in her individual
capacity, and DIANNE PIERCY,
in her individual capacity,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendants’
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (Doc. #24)
filed on July 25, 2014.
Plaintiff filed a Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the First Amended
Complaint (Doc. #27) on August 15, 2014.
For the reason set forth
below, the motion is granted.
I.
On May 13, 2014, plaintiff K.W., as parent and guardian of
J.W., a minor, initiated this action by filing an eight-count
against the Lee County School Board, Kirk Swope, Sue Patti, and
Dianne Piercy.
(Doc. #1.)
Plaintiff is now relying on her First
Amended Complaint (Doc. #20), which alleges as follows:
In 2012, J.W., an eight year-old female, attended the second
grade at Allen Park Elementary School (Allen Park) in Fort Myers,
Florida.
(Doc. #20, ¶ 12.)
J.W. suffers from permanent medical
disabilities and has ongoing pulmonary and respiratory problems.
(Id. ¶ 13.)
J.W.’s medical condition requires ongoing treatment,
including the use of prescription medications and a breathing
machine.
The
medications
cause
significant
pulmonary and respiratory sensitivities.
weight
gain
and
At the time of the
alleged incident, J.W. weighed 172 pounds and suffered from lung
disease and emphysema.
(Id. ¶ 14.)
On May 11, 2012, J.W. sustained an injury to her left foot
while walking from her lunch period to her instructional period.
(Id. ¶ 17.)
J.W. informed her teacher, Kirk Swope (Swope), that
she was in a lot of pain and was unable to walk without significant
trauma.
(Id. ¶ 18.)
Swope, however, did not contact the school
nurse or provide any assistance and when another student attempted
to assist J.W., he verbally mocked her.
(Id. ¶¶ 18-19.)
J.W.
continued to complain of her pain, but Swope continued to mock her
by telling her that he was trying to call the school clinic even
though no such attempt was made.
(Id. ¶ 21.)
J.W. to her physical education class.
When
J.W.
arrived
at
her
Swope then sent
(Id. ¶ 22.)
physical
education
class,
she
informed Dianne Piercy (Piercy) that she was in significant pain
and could not put any weight on her foot.
2
Piercy did not inspect
J.W.’s foot or send her to the school nurse and demanded that J.W.
participate in class.
(Id. ¶ 23.)
J.W. refused to participate
and was subsequently written up for having a behavioral problem.
Piercy then sent J.W. across the building, without assistance, to
see Sue Patti (Patti), the counselor at Allen Park.
(Id.)
J.W.
told Patti about her injury and stated that she was in excruciating
pain.
Patti did nothing to assist J.W. and did not contact the
school nurse or J.W.’s mother.
J.W. received a disciplinary note
from Patti and was sent back to class without any assistance.
(Id.
¶ 24.)
By the time the school day ended, the pain in J.W.’s foot was
so severe that she collapsed as she walking to the parent pick-up
line.
After she collapsed, some of the other children pointed at
her and said “look at the fat girl on the ground.”
(Id. ¶ 26.)
When K.W. arrived to pick J.W. up from school, she was told that
there were no more children for pick-up.
K.W. frantically rushed
to the front of the school and was told that J.W. had collapsed in
the hallway.
(Id. ¶¶ 28-29.)
After J.W. told her mother about
the excruciating pain in her foot, K.W. attempted to take off
J.W.’s shoe, but struggled because J.W.’s foot was swollen to
almost twice its normal size.
(Id. ¶ 30.)
K.W. immediately rushed
J.W. to the emergency room where she was diagnosed with a fracture
on the fifth metatarsal bone of her left foot.
3
(Id. ¶¶ 31-32.)
J.W. returned to school on May 14, 2012, in a cast and on
crutches, with a physician’s note indicating that she was not
supposed to participate in physical education because doing so
could exacerbate her injuries.
(Id. ¶ 34.)
The staff at Allen
Park told J.W. that she could not use crutches without a doctor’s
note.
K.W. presented the release sheet from the emergency room,
which indicated that the hospital provided the crutches.
35.)
(Id. ¶
Allen Park refused to accept the emergency room release and
forced K.W. to return to the hospital in order to secure a doctor’s
note authorizing J.W.’s use of crutches.
(Id.)
Despite the instruction to limit J.W.’s physical activity and
the presence of a cast, Swope and other employees at Allen Park
forced J.W. to attend physical education class on May 16, 2012.
Piercy
even
participating
wrote
in
J.W.
physical
up
in
a
disciplinary
education.
(Id.
¶
note
for
36.)
not
Shortly
thereafter, K.W. contacted the assistant principal at Allen Park
as well as other members of the Lee County School Board to complain
of the outrageous treatment of J.W. by the employees at Allen Park.
Despite her complaints, neither the school officials nor the School
Board investigated the incident or took any disciplinary action.
(Id. ¶ 37.)
J.W. spent most of the summer recovering from her injury and
when
she
returned
to
Allen
Park
officials continued to harass her.
4
in
August
2012,
the
school
She was severely disciplined
for non-violent and non-destructive behavior that was typical of
a child her age and school officials frequently contacted K.W.
during work hours to complain of the behavior.
As
a
initiated
result
this
of
the
action
incidents
against
at
(Id. ¶¶ 38-40.)
Allen
defendants.
Park,
plaintiff
Plaintiff’s
First
Amended Complaint sets forth six counts based on federal law
(Counts I - VI) and two counts based on Florida law (Counts VII &
VIII).
Counts I through III assert the following official policy
and custom claims against the School Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
(I) failure to train, (II) deliberate indifference, and (III)
failure to investigate and discipline misconduct.
Plaintiff also
asserts three § 1983 against the individual defendants: (IV)
deliberate indifference against Swope, Patti, and Piercy, (V)
equal protection (class-of-one) against Swope and Patti (Count V),
and (VI) substantive due process against Swope, Patti, and Piercy.
Finally, plaintiff asserts two state law claims: (VII) negligent
supervision
against
the
School
Board
and
(VIII)
intentional
infliction of emotional distress against Swope (Count VIII).
II.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
This obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
5
do.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citation omitted).
To survive dismissal, the factual allegations
must be “plausible” and “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.”
Id. at 555.
See also Edwards v.
Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010).
“more
than
an
accusation.”
unadorned,
Ashcroft
v.
This requires
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
662,
678
(2009)
(citations omitted).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must
accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take
them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without adequate
factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth,”
v.
Berzain,
omitted).
654
F.3d
1148,
1153
(11th
Cir.
2011)
Mamani
(citations
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
consistent
with
a
facially plausible.”
“Factual allegations that are merely
defendant’s
liability
fall
short
of
being
Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333,
1337 (11th Cir. 2012) internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Thus, the Court engages in a two-step approach: “When
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume
their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
6
III.
Section 1983 imposes liability on any person who, under color
of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
1983.
42 U.S.C. §
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege “(1) that the defendant deprived [the plaintiff] of a right
secured under the Constitution or federal law and (2) that such
deprivation occurred under color of state law.”
Cnty., 139 F.3d 865, 872 (11th Cir. 1998).
Arrington v. Cobb
A local government may
be held liable under § 1983 only “if the plaintiff shows that a
‘custom’ or ‘policy’ of the municipality was the ‘moving force’
behind the constitutional deprivation.”
Sewell v. Town of Lake
Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978)). The government
entity “must be found to have itself caused the constitutional
violation at issue; it cannot be found liable on a vicarious
liability theory.”
Skop v. City of Atlanta, 485 F.3d 1130, 1145
(11th Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original) (citing Monell, 436 U.S.
at 694-95).
Defendants assert that plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the
School
Board
fail
because
“(1)
Plaintiff
is
unable
to
show
deliberate indifference, (2) she cannot establish a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause, and (3) there was no violation of
substantive due process.”
(Doc. #24, p. 5.)
7
Because the policy
and
custom
claims
fail
in
the
absence
of
a
constitutional
violation, Rooney v. Watson, 101 F.3d 1378, 1381-82 (11th Cir.
1996), the Court will first address the challenges to the § 1983
claims asserted against the individual defendants.
A.
Deliberate Indifference and Substantive Due Process
In Count IV, plaintiff alleges that Swope, Patti, and Piercy
were informed of J.W.’s serious medical injury when J.W. indicated
that she was in excruciating pain and unable to walk.
It is
further alleged that Swope, Patti, and Piercy were deliberately
indifferent
intentionally
to
J.W.’s
refused
serious
to
treat
medical
or
seek
need
because
treatment
for
they
J.W.’s
fractured foot, they demanded that J.W. ambulate on her fractured
foot despite her repeated protests of pain, and they mocked J.W.
for complaining about her pain.
(Doc. #20, ¶¶ 69-70.)
Count VI
relies on similar allegations, but adds that such behavior shocks
the conscience.
of
Count
IV
is
(Id. ¶¶ 78-79.)
warranted
Defendants argue that dismissal
because
deliberate
indifference
is
insufficient to constitute a due process violation in a noncustodial setting.
(Doc. #24, p. 6.)
Defendants further argue
that Count VI should be dismissed because the alleged actions of
defendants do not shock the conscience.
The
Fourteenth
Amendment
(Id.)
prohibits
States
and
their
components from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”
8
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §
1.
[T]he Due Process Clause was intended to prevent government
officials
from
abusing
their
instrument of oppression.”
power,
or
employing
it
as
an
County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523
U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
The substantive component of the Due Process Clause “protects
individual liberty against ‘certain government actions regardless
of
the
fairness
of
the
procedures
used
to
implement
them.’”
Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)
(quoting
Daniels
v.
Williams,
474
U.S.
327,
331
(1986)).
Accordingly, the Fourteenth Amendment must not be used through §
1983 as a “font for tort law” to convert state tort claims into
federal causes of action.
1305 (11th Cir. 2003).
Waddell v. Hemerson, 329 F.3d 1300,
“Nothing in the language of the Due Process
Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.
The
Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not
as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security.”
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189,
195 (1989).
Only in certain limited circumstances does the Constitution
impose affirmative duties of care on the state.
673 F.3d 1313, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012).
Doe v. Braddy,
As originally defined by
the Supreme Court, those circumstances exist where (1) the state
takes a person into custody, confining him against his will, and
9
(2) when the state creates the danger or renders a person more
vulnerable to an existing danger.
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-201.
The “state-created danger” exception has since been replaced by
the standard employed by the Supreme Court in Collins, 503 U.S. at
128. Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1305. Now, the government’s affirmative
acts “rise to the level of a substantive due process violation
[when] the act can be characterized as arbitrary or conscience
shocking in a constitutional sense.”
Id. (citing Collins, 503
U.S. at 128).
(1)
“A
Duty Created by a Custodial Relationship
duty
of
protection
can
arise
where
the
state
has
a
custodial relationship with the individual, arising from such
circumstances as incarceration in prison or involuntary commitment
in a mental institution.”
Davis v. Carter, 555 F.3d 979, 982 n.2
(11th Cir. 2009) (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198-99).
Mere
compulsory attendance at a public school does not give rise to a
constitutional duty of protection under the Due Process Clause
because public schools generally lack the requisite control over
children to impose such a duty of care upon these institutions.
Id. (citing Wright v. Lovin, 32 F.3d 538, 540 (11th Cir. 1994)).
See also Wyke v. Polk Cnty. Sch. Bd., 129 F.3d 560, 569 (11th Cir.
1997).
Like the Eleventh Circuit, “each circuit to have addressed
the issue has concluded that public schools do not have a special
relationship with their students, as public schools do not place
10
the same restraints on students’ liberty as do prisons and state
mental health institutions.”
Doe ex rel Magee v. Covington Cnty.
Sch. Dist. ex rel Keys, 675 F.3d 849, 858 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing
cases).
The Eleventh Circuit has been “explicit in stating that
‘deliberate indifference’ is insufficient to constitute a dueprocess violation in a non-custodial setting.”
Davis, 555 F.3d at
983 (quoting Nix v. Franklin Cnty. Sch. Dist., 311 F.3d 1373, 1377
(11th Cir. 2002)).
Here, plaintiff alleges that Swope, Patti, and
Piercy were deliberately indifferent, but has not alleged that the
circumstances surrounding J.W.’s attendance at Allen Park were
different from that of any other child attending public school
such
that
it
plaintiff
has
would
trigger
failed
to
the
allege
custody
that
exception.
J.W.
had
a
Because
custodial
relationship with defendants, plaintiff’s claim for deliberate
indifference fails as a matter of law.
plaintiff’s
First
Amended
Complaint
Accordingly, Count IV of
is
dismissed
without
prejudice.
(2)
Conduct that Shocks the Conscience
Under the second exception, a constitutional violation may be
present if the conduct of the governmental actor “shocks the
conscience.”
“To rise to the conscience-shocking level, conduct
most likely must be ‘intended to injure in some way unjustifiable
by any government interest.’”
Davis, 555 F.3d at 982 (quoting
11
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849).
Conduct by a government actor that would
amount to an intentional tort under state law would not, without
more, rise to the level of the constitutional violation.
Dacosta
v.
Nwachukwa,
304
F.3d
1045,
1048
(11th
Cir.
See
2002).
“[O]nly the most egregious official conduct can be said to be
arbitrary in the constitutional sense.” Waddell, 329 F.3d at 1305.
There are very few cases in the Eleventh Circuit in which the
circumstances actually give rise to a constitutional violation.
It is illustrative to review cases in the school setting where
these principles have been applied. In Neal v. Fulton County Board
of Education, 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000), a high school coach
intentionally struck a student with a metal weight lock, knocking
the student’s eye out of its socket, as a form of punishment for
his involvement in a fight with another student.
Id. at 1071.
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the coach’s conduct rose to
the level of a constitutional violation because a school official
“intentionally us[ed] an obviously excessive amount of force that
presented a reasonably foreseeable risk of serious bodily injury.”
Id. at 1076.
In reaching its conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit
made clear that the claims of excessive corporal punishment shaped
the outcome.
Id.
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit concluded in
Kirkland v. Greene County Board of Education, 347 F.3d 903 (11th
Cir. 2003), that a high school principal violated a student’s
constitutional rights after he struck the student with a metal
12
cane in the head, ribs, and back for disciplinary reasons.
Id. at
904-05.
By contrast, no conscience-shocking constitutional violations
occurred in Nix v. Franklin County School District, 311 F.3d 1373
(11th Cir. 2002), or Davis v. Carter, 555 F.3d 979 (11th Cir.
2009).
live
In Nix, a high school teacher told his students to hold a
wire
during
a
voltage-reading
electromechanical class.
demonstration
Nix, 311 F.3d at 1374.
in
his
The teacher
warned his students that they might die if they accidently touched
the exposed part of the wire.
Id.
The teacher increased the power
to the wire, then turned away to answer a question.
Id.
When the
teacher turned back to the students, he saw that one student had
touched the wire and was gasping for breath.
Id.
After the
student died, his parents brought a § 1983 suit and alleged that
“the
actions
of
the
defendants
‘were
particularly
reckless, and deliberately indifferent.’”
arbitrary,
Id. at 1376.
The
Eleventh Circuit, in concluding that the student’s substantive due
process rights were not violated, emphasized that mere negligence
is insufficient to sustain a constitutional claim, while actions
intended
to
injure
and
that
are
unrelated
to
any
government
interest are likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.
at 1375.
context
Id.
The court further noted that “[o]nly in the limited
of
due-process
claims
13
based
on
excessive
corporal
punishment has this court held that the intentional conduct of a
high-school educator may shock the conscience.”
Id. at 1378.
In Davis, the plaintiffs bought a § 1983 action for violations
of their son’s substantive due process rights after the son died
the morning after a voluntary workout session for the school
football team.
that
their
Davis, 555 F.3d at 981.
son
was
subjected
to
an
The plaintiffs contended
intense
and
unreasonable
practice that caused him to collapse and die the next morning.
Specifically,
plaintiffs
alleged
that
the
coaches
failed
to
provide enough water to keep Davis hydrated, ignored signs and
Davis’s complaints that he was becoming dehydrated, subjected
Davis to rigorous conditioning drills at the end of a two-hour
practice, and failed to attend to Davis until after a team meeting,
even though he had collapsed in the middle of the drills.
980-81.
Id. at
The plaintiffs further alleged that if a student did not
perform all the exercises and activities in the workout, he would
be subject to discipline from the coaches, such as additional
drills, exclusion from tryouts, or demotion to the junior varsity
team.
coaches
Id.
did
On these facts, the Eleventh Circuit found that the
not
violate
the
student’s
constitutional
rights
because they did not engage in corporal punishment, physically
contact the student, or otherwise “act[] willfully or maliciously
with an intent to injure” the student.
Id. at 984.
The court
noted that “the coaches were deliberately indifferent to the safety
14
risks posed by their conduct,” but found that in a school setting,
“allegations of deliberate indifference, without more, do not rise
to
the
conscience-shocking
violations.”
level
required
for
constitutional
Id.
In this matter, plaintiff alleges that Swope, Patti, and
Piercy knew of J.W.’s serious medical injury, but intentionally
failed to provide immediate medical assistance.
It
is
further
alleged
that
defendants
(Doc. #20, ¶ 78.)
were
deliberately
insensitive to J.W.’s medical need because they intentionally
refused to treat or seek treatment for J.W.’s fractured foot,
demanded that J.W. ambulate on her fractured foot despite her
repeated protests of pain, and mocked J.W. for complaining about
her pain. (Doc. #20, ¶ 70.) The Court finds that these allegations
do not rise to the conscience-shocking level.
Plaintiff does not allege that Swope, Patti, or Piercy made
physical contact with J.W., intended to punish J.W., or acted with
an intent to injure the minor child.
Thus, defendants’ actions
were not the type of intentional and excessive corporal punishments
inflicted by the school officials in Neal and Kirkland.
Moreover, the alleged conduct is no more egregious than the
deliberate indifference shown by the coaches in Davis. The coaches
in Davis saw that the student suffered from heat exhaustion and
also
saw
the
student
collapse
on
the
field.
Despite
their
knowledge of the impending danger to the student, their failure to
15
provide or summon medical assistance was insufficient to state a
viable cause of action under § 1983.
Although J.W. was only eight
years old at the time of the alleged incident and was threatened
with disciplinary action, defendants’ conduct does not shock the
conscience. Accordingly, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed
to allege a substantive due process violation and dismissal of
Count VI is warranted.
B.
Equal Protection
In Count V of the First Amended Complaint, plaintiff asserts
a claim based on the “class of one” theory of equal protection
against Swope and Patti.
(Doc. #20, ¶¶ 72-76.)
A class of one
claim is implicated “where the plaintiff alleges that she has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated
and
that
there
treatment.”
is
no
rational
basis
for
the
difference
in
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000) (per curiam); Griffin Indus., Inc. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189,
1201 (11th Cir. 2007).
The Eleventh Circuit has enunciated an
exacting standard for the pleading of class-of-one claims: the
plaintiff must allege the existence of some similarly situated
individual who was treated more favorably than the plaintiff
herself.
the
Griffin Indus., Inc., 496 F.3d at 1204-05.
similarly
situated
requirement
requires
a
Moreover,
plaintiff
to
demonstrate that she was treated differently than a similarly
16
situated comparator that is “prima facie identical in all relevant
respects.”
Id. at 1203.
Here, plaintiff alleges that Swope and Patti singled out J.W.
“for disparate treatment different from the other minor children
at Allen Park Elementary School.”
(Doc. #20, ¶ 74.)
There are,
however, no allegations suggesting that the “other minor children
at Allen Park Elementary School” were similarly situated in all
relevant respects.
Plaintiff must do more than assert that other,
unidentified students, were given better treatment.
See Douglas
Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2008).
As such, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to state an
equal protection claim and Count V is dismissed without prejudice.
C.
Policy and Custom Claims
In order “to impose § 1893 liability on a municipality, a
plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were
violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that
constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right;
and (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.
McDowell
v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)).
has
failed
to
plausibly
allege
a
Because plaintiff
deprivation
of
J.W.’s
constitutional rights, the custom and policy claims fail.
Counts
I, II, and III will therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
17
IV.
Plaintiff also asserts two claims arising under state law.
As set forth above, each of plaintiff’s claims arising under
federal law is dismissed.
basis
for
jurisdiction
Accordingly, there is no independent
over
plaintiff’s
state
law
claims.
Therefore, if plaintiff chooses not to amend her complaint (or the
second amended complaint fails to adequately allege a claim arising
under federal law), the Court will not retain jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Defendants’
Motion
to
Dismiss
Plaintiff's
First
Amended
Complaint (Doc. #24) is GRANTED and the First Amended Complaint is
dismissed without prejudice to filing a Second Amended Complaint
within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Opinion and Order.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
December, 2014.
Copies:
Counsel of record
18
11th
day of
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