Rodriguez v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 31

OPINION AND ORDER re: 1 Complaint. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) in favor of the Commissioner, and close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge Carol Mirando on 7/11/2016. (LS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
OLGA RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:15-cv-50-FtM-CM

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Olga Rodriguez seeks judicial review of the denial of her claims for a
period of Social Security disability, disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) by the Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration (“Commissioner”).

Plaintiff raises four issues on appeal:

(1)

whether substantial evidence supports the Appeals Council’s denial of Plaintiff’s
request for review; (2) whether substantial evidence supports the evaluation of the
Administrative Law Judge, M. Dwight Evans (the “ALJ” or “law judge”), concerning
Plaintiff’s mental impairments; (3) whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
evaluation concerning medical opinions about Plaintiff’s physical impairments; and
(4) whether the ALJ’s credibility decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Because the decision of the Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence, and
the Plaintiff has not shown any reversible error, the decision will be affirmed.

I.
Plaintiff, who was forty-four years old at the time of the administrative
hearing, applied for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits and SSI on
February 16, 2011, alleging she became disabled and unable to work on February 9,
2009 (“alleged onset date” or “AOD”) due to diabetes, hyperlipidemia, high blood
pressure and tendonitis. Tr. 107, 209-19, 242, 268. Her applications were denied
initially and upon reconsideration. Tr. 113-25, 128-34. Plaintiff can read and write
in English, has at least a 9th grade education 1 and previously worked as a deli cutter,
sandwich maker, nursery school attendant, commercial cleaner and supervisor. Tr.
83-84, 241-42, 244, 306.
At her request, Plaintiff received a de novo administrative hearing on February
25, 2013 before ALJ Evans, during which she was represented by counsel. Tr. 4698. Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) testified at the hearing. 2 Id.

On May

24, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff is not disabled and denying
her claim. Tr. 30-40. At step two, the law judge found that Plaintiff had severe
impairments of diabetes mellitus, obesity, hypertension and shoulder pain. Tr. 32.
At step three, he concluded that Plaintiff “does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the

As discussed, infra, in Section III(C), there was conflicting information in the record
concerning Plaintiff’s level of education. She testified that she had completed only the 9th
grade and provided supporting educational records; however, Plaintiff indicated in her
application that she completed one year of college. Compare Tr. 51, 306 with Tr. 242.
1

Plaintiff, her counsel and the VE appeared in Ft. Myers, FL; and the law judge
presided over the hearing by videoconference. Tr. 48.
2

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listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. . . .” Tr. 36. The
ALJ concluded that, with her severe impairments, Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of light work, as defined in 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b). 3 Tr. 36. Relying on the VE’s testimony, the
ALJ ruled that Plaintiff is capable of performing her past relevant work as a deli
clerk, nursery school attendant and supervisor, noting this “work does not require
the performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant’s residual
functional capacity.” Tr. 39. Alternatively, the ALJ found that assuming Plaintiff
is limited to performing only unskilled work as a result of her mental impairments,
the VE identified jobs in the national economy she is able to perform, such as
sandwich board carrier, marker and surveillance system monitor.

Tr. 39-40.

Accordingly, the ALJ ruled that Plaintiff is not disabled through the date of the
decision. Tr. 39-40. The Appeals Council let stand the decision of the ALJ as the
final decision of the Commissioner, after considering new evidence submitted by
Plaintiff. Tr. 1-5. Plaintiff filed an appeal in this Court on January 27, 2015. Doc.
1.

Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting
or carrying of objects weighing up to 10 pounds. Even though the weight lifted may be very
little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it
involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. To
be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, you must have the
ability to do substantially all of these activities. If someone can do light work, we determine
that he or she can also do sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such
as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b).
3

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II.
A claimant is entitled to disability benefits when she is unable to engage in
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to either result in death or last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months.

42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i)(1),

423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a). The Commissioner has established a five-step
sequential analysis for evaluating a claim of disability. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through step four, and, at step five, the
burden shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the ALJ
applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings are supported by
substantial evidence. McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988)
(citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971)). The district court must
consider the entire record, including new, chronologically relevant evidence
submitted to the Appeals Council for the first time, in determining whether the
Commissioner’s final decision is supported by substantial evidence.

Ingram v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2007); 20 C.F.R. §
404.970(b).

The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by

substantial evidence.

42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Substantial evidence is “more than a

scintilla, i.e., evidence that must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of
the fact to be established, and such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would
accept as adequate to support the conclusion.” Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560

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(11th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted); see also Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206,
1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that “[s]ubstantial evidence is something more than a
mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance”) (internal citation omitted).
Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the
district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result
as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the preponderance of the evidence
is against the Commissioner’s decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3
(11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). “The
district court must view the record as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable
as well as unfavorable to the decision.” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; see also Lowery v.

Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that the court must scrutinize
the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the factual findings). It is the
function of the Commissioner, and not the courts, to resolve conflicts in the evidence
and to assess the credibility of the witnesses. Lacina v. Comm’r, 606 F. App’x 520,
525 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Grant v. Richardson, 445 F.2d 656 (5th Cir.1971)).
III.

A. Whether substantial evidence supports the Appeals Council’s denial of
Plaintiff’s request for review.
Plaintiff first argues that the Appeals Council improperly denied her request
for review because new material evidence concerning Plaintiff’s mental impairments
was submitted to the Appeals Council that was not “associated with the
administrative record,” warranting remand. 4 Doc. 25 at 7-28. Specifically, Plaintiff
4

The Commissioner acknowledges that “Plaintiff correctly notes the Appeals Council

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submitted a psychological evaluation of Plaintiff conducted on August 13, 2013,
nearly four months after the ALJ’s decision, by examining psychologist Christine
Needham, a licensed school psychologist.

Tr. 1-2, 587-93.

The Appeals Council

considered the additional evidence and found the new evidence concerned a time
period after the ALJ’s May 24, 2013 decision and thus did not affect the decision
whether Plaintiff was disabled as of the ALJ’s decision. Tr. 2. The Commissioner
responds that the Appeals Council properly evaluated the evidence and correctly
determined it is not chronologically relevant to the ALJ’s decision. Doc. 28 at 4-6.
The Court agrees.
“[W]hen a claimant properly presents new evidence to the Appeals Council, a
reviewing court must consider whether that new evidence renders the denial of
benefits erroneous.” Ingram, 496 F.3d at 1262 (citation omitted). Under the Social
Security regulations, a claimant is entitled to remand for consideration of newlydiscovered evidence “only upon a showing that there is new evidence which is
material and that there is good cause for the failure to incorporate such evidence into
the record in a prior proceeding.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Thus, the claimant must
show that (1) the evidence is new and noncumulative; (2) the evidence is material
such that a reasonable probability exists that the new evidence would change the
administrative result; and (3) there is good cause for the claimant’s failure to submit

failed to exhibit this new evidence with the administrative record (Doc. 25 at 8). See Hearings,
Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual (HALLEX) § I-3-5-20(A)(3), 1993 WL 643143, at *3
(S.S.A.). The Commissioner’s counsel inadvertently overlooked this issue.” Doc. 28 at 4.
Subsequently, the Commissioner filed a supplemental certified administrative record, which
was made part of the record and is before this Court. See id.; Doc. 26.

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the evidence at the appropriate administrative level.” Leiter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

Admin., 377 F. App’x 944, 950 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320,
1323 (11th Cir. 1998)). For evidence to be “new and noncumulative,” it must relate
to the time period on or before the date of the ALJ’s decision.

See 20 C.F.R. §

404.970(b). The Commissioner’s policies state that new evidence is chronologically
relevant only if it is “dated before or on the date of the ALJ decision, or [] post-dates
the ALJ decision but is reasonably related to the time period adjudicated by the ALJ.”

See HALLEX § I-3-3-6(B)(3), 1993 WL 643129 (S.S.A.); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.970(b);
416.1470(b). Thus, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “[e]vidence of a deterioration

of a previously-considered condition may subsequently entitle a claimant to benefit
in a new application, but is not probative of whether a person was disabled during
the specific period under review.” Leiter, 377 F. App’x at 950 (citing Wilson v. Apfel,
179 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 1999)).
Dr. Needham’s report consisted of the following: a brief summary of records
dated April 25, 2013 from Lee Mental Health Center, in which Plaintiff was
diagnosed with depressive disorder, not otherwise specified; background information
summarizing Dr. Needham’s interview with Plaintiff; a mental status examination;
intelligence testing using the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence; and
Achievement Testing. Tr. 587-89. The testing revealed that Plaintiff’s full scale IQ
is 87 (88 verbal and 89 performance), which is in the low average range; her reading
level is in the low average range; her sentence comprehension is at the third to fifth
grade level; and her spelling and math abilities are borderline. Tr. 588-89. The
psychologist opined that Plaintiff suffers from single episode depression, without
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psychosis, due to her medical condition, reading and math disabilities and a disorder
of written language; and she has a GAF of 40. Tr. 589.
Plaintiff argues that the new evidence is chronologically relevant because Dr.
Needham’s opinion was based, in part, on Plaintiff’s “medical history and treatment
records,” contending that Dr. Needham reviewed medical evidence of record “during
the relevant period.” Doc. 25 at 8. As noted, however, Dr. Needham only briefly
discussed Plaintiff’s treatment at Lee Mental Health in the Vista Program on one
occasion, noting:
When [Plaintiff] was admitted to the hospital she stated that, "I asked
the doctor in the hospital to tell me a place to get treatment for
depression and they transferred me here. I don't need to be here at
Vista. I am not suicidal or homicidal, I'm just depressed. I've been
taking medication for my depression from my doctor but I just need a
psychiatrist who can adjust my medication because I don't think it is
right.
Tr. 587. Clearly, the record reveals other mental health evaluations, which the ALJ
discussed. See, e.g., Tr. 33-35 (discussing psychological evaluation in 2011 with Dr.
Nancy Kelly and psychological evaluation with Dr. Cheryl Kasprzak in January
2013). More importantly, as noted by the Commissioner, Dr. Needham’s opinion is
based on the testing and procedures she performed at that time, and the report did
not note a retroactive date to which her findings might apply. Doc. 28 at 6, Tr. 58793. Thus, the opinion did not satisfy all three required elements – new, material and
chronologically relevant – and therefore the Appeals Council was not required to
consider it.

Clearly, Plaintiff complained of depression prior to the ALJ’s decision.

Thus, any evidence showing an exacerbation of her condition is not probative to the

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disability decision at issue. Here, it is clear from the Appeals Council’s decision that
it considered the “seven pages of [new] records from Christine Needham, EdD,”
submitted by the Plaintiff yet determined that “new information” from August 27,
2013 “does not affect the decision about whether [Plaintiff was] disabled beginning
on or before May 24, 2013,” the date of the ALJ’s decision, and denied review. The
Council was required to do no more.

B. Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation concerning
the severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairments and whether they were
medically equivalent to Listing 12.05.
i. Severity of mental impairments
Plaintiff first states that the ALJ erred in not finding her mental limitations
of depression and borderline intellectual functioning to be severe, asserting
substantial evidence supports otherwise.

Doc. 25 at 10-14. Defendant responds

that the ALJ properly applied a psychiatric review technique to assess the severity of
Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairments and found that they were not severe. Doc. 28
at 7-8; Tr. 35. The Court, having reviewed the record, the applicable law and the
decision of the ALJ, agrees with the Commissioner.
At the second step in the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ determines
whether the claimant has a severe impairment.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii).

Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that her impairments are severe and
prevent the performance of her past relevant work. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. at
146 n.5. A severe impairment is an impairment or combination of impairments that
significantly limits a claimant’s physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.

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20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). “An impairment is not severe only if the abnormality is so
slight and its effect so minimal that it would clearly not be expected to interfere with
the individual’s ability to work, irrespective of age, education, or work experience.”

McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1031 (11th Cir. 1986).
The Social Security Regulations provide that an “impairment or combination
of impairments is not severe if it does not significantly limit your . . . . mental ability
to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a). Basic work activities mean
“the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” Id. § 404.1521(b). Examples
of mental requirements set forth in the regulations include understanding, carrying
out, and remembering simple instructions; use of judgment; responding appropriately
to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and dealing with changes in a
routine work-setting. Id. § 404.1521(b)(3)-(6).
In order to evaluate the severity of a mental impairment, the Commissioner’s
regulations require the application of a “special technique,” which the ALJ applied in
this case. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a; see Tr. 35. Under the special technique, the ALJ
will rate the degree of functional limitation in four broad functional areas: activities
of daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and episodes of
decompensation. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(3). The degree of limitation in the first
three areas are rated on a five point scale of none, mild, moderate, marked, and
extreme; and the fourth area is rated as none, one or two, three, four or more. 20
C.F.R § 404.1520a(c)(4). Once the degree of limitation in each area is determined, if
the degree of limitation in the first three functional areas is none or mild and the

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fourth area is none, the ALJ generally will find, as he did here, the impairment is not
severe, unless the evidence otherwise indicates more than a minimal limitation in
ability to do basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d)(1). The ALJ’s decision
must incorporate findings and conclusions based on the special technique. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520a(e)(4).
Here, the ALJ determined that the only severe impairments Plaintiff suffered
from were physical limitations: diabetes mellitus, obesity, hypertension and shoulder
pain. Tr. 32. The ALJ specifically considered Plaintiff’s alleged mental impairment
of major depressive disorder and determined it does not cause more than minimal
limitation in Plaintiff’s ability to perform basic mental work activities. Tr. 35. The
ALJ applied the special technique and considered the four broad functional areas set
out in the regulations for evaluating mental disorders. Id. The ALJ found only
mild limitation in Plaintiff’s activities of daily living; social functioning; and
concentration, persistence or pace. With respect to her activities of daily living, the
ALJ noted that at or around the time of Plaintiff’s alleged onset, reports showed
Plaintiff was able to prepare simple meals, perform household chores, shop and
handle finances. Id. He also noted that in August 2012, Plaintiff indicated that her
daily activities were normal, and in early 2013 that she still could prepare simple
meals and take care of her daily needs independently. Id.
In finding mild limitation in Plaintiff’s social functioning, the ALJ also noted
around the time of the AOD Plaintiff could drive, shop and attend church. In 2013,

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Plaintiff reported weekly visits with her mother, regular contact with other family
members by telephone and that she gets along well with her family. Id.
In terms of concentration, persistence or pace, the ALJ found that repeated
examinations of Plaintiff showed her to have adequate memory.

Id.

She also

retained the ability to engage in a “wide range of daily activities on a regular basis,”
and no “credible” examination indicated Plaintiff had diminished attention or
concentration.

Id.

extended duration.

Finally, the ALJ found no episodes of decompensation of

Id.

Based on these findings, the ALJ determined that

Plaintiff’s mental impairment was non-severe. Tr. 35.
The ALJ’s conclusion is supported by the record, which the ALJ further
discussed when assessing Plaintiff’s ability to work despite her mental limitations.
Tr. 38-39. The ALJ examined and discussed records from 2010 to 2013, and found
that “objective observation does not support the claimant’s subjective complaints, and
her condition appeared to be well managed with a proper medication and treatment.”
Tr. 37. He noted that an examination in December 2010 by Alphonsus Zohlandt,
M.D., was “unremarkable, and Plaintiff’s appearance was normal, her mood euthymic
and her affect and thought content normal. Id. at 37-38, Tr. 312. In June 2011,
Plaintiff’s mental examination by Nancy Kelly, Psy.D., noted only a “dysthymic
mood.”

Tr. 38, 350.

Dr. Kelly diagnosed Plaintiff with depressive disorder, not

otherwise specified, and noted her prognosis was “fair,” given Plaintiff’s cognitive
ability. Tr. 351. The ALJ further noted that psychiatric notes from examinations
in January and April 2012 likewise were “unremarkable.” Tr. 38, see Tr. 439-48.

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The ALJ noted that although in June 2012 Plaintiff’s mood was depressed (Tr. 38,
436), the following month Plaintiff reported improvement in her depression with
proper treatment (Tr. 570); and her examination in August 2012 reported she had a
euthymic mood, normal affect and normal thought content.

Tr. 563.

The ALJ

discussed an examination in January 2013 in which Plaintiff appeared alert, oriented
with unimpaired judgment and no memory impairment and with normal affect. Tr.
38, 530.
The ALJ stated that a detailed psychiatric examination performed by
psychologist Cheryl Kasprzak in January 2013, discussed in more detail later in this
opinion, showed limitations greater than Plaintiff’s abilities otherwise indicated. Tr.
38, 551.

Dr. Kasprzak concluded that Plaintiff’s response patterns resulted in

underestimation of her true abilities.

Tr. 551.

Nonexamining psychologists,

Jeannie Nunez and Pauline Hightower, each opined that Plaintiff did not have a
severe mental impairment; and the ALJ gave these opinions great weight, as he found
them to be consistent with the record as a whole. Tr. 38-39, 352-64, 367. Plaintiff
also argues that treatment records from April 25, 2013 from Lee Mental Health show
she had a severe mental impairment, and the ALJ failed to discuss these records in
his decision although they were submitted after the hearing but before the ALJ
rendered his decision. Doc. 28 at 11. Although the Court agrees that the ALJ’s
failure to discuss these records was error, any such error was harmless; as these
records do not show additional limitations, and the ALJ properly discussed Plaintiff’s
mental condition “as a whole.” See Hunter v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F. App’x 555,

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558 (11th Cir. 2015). These records reveal Plaintiff was seeking adjustment to her
medications, and she was found to have had normal mental functioning with
euthymic mood, and was discharged the same day. Tr. 581.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the ALJ’s decision at step two is supported
by substantial evidence in the record. Plaintiff has submitted no evidence of severe
mental limitations because of her depression or borderline intellectual functioning.

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(a) (an impairment is not severe if it does not significantly
limit your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities). Furthermore, no
doctor has opined that Plaintiff’s mental limitations are so debilitating as to preclude
Plaintiff from working.

Rather, the record shows the opposite. 5

See Wind v.

Barnhart, 133 F. App’x 684, 690-91 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that ALJ did not err in
finding that plaintiff’s obesity was not a severe impairment where there was no
evidence it affected plaintiff’s ability to perform work activities).
Additionally, the ALJ found in Plaintiff’s favor at step two of the sequential
evaluation process by finding that she had multiple severe impairments. Tr. 32.
The ALJ then proceeded with the other steps of the sequential evaluation process.
Tr. 36-40. As the Eleventh Circuit has stated, “[n]othing requires that the ALJ must
identify, at step two, all of the impairments that should be considered severe.”

Heatly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 382 F. App’x 823, 825 (11th Cir. 2010). Thus, the
ALJ’s findings were not in error.

Moreover, the ALJ accounted for Plaintiff’s mental impairments in his alternative
findings in step five by limiting Plaintiff to unskilled work. Tr. 39-40.
5

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ii. Listing 12.05(C) 6
As for Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ should have found that Plaintiff’s
mental impairment, specifically her borderline intellectual functioning with an IQ of
72, was medically equal to Listing 12.05(C) (Doc. 25 at 10-11), the Court finds that
Plaintiff has not met her burden, as she is required to do. Barron v. Sullivan, 924
F.2d 227, 229 (11th Cir. 1991).

The listings describe impairments that the

Commissioner considers severe enough to prevent a person from doing “any gainful
activity, regardless of his or her age, education, or work experience.” See 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1625(a), 416.925(a). If an adult’s impairment “meets or equals one of the
listed impairments, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled. . . .”

Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 532 (1990) (citing Bowen, 482 U.S. at 141). The
Eleventh Circuit has described how the standard is met or equaled:
In order to meet a listing, the claimant must (1) have a diagnosed
condition that is included in the listings and (2) provide objective
medical reports documenting that this condition meets the specific
criteria of the applicable listing and the duration requirement. A
diagnosis alone is insufficient. [] In order to equal a listing, the medical
findings must be at least equal in severity and duration to the listed
findings.

Wilkinson ex rel. Wilkinson v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 660, 662 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 416.925(c)-(d)). The burden of establishing that a claimant’s impairments
meet or equal a listing rests with the claimant, who must produce specific medical
findings that satisfy all the criteria of a particular listing. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

As noted by the Commissioner (Doc. 28 at 11 n.7), Plaintiff only appears to challenge
whether her impairments equaled Listing 12.05(C); accordingly, the Court only will address
this issue.
6

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If Plaintiff contends that an impairment meets a listing, as she does here (Doc.
25 at 10-11), she bears the burden of “present[ing] specific medical findings that meet
the various tests listed under the description of the applicable impairment.”

Wilkinson, 847 F.2d at 662. In doing so, Plaintiff must have a diagnosed condition
that is included in the listings. Id. Diagnosis of a listed impairment, however, is
not enough; as the claimant must also provide objective medical reports documenting
that her impairment meets the specific criteria of the applicable listing. Id.; accord

Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002). Further, “[a]n impairment
that manifests only some of [the specific] criteria [of the applicable impairment], no
matter how severely, does not qualify.” Sullivan, 493 U.S. at 530.
The introductory material to the mental disorders listings clarifies Listing
12.05, stating:
The structure of the listing for intellectual disability (12.05) is different
from that of the other mental disorders listings. Listing 12.05 contains
an introductory paragraph with the diagnostic description for
intellectual disability. It also contains four sets of criteria (paragraphs
A through D). If your impairment satisfies the diagnostic description
in the introductory paragraph and any one of the four sets of criteria,
[the Commissioner] will find that your impairment meets the listing.
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00A. Listing 12.05 provides, that a claimant
is disabled if he or she meets the following criteria:
12.05 Intellectual disability: intellectual disability refers to significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive
functioning initially manifested during the developmental period; i.e.,
the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before
age 22.
The required level of severity for this disorder is met when the
requirements in A, B, C, or D are satisfied.

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...
C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a
physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and
significant work-related limitation of function;
...
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.05 (emphasis added). Accordingly, in order
to meet Listing 12.05, “a claimant must at least[:] 1) have significantly subaverage
general intellectual functioning; 2) have deficits in adaptive [functioning]; and 3) have
manifested deficits in adaptive [functioning] before age 22.” Crayton v. Callahan,
120 F.3d 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997); 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.05.
Additionally, a claimant must meet one of the four sets of criteria found in 12.05A, B,
C, or D, in order to show that his or her impairments are severe enough to meet or
equal Listing 12.05. 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A).
In Hodges v. Barnhart, the Eleventh Circuit held that “there is a presumption
that mental retardation 7 is a condition that remains constant throughout life” and
would apply to a claimant since the onset date of disability. 276 F.3d 1265, 1266
(11th Cir. 2001). In Hodges, the plaintiff acknowledged the lack of I.Q. evidence
before the age of 22, but the court agreed with the plaintiff that “I.Q. tests create a
rebuttable presumption of a fairly constant I.Q. throughout her life.” Id. at 1268.
The court also noted that “a claimant meets the criteria for presumptive disability

The Court notes that currently Listing 12.05 uses “Intellectual disability” in place
of “Mental retardation,” amended on August 1, 2013. See 78 Fed. Reg. 46,499, 46,501. The
listing, however, has not substantively changed. Id.
7

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under Listing 12.05(c) when the claimant presents a valid I.Q. score of 60 to 70 and
evidence of additional mental or physical impairment.” Id. at 1269. However, “a
valid I.Q. score need not be conclusive of mental retardation where the I.Q. score is
inconsistent with other evidence in the record on the claimant’s daily activities and
behavior.” Id. (citing Popp v. Heckler, 779 F.2d 1497, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986)).
The Court concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision
that, despite Plaintiff’s IQ score, she did not meet or equal the criteria of Listing
12.05(C). First, Plaintiff’s full scale IQ score of 72 is not sufficiently low to be “equal
in severity” to Listing 12.05(C).

20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.05C.

Second, the record supports the conclusion that, due to her limited effort and possible
chronic pain during the examination, Plaintiff’s IQ score was not valid and
underestimated her actual level of functioning. See 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App.
1 § 12.00(D)(6)(a) (noting that the “narrative report that accompanies the test results
should comment on whether the IQ scores are considered valid and consistent with
the developmental history and the degree of functional limitation”). Here, as noted,
Dr. Kaspzak opined that the results of Plaintiff’s IQ score was “an underestimation”
of Plaintiff’s capability, as Plaintiff frequently hesitated between 30 and 60 seconds
before responding, even when asked about her personal background, and often
responded she could not remember or did not know. Tr. 551. As to this issue, Dr.
Kaspzak further opined:
Although chronic pain may certainly be a factor in [Plaintiff’s] process
speed[,] individual subtest scaled scores and composite score, the
aforementioned behaviors and verbalizations seemed to be in excess,
repeatedly throughout the evaluation.

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Id. The ALJ gave Dr. Kaspzak’s opinion significant weight. Tr. 38. Third, the ALJ
did not find Plaintiff’s testimony to be credible concerning the extent of her mental
impairment and its effect on her ability to work. Id. Although the ALJ noted that
Plaintiff appeared very sympathetic and described “significant reports of depression
. . . the fact is that the claimant’s allegations are not supported [by] corresponding
medical treatment records or objective observations.”

Id. (discussing, e.g., Dr.

Kaspzak’s opinion that “claimant was not limited in understanding, remembering,
and carrying out instructions or making judgments about work related decisions [and
that c]laimant also retained the ability to interact appropriately with supervisors,
coworkers, the public, and respond to changes in a routine work setting”). Plaintiff
cannot rely solely on her own testimony to show her impairments meet or equal a
listing, but only on an acceptable medical source.

See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1508,

404.1525. Fourth, even though Plaintiff was diagnosed with borderline intellectual
functioning, this diagnosis alone was insufficient to meet the criteria of Listing
12.05(C). Wilkinson, 847 F.2d at 662; Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 535 F. App’x
894, 897-98 (11th Cir. 2013), citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.925(d). Given that Dr. Kaspzak,
who administered the tests, concluded that Plaintiff’s IQ score underestimated her
intelligence, and based on Plaintiff’s other treatment records, the ALJ properly
determined she did not meet Listing 12.05C. See Smith, 535 F. App’x at 897; Popp,
779 F.2d at 1500 (holding that the ALJ was not required to find claimant was
mentally retarded based on IQ test but was required to examine the results “in

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conjunction with other medical evidence and the claimant’s daily activities and
behavior”).

C. Whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation concerning
medical opinions about Plaintiff’s physical impairments.
Plaintiff contends the ALJ did not properly assess Plaintiff’s RFC by failing to
provide adequate reasons for rejecting the medical opinions of Jacob Glock, M.D., Dr.
Kasprzak and Dr. Zohlandt. Doc. 25 at 14-16. The Commissioner responds that the
ALJ properly considered all record evidence, including medical opinions, and gave the
appropriate weight to the opinions in accordance with the regulations. Doc. 28 at
17. The Court agrees.
When determining how much weight to afford an opinion, the ALJ considers
whether there is an examining or treatment relationship and the nature and extent
thereof; whether the source offers relevant medical evidence to support the opinion;
consistency with the record as a whole; the specialization of the source, if any; and
any other factors that tend to support or contradict the opinion.

20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(c)(1)-(6). Under the regulations, opinions of treating sources usually are
given more weight because treating physicians are the most likely to be able to offer
detailed opinions of the claimant’s impairments as they progressed over time and
“may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from
the objective medical findings alone or from reports of individual examinations . . . .”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). Medical source opinions may be discounted, however,
when the opinion is not well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques or if the opinion is inconsistent with the record as a

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whole. SSR 96-2p; Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1159-60 (11th
Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, “[a]n ALJ must give a treating physician’s opinion substantial
weight, unless good cause is shown.” Castle v. Colvin, 557 F. App’x 849, 854 (11th
Cir. 2014) (citing Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 (11th Cir. 2004)); Lewis

v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); Sabo v. Chater, 955 F. Supp. 1456,
1462 (M.D. Fla. 1996). “Good cause exists when the ‘(1) treating physician’s opinion
was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3)
treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor’s own
medical records.’” Winschel 631 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241).
If the opinion of a treating physician as to the nature and severity of a
claimant’s impairment is supported by acceptable medical evidence and is not
inconsistent with other substantial evidence of record, the treating physician’s
opinion is entitled to controlling weight. SSR 96-2p; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). By
contrast, if the ALJ does not afford controlling weight to a treating physician’s
opinion, he must clearly articulate the reasons for doing so. Winschel, 631 F.3d at
1179. Although the regulations require that the ALJ consider all factors set forth in
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c), the ALJ is not required to expressly address each factor so
long as he demonstrates good cause to reject the opinion. Lawton v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., 431 F. App’x 830, 833 (11th Cir. 2011).
Findings of fact made by state agency medical and psychological consultants
as to the nature and severity of a claimant’s impairments must be treated as expert

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opinion evidence of nonexamining sources by the ALJ, but the ultimate opinions as
to whether a claimant is disabled, the severity of a claimant’s impairments, the
claimant’s RFC and the application of vocational factors are exclusively reserved to
the Commissioner. SSR 96-6p; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(1)-(2). Unless a treating
source’s opinion is given controlling weight, the ALJ must explain the weight given
to the opinions of other consultants, doctors or medical specialists.

20 C.F.R. §

404.1527(e)(2)(ii); Vuxta v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 194 F. App’x 874, 877 (11th Cir.
2006).
At the request of the Division of Disability Determination, Dr. Glock examined
Plaintiff on January 2, 2013. Tr. 527. With respect to her physical impairments,
Plaintiff complained of right shoulder pain and diffuse body pain in her hands and
feet, which had begun about 10 years earlier. Id. On examination, Dr. Glock found
Plaintiff’s gait was normal except for a slight limp because of an infection in her right
toe, she was able to squat about 50% of full, she could dorsiflex her spine with about
50% restriction, her stance was normal, she used no assistive device, and she needed
no help changing for her examination. Tr. 529. He further found Plaintiff had a
full range of motion in her cervical and lumbar spine and no abnormalities in her
thoracic spine. Id. With respect to her shoulders, Dr. Glock found Plaintiff had a
full range of motion in her left shoulder; and restricted forward motion in her right
shoulder to 75 degrees, restricted abduction to 75 degrees and restricted adduction to
15 degrees. Id. He found a full range of motion in all joints but with some pain, but
no evidence of musculoskeletal abnormalities.

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Tr. 530.

Notwithstanding these

relatively mild findings, Dr. Glock opined that Plaintiff could lift no more than ten
pounds occasionally, sit or stand for no more than one hour, or walk for more than
thirty minutes. Tr. 535-36. She could occasionally reach with her right hand or
operate controls with her right foot, occasionally climb, balance, stoop, kneel, crouch
or crawl. Tr. 537-38. Dr. Glock further opined that Plaintiff could not use public
transportation, climb steps, walk a block at a reasonable pace, travel without a
companion or perform individual activities, such as shopping. Tr. 540.
The ALJ gave no weight to Dr. Glock’s consultative opinion, finding it was
unsupported by the physician’s own notes, Plaintiff’s activities of daily living and
other record evidence. Tr. 38, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 1527(c)(4), 1528(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4).
The Court finds substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. With respect to
her activities of daily living, Plaintiff reported in her function report that she cooked
daily for up to one hour, cleaned a little at a time throughout the day, and shopped
twice weekly for up to one hour. Tr. 256-67. In August 2012, Plaintiff reported to
her treating physician, Colette Haywood, M.D., that her activities of daily living were
normal and she had no physical disability. Tr. 561. An ALJ may reject a medical
opinion based, in part, on its inconsistency with the claimant’s own testimony.

Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1241. Dr. Glock’s opinion also was inconsistent with other
record evidence, as noted by the ALJ.

Tr. 32-33 (discussing Plaintiff’s treating

physicians at Family Health Centers, including Dr. Zohlandt, routinely documented
Plaintiff’s normal physical findings); see, e.g., Tr. 312, 315, 325, 339, 343, 441, 445

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(findings of normal musculoskeletal functioning). The ALJ may reject a physician’s
opinion when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion. Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440.
Plaintiff also briefly argues that the ALJ erred by not including limitations
from the opinions of Dr. Zohlandt or Dr. Kasprzak.

Doc. 25 at 16.

As noted,

however, Dr. Zohlandt’s examination findings were normal, supporting the ALJ’s
finding of no disability. See, e.g., Tr. 311-13. Similarly, examining psychologist Dr.
Kasprzak noted that Plaintiff’s response patterns resulted in underestimation of her
true abilities, she was not limited in remembering, understanding and carrying out
instructions or making judgments about work-related matters. Tr. 543. The ALJ
gave this opinion significant weight. Tr. 38.
Without complete citation to the record or to any authority, Plaintiff asserts
that the ALJ erred by asking the VE to consider a hypothetical individual with the
educational equivalence of “one year of college,” arguing that Plaintiff has only a 9th
grade education. Doc. 25 at 15; see Tr. 84. The only records cited by Plaintiff to
support her argument indeed show educational records through 9th grade, from 1986.

See, e.g., Tr. 305. Plaintiff also testified in the administrative hearing that the
highest level of education she completed was 9th grade. Tr. 51. Elsewhere in the
record, however, Plaintiff indicates in her application she completed one year of
college in 1994. Tr. 242. Here, the ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff could
perform her past relevant work as a deli clerk, nursery school attendant and
supervisor.

Tr. 39.

Alternatively, limiting Plaintiff to unskilled work, the ALJ

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found at step five that Plaintiff could perform her past work as a deli clerk and, in
addition, a sandwich board carrier, marker and surveillance system monitor. Tr. 40.
For this issue, the Court must determine whether substantial evidence
supports the ALJ's determination that Plaintiff failed to meet the fourth criteria of
the sequential evaluation process. At the fourth step, the claimant bears the burden
of demonstrating that she cannot return to her past relevant work. Battle v. Astrue,
243 F. App’x 514, 522 (11th Cir. 2007) (citing Lucas v. Sullivan, 918 F.2d 1567, 1571
(11th Cir.1990)). The ALJ assesses the claimant's RFC to determine whether the
claimant can perform past relevant work despite her impairment. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(f), 416.920(f). To support a conclusion that the claimant is able to return
to her past relevant work, the ALJ must consider all the duties of that work and
evaluate the claimant's ability to perform them in spite of her impairments. See

Lucas, 918 F.2d at 1574. An ALJ may consider a VE's opinion when making this
determination.

20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)(2). “In order for a [VE's] testimony to

constitute substantial evidence, the ALJ must pose a hypothetical question which
comprises all of the claimant's impairments.” Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d at 1227
(citation omitted). Errors may be harmless if they do not prejudice the claimant.

See Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir.1983).
The regulations define an education of 7th grade through the 11th grade as a
“limited education,” meaning the “ability in reasoning, arithmetic, and language
skills, but not enough to allow a person with these educational qualifications to do
most of the more complex job duties needed in semi-skilled or skilled jobs.” 20 C.F.R.

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§ 404.1564(b)(3). The VE identified at least three of Plaintiff’s past jobs, sandwich
maker, deli clerk and cleaner/maid, as unskilled, e.g., having an SVP of 2. 8 Tr. 83.
Here, in both step four and step five the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could
perform unskilled jobs (identifying deli cutter as “unskilled work”). Tr. 39-40. Even
assuming Plaintiff only completed the 9th grade, for which the record is in conflict,
she would have the educational ability under the regulations to perform the work
identified by the ALJ. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(3). Moreover, the record shows
that Plaintiff in fact performed the work of a deli clerk for a number of years. Tr.
244.

Therefore, Plaintiff was not prejudiced by any error in the hypothetical

question to the VE, as such error was harmless. Battle, 243 F. App’x at 522.
As to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ improperly limited Plaintiff’s
attorney’s questioning during the hearing, the Court has reviewed the transcript in
detail and finds no error in the ALJ’s request to control the hearing testimony and
ensure that counsel for Plaintiff ask only appropriate and relevant questions of the
VE. See Tr. 87-90. As noted by the Commissioner, the ALJ has the discretion to do
so.

Doc. 28 at 20 (citing HALLEX, § I-2-6-60, 1993 WL 751900, at *1 (S.S.A.)).

Accordingly, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision as
to Plaintiff’s physical limitations, and he properly considered all record evidence,
including medical opinions, and gave the appropriate weight to the opinions in
accordance with the regulations.

“The DOT lists a specific vocational preparation (SVP) time for each described
occupation. Using the skill level definitions in 20 CFR 404.1568 and 416.968, unskilled work
corresponds to an SVP of 1-2.” SSR 00–4p, 2000 WL 1898704 at *3.
8

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D. Whether the ALJ’s credibility decision is supported by substantial evidence
Plaintiff’s final argument is that the ALJ erred in his credibility assessment of
Plaintiff and did not adequately explain his reasons for his adverse credibility finding.
Doc. 25 at 16. The Commissioner asserts that the ALJ properly found Plaintiff’s
statement were not entirely credible based on Plaintiff’s own reports and the medical
records. Doc. 28 at 22.
In Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221 (11th Cir.1991), the Eleventh Circuit
articulated the “pain standard,” which applies when a claimant attempts to establish
a disability through her own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms. 921
F.2d at 1223. The pain standard requires:
(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective
medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising
from that condition or (3) that the objectively determined medical
condition is of such a severity that it can be reasonably expected to give
rise to the alleged pain.

Id. If a claimant testifies as to her subjective complaints of disabling pain and other
symptoms, as Plaintiff did here, the ALJ must clearly “articulate explicit and
adequate reasons” for discrediting the claimant's allegations of completely disabling
symptoms. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561-62. “Although this circuit does not require an
explicit finding as to credibility . . . the implication must be obvious to the reviewing
court.” Id. (citation omitted). The credibility determination does not need to cite
“‘particular phrases or formulations’” but it cannot merely be a broad rejection which
is “‘not enough to enable [the district court or this Court] to conclude that [the ALJ]
considered her medical condition as a whole.’” Id. at 1561 (quoting Jamison v. Bowen,

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814 F.2d 585, 588-90 (11th Cir.1987)). As stated in SSR 96-7p: “When evaluating
the credibility of an individual’s statements, the adjudicator must consider the entire
case record and give specific reasons for the weight given to the individual’s
statement.”
The ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s testimony at the administrative hearing. Tr.
36-37. Plaintiff testified that she attended high school through the ninth grade. Tr.
51.

She previously worked in the Publix deli for fifteen years slicing meat and

making sandwiches, but quit her job in about 2011 because she was depressed and
could not be friendly to customers and because of the pain in her right shoulder, which
interfered with her ability to slice meat, as she is right handed. Tr. 52-54. Plaintiff
testified she could not afford to see a specialist for her shoulder pain or for her
depression.

Tr. 53.

She cried throughout the hearing.

Id., Tr. 37.

Before

working at Publix, Plaintiff briefly worked as a housekeeper and housekeeper
supervisor at a hotel, and also worked in a daycare center. Tr. 54, 222. Plaintiff
testified she does not drive, cook, clean, do laundry or take out the trash; her daughter
does those things for her. Tr. 54. She stated that since 2011 she has daily right
shoulder pain two to three times per day, in which she has to lay down for up to one
hour each time, and she has been depressed every day since 2011 and wants to stay
in bed.

Tr. 55.

She lies down to relieve her shoulder pain and takes pain

medication. Tr. 55-56. Her diabetes causes poor vision and sores on her feet, which
causes significant pain and precludes her from wearing closed-toe shoes. Tr. 56.
Plaintiff testified she also cannot afford to see a specialist for her diabetes. 56-57.

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After reviewing Plaintiff’s testimony, the ALJ held:
After careful consideration of the evidence, the undersigned finds that
the claimant's medically determinable impairments could reasonably be
expected to cause the alleged symptoms; however, the claimant's
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained in
this decision.
Tr. 36.
Here, as outlined earlier in this opinion, the ALJ articulated explicit and
adequate reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s self-reports and testimony, as is required
in this circuit. The ALJ based his credibility determination on the medical evidence
of record, which was essentially normal, as discussed above, contrary to Plaintiff’s
complaints of disabling pain and depression. Tr. 37. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211.
With respect to her physical impairments, the ALJ noted that repeated
examinations and objective observation by her medical providers and Plaintiff’s
activities of daily living do not support her subjective complaints.

Tr. 37.

Beginning with Plaintiff’s AOD, the ALJ noted that examinations at that time were
largely “unremarkable with normal reflexes, neurological function, gait and balance.”

Id.

Examination reports by Dr. Zohlandt and other physicians from late 2010

throughout 2012 for the most part showed that Plaintiff had normal musculoskeletal
functioning, and Plaintiff reported she had no physical disability as of August 2012.

See, e.g., Tr. 312, 315, 325, 339, 343, 441, 445, 561.

Such mild findings were

substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision that that Plaintiff’s impairments
were not as severe as she alleged. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211 (affirming an adverse

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credibility finding based, in part, on mild examination findings); Watson v. Heckler,
738 F.2d 1169, 1173 (11th Cir. 1984) (same).
The ALJ also noted that the record showed Plaintiff’s diabetes and
hypertension were well controlled when Plaintiff complied with her treatment,
observing that Plaintiff had a “history of medication noncompliance.”

Tr. 37.

Plaintiff contends the ALJ erred in considering Plaintiff’s improvement with
medication arguing her blood sugar was not controlled and that the ALJ should have
considered that Plaintiff was unable to afford treatment.

Doc. 25 at 17-18.

Plaintiff’s argument is not persuasive. The ALJ did not find Plaintiff’s diabetes was
well-controlled in general. Tr. 37. Instead, he found Plaintiff’s noncompliance with
her medication was another factor to discount her credibility because she was
noncompliant even though her medication would have provided her with relief. Id.
The ALJ is only required to consider that a claimant is unable to afford treatment
when noncompliance is the sole basis for an adverse credibility finding. See Ellison

v. Barnhart, 355 F.3d 1272, 1275 (11th Cir. 2003). That was not the case here.
Considering Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, the ALJ also noted that
Plaintiff reported that she could prepare simple meals, perform household chores,
drive a car, shop, attend church and handle financial transactions, and that such
activities were inconsistent with her complaints. Tr. 37. The ALJ properly may
consider a claimant’s activities of daily living in determining her credibility with
respect to symptoms and pain. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529, 416.929.

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With respect to Plaintiff mental condition, the ALJ found that objective
observations of her medical providers do not support her subjective complaints, and
her depression symptoms appeared to approve with proper medication. Tr. 37-38
(discussing such examinations from 2010 through 2013). The ALJ also addressed
Dr. Kasprzak’s opinion, discussed in more detail above, that Plaintiff’s response
patterns during her examination and testing resulted in an underestimation of
Plaintiff’s true abilities. Tr. 38, 551. The ALJ noted he agreed with Dr. Kaspzak’s
assessment; and thus, he discounted the “subpar findings of her exam.”

Tr. 38.

This evidence further supports the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff’s symptoms
were not as serious as she alleged. See De Olazabal v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r,
579 F. App’x 827, 831 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that the appellant’s subjective
complaints were undermined, in part, by her symptoms being controlled with
medication); Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1212 (same).
In summary, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, her
reports, and the findings of her medical providers and concluded that Plaintiff’s
subjective complaints were inconsistent with the medical record. The Court thus
finds the ALJ adequately explained his reasons. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1213, quoting

Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1226 (noting the “ALJ made a reasonable decision to reject [the
claimant’s] subjective testimony, articulating, in detail, the contrary evidence as his
reasons for doing so”).

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IV.
Upon review of the record, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ applied the
proper legal standards, and his determination that Plaintiff is not disabled is
supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ applied the proper legal standards
in doing so.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.

The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED.

2.

The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment pursuant to sentence

four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) in favor of the Commissioner, and close the file.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 11th day of July, 2016.

Copies:
Counsel of record

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