Guadagnoli v. Masony et al

Filing 58

ORDER OF DISMISSAL granting 47 motion to dismiss; dismissing without prejudice 9 amended complaint. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants, terminate any pending motions, and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 1/30/2017. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
LARRY D. GUADAGNOLI,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:15-cv-176-FtM-29MRM

BRIAN LEE MASONY, Facility
Legal
Advisor,
Attorney,
BILL PRICE, DONALD SAWYER,
Doctor, REBECCA J. JACKSON,
Doctor,
MELINDA
MASTERS,
PAUL PYE, FORENSIC ADMISSION
COORDINATOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAM,
Tallahassee,
Florida,
DEPARTMENT
OF
CHILDREN
AND
FAMILY
SERVICES, S.V.P. Department,
GLOBAL
ENFORCEMENT
OPERATIONS,
CORRECT
CARE
SOLUTIONS, and FLORIDA CIVIL
COMMITMENT
CENTER
INTERDISCIPLINARY TREATMENT
TEAM FACILITY,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion to dismiss
filed by Defendants Brian Masony, Bill Price, Donald Sawyer,
Melissa Master, Paul Pye, and Rebecca Jackson (Doc. 47, filed
October 19, 2016).

Although Plaintiff has not filed a response

to the motion, he has filed an unsigned “Request for Oral Argument”
which appears to address the motion to dismiss (Doc. 56, filed
November 28, 2016).

The Court will liberally construe Plaintiff’s

unsigned request for oral argument as a response to the motion to
dismiss.
For the reasons set forth in this Order, Defendant’s motion
to dismiss is granted.
I.

Background

Plaintiff initiated this case on March 19, 2015 by filing a
complaint against eleven defendants associated with the Florida
Civil Commitment Center (Doc. 1).

In the complaint, Plaintiff

appeared to generally allege that he was displeased with the
treatment he received for tinnitus (ringing in the ears). Id.
relief, Plaintiff sought release from the FCCC. Id.
of

the

complaint,

it

was

determined

that

As

Upon review

Plaintiff

had

not

adequately set forth his claims and that he could not seek relief
from detention in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action (Doc. 5 at 2).
Plaintiff was ordered to file an amended complaint, and he was
provided explicit instructions on how to do so. Id.
On April 16, 2015, Plaintiff filed a 27-page amended complaint
which

is

virtually

incomprehensible

(Doc.

9).

He

generally

questions his treatment at the FCCC and the validity of the
facility’s professional licenses. Id.

Instead of providing a

short and plain statement of the facts surrounding the alleged
constitutional violations committed by the defendants, Plaintiff
appears to have cut and pasted portions of other documents and
random

legal

definitions

into

the

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amended

complaint

without

explaining these portions’ applicability to his tinnitus or to
other treatment he has received at the FCCC. 1

In fact, the only

mention of tinnitus in the amended complaint appears to be an
assertion that Defendant Sawyer has access to a website for the
Physician’s Desk Reference (Doc. 9 at 9).
Defendants Masony, Price, Sawyer, Master, Pye and Jackson
move to dismiss the amended complaint (Doc. 47).

They generally

allege that they cannot provide a responsive pleading because the
allegations against them make no sense. Id. Defendants further
urge

that

the

amended

complaint

should

be

dismissed

because

1

For example, in Plaintiff’s discussion involving Defendant
Sawyer, Plaintiff references a complaint presumably sent to Maura
Canter, “bar counsel for the Attorney Consumer Assistance ProgramThe Florida Bar.” (Doc. 9 at 8).
Plaintiff states without
explanation of the statement’s relevance to the instant complaint:
The Fact(s) Stated in reference to filed
complaint(s)-2014010,782(12B);
“In
*our*
Response to the above complaint,”. . . that
Counsel-including
all
parties
previously
stated willingly with intent to deceive the
Great State of Florida-Florida Bar, in case(s)
2:15-cv-00176-JES-DNF(2:15-cv-176-Ftm29DNF), and Defense Attorney(s)-*Willie E.
Gary
III,
*Carmen
Vix
Caino,*
Ashley
Minton,*Holly Stacie; resulting in damages
(personal/Career related) financially and
transferring liability to third parties,
causing economic losses.
(Doc. 9 at 8) (editorial enhancements and asterisks in original).

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Plaintiff did not abide by the instructions set forth in this
Court’s order to amend. Id.
II.

Standard of Review for Motions to Dismiss

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court
accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint and construes
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v.
BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004).
Further, this Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable
inferences from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990)
(“On a motion to dismiss, the facts stated in [the] complaint and
all

reasonable

inferences

therefrom

are

taken

as

true.”).

However, the Supreme Court explains that:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the grounds of his entitlement to
relief
requires
more
than
labels
and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).

Further, courts are not

“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court,
referring

to

its

earlier

decision

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in

Bell

Atlantic

Corp.

v.

Twombly, illustrated a two-pronged approach to motions to dismiss.
First, a reviewing court must determine whether a Plaintiff’s
allegation is merely an unsupported legal conclusion that is not
entitled to an assumption of truth.

Next, the court must determine

whether the complaint’s factual allegations state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

In

the case of a pro se action, the Court should construe the
complaint

more

liberally

than

it

would

pleadings

drafted

by

lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980).
III. Analysis
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a
complaint to “contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“[T]he pleading standard
Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but
it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmedme- accusation.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555)).

Rule 10 of the

Federal Rules further provides that, “[i]f doing so would promote
clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence
. . . must be stated in a separate count[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
Rules 8 and 10 work together and “‘require the pleader to present his
claims discretely and succinctly, so that his adversary can discern
what he is claiming and frame a responsive pleading, the court can
determine which facts support which claims and whether the plaintiff

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has stated any claims upon which relief can be granted, and, at trial,
the court can determine that evidence which is relevant and that
which is not.’” Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th
Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s amended complaint presents a confusing mixture
of

allegations,

narrative,

relevant

conclusory

facts,

irrelevant

accusations,

and

facts,

legal

argument

disjointed
(Doc.

9).

Plaintiff appears to generally complain about his treatment at the
FCCC without explaining how his constitutional rights were violated.
He raises confusing claims for “breach of contract” and for alleged
violations of criminal statutes.

Plaintiff does not separate the

causes of action, making it difficult to decipher the precise claims
and against whom the claims are brought.

It is the type of pleading

that renders it impossible for a defendant to answer and must be
dismissed under Rule 8 for that reason.
Plaintiff’s response to the motion to dismiss (Doc. 56, labeled
“Plaintiffs, Johnny C. Evans, Larry D. Guadagnoli, Terrod Smith, Gary
Dextor, and Movants (Clients/Residents’) Housed or Formerly Housed
at

Florida

Facility

–

Civil

Commitment

Arcadia,

Florida

Center
Legal

Interdisciplinary
Memoranda;

Request

Treatment
for

Argument”) is no less confusing than his amended complaint.
appears

as

if

Plaintiff

may

be

attempting

to

raise

Oral
It

additional

unrelated claims against people who are not named in his amended
complaint. See Doc. 56 at 5 (asserting that “Adele Simmons; deliberate
obstruction of criminal and civil statutes cited”; Doc. 56 at 4-5

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(asserting

that

Defendants

Sawyer,

Masters,

interfered with Plaintiff’s “trade secrets”).

and

Pye

may

have

Plaintiff also appears

to assert that he is not the only plaintiff in this action. See Doc.
56 at 6, (“Constitutional Rights and Amendments have been violated;
by withholding Plaintiffs’ (Guadagnoli, Poole, Evans, Johhny [sic]
C., Gary Dextor, Terrod Smith, and listed movants’[)] under ‘Notice
of Pendency of Other Actions’”).
After conducting a review of his original complaint, Plaintiff
was granted an opportunity to amend. See Bank v. Pitt, 928 F.2d 1108,
1112 (11th Cir. 1991) (“Where a more carefully drafted complaint

might state a claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance
to amend the complaint before the district court dismisses the
action with prejudice.”), overruled in part by Wagner v. Daewoo
Heavy Indus. America Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002).
Although provided detailed instructions on how to amend, Plaintiff
did not comply with those instructions.

Accordingly, he will not

be provided an opportunity to file a second amended complaint in
this action.

If Plaintiff wishes to pursue his tinnitus-based

claim, he must file a new complaint along with a new motion to
proceed in forma pauperis.

Plaintiff should not use the instant

case number on any further complaints filed in this Court.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED:

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1.

The defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 47) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s

amended

complaint

is

dismissed

without

prejudice

pursuant to Rules 8 and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
2.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending

motions, enter judgment in favor of the defendants, and close this
case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of January, 2017.

SA: OrlP-4
Copies: Larry D. Guadagnoli
Counsel of Record

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30th

day