Friedhofer v. Commissioner of Social Security et al

Filing 25

OPINION AND ORDER affirming the decision of the Commissioner. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Douglas N. Frazier on 6/26/2015. (brh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
RONNY FRIEDHOFER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:14-cv-477-FtM-DNF

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
ORDER
This cause is before the Court on Plaintiff, Ronny Friedhofer’s Complaint (Doc. 1) filed
on August 20, 2014. Plaintiff, Ronny Friedhofer seeks judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying his claim for a period of
disability, disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The Commissioner
filed the Transcript of the proceedings (hereinafter referred to as “Tr.” followed by the appropriate
page number), and the parties filed legal memoranda in support of their positions. For the reasons
set out herein, the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED pursuant to §205(g) of the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §405(g).
I. Social Security Act Eligibility, the ALJ Decision, and Standard of Review
A. Eligibility
The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months. 42 U.S.C. §§416(i), 423(d)(1)(A), 1382(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505, 416.905. The
impairment must be severe, making the claimant unable to do his previous work, or any other

substantial gainful activity which exists in the national economy.

42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(2),

1382(a)(3); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1505 - 404.1511, 416.905 - 416.911. Plaintiff bears the burden of
persuasion through step four, while at step five the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146, n.5 (1987).
B. Procedural History
On May 11, 2011, Plaintiff filed applications for disability insurance benefits and
supplemental security income asserting a disability onset date of June 14, 2005. (Tr. p. 107-108,
207). Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially on July 12, 2011, and on reconsideration
September 28, 2011. (Tr. p. 107, 108, 133, 134). A hearing was held before Administrative Law
Judge Dwight Evans on September 19, 2013. (Tr. p. 35-82). The ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision on September 25, 2013. (Tr. p. 18-29). On June 20, 2014, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr. p. 1-4). Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) in the United
States District Court on August 20, 2014. This case is ripe for review. The parties consented to
proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all proceedings. (See, Doc. 17).
C. Summary of the ALJ’s Decision
An ALJ must follow a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if a claimant
has proven that he is disabled. Packer v. Commissioner of Social Security, 542 F. App’x 890, 891
(11th Cir. 2013) 1(citing Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999)). An ALJ must
determine whether the claimant (1) is performing substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe
impairment; (3) has a severe impairment that meets or equals an impairment specifically listed in

1 Unpublished opinions may be cited as persuasive on a particular point. The Court does not rely on
unpublished opinions as precedent. Citation to unpublished opinions on or after January 1, 2007 is expressly
permitted under Rule 31.1, Fed. R. Ap. P. Unpublished opinions may be cited as persuasive authority pursuant to
the Eleventh Circuit Rules. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.

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20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) can perform his past relevant work; and (5) can
perform other work of the sort found in the national economy. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232,
1237-40 (11th Cir. 2004). The claimant has the burden of proof through step four and then the
burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Hines-Sharp v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 511
F. App’x 913, 915 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements through December 31,
2011. (Tr. p. 20). At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not
engaged in substantial gainful activity since June 14, 2005, the alleged onset date. (Tr. p. 20).

At

step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments:
degenerative osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine and left foot, affective mood disorder, anxiety, and
peripheral neuropathy likely from alcoholism, and alcohol abuse. (Tr. p. 20). At step three, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and
416.926). (Tr. p. 24). At step four, the ALJ determined that the Plaintiff has the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform the full range of light work, such that Plaintiff is able to occasionally
lift/carry 20 pounds, frequently lift/carry 10 pounds, stand/walk about 6 hours in an 8-hour
workday, sit about 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, has unlimited ability to push and pull, has the
ability to understand, remember and carry out simple instructions. (Tr. p. 22). The ALJ decided
that Plaintiff is not capable of performing his past relevant work as a Construction Worker II,
Truck Driver, or Industrial Truck Operator (fork lift driving). (Tr. p. 27). At step five, the ALJ
found that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs in significant numbers in the national economy which Plaintiff is able to

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perform, such as Counter and Rental Clerk, Cashier II, Parking Enforcer Officer, and Order Caller.
(Tr. p. 28). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not been under a disability from June 14, 2005
through the date of the decision. (Tr. p. 29).
D. Standard of Review
The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standard, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether
the findings are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390
(1971). The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.
42 U.S.C. §405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla; i.e., the evidence must do more
than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence
as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67
F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995), citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982)
and Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401.
Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court
will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if
the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision.
Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356,
1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account
evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; accord, Lowery
v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (court must scrutinize the entire record to determine
reasonableness of factual findings).

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II. Analysis
Plaintiff raises one issue on appeal which is that the ALJ substituted his opinion for expert
medical opinion evidence. Within the first issue is also the issue of whether the ALJ properly
evaluated Plaintiff’s alcohol abuse.
A. Whether ALJ substituted his opinion for expert medical evidence
Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff’s condition worsened over time, and that in June 2012,
Plaintiff went to the emergency room at Naples Community Hospital and was diagnosed with
peripheral neuropathy, history of old back injury, history of bilateral ankle fractures, and alcohol
abuse. On August 7, 2013, Rajan Sareen, M.D. completed a Residual Functional Capacity
Questionnaire finding Plaintiff was more limited than the ALJ’s findings. Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ improperly discounted Dr. Sareen’s opinion. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly
relied on psychologist Nancy Kelly’s opinion and discounted the findings of Sam Pinosky, M.D.,
on a June 12, 2012 visit to Naples Community Hospital. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ substituted
his opinion for the expert medical opinions in the record.
The Commissioner responds that the ALJ did discuss the evidence and assessment from
Dr. Sareen, and determined that Dr. Sareen’s opinion was entitled to little weight because Dr.
Sareen’s evaluation was accompanied by little or no treatment records. The Commissioner
contends that the ALJ did consider the findings of Dr. Pinosky who examined Plaintiff while in
the hospital for detoxification, but chose to rely on the consultative examination Dr. Nancy Kelly.
At the fourth step in the evaluation process, the ALJ is required to determine a claimant’s
RFC and based on that determination, decide whether the plaintiff is able to return to his or her
previous work. McCruter v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir. 1986). The determination
of a claimant’s RFC is within the authority of the ALJ and along with the claimant’s age

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education, and work experience, the RFC is considered in determining whether the claimant can
work. Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). Weighing the opinions and
findings of treating, examining, and non-examining physicians is an integral part of the ALJ’s
RFC determination at step four. See Rosario v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 877 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1265
(M.D. Fla. 2012).
“The Secretary must specify what weight is given to a treating physician’s opinion and
any reason for giving it no weight, and failure to do so is reversible error.” MacGregor v. Bowen,
786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has held that
whenever a physician offers a statement reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of a
claimant’s impairments, including symptoms, diagnosis, and prognosis, what the claimant can
still do despite his or her impairments, and the claimant’s physical and mental restrictions, the
statement is an opinion requiring the ALJ to state with particularity the weight given to it and the
reasons therefor. Winschel v. Comm’r of Social Security, 631 F3d 1176, 1178-79 (11th Cir.
2011). Without such a statement, “it is impossible for a reviewing court to determine whether
the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and supported by substantial
evidence.” Id. (citing Cowart v. Shweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981)). The opinions of
treating physicians are entitled to substantial or considerable weight unless good cause is shown
to the contrary. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004). The Eleventh
Circuit has concluded that good cause exists when the: “treating physician’s opinion was not
bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician’s
opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records. Id.
An ALJ is not permitted to substitute his judgment as to a “claimant’s condition for that of
the medical and vocational experts.” Freeman v. Schweiker, 681 F.2d 727, 731 (11th Cir. 1982),

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See also, Reynolds-Buckley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 457 F. App’x 862, 865 (11th Cir. Feb. 9, 2012)
and Aponte v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2013 WL 178336, *6 (M.D. Fla. Jan 17, 2013). 2
1.

Naples Community Hospital June 2012

Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff went to Naples Community Hospital complaining of chronic
pain in his back, both ankles, and both legs. The ALJ discussed Plaintiff’s visit to Naples
Community Hospital in June 2012. (Tr. p. 25). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff presented with
complaints of needing alcohol detoxification due to chronic pain in his back, ankles and legs. (Tr.
p. 25). The ALJ noted that he was briefly hospitalized and given Librium and Motrin for pain, and
placed on an alcohol withdrawal protocol. (Tr. p. 25). The ALJ noted that the Hospital reported
Plaintiff’s physical examination was within normal limits. (Tr. p. 25).
The record reflects that on June 8, 2012, Plaintiff went to Naples Community Hospital with
chronic alcohol abuse and intoxication claiming that he drinks alcohol due to chronic pain in his
back, both ankles, and both legs. (Tr. p. 426-28). He was treated with Librium and was to take
Motrin as needed for ankle pain. (Tr. p. 430). Plaintiff’s physical examination was within normal
limits. (Tr. p. 431-32). The ALJ did consider these records from the Naples Community Hospital
in his opinion, and the Court finds no error.
2.

Dr. Sareen

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in giving the opinion of Rajan Sareen, M.D. little weight.
The ALJ reviewed Dr. Sareen’s records. (Tr. p. 25). Dr. Sareen records included x-rays dated

2 Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ gave little weight to the opinion of Robert Whittier (his credentials were not
included in his report) dated September 28, 2011. (Tr. p. 26). The ALJ found Plaintiff to be more limited than Mr.
Whittier found. (Tr. p. 26, 118). The ALJ gave little weight to Mr. Whittier’s opinion because the medical records
showed that Plaintiff had a more limited residual functional capacity than found by Mr. Whittier, and Mr. Whittier
did not have access to more recent medical records at the time he made his determinations. (Tr. p. 26). If any error
exists by the ALJ giving the opinion of Mr. Whittier little weight is harmless because the ALJ found Plaintiff more
limited than Mr. Whittier. A remand is not warranted when an ALJ commits harmless error. Pichette v. Barnhart,
185 F. App’x. 855, 856 (11th Cir. June 21, 2006).

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August 7, 2013, and the ALJ noted that the x-rays showed “mild to moderate degenerative
osteoarthritis of the lumbar spine, and healed fracture of the left foot and moderate degenerative
osteoarthritis.” (Tr. p. 25). The ALJ noted that Dr. Sareen found Plaintiff’s gait to be within
normal limits, his heel and toe walking was within normal limits, his range of motion of the lumbar
spine was decreased, and his range of motion of his left ankle was decreased. (Tr. p. 25). The
ALJ did consider the opinion of Dr. Sareen, but accorded the opinion little weight. (Tr. p. 27).
The ALJ found that Dr. Sareen’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s limitations was too restrictive because
Dr. Sareen had little to no treating relationship with Plaintiff, there were no treatment records to
support the opinion, the x-rays provided revealed only mild to moderate limitations in the lumbar
spine and ankle, and the medical evidence as a whole including other physical examinations in the
record did not support Dr. Sareen’s opinion, and therefore, the ALJ did not accept Dr. Sareen’s
opinion. (Tr. p. 27).
The records from Dr. Sareen comprise x-rays taken, a Residual Functional Capacity
Questionnaire, and a Range of Motion Report Form all dated August 7, 2013. (Tr. p. 441-445).
The x-rays show mild to moderate degenerative osteoarthritis in the lumbar region, a healed
fracture calcaneum left foot, and moderate degenerative osteoarthritis in the foot. (Tr. p. 445). Dr.
Sareen completed a Residual Functional Capacity Questionnaire (Tr. p. 441). For length of
contact, Dr. Sareen indicated “PCP” which the Court interprets to mean primary care provider,
however, no treatment records for Dr. Sareen were in the record. (Tr. p. 441). Dr. Sareen
diagnosed Plaintiff with chronic back pain, bilateral leg pain, and left shoulder pain. (Tr. p. 441).
Dr. Sareen determined Plaintiff’s prognosis was fair, with symptoms of pain in multiple sites, and
Plaintiff suffered from these symptoms frequently. (Tr. p. 441). Dr. Sareen indicated that
Plaintiff was not taking any current medications. (Tr. p. 441). Dr. Sareen found that Plaintiff could

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sit for 10 minutes and stand for 15 minutes at one time; would need to sit in a recliner or lie down
during a normal work day for 2 hours; could sit for 1-2 hours, stand for 1-2 hours, and walk for 12 hours in an 8-hour work day; conditions would be aggravated with increased physical activity;
would need to be able to shift positions from sitting, to standing during an 8-hour day; would need
unscheduled breaks every 10 to 20 minutes lasting 10 to15 minutes during an 8-hour day; could
never lift 50 pounds, could occasionally lift 10 to 20 pounds, and could frequently lift less than 10
pounds; would be limited in left arm reaching, and slightly limited in left hand and finger
manipulations; could stoop, crouch, kneel, and climb stairs about 50% of the time in an 8-hour
work day; would have a reduced productivity level of 85%; would have good and bad days; would
be absent from work 3 times per month; and, would have watery eyes, left shoulder, upper back
pain, and difficulty sitting and standing for long periods of time. (Tr. p. 441-443). Dr. Sareen found
some range of motion limitations in Plaintiff’s right shoulder, and left ankle. (Tr. p. 444).
The ALJ did not accept Dr. Sareen’s opinion. An ALJ may give little or no weight to a
treating physician’s opinion if the doctor’s opinion is conclusory or if the doctor’s own medical
records do not support his opinion. In this case, Dr. Sareen’s opinion is conclusory. Other than
Dr. Sareen’s opinion as to Plaintiff’s limitations, the only medical records associated with Dr.
Sareen were the x-rays. The x-rays show mild to moderate osteoarthritis, however, Dr. Sareen
never discussed the findings of the x-rays in his opinion, included no records that he ever
conducted a physical examination of Plaintiff, and had no records to support his findings as to
Plaintiff’s limitations. The ALJ did not err in not accepting Dr. Sareen’s opinions as to Plaintiff’s
limitations.

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3.

Dr. Kelly and Dr. Pinosky

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in failing to recognize that Plaintiff’s mental
functioning declined from Dr. Kelly’s assessment in June 2011 to Dr. Pinosky’s assessment in
June 2012. The ALJ gave great weight to Nancy Kelly, Psy.D.’s opinion. (Tr. p. 26). The ALJ
reviewed Dr. Kelly’s psychological evaluation of Plaintiff conducted on June 27, 2011. (Tr. p. 25).
The ALJ reviewed Dr. Kelly’s findings, and noted that Dr. Kelly found Plaintiff’s recent and
remote memory to be mildly impaired, and his judgment fair. (Tr. p. 25). The ALJ found that Dr.
Kelly determined that Plaintiff’s exam was consistent with someone with substance abuse
problems, but the substance abuse, “in and of itself” . . . [was] not significant enough to interfere
with claimant’s ability to function on a daily basis.” (Tr. p. 25). The ALJ gave great weight to
Dr. Kelly’s opinion because she supported her opinion with relevant evidence, provided a good
explanation for her opinion, and her opinion is consistent and supported by the medical evidence
of record as a whole and by Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. (Tr. p. 27). The ALJ limited
Plaintiff’s RFC by stating that he has the ability to understand, remember and carry out simple
instructions. (Tr. p. 22).

Dr. Kelly diagnosed Plaintiff with depressive disorder, alcohol

dependence, chronic pain, financial problems, housing problems, vocational problems, and a GAF
score of 65. (Tr. p. 401).
The ALJ summarized the medical evidence from Plaintiff’s June 2012 visit to Naples
Community Hospital for alcohol detoxification. (Tr. p. 25). The ALJ noted that Plaintiff was
briefly hospitalized, and given Librium and Motrin for pain, and then placed on an alcohol
withdrawal protocol. (Tr. p. 25). The ALJ noted Plaintiff did reasonably well and did not require
any Lorazepam. (Tr. p. 25).

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On June 8, 2012, Plaintiff was admitted to Naples Community Hospital, and received a
psychiatric consultation by Sam Pinosky, M.D. (Tr. p. 433). Plaintiff appeared at the hospital to
receive assistance with an alcohol problem. (Tr. p. 433). Plaintiff reported his history of alcohol
abuse, and Dr. Pinosky noted that Plaintiff had not seen a psychiatrist in over a year. (Tr. p. 433).
Dr. Pinosky found Plaintiff to be pleasant, mildly anxious, fully oriented, speaking fluently in an
organized fashion, not delusional, non-hallucinating, not suicidal, insight limited, and focused on
his lower extremity discomfort. (Tr. p. 434). Dr. Pinosky’s impression was that Plaintiff was
alcohol dependent, history of panic disorder with phobic avoidance, asking for assistance, and
having lower extremity discomfort with possible neuropathy. Dr. Pinosky prescribed medications
for him. (Tr. p. 434).

Dr. Pinosky diagnosed Plaintiff with Alcohol dependence, alcohol

withdrawal, panic disorder with agoraphobia, lower extremity discomfort, stress of chronic pain
and unemployment, and GAF score of 35. (Tr. p. 434).
Plaintiff argues that his GAF score decreased from 65 to 35, and the ALJ should have
recognized that Plaintiff’s mental functioning declined from Dr. Kelly’s opinion of June 2011 to
Dr. Pinosky’s opinion of June 2012.

“The GAF Scale describes an individual’s overall

psychological, social, and occupational functioning as a result of mental illness, without including
any impaired functioning due to physical or environmental limitations.” Mathis v. Astrue, 2008
WL 876955, *7, n. 4 (M.D. Fla. March 27, 2008) (citing Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (“DSM-IV”) (4th ed. 1994 at 32). A GAF score is a subjective determination
based on a clinician’s judgment of a person’s overall level of functioning. Wilson v. Astrue, 653
F. Supp. 2d 1282, 1293 (M.D. Fla 2009) (citation omitted).

Even though GAF scores have been

cited in social security cases, “the Commissioner has declined to endorse the GAF score for ‘use
in the Social Security and SSI disability programs,’ and has indicated that GAF scores have no

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‘direct correlation to the severity requirements of the mental disorders listings.’”

Wind v.

Barnhart, 133 F. App’x 684, 692 n.5 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). A low GAF score by
itself is not necessarily determinative of a severe mental impairment. Bailey v. Astrue, 2010 WL
3220302, *8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2010). The Court determines that simply comparing two GAF
scores on two different days is not sufficient to determine that Plaintiff’s mental functioning
declined. The Court must look at the opinions of both Dr. Kelly and Dr. Pinosky, and not just the
GAF scores.
In the instant case, the ALJ reviewed Dr. Kelly’s opinion and found her opinion to be
supported by relevant evidence and was consistent and supported by the medical evidence of
record and by Plaintiff’s activities of daily living. Dr. Kelly found Plaintiff’s recent and remote
memory to be mildly impaired, and his judgment fair, and the ALJ accounted for this finding by
limiting Plaintiff’s RFC to understanding, remembering and carrying out simple instructions. Dr.
Pinosky found Plaintiff to be pleasant, mildly anxious, fully oriented, speaking fluently in an
organized fashion, with limited insight, and focused on his lower extremity discomfort. Dr.
Pinosky did not include any functional limitations for Plaintiff. A review of Dr. Kelly’s and Dr.
Pinosky’s records do not indicate that Plaintiff’s functional limitations declined from June 2011 to
June 2012, and the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in giving great weight to Dr. Kelly’s opinion
of June 2011 in determining Plaintiff’s RFC.

A. Whether the ALJ erred in failing to properly consider Plaintiff’s alcohol abuse
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to evaluate the impact of Plaintiff’s alcohol
use on Plaintiff’s limitations. The Commissioner asserts that a secondary sequential evaluation
relating to alcohol use must be conducted only if a plaintiff is determined to be disabled and if his

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alcohol abuse is determined to be material to the disability. The Commissioner asserts that the
ALJ did not find Plaintiff to be disabled when considering his alcohol abuse, and therefore, the
ALJ did not need to consider whether Plaintiff’s alcohol abuse could be material to his disability.
If a claimant is found “disabled and ha[s] medical evidence of [] drug addiction or
alcoholism, we must determine whether [the] drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor
material to the determination of disability.”

20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(a). “The key factor in

determining whether drug addiction or alcoholism is a contributing factor material to the
determination of a disability (the ‘materiality determination’) is whether the claimant would still
be found disabled if he stopped using drugs or alcohol.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1279
(11th Cir. 2001) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1535(b)(1). In the instant case, the ALJ did not find
Plaintiff to be disabled, therefore, the ALJ did not err in failing to determine whether alcoholism
was a contributing factor material to the determination of disability.
IV. Conclusion
Upon consideration of the submissions of the parties and the administrative record, the
Court finds that the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence and decided upon
proper legal standards.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
The decision of the Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. §405(g). The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending
motions and deadlines, and close the case.

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DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on June 26, 2015.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties

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