Hasanati v. David Lawrence et al
Filing
45
OPINION AND ORDER denying re: 11 Amended petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Clerk of Court shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgmentaccordingly, and close this case. Petitioner is not entitled to acertificate of appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 8/31/2017. (SLU)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JAHI HASANATI,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No: 2:15-cv-54-FtM-38MRM
DAVID LAWRENCE and DIANE
ANDREWS,
Respondents.
/
OPINION AND ORDER1
Petitioner Jahi Hasanati, a prisoner in the custody of the Florida Department of
Corrections who is also a proclaimed sovereign citizen, initiated this action by filing a
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. #1) on January 30,
2015. Petitioner challenges a disciplinary report he received at Desoto Correctional
Institution stemming from attempting to bite a correctional officer. Petitioner is now
proceeding on his Amended Petition challenging the disciplinary report, of which the
disciplinary team found him guilty. As a result, Petitioner served sixty-days in disciplinary
confinement and forfeited ninety-days gain time (Doc. #11, Amended Petition).
1
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Respondents filed a Response opposing the Petition (Doc. #18, Response) and
attached supporting exhibits (Docs. #18-1 through #18-4). Respondents point out that
Petitioner did not properly exhaust his challenge to the disciplinary report by filing a
petition for relief in the State court. Response at 7-11. Consequently, Respondents
argue that Petitioner’s claims are unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Id. Turning
to address the merits, Respondents argue that Petitioner was afforded all of the due
process protections required under the United States Constitution. Id. at 11-15.
I. Factual History and Procedural Background
Stemming from an incident that occurred around 4:00 p.m. on December 4, 2014,
Hasanati was issued a disciplinary report (“DR”) for “assault or attempted assault on a
correctional officer” in violation of Florida Administrative Code Rule 33-601.314.
Response at 4, Exh. 2. Immediately preceding the incident, Correctional Officer Woods,
the coordinator for Desoto Correctional Institution’s security threat group, questioned
Hasanati about documents Hasanati had previously filed with Desoto’s library clerk
referencing the Uniform Commercial Code and the Sovereign Citizen movement. Doc.
#18-2 at 1. In the disciplinary report, Woods explained that while he was questioning
Hasanati about the sovereign citizen movement, Hasanati became “argumentative to the
questioning of his legal work.” Woods explained to Hasanati he would be going to
administrative confinement pending the outcome of the investigation. Woods stated that
Hasanati then began screaming down the hallway. Woods instructed Hasanati to submit
to hand restraints, but he refused every order. Woods then went to grab Hasanati’s right
wrist while Hasanati was sitting down, at which point Hasanati tried to bite Woods arm.
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Woods’ disciplinary report identifies correctional officer Rinvil as a witness.
Rinval’s written witness statement confirms that Hasanati refused to obey every order,
but does not state that Hasanati tried to bite Woods. Doc. #18-3 at 23.
Hasanati received notice of the charge on December 5, 2014. Doc. #18-2 at 1.
An investigation into the charge commenced on December 5 and ended on December 8,
2014. Id. On December 11, 2014, the disciplinary hearing commenced with England
and Stewart presiding. Id. Petitioner waived his right to be present at the disciplinary
hearing and signed the 24 hour/refusal to appear waiver form. Doc. #18-2 at 10. The
disciplinary team found Petitioner guilty as set forth in Woods’ disciplinary report. The
disciplinary finding further states that Rinvil witnessed Hasanati’s actions.
The
disciplinary team also noted that Hasanati did not request any additional witnesses or
evidence during the investigation, and that the team reviewed Hasanati’s witness
statement before reaching its conclusion.
II. Standard of Review
A. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and Disciplinary Proceedings
A state prisoner who is deprived of gain time as a result of a prison disciplinary
proceeding that allegedly violated due process may seek federal habeas review, but such
review is governed by restrictions set forth under 28 U.S.C. ' 2254. Medberry, 351 F.3d
at 1054.
Under the deferential review standard, habeas relief may not be granted
regarding a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication of the
claim:
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
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(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d). Cullen v. Pinholster, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
AThis is a difficult to meet, and highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court
rulings, which demands that the state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.@
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). See also Harrington v. Richter, ___ U.S.
___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (pointing out that Aif [' 2254(d)=s] standard is difficult to
meet, that is because it was meant to be.@Both the Eleventh Circuit and the Supreme
Court broadly interpret what is meant by an Aadjudication on the merits.@ Childers v.
Floyd, 642 F.3d 953, 967-68 (11th Cir. 2011). Thus, a state court=s summary rejection
of a claim, even without explanation, qualifies as an adjudication on the merits that
warrants deference by a federal court. Id.; see also Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144,
1146 (11th Cir. 2008). Indeed, “unless the state court clearly states that its decision was
based solely on a state procedural rule [the Court] will presume that the state court has
rendered an adjudication on the merits when the petitioner=s claim >is the same claim
rejected= by the court.” Childers v. Floyd, 642 F.3d at 969 (quoting Early v. Packer, 537
U.S. 3, 8 (2002)).
“A legal principle is >clearly established= within the meaning of this provision only
when it is embodied in a holding of [the United States Supreme] Court.” Thaler v.
Haynes, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 1171, 1173 (2010); see also Carey v. Musladin, 549
U.S. 70, 74 (2006)(citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000))(recognizing
A[c]learly established federal law@ consists of the governing legal principles, rather than
the dicta, set forth in the decisions of the United States Supreme Court at the time the
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state court issues its decision).
AA state court decision involves an unreasonable
application of federal law when it identifies the correct legal rule from Supreme Court case
law but unreasonably applies that rule to the facts of the petitioner's case, or when it
unreasonably extends, or unreasonably declines to extend, a legal principle from
Supreme Court case law to a new context.@ Ponticelli v. Sec=y, Fla. Dep=t of Corr., 690
F.3d 1271, 1291 (11th Cir. 2012)(internal quotations and citations omitted). The
Aunreasonable application@ inquiry requires the Court to conduct the two-step analysis set
forth in Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770. First, the Court determines what arguments
or theories support the state court decision; and second, the Court must determine
whether Afairminded jurists could disagree those arguments or theories are inconsistent
with the holding in a prior@ Supreme Court decision. Id. (citations omitted). Whether a
court errs in determining facts Ais even more deferential than under a clearly erroneous
standard of review.@ Stephens v. Hall, 407 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir. 2005). The Court
presumes the findings of fact to be correct, and petitioner bears the burden of rebutting
the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(e)(1).
The Supreme Court has held that review Ais limited to the record that was before
the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.@ Cullen, 131 S. Ct. at 1398.
Thus, the Court is limited to reviewing only the record that was before the state court at
the time it rendered its order. Id.
The Court recognizes that prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal
prosecution, and therefore the full panoply of rights that are due a defendant in a criminal
proceeding does not apply. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citation
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omitted). AIn sum, there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs
and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.@ Id.
In Wolff, the United States Supreme Court held Athat written notice of the charges
must be given to the disciplinary-action defendant in order to inform him of the charges
and to enable him to marshal the facts and prepare a defense.@ Id. at 564. Further, the
Court held that A[a]t least a brief period of time after the notice, no less than 24 hours,
should be allowed to the inmate to prepare for the appearance before the [disciplinary
committee].@ Id. The Court further explained Athere must be a >written statement by the
fact finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons= for the disciplinary action.@ Id.
(quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972)). The Court also noted Athe
inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present
documentary evidence in his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.@ Id. at 566. The Court explained
its concern for institutional safety:
Ordinarily, the right to present evidence is basic to a fair
hearing; but the unrestricted right to call witnesses from the
prison population carries obvious potential for disruption and
for interference with the swift punishment that in individual
cases may be essential to carrying out the correctional
program of the institution. We should not be too ready to
exercise oversight and put aside the judgment of prison
administrators. It may be that an individual threatened with
serious sanctions would normally be entitled to present
witnesses and relevant documentary evidence; but here we
must balance the inmate=s interest in avoiding loss of good
time against the needs of the prison, and some amount of
flexibility and accommodation is required. Prison officials
must have the necessary discretion to keep the hearing within
reasonable limits and to refuse to call witnesses that may
create a risk of reprisal or undermine authority, as well as to
limit access to other inmates to collect statements or to
compile other documentary evidence. Although we do not
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prescribe it, it would be useful for the Committee to state its
reason for refusing to call a witness, whether it be for
irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards presented in
individual cases. Any less flexible rule appears untenable as
a constitutional matter, at least on the record made in this
case. The operation of a correctional institution is at best an
extraordinary difficult undertaking. Many prison officials, on
the spot and with the responsibility for the safety of inmates
and staff, are reluctant to extend the unqualified right to call
witnesses; and in our view, they must have the necessary
discretion without being subject to unduly crippling
constitutional impediments. There is this much play in the
joints of the Due Process Clause, and we stop short of
imposing a more demanding rule with respect to witnesses
and documents.
Id. at 566-567.
An inmate facing a disciplinary charge, however, has no constitutional right to
confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses furnishing evidence against him at the
disciplinary hearing. Id. at 567. The Court left this matter to the sound discretion of the
officials of the state prisons. Id. at 569. Finally, the disciplinary hearing committee must
be sufficiently impartial in that it must not present Aa hazard of arbitrary decision making.@
Id. at 571.
B. Section 2254's Exhaustion Requirement
A petitioner, when asserting grounds that warrant review by a federal court under
§ 2254, must have first raised such grounds before the state courts, thereby giving the
state courts the initial opportunity to address the federal issues. A ' 2254 application
cannot be granted unless a petitioner Ahas exhausted the remedies available in the courts
of the State; . . .” 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(b)(1)(A).
This imposes a “total exhaustion”
requirement in which all of the federal issues must have first been presented to the state
courts. Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005).
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“[T]he state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims
before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.@ O=Sullivan v.
Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). See also Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365-66
(1995).
AA state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief cannot raise a federal
constitutional claim in federal court unless he first properly raised the issue in the state
courts.@ Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). See also Pruitt v. Jones,
348 F.3d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, sub nom. Pruitt v. Hooks, 543 U.S.
838 (2004). To properly exhaust a claim, a petitioner must present the same claim to
the state court he urges the federal court to consider. A mere citation to the federal
constitution is insufficient for purposes of exhaustion. Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4,
7 (1983). “‘[T]he exhaustion doctrine requires a habeas applicant to do more than scatter
some makeshift needles in the haystack of the state court record.’ ” McNair v. Campbell,
416 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Kelley v. Sec=y for the Dep=t of Corr., 377
F.3d 1317, 1343-44 (11th Cir. 2004)).
III. Analysis
As set forth above, any claims Petitioner wished to pursue pertaining to the alleged
false disciplinary report should have been filed by a petition for writ of mandamus in the
Florida courts. Bush v. State, 945 So. 2d 1207, 1210 (Fla. 2006). And, Petitioner
should have filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus before the Florida courts concerning
any claims concerning his placement on CM-I status. See Kendrick v. McNeil, 6 So. 2d
657 (Fla. 1st DCA March 5, 2009)(finding Florida courts consistently ruled that an inmate
seeking release from close management is entitled to proceed through a petition for writ
of habeas corpus)(citations omitted). Because Petitioner did not pursue any claim in the
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state court by filing a petition for writ of mandamus concerning the disciplinary infraction,
his claims sub judice are unexhausted and now procedurally defaulted.
In the abundance of caution the Court further addresses the merits of Petitioner’s
claims. Each of the claims stems from the premise that Desoto Correctional Institution
lacked the authority, or jurisdiction, to issue the disciplinary report, hold the disciplinary
hearing, find Petitioner guilty, and ultimately impose a punishment of sixty days in
disciplinary confinement and ninety days loss of gain time. Petitioner’s claims have no
merit. As set forth above, correctional institutions have the authority to maintain a safe
and orderly institution for inmates and correctional officials.
To the extent Petitioner alleges a due process claim, the claim must be measured
according to the test established by the United States Supreme Court in Wolff v.
McDonnell. It is not a question of whether state law or an administrative departmental
policy was violated, but rather the inquiry concerns whether Petitioner’s allegations rise
to the level of a federal constitutional violation, and whether the procedural deficiences
are ones that violate Petitioner’s due process rights guaranteed to him under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
The facts in the record show that Petitioner received written notice including the
charges against him and that the hearing would not take place prior to 24 hours of the
delivery of the charges.
The hearing commenced approximately seven days after
Woods issued the disciplinary report. Petitioner was provided the opportunity to be
present for the disciplinary hearing, but signed a waiver form, thereby waiving his
presence at the hearing.
During the disciplinary hearing, the team considered
correctional officer Woods’ statement, correctional officer Rivili’s statement, and
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Petitioner’s statement to the contrary. Ultimately, the disciplinary hearing team found the
correctional official’s statement of the facts to be more reliable than Petitioner’s lone
statement, and found Petitioner guilty. Based on a review of the record, it is apparent
that the committee relied upon facts to support their finding of guilt and did not reach an
arbitrary and capricious decision. Thus, all of Petitioner’s due process rights remained
intact.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. The Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #11) is DENIED.
2.
The Clerk of Court shall terminate any pending motions, enter judgment
accordingly, and close this case.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND
LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS DENIED
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of
appealability on either petition. A prisoner seeking to appeal a district court's final order
denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus has no absolute entitlement to appeal but
must obtain a certificate of appealability (“COA”). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Harbison v.
Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 184 (2009). “A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To
make such a showing, Petitioner “must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the
district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v.
Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) or, that “the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further”,
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36
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(2003)(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Petitioner has not made the
requisite showing in these circumstances. Finally, because Petitioner is not entitled to a
certificate of appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 31st day of August, 2017.
FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record
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