Grawbadger v. GEO Care, LLC et al
Filing
40
OPINION AND ORDER granting 28 motion to dismiss and the Complaint is dismissed against all defendants. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 6/15/2017. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
WILLIAM P. GRAWBADGER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:14-cv-432-FtM-29MRM
GEO
CARE,
LLC,
FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES,
DONALD
SAWYER,
Dr., REBECCA JACKSON, Dr.,
FNU KILGO, C.O., FNU FOSSI, 1
C.O., and JOHN DOE 1-6,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon review of the motion
to dismiss filed on behalf of Defendants Donald Sawyer, Rebecca
Jackson, and FNU Fausi (Doc. #28, Motion).
response
in
opposition
(Doc.
#34,
Plaintiff filed a
Response)
and
included
attachments (Doc. #34-1), which are not pertinent for review at
the motion to dismiss stage of the proceedings.
This case is ripe
for review.
I.
Plaintiff
detained
1
at
William
the
Facts
Grawbadger,
Florida
Civil
a
resident
Commitment
who
Center
is
civilly
(“FCCC”),
It appears Plaintiff misspelt Defendant FNU Fossi’s name on
the Complaint. Motion at 1. The Clerk is directed to correct the
spelling of this Defendant’s last name to “Fausi” on the docket
and any forms. Motion at 1.
initiated this action by filing a pro se Civil Rights Complaint
(Doc.
#1,
Complaint).
Liberally
construing
the
Complaint,
Plaintiff attempts to state a medical deliberate indifference
claim, an excessive use of force claim, and a conditions of
confinement claim.
Plaintiff names as Defendants GEO Care, LLC,
the Florida Department of Children and Families, and the following
individuals in their official and individual capacities who work
at
the
FCCC:
Doctor
Donald
Sawyer,
Doctor
Rebecca
Jackson,
Correctional Officer Kilgo, Correctional Officer Fausi, and John
Does 1-6.
According to the Complaint, on January 29, 2014, Plaintiff
attempted
issues.”
to
speak
with
Doctor
Complaint at 5.
Jackson
“concerning
treatment
Plaintiff alleges that Doctor Jackson
refused to speak to him and then went to speak privately to
Correctional Officer Fausi.
Id.
Thereafter, Plaintiff states he
attempted to leave to return his living quarters, but Fausi “put
his hand out and grabbed my upper arm to restrain me.”
Id.
Unit
manager Price, who is not named as a Defendant, “came to see what
was happening.”
Plaintiff states “upon [Fausi] being disengaged
from [Plaintiff’s] arm, [Fausi] then grabbed [Plaintiff] violently
and forced [Plaintiff] to the ground.”
Id.
Plaintiff claims several FCCC security officers then arrived
and two sat on Plaintiff’s shoulders and two grabbed his legs,
including Defendant Kilgo.
Id.
Plaintiff alleges Kilgo placed
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his knee in the back of Plaintiff’s head and “ground Plaintiff’s
face and head into the tiled, hallway floor.”
Id.
Kilgo “placed
the knuckle of his right hand into a pressure point behind my left
ear and pressed.”
Id.
Fausi and Kilgo “then tried to break my
arms to force handcuffs on [Plaintiff’s] wrists.”
putting
handcuffs
[Plaintiff] up.”
Plaintiff
treatment,”
on
[Plaintiff],
the
“Upon
then
officer
Id.
picked
Id.
claims
“marched
he
was
to
refused
confinement,”
“immediate
and
medical
placed
in
a
suicide/observation cell at the FCCC that had no bunk, desk, or
stool.
Id.
his shoes.
them
off
Plaintiff alleges that Fausi told Plaintiff to remove
Kilgo then grabbed Plaintiffs’ shoes and “wrenched
[Plaintiff’s
feet].”
handcuffed for “20-23 [sic].”
Plaintiff
claims
he
remained
Id. at 6.
After “getting off the floor” and “hobbling to the door,”
Plaintiff
alleges
he
looked
out
the
door
Administrator, Doctor Donald Sawyer present.
brought
to
Sawyer’s
attention
and
saw
Facility
Plaintiff claims “he
[Plaintiff’s]
injuries.”
Plaintiff states he was kept in “confinement” for two weeks.
Id.
Id.
During this time, Plaintiff alleges “he refused all food for fear
[he] would be poisoned.”
Id.
Plaintiff alleges he was denied
mattress, bedding, and hygiene items for 12 hours.
Id.
Plaintiff
states he was charged with disciplinary infractions and ultimately
had a disciplinary hearing, during which his charges were reduced
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to minor infractions.
Id.
Plaintiff believes that because he
“was victorious in a previous Civil Rights Complaint against the
Institution that [he] is being harassed and punished at every
opportunity.”
relief.
Id.
Plaintiff seeks compensatory and declaratory
Id. at 10-11.
II.
Standard of Review
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court
limits
its
consideration
to
well-pleaded
factual
allegations,
documents central to or referenced in the complaint, and matters
judicially noticed.
La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d
840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).
The Court must accept all factual
allegations in Plaintiff=s Complaint as true and take them in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.
F.3d
1282,
1284
(11th
Cir.
2008).
Pielage v. McConnell, 516
Conclusory
however, are not entitled to a presumption of truth.
allegations,
Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1951 (2009) (discussing a
12(b)(6) dismissal); Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014,
1036 n.16 (11th Cir. 2001).
The Court employs the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard
when reviewing a complaint subject to a motion to dismiss.
v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 708, fn. 2 (11th Cir. 2010).
Randall
A claim is
plausible where the plaintiff alleges facts that “allow[] the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.
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Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
plaintiff
allege
The plausibility standard requires that a
sufficient
facts
“to
raise
a
reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” that supports the
plaintiff=s claim.
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
556 (2007); Marsh, 268 F.3d at 1036 n.16.
Specifically, “[w]hile
a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations . . . a plaintiff=s obligation
to provide the >grounds= of his >entitle[ment] to relief= requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
(citations omitted).
Id. at 555
Thus, “the-defendant-unlawfully harmed me
accusation” is insufficient.
Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
“Nor
does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement.”
Id.
The “[f]actual allegations
must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”
See Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965, 1968-
69 (citations omitted) (abrogating Conley, 355 U.S. 41 in part).
Additionally,
requirement.
there
is
no
longer
a
Randall, 610 F.3d at 701.
heightened
pleading
Because Plaintiff is
proceeding pro se, his pleadings are held to a less stringent
standard
than
pleadings
liberally construed.
drafted
by
an
attorney
and
will
be
Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th
Cir. 2003) (citing Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262,
1263 (11th Cir. 1998)).
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III.
A.
Applicable Law and Analysis
Section 1983
Title 42 U.S.C. ' 1983 imposes liability on anyone who, under
color of state law, deprives a person Aof any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.@
To state a
claim under 42 U.S.C. ' 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1)
defendants deprived him of a right secured under the United States
Constitution or federal law, and (2) such deprivation occurred
under color of state law.
Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865,
872 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. Steel, LLC v. Tieco, Inc., 261 F.3d
1275, 1288 (11th Cir. 2001).
and
establish
an
In addition, a plaintiff must allege
affirmative
causal
connection
between
defendant=s conduct and the constitutional deprivation.
the
Marsh v.
Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1059 (11th Cir. 2001); Swint
v. City of Wadley, Ala., 51 F.3d 988, 999 (11th Cir. 1995); Tittle
v. Jefferson County Comm'n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1541 n.1 (11th Cir.
1994).
B.
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Condition Claims
The Court recognizes that the FCCC is not a prison and
Plaintiff is not a prisoner.
1260 (11th Cir. 2002).
Troville v. Venz, 303 F.3d 1256,
Instead, an individual who has been
involuntarily civilly committed has “liberty interests under the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to safety, freedom
from
bodily
restraint,
and
minimally
- 6 -
adequate
or
reasonable
training” as required to ensure safety and freedom from restraint.
Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1041 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982)).
See also Lavender
v. Kearney, 206 F. App=x 860, 862 (11th Cir. 2006).
Indeed, the
Court recognizes that residents at the FCCC are afforded a higher
standard of care than those who are criminally committed.
See id.
(wherein the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that “persons
subjected to involuntary civil commitment are entitled to more
considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals
whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish.”).
Nonetheless, “the Eighth Amendment=s deliberate indifference
jurisprudence
is
applicable
to
the
Fourteenth
process rights of pre-trial detainees.”
Amendment
due
Id. at 863 n.2 (citing
Purcell v. Toombs County, Ga., 400 F.3d 1213, 1219 (11th Cir. 2005)
(other citations omitted)). Consequently, the Court examines cases
addressing medical deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth
Amendment for guidance in evaluating Plaintiff=s claims.
A pre-trial detainee alleging a constitutional deliberate
indifference claim “must sufficiently allege ‘both an objectively
serious medical need and that a Defendant acted with deliberate
indifference to that need.’”
Harper v. Lawrence County, Ala., 592
F.3d. 1227, 1233 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Burnette v. Taylor, 533
F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008) (footnote omitted)).
- 7 -
“[A] serious medical need is considered ‘one that has been
diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so
obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor=s attention.’”
Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243
(11th Cir. 2003) (citing Hill v. Dekalb Reg=l Youth Det. Ctr., 40
F.3d 1176, 1187 (11th Cir. 1994)).
In either situation, “the
medical need must be >one that, if left unattended, pos[es] a
substantial risk of serious harm.”
Id. (citing Taylor, 221 F.3d
at 1258)(alteration in original).
Not all pain constitutes a
serious medical need, but the failure to treat pain can constitute
a serious medical need.
Danley v. Allen, 540 F.3d 1298, 1311
(11th Cir. 2008).
To establish “deliberate indifference” the plaintiff must
establish that Defendants “(1) had sufficient knowledge of a risk
of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk; and, (3) acted with
more than gross negligence.”
omitted).
Further,
the
Harper, 592 F.3d at 1233 (citations
plaintiff
must
show
that
it
was
“Defendant=s conduct” that “caused [Plaintiff=s] injuries.”
the
Id.
To establish “sufficient knowledge,” a Defendant “‘must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [ ] must also draw
the inference.’”
Id. (quoting Bozeman v. Orum, 422 F.3d 1265,
1272 (11th Cir. 2005)).
“[I]mputed or collective knowledge cannot
serve as the basis for a claim of deliberate indifference. Each
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individual Defendant must be judged separately and on the basis of
what that person knows.”
Burnette, 533 F.3d at 1331.
Further, a
plaintiff must allege that the Defendant disregarded the risk of
serious harm to the plaintiff with conduct that rises beyond
negligence.
Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1027
(11th Cir. 2001).
Here, the Complaint is devoid of any factual allegations
describing
refused
a
serious
Plaintiff
medical
medical
condition
treatment.
for
which
Assuming
Defendants
arguendo
that
Plaintiff sustained some sort of injury that constituted a medical
condition from the use of force described herein, the Complaint
only alleges that Plaintiff was not provided “immediate” treatment
following the use of force.
These facts do not rise to the level
of
indifference
a
stating
a
condition claim.
deliberate
to
a
serious
medical
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is granted with
respect to any such claims.
C.
Excessive Use of Force and Conditions of Confinement
Claims
The Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual punishment.
Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1303-1304 (11th Cir. 2010).
Allegations about the conditions encountered in confinement fall
within the category of condition of confinement claims governed by
the standard set forth in Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346
(1981).
On the other hand, allegations about the severity and
- 9 -
manner of being restrained during the use of force incident fall
within the category of the use of excessive force claims governed
by Whitely, 475 U.S. at 320-21 and Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S.
1, 5 (1992) and their progeny for convicted prisoners, but governed
by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015) for pre-trial
detainees.
William Morales v. Ellis, Case No. 2:10-cv-249-FtM-
29SPC, 2011 WL 4389600 *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2011) (recognizing
that the Fourteenth Amendment standard applies to FCCC residents
alleging excessive use of force claims).
The Supreme Court recognizes that a prisoner may challenge a
condition of confinement, Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347
(1981).
A two-prong showing is required: an objective deprivation
or injury that is “sufficiently serious” to constitute a denial of
the
“minimal
civilized
measure
of
life=s
necessities”
and
a
subjective showing that he official had a “sufficiently culpable”
state of mind.
Thomas v. Bryant, 614 F.3d 1288, 1303 (11th Cir.
2010) (citations omitted).
“Because the Eighth Amendment draws
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society,” the objective harm inquiry is
contextual in that it is responsive to contemporary standards.
Id. at 1304 (citations omitted).
“Extreme deprivations” are
required to make out a claim for an unconstitutional condition of
confinement.
Id. at 1304.
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The totality of the circumstances at issue in this case do
not amount to the “extreme deprivations” required to satisfy the
objective prong under Hudson.
The conditions of which Plaintiff
takes issue in this action, including the deprivation of bed
linens, mattress, and hygiene items while held in “observation”
for a twelve-hour period of time do not amount to an extreme
deprivation.
See Anderson v. County of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314
(9th Cir. 1995) (acknowledging temporary deprivation of sinks and
beds
for
a
short
constitutionally
period
time
justifiable).
to
protect
Further,
prisoner
Defendants
deprive Plaintiff of food during this time.
did
is
not
Instead, Plaintiff
acknowledges that he refused all food while held in security
confinement.
Nor
does
a
two-week
period
of
detention
in
confinement amount to a violation considering the facts that led
to the use of force, after which Plaintiff was charged with assault
in
a
disciplinary
report
presumably
stemming
from
Plaintiff
“disengaging” an officer’s hand from his arm, for which Plaintiff
had a disciplinary hearing.
Turning to the alleged excessive use of force claim, under
Kingsley, a plaintiff must show “that the force purposely or
knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at
2473.
The
inquiry
into
objective
unreasonableness
is
not
mechanical and depends on the facts and circumstances in each case.
Id. (citations omitted).
In determining the reasonableness or
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unreasonableness of the officer’s use of force, the Court may
consider the following factors: (1) the relationship between the
need for the use of force and the amount of force used; (2) the
extent of the plaintiff’s injury; (3) any effort made by the
officer to temper or to limit the amount of force; (4) the severity
of
the
security
problem
at
issue;
(5)
the
threat
reasonably
perceived by the officer; and (6) whether plaintiff was actively
resisting.
Id.
“A court must make this determination from the
perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, including what
the officer knew at the time, not with the 20/20 vision of
hindsight.”
Id.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff acknowledges that he “disengaged”
Defendant Fausi “from [his] arm.”
Complaint at 5, ¶6, ¶10.
Plaintiff told “[Fausi] not to put his hands on [him].”
¶6.
In
Plaintiff’s
“frustrated”
and
response,
“aggravated”
he
acknowledges
with
the
that
Clinical
Id. at
he
was
Director
(Defendant Jackson) because she refused to authorize Plaintiff’s
application for work because he was not in compliance with group
participation.
Response at 4.
Thus, the facts alleged in the
Complaint and Plaintiff’s Response, which are accepted as true at
this stage of the proceedings show Plaintiff was aggravated and
actively
occurred.
resisted
Fausi
Plaintiff
immediately
also
received
before
the
disciplinary
use
of
force
charges
for
assault as a result of the incident and had a disciplinary hearing,
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albeit the charges were reduced to “minor infractions.”
Id. at
¶¶36-37.
After
Plaintiff
resisted
Fausi,
the
scenario
Plaintiff
describes amounts to a rapid progression of events including Fausi
taking Plaintiff down to the ground and securing him on the ground
with the assistance of other FCCC officers, until Plaintiff could
be
placed
in
handcuffs,
and
escorted
to
a
secure
room.
Significantly, despite acknowledging Plaintiff underwent spinal
surgery shortly before the use of force incident, id. at 6, the
Complaint does not allege Plaintiff suffered any physical injury
whatsoever stemming from the use of force incident.
Instead,
Plaintiff alleges he suffered “mental anguish and disturbance.”
Id. at 4.
The facts in the Complaint do not set forth a plausible
excessive force claim.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is due to
be granted.
D.
Supervisory Liability Claims
A defendant who occupies a supervisory position may not be
held liable under a theory of respondeat superior in a § 1983
action.
Monell v. Dep=t of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690-692
(1978); Quinn v. Monroe County, 330 F.3d 1320, 1325 (11th Cir.
2003); Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2003).
To impute
a supervisor with knowledge, the knowledge “must be so pervasive
that the refusal to prevent harm rises to the level of a custom or
policy
of
depriving
inmates
of
their
- 13 -
constitutional
rights.”
Tittle v. Jefferson County Comm=n, 10 F.3d 1535, 1542 (11th Cir.
1994).
a
In other words, “to establish that a defendant committed
constitutional
violation
in
his
supervisory
capacity,
a
plaintiff must show that the defendant instituted a >custom or
policy
[that]
result[s]
in
deliberate
indifference
to
constitutional rights or . . . directed [his] subordinates to act
unlawfully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and
failed to stop them from doing so.”
Goebert v. Lee County, 510
F.3d 1312, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007).
The Court finds the Complaint fails to state a claim against
Defendant Sawyer, the FCCC’s Facility Administrator, and Doctor
Jackson, the FCCC’s Clinical Director.
The Complaint does not
contain any allegations that Jackson or Sawyer were personally
involved.
Instead, it appears Plaintiff attempts to attribute
liability on Defendant Sawyer as the Facility Administrator at the
FCCC and Doctor Jackson as the FCCC’s Clinical Administrator.
The
Complaint, however, fails to establish a causal connection between
Sawyer, or Jackson, and the ensuing incidents because there are no
factual allegations that Sawyer or Jackson failed to act in the
face of notice of widespread abuse; that they instituted a custom
or policy; that they directed the officers to act unlawfully; or,
that they failed to stop the officers from acting unlawfully.
To
the extent Plaintiff faults Jackson for not talking with him about
his work assignment at the FCCC, or Sawyer because Sawyer saw
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Plaintiff and his unspecified injuries, such claims do not amount
to Constitutional violations in this case.
As
previously
noted,
other
than
a
Complaint at 6, ¶28.
sole,
vague
reference
to
“injuries,” Plaintiff does not allege or describe any physical
injuries whatsoever following the use of force incident.
Because
the Court has determined that the Complaint fails to state a
conditions of confinement claim, an excessive force claim, or a
medical deliberate indifference claim, the Complaint also fails to
state
a
claim
against
Sawyer
or
Jackson
as
the
supervisors.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.
E.
First Amendment Retaliation Claims
Finally, Plaintiff’s vague reference in the Complaint that he
believes he is being “harassed and punished” at the FCCC at every
opportunity because he “was victorious in a previous Civil Rights
Complaint,”
also
fails
to
state
a
claim.
Complaint
at
2.
Plaintiff’s mere speculation and belief without any facts to
substantiate a causal connection between Plaintiff’s victorious
case and the incidents at issue sub judice do not state a First
Amendment retaliation claim.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. #28) is GRANTED. The
Complaint is DISMISSED against all Defendants.
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2.
The Clerk of Court shall terminate any pending motions,
enter judgment accordingly, and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of June, 2017.
SA: ftmp-1
Copies: All Parties of Record
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15th
day
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