Inglis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.

Filing 217

OPINION AND ORDER denying 136 Motion to Strike Plaintiff's Jury Demand. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 2/8/2017. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
RICHARD
K.
INGLIS,
as
Special Trustee to the trust
under the will of Rosa B.
Schweiker, dated February 2,
1961,
the
Frederick
W.
Berlinger Revocable Deed of
Trust, dated 10/17/1991, as
amended and restated.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:14-cv-677-FtM-29CM

WELLS FARGO BANK N.A.,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant’s Motion to
Strike Plaintiff’s Jury Demand (Doc. #136) filed on October 13,
2016.

Plaintiff filed a Response in opposition (Doc. #144) on

October 25, 2016.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion to

strike is denied.
In

the

First

Amended

Complaint,

plaintiff,

the

special

trustee of the Trusts 1, asserts a single claim for civil theft and
demands a jury trial on all issues so triable in the action (Doc.

1

The trust under the will of Rosa B. Schweiker, dated
February 2, 1961 and the Frederick W. Berlinger Revocable Deed of
Trust, dated 10/17/1991 (Doc. #125-1).

#125, ¶ 34).
Wells

Fargo

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant,
Bank

N.A.

(defendant

or

Wells

Fargo),

a

former

corporate co-trustee of the Trusts, intentionally and wrongfully
refrained from transferring trust assets to the successor trustee
in a timely manner.

Plaintiff seeks judgment against Wells Fargo

for treble damages in the amount of $19,394,171.88 and reasonable
attorney fees and costs.

(Doc. #125, p. 7.)

Defendant asserts that plaintiff’s demand for jury trial
should be stricken due to the equitable nature of plaintiff’s claim
and the equitable relief sought.

(Doc. #136.)

Defendant argues

that plaintiff’s civil theft claim is “essentially cloaking a
simple breach of fiduciary duty claim” and the damages sought are
“essentially restitution.”

(Doc. #136, p. 2.)

Plaintiff responds

that this is a legal action which seeks a legal remedy therefore,
plaintiff is entitled to a trial by jury.

(Doc. #144.)

The basic principles are well established, and do not appear
to be disputed by the parties.

First, while jurisdiction is based

upon diversity of citizenship and plaintiff’s claim is a Florida
state law cause of action, the issue of whether a party is entitled
to a jury trial is a matter of federal law.

Simler v. Conner, 372

U.S. 221, 221-22 (1963); In re Graham, 747 F.3d 1383, 1387 (11th
Cir. 1984).

Although “the substantive dimension of the claim

asserted finds its source in state law” in diversity cases, “the

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characterization of that state-created claim as legal or equitable
for purposes of whether a right to jury trial is indicated must be
made by recourse to federal law.”

Simler, 372 U.S. at 222.

Second, there are two possible sources of plaintiffs’ right
to a jury trial, a federal statute and the federal Constitution.
In re Graham, 747 F.3d at 1387.

Neither party relies on a federal

statute, but rather upon the U.S. Constitution as the source for
the right to a jury trial in this case.

(Docs. #136, pp. 2-3;

#144, pp. 1-3.)
Third,

the

Seventh

Amendment

to

the

United

States

Constitution preserves the right to a jury trial “[i]n suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars.”

Determination of entitlement to a jury trial under the

Seventh Amendment is a two-step inquiry when a federal statute
does not explicitly provide for a jury trial.
To determine whether a particular action will
resolve legal rights, we examine both the
nature of the issues involved and the remedy
sought.
“First, we compare the statutory
action to 18th-century actions brought in the
courts of England prior to the merger of the
courts of law and equity. Second, we examine
the remedy sought and determine whether it is
legal or equitable in nature.”
The second
inquiry is the more important in our analysis.
Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S.
558, 565 (1990) (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–

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18 (1987)).

“[T]he first inquiry is nonetheless essential because

the Seventh Amendment only extends to cases in which legal rights
are at stake.”

Stewart v. KHD Deutz of Am. Corp., 75 F.3d 1522,

1526 (11th Cir. 1996).
Defendant asserts that both prongs of the inquiry show that
plaintiff is not entitled to a jury trial in this case.

First,

defendant asserts plaintiff’s civil theft claim will only succeed
if defendant breached its fiduciary duties and that disputes
involving trusts are exclusively equitable in nature.

Defendant

is correct that generally an action for breach of a trustee’s
fiduciary duties would have been brought in courts of equity in
eighteenth century courts of England prior to the merger of the
courts of law and equity.

Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers Local

No. 391, 494 U.S. at 567.

However, plaintiff asserts a claim for

civil theft, not breach of fiduciary duty.

Thus, the prevailing

issue in this case is whether Wells Fargo’s actions rise to the
level of violating Florida’s criminal theft statute.

See Fla.

Stat. § 772.11 (providing civil remedy for theft); United Techs.
Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1270 (11th Cir. 2009).
The Court finds that the issue in this case – whether Wells
Fargo

committed

civil

theft

by

intentionally

and

wrongfully

delaying the transfer of trust assets to the successor trustee would not have been brought in courts of equity in eighteenth

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century courts of England prior to the merger of the courts of law
and equity.

Therefore, the first factor weighs in favor of a jury

trial.
As to the second prong, Wells Fargo argues plaintiff’s civil
theft claim seeks the equitable recovery of funds on behalf of the
Trusts.

Defendant asserts plaintiff does not seek direct money

damages but rather equitable restitution for the money that was
improperly

withheld

from

the

Trusts.

(Doc.

#136,

pp.

5-6.)

Plaintiff counters that he is seeking monetary relief that is
punitive in nature thus, entitling him to a jury trial.

(Doc.

#144, pp. 3-5.)
As an initial matter, Florida courts have not been consistent
in determining whether the primary purpose of damage awards under
the civil theft statute are remedial or punitive. 2

Nevertheless,

the Court finds that the relief sought in this case is legal in

2

Florida courts have treated treble damages as both punitive
and remedial. Compare Snyder v. Bell, 746 So. 2d 1096, 1098–99
(Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (holding that treble damages awarded under the
civil theft statute are remedial, not punitive), review granted,
760 So. 2d 945 (Fla. 2000), review dismissed, 778 So. 2d 970 (Fla.
2001) with United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Berryhill, 620 So.2d 1077, 1079
(Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (concluding that treble damages awarded under
the federal odometer fraud statute “are punitive and in the nature
of fines”); Country Manors Ass’n, Inc. v. Master Antenna Sys.,
Inc., 534 So. 2d 1187, 1195 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (same with respect
to treble damages under the civil theft statute); and McArthur
Dairy, Inc. v. Original Kielbs, Inc., 481 So. 2d 535, 539–40 (Fla.
3d DCA 1986) (same).

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nature.

“[F]or restitution to lie in equity, the action generally

must seek not to impose personal liability on the defendant, but
to restore to the plaintiff particular funds or property in the
defendant’s possession.”

Great-W. Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v.

Knudson, 534 U.S. 204, 214 (2002).
Here,

plaintiff

seeks

treble

damages

in

the

amount

$19,394,171.88 and reasonable attorney fees and costs.
#125, p. 7.)

of

(Doc.

Plaintiff calculated this amount by alleging the

Trustee suffered actual damages of $6,464,723.96 and is entitled
to three time the actual damages pursuant to Florida Statute §
722.11.

(Id. at 6.)

The basis for plaintiff’s claim is not that

Wells Fargo still holds particular funds that belong to the Trusts,
but that Wells Fargo failed to transfer the trust assets within
the appropriate time frame and is thus, liable for treble damages.
Consequently, the monetary relief sought in this case is the
imposition of personal liability for Wells Fargo’s wrong doing.
The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that, as a
general rule, monetary relief is legal in nature, and that claims
for such relief give rise to a right to trial by jury.

See Feltner

v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 352 (1998).
Therefore, the Court concludes that the issue raised in
plaintiff’s claim and the relief sought are legal in nature and
therefore, plaintiff is entitled to a trial by jury.

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Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Jury Demand (Doc.
#136) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
February, 2017.

Copies:
Counsel of Record

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8th

day of