Goodall v. Comprehensive Women's Health Center et al
Filing
12
OPINION AND ORDER denying 2 Motion for temporary restraining order. The request for a preliminary injunction is deferred pending an opportunity to respond and a hearing. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 7/18/2014. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JENNIFER GOODALL,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:14-cv-399-FtM-38CM
COMPREHENSIVE WOMEN'S HEALTH
CENTER,
BAYFRONT
MEDICAL
HEALTH
GROUP,
BAYFRONT
HEALTH
PORT
CHARLOETTE,
STEPHEN B. RUSSELL as the
State Attorney for Florida's
Twentieth Judicial Circuit,
JOHN DOE I in his or her
official capacity as Special
Assistant State's Attorney,
JOHN DOE(S) II, physicians
providing obstetric care at
Bayfront
Health
Port
Charlotte,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Jennifer
Goodall's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. #2) filed
on
July
18,
restraining
2014.
Plaintiff
Defendants
moves
Comprehensive
the
Court
Woman's
for
Health
an
order
Center,
Bayfront Medical Health Group, Bayfront Health Port Charlotte,
Stephen B. Russell, John Doe I, and John Doe II from the following:
(1)
Contacting Florida's Department of Children and Family
Services because she has refused to consent to a Caesarian
surgery unless and until a medical complication arises
during labor;
(2)
Instituting
process
for
an
"Expedited
Judicial
Intervention Concerning Medical Treatment Procedures";
(3)
Performing
a
cesarean
surgery
without
Plaintiff's
consent and over her objection; and
(4)
Interfering with her ability to obtain care from another
hospital or obstetrical practice by sharing a letter dated
July 10, 2014 (described below) with any other medical
provider, hospital, or entity.
(Doc. #2 at 1-2).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is approximately forty (40) weeks pregnant with her
fourth child, and her estimated due date is July 18, 2014.
#6, ¶ 1.)
(Doc.
Since on or about June 13, 2014, Plaintiff has been
receiving prenatal care at Defendant Comprehensive Women's Health
Care.
(Doc. #6, ¶ 2.)
Caesarean surgeries.
additional
surgery,
Her previous three children were born via
(Doc. #6, ¶ 2.)
however,
fourth child vaginally.
Plaintiff
Wanting to avoid an
wishes
(Doc. #6, ¶ 2.)
to
deliver
her
Plaintiff told her
treating physicians, Drs. Aimee Young and Nay Hoche, of her desire
to attempt a trial of labor after cesarean section ("TOLAC").
(Doc. #2, ¶¶ 2-8.)
She explained, however, that she would consent
to an elective Caesarean surgery, if complications arose during
2
the labor that made such a procedure medically necessary.
#6, ¶ 4.)
(Doc.
Although Drs. Young and Hoche did not agree with
Plaintiff's position from a medical standpoint, Plaintiff believed
that they would honor her decision.
On July 10, 2014, Plaintiff received letter from Cheryl
Tibbett, the Chief Financial Officer of Defendant Bayfront Health
Port Charlotte ("Defendant BHPC"), stating that the hospital's
ethics committee had reviewed her case and intended to take the
following actions: (1) "contact the Department of Children and
Family Services about [her] refusal to undergo a Cesarean section";
(2)
"begin
a
process
for
an
Expedited
Judicial
Intervention
Concerning Medical Treatment Procedures" regarding the delivery of
her child; and, (3) in the event she presented at their hospital,
and her physicians deemed it clinically necessary, they would
perform Cesarean section "with or without [her] consent."
#6 at 9-10.)
(Doc.
Plaintiff was also encouraged to find a physician
who would agree to her demand for a vaginal delivery; and if she
did, they would "be happy to supply the physician with [her]
records in a timely manner so there [wa]s no interruption in care."
(Doc. #6 at 10.)
Despite her efforts, Plaintiff, however, has
been unsuccessful in finding another physician.
(Doc. #6, ¶ 12.)
On July 18, 2014, Plaintiff filed a nine-count complaint
against Defendants.
(Doc. #1.)
Plaintiff alleges Defendants have
violated her due process, privacy, and equal protection rights
3
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and violated her rights under the Article I, Sections 23 and 9 of
the Florida Constitution.
Plaintiff also alleges state law causes
of
intentional
action
for
assault,
infliction
of
emotional
distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
seeks a declaratory judgment.
DISCUSSION
To
obtain
a
temporary
restraining
order,
a
party
must
demonstrate that (1) there is a substantial likelihood of success
on the merits; (2) irreparable injury will be suffered if the
relief is not granted; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the
harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) the entry
of the relief would serve the public interest.
Parker v. State
Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 275 F.3d 1032, 1034-35 (11th Cir. 2001);
Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 430 F.3d 1223, 1225–26 (11th
Cir. 2005).
The moving party bears the burden of proof on each
requirement.
Additionally, under Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a court may issue a temporary restraining order
without notice to the adverse party
only if (A) specific facts in an affidavit or
a verified complaint clearly show that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or
damage will result to the movant before the
adverse party can be heard in opposition; and
(B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing
any efforts made to give notice and the
reasons why it should not be required.
4
Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b).
"The specific requirements of Rule 65(b)
are not mere technical niceties."
F.2d 314, 324 (7th Cir. 1984).
Am. Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742
The "stringent restrictions" of
Rule 65 recognize that "our entire jurisprudence runs counter to
the notion of court action taken before reasonable notice and an
opportunity to be heard has been granted both sides of a dispute."
Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 43839
(1974);
see
also
Mansukhani,
742
F.2d
at
324-25
("[T]he
procedural hurdles of Rule 65 are intended to force both the movant
and the court to act with great care in seeking and issuing an ex
parte restraining order.").
Rule 4.05(a) of the Middle District
of Florida Local Rules also requires that ex parte restraining
"orders will be entered only in emergency cases to maintain the
status
quo
until
the
requisite
notice
may
be
given
and
an
opportunity is afforded to opposing parties to respond to the
application for a preliminary injunction."
M.D. Fla. R. 4.05(a).
The Court doubts that Plaintiff has satisfied Rule 65(b) and
Local Rule 4.05(a). At the very least, Plaintiff has not certified
in writing any efforts made to give notice, or the reasons why it
should not be required.
At least some of the defendants are
readily available, and plaintiff clearly anticipates contact with
at least some of them.
See generally McMahon v. Cleveland Clinic
Found. Police Dep't, 455 F. App'x 874, 878 (11th Cir. 2011)
(concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
5
in denying plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order
because he failed to provide any of the information required by
Rule 65(b)).
Additionally, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not
established the requirements justifying a temporary restraining
order. There is simply no legitimate basis to forbid any defendant
from notifying the Florida Department of Children and Family
Services of the situation or to believe that such notification
violates any of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Further, there
is no legal basis to forbid institution of a state judicial
proceeding if one is warranted, and enjoining such a state court
proceeding would appear to violate 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
There is no
evidence that any defendant is or will interfere with Plaintiff’s
ability
to
obtain
care
from
another
hospital
or
obstetrical
practice, but in any event there is no showing that sharing the
July 10, 2014 letter is substantially likely to violate any of
Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
The Court also finds that
Plaintiff has not established she is substantially likely to
succeed on the merits of her claim that she has a right to compel
a physician or medical facility to perform a medical procedure in
the manner she wishes against their best medical judgment.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
6
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Doc.
#2) is DENIED.
2.
The
Court
will
rule
on
Plaintiff's
request
for
a
preliminary injunction after Defendants have an opportunity to
respond and a hearing is held on this matter.
See Fed. R. Civ. P.
65(a); Local Rule 4.06(a).
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida this
July, 2014.
Copies:
All Parties of Record
7
18th
day of
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