Figueroa v. Florida Attorney General et al
Filing
27
OPINION AND ORDER dismissing the Florida Attorney General as a named respondent; dismissing with prejudice 1 Petition for writ of habeas corpus as time-barred. A certificate of appealability is denied. The clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 7/21/2016. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JOSE FIGUEROA,
Petitioner,
v.
Case No: 2:15-cv-195-FtM-29MRM
FLORIDA ATTORNEY GENERAL and
TOM REID, Warden,
Respondents. 1
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon a pro se petition for
habeas corpus relief filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Jose
Figueroa (“Petitioner”) (Doc. 1, filed Mar. 25, 2015).
Petitioner
attacks the convictions entered by the Twentieth Judicial Circuit
Court in Lee County, Florida in 1997 for first degree premeditated
murder, first degree felony murder, three counts of attempted first
degree murder with a firearm, and five counts of attempted robbery
with a firearm. Id.
Respondent moves to dismiss the petition because
it was untimely filed (Doc. 21).
1
Petitioner did not file a reply to
When the petitioner is incarcerated and challenges his
present physical confinement “the proper respondent is the warden
of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney
General or some other remote supervisory official.” Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 436 (2004) (citations omitted).
In
Florida, the proper respondent in this action is the Secretary of
the Florida Department of Corrections.
Therefore, the Florida
Attorney General will be dismissed from this action.
the response, and his time to do so has expired (Doc. 22; Doc. 26).
The petition is now ripe for review.
Petitioner raises a single claim in his petition.
He asserts
that he is actually innocent of the charges against him because,
eleven years after his trial, the lead detective in his criminal case
was discharged from his position as a law enforcement officer due to
his failure to attend a training class on hostage negotiation and due
to false statements made to his superiors as to the reason for his
absence from the class (Doc. 1 at 5).
The Court cannot reach the
merits of this claim because the pleadings, exhibits, and attachments
establish that the petition should be dismissed as untimely.
Because the Court may resolve the Petition on the basis of
the record, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted.
See Schriro
v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 474 (2007) (if the record refutes the
factual allegations in the petition or otherwise precludes habeas
relief, a district court is not required to hold an evidentiary
hearing).
I.
Background and Procedural History 2
On December 5, 1995, Petitioner was indicted on charges of
first degree murder, first degree felony murder, three counts of
attempted first degree murder, and five counts of attempted robbery
with
a
firearm
(Ex.
1
at
5).
2
The
indictment
alleged
that
References to exhibits and appendices are to those filed by
Respondent on January 15, 2016 (Ex. 15). Citations to the trial
transcript, located in Exhibit 1 will be cited as (T. at __).
- 2 -
Petitioner killed Gerardo Rodriguez and shot Carmen Campuzano,
Jose Ramirez, and Franco Cleofas during a robbery attempt. Id.
The underlying facts of this case and Petitioner's trial are
relevant to his instant claim of actual innocence.
In its response
to Petitioner's appellate brief, the state summarized the evidence
presented at trial as follows:
Lilliana and Alejandre Cruz testified that the
evening before the crime Ivan Melendez and
[Petitioner] Jose Figueroa were near their
house and were discussing their plans to rob
some “Guatoes” or Guatemalans.
Both men
participated
in
the
conversation,
and
[Petitioner] said he would carry a gun to
scare
the
victims.
Lilliana
heard
[Petitioner] use the phrase “take a life” in
the course of the conversation.
Her sister
Alejandra testified that that evening at 7:00
pm when Figueroa and Melendez were there, she
heard Melendez state that “he had to go
because he was going to kill someone.”
The state also presented evidence that boxer
Eric Madison testified that he saw Melendez
and [Petitioner] that same evening and that
they invited him to join them in robbing some
victims, but that he had said, “No.”
Later
in the evening, the two men set off; Madison
heard four shots and two or three minutes
afterwards, Melendez and [Petitioner] came
running, short of breath and sweating saying
that they had “burned” someone.
The
victims
who
survived
the
shooting
testified that their two assailants had
clothing over their faces, were armed and
demanded “chavos”, the word commonly used by
Spanish speaking Puerto Ricans for money.
Juan Alvarez testified that one evening (later
determined to be within 24 hours of the crimes
at trial in this case) he was driving to
Lagunda Migrant Camp when he was approached
- 3 -
and overtaken by a car whose driver got out of
the car and pointed a gun at him, demanding
“chavos” and shooting him in the leg and
shooting at his car.
He was able to pick
[Petitioner] Jose Figueroa’s photograph out of
a
police
photo-pak
and
to
identify
[Petitioner's] picture as that of the person
who shot him.
The Court allowed this
testimony
into
evidence
to
show
the
Petitioner’s identity and opportunity to
commit the crimes at bar.
The State
established that the Lagunda Migrant Camp was
a four minute car ride away from the murder
scene. Ballistics evidence established that
gun casings gathered at the scene of the
murder and those gathered at the scene of the
Alvarez shooting were fired from the same gun.
(Ex. 3 at 4-5).
On July 31, 1997, a jury found Petitioner guilty on all counts
(Ex. 1, Vol. IV at 78-82).
be sentenced to death.
The jury recommended that Petitioner
However, the trial court overrode the jury
recommendation and sentenced Petitioner to life in prison without
parole on the first degree murder convictions, forty years in
prison on each of the attempted first degree murder counts, and
fifteen years in prison on the attempted armed robbery convictions
(Ex. 1 at Vol. VI at 280-86).
On June 4, 1999, Florida’s Second
District Court of Appeal affirmed Petitioner's convictions and
sentences per curiam (Ex. 5).
On November 14, 2000, Petitioner filed his first motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules
of
Criminal
conducting
Procedure
an
(“Rule
evidentiary
3.850
hearing,
- 4 -
motion”)
the
(Ex.
7).
post-conviction
After
court
denied the motion on June 19, 2001 (Ex. 8).
Petitioner did not
timely appeal the denial, but sought leave to file a belated appeal
on January 14, 2002 (Ex. 10).
The motion was denied on May 1,
2002 (Ex. 12).
Petitioner filed a second Rule 3.850 motion on April 28, 2003
(Ex. 14) which was denied as untimely and successive by the postconviction court on May 21, 2003 (Ex. 15).
Petitioner appealed
(Ex. 16), and Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal affirmed
(Ex. 18); Figueroa v. State, 866 So. 2d 1218 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003).
On August 25, 2003, Petitioner filed a motion for postconviction DNA testing pursuant to Rule 3.853 of the Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure (Ex. 20).
After securing a response (Ex.
24),
denied
the
post-conviction
court
evidentiary hearing (Ex. 25).
the
motion
without
an
On September 8, 2004, Florida’s
Second District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam (Ex. 27).
Mandate issued on October 21, 2004 (Ex. 28).
On December 7, 2007, Petitioner filed a motion to correct an
illegal sentence pursuant to Rule 3.800(a) of the Florida Rules of
Criminal Procedure (Ex. 32).
The motion was denied in part and
dismissed in part (Ex. 33).
Petitioner appealed (Ex. 34), and
Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal affirmed per curiam (Ex.
35); Figueroa v. State, 994 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).
issued on November 24, 2008 (Ex. 38).
- 5 -
Mandate
On May 8, 2013, Petitioner filed a third Rule 3.850 motion,
raising the same “newly discovered evidence” claim as the instant
petition (Ex. 40).
The post-conviction court denied the motion
on April 9, 2014, and Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal
affirmed per curiam (Ex. 45); Figueroa v. State, 137 So. 3d 382
(Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
Mandate issued on May 8, 2014 (Ex. 45).
On October 2, 2013, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in the incorrect court (Ex. 47).
The motion was
transferred to a civil case (Ex. 48) and dismissed (Ex. 49).
Florida’s Second District Court of Appeal affirmed (Ex. 52);
Figueroa v. State, 139 So. 3d 306 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014).
Mandate
issued on June 26, 2014 (Ex. 53).
Petitioner delivered the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition
for mailing on March 23, 2015 (Doc. 1).
II.
A.
Analysis
A 28 U.S.C. § 2254 federal habeas corpus petition is
subject to a one-year statute of limitation
Pursuant to the requirements set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2244,
as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (“AEDPA”), a one-year limitation period applies to the filing
of a habeas petition by a person in custody pursuant to a state
court judgment.
(A)
This limitation period runs from the latest of:
the date on which the judgment became final by
the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such
review;
- 6 -
(B)
the date on which the impediment to filing an
application created by State action in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;
(C)
the date on which the constitutional right
asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively
applicable
to
cases
on
collateral review; or
(D)
28
U.S.C.
§
the date on which the factual predicate of the
claim or claims presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due
diligence.
2244(d)(1).
Petitioner
does
not
identify
the
provision of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) that applies to his petition.
However, he does not allege that the State created an impediment
to timely filing the instant petition (§ 2244(d)(1)(B)) or that a
retroactively
applicable
constitutional
right
recognized by the Supreme Court (§ 2241(d)(1)(C)).
the
Court
will
address
the
remaining
two
was
recently
Accordingly,
provisions
of
§
2244(d)(1).
1.
Florida’s
Petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition
untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)
Second
District
Court
of
Appeal
is
affirmed
Petitioner's convictions and sentences on June 4, 1999 (Ex. 7).
Petitioner's judgment became final ninety days later - when the
time to seek review in the United States Supreme Court expired.
See Nix v. Sec’y for the Dep't of Corr., 393 F.3d 1235, 1236–37
- 7 -
(11th Cir. 2004); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 232 (1964) (time
period in which a petitioner could file a petition for writ of
certiorari to the Supreme Court must be considered in calculating
date on which judgment becomes final).
Accordingly, Petitioner's
judgment became final on September 2, 1999.
Petitioner then had
until September 2, 2000 to file his federal habeas petition. Downs
v. McNeil, 520 F.3d 1311, 1318 (11th Cir. 2008) (AEDPA's one-year
“limitations
period
should
be
calculated
according
to
the
‘anniversary method,’ under which the limitations period expires
on the anniversary of the date it began to run.”) (citing Ferreira
v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 494 F.3d 1286, 1289 n.1 (11th Cir.
2007)).
Petitioner's federal habeas petition was signed on March 23,
2015.
Therefore, it was filed 5315 days late unless tolling
principles apply to render it timely.
“The time during which a
properly filed application for State post-conviction or other
collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim
is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.”
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Petitioner filed his first Rule 3.850 motion on November 14,
2000 (Ex. 6).
By then, his one-year AEDPA limitations period had
already lapsed.
A state court motion that is filed after the
expiration of the federal limitations period for § 2254 petitions
does not toll the limitation period because the period has already
- 8 -
expired.
That
is,
there
was
no
federal
limitations
period
remaining to be tolled at the time Petitioner's November Rule 3.850
motion, or any of his other subsequent post-conviction motions,
were filed. See Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2001).
Petitioner is not entitled to statutory tolling of the AEDPA
limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
2.
Petitioner is not entitled to a later start date
under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D), the one-year AEDPA statute
of limitation begins on “the date on which the factual predicate
of the [claims] presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.” Id.
Although Petitioner does not
specifically cite to § 2241(d)(1)(D), he now offers evidence that
was unavailable at his trial and proposes an alternative starting
date for the AEDPA statute of limitations.
Specifically, he
asserts:
[T]he newly discovered evidence claim was
filed on January 14, 2013. [U]pon denial by
the trial judge, and ensuing appeal to the
second District Court of Appeal, the one-year
time limitations was tolled until the mandate
issued on May 8, 2014. Henceforth, from the
filing date of this petition, 315 days of the
365 days for the filing of this petition
elapsed. Thus, this petition is being timely
filed.
(Doc. 1 at 13).
Accordingly, the Court will examine whether the
petition was timely filed under this section.
- 9 -
Petitioner points the Court to documents regarding a 2008 Lee
County
Sheriff’s
Office
investigation
Buissereth (Doc. 1-1 at 46-53). 3
of
Lieutenant
Yves
The attached documents show
that Buissereth’s employment with the Lee County Sheriff’s Office
was terminated on March 13, 2008 because he failed to attend a
mandatory training class on hostage negotiation and lied to his
superiors as to the reason for his absence. The report described
Lieutenant Buissereth’s actions as follows:
During the course of the Internal Affairs
Investigation it was determined Lieutenant
Yves Buissereth violated Department Policy and
Procedure by failing to attend a mandatory
class as ordered by his supervisor, Lieutenant
Todd Garrison. Buissereth being a member of
the Lee County Sheriff’s Office Hostage
Negotiation Team was ordered as well as the
entire team to attend the CISM class unless
they had already taken the class and were
certified. Buissereth signed up for the class
on
January
16,
2008.
Additionally,
Buissereth
notified
Garrison
twenty-four
minutes prior to the start of class while
Buissereth was working an extra-duty detail in
the Gateway subdivision. These being true the
allegation of Neglect of Duty: Failure to
appear/Tardiness by Lieutenant Todd Garrison
against Lieutenant Yves Buissereth warrants a
conclusion of Substantiated.
The investigation revealed an additional
violation
of
Policy
and
Procedure
for
untruthfulness. It occurred when Lieutenant
Garrison questioned Buissereth as to why he
was working a detail instead of attending the
mandatory class. Buissereth sent an email to
Lieutenant Garrison explaining why he was not
3
Lieutenant Buissereth was the
investigation of Petitioner's case.
- 10 -
lead
detective
on
the
able to attend the class. The email contained
several statements that were not factual,
deceptive and/or misleading as to the reasons
why Buissereth was not attending the mandatory
class. This being a violation of Department
Policy and Procedures the additional charge of
Improper Conduct: Untruthfulness warrants a
conclusion
of
Substantiated
against
Lieutenant Yves Buissereth.
(Doc. 101 at 52-53).
Petitioner now claims that “his discovery
of Det. Buissereth’s firing from the L.C.S.O. for lying to his
superiors, and other misconduct that amounted to newly discovered
evidence which clearly would show that, he is actually innocent
of
the
offenses
that
he
has
been
wrongly
convicted
of
and
unlawfully incarcerated for over approximately 20-years now.”
(Doc. 1 at 9-10) (emphases in original).
In the context of § 2244(d)(1)(D), the Eleventh Circuit
defines the “factual predicate” of a claim as the underlying vital
facts of the claim. Cole v. Warden, 768 F.3d 1150, 1155 (11th Cir.
2014).
Petitioner does not explain how Buissereth’s failure to
attend a training class on hostage negotiation more than a decade
after
the
conclusion
of
Petitioner's
trial
and
Buissereth’s
subsequent lies to his superiors as to the reason for his absence
is a factual predicate of any new claim.
Although Petitioner
asserts otherwise, Buissereth’s actions in 2008 constitute neither
a claim nor the underlying vital facts of a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d).
Rather, Petitioner confuses the facts that make up his
claim with evidence that might support his otherwise conclusory
- 11 -
assertions. 4
The vital facts making up the “claims” discussed in
the petition were available to petitioner long before he allegedly
discovered that Buissereth was disciplined on completely unrelated
matters.
At most, Buissereth’s discipline could be used for
impeachment purposes at a new trial – it is not a vital fact
comprising
any
claim
so
as
to
implicate
§
2244(d)(1)(D).
Accordingly, Petitioner is not entitled to a later start date under
§ 2244(d)(1)(D).
4
Petitioner asserts that Buissereth used his position as a law
enforcement officer “to coerce snitches to falsely testify against
him.” (Doc. 1 at 5-6). He alleges that Buissereth used “unethical
tactics” to force witnesses to identify Petitioner as the killer.
Id. These claims were available to Petitioner at trial. In fact,
this was the gravamen of Plaintiff's defense at trial. Defense
counsel
strenuously
cross
examined
Buissereth
about
the
“persistence” he used to get witnesses to identify Petitioner as
the killer (T. at 529, 530, 531, 533, 536). Defense counsel also
questioned Buissereth as to whether he was aware that four
witnesses had accused him of “forced statements.” (T. at 551).
During closing statement, defense counsel argued that Buissereth
had pressured witnesses into identifying Petitioner as the killer.
Id. at 640, 642, 649, 660. Defense counsel described Buissereth
as “a disgrace.
This man has manufactured evidence, I – four
witnesses testified he forced them to do statements . . . [f]or
whatever reason, Buissereth decided Jose did the crime,
Buissereth, in his warped mind, said I am going to get the
evidence. I’ll get the evidence. He got it.” Id. at 688-89. The
Eleventh Circuit has been clear that evidence known to petitioner
at the time of trial is not “new.” See Frederick v. Sec’y, Dep’t
of Corr., 481 F. App’x 472 (11th Cir. 2012) (describing as
“unavailing” any argument that evidence known to petitioner at
trial was “newly discovered evidence.”); Rozzell v. Sec’y, Fla.
Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1016-19 (11th Cir. 2012) (same).
- 12 -
3.
Petitioner has not demonstrated “actual innocence”
so as to excuse his failure to comply with the
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation
Petitioner
asserts
that
the
evidence
of
Buissereth’s
wrongdoing shows that he (Petitioner) is actually innocent of the
charges for which he was convicted (Doc. 1 at 10).
The Supreme
Court's decision in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924 (2013),
provides that “actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway
through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a
procedural bar, as it was in Schlup [v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995)]
and House [v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006)], or [the] expiration of
the [AEDPA] statute of limitations.” Id. at 1928.
In Schlup, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner otherwise
subject to procedural bars on the filing of abusive or successive
writs of habeas corpus may have his federal constitutional claim
considered on the merits if he makes a proper showing of actual
innocence. 513 U.S. at 326–27.
“To be credible, such a claim
requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional
error
with
new
reliable
evidence—whether
it
be
exculpatory
scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical
physical evidence—that was not presented at trial.” Id. at 324.
“To establish the requisite probability, the petitioner must show
that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id. at 327.
Because this standard is intended to focus the inquiry on actual
- 13 -
innocence, “the district court is not bound by the rules of
admissibility that would govern at trial.” Id.
“Instead, the
emphasis on ‘actual innocence’ allows the reviewing tribunal also
to consider the probative force of relevant evidence that was
either excluded or unavailable at trial.” Id. at 327–28.
Indeed,
“[t]he habeas court must make its determination concerning the
petitioner's innocence in light of all the evidence, including
that alleged to have been illegally admitted (but with due regard
to any unreliability of it) and evidence tenably claimed to have
been wrongly excluded or to have become available only after the
trial.” Id. at 328 (internal quotations omitted).
“It is not the
district court's independent judgment as to whether reasonable
doubt exists that the standard addresses; rather the standard
requires the district court to make a probabilistic determination
about what reasonable, properly instructed jurors would do.” Id.
at 329. “Thus, a petitioner does not meet the threshold requirement
unless he persuades the district court that, in light of the new
evidence, no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
The procedural posture of the instant situation is different
from that presented in McQuiggin.
McQuiggin pleaded guilty to
murder and was sentenced to life in prison. Perkins v. McQuiggin,
No. 2:08-CV-139, 2009 WL 1788377 (W.D. Mich. June 18, 2009)
(“McQuiggin I”).
Thereafter, McQuiggin obtained three affidavits
- 14 -
which he claimed would prove his innocence, yet he waited nearly
six years before presenting his newly discovered evidence to any
court;
in
fact,
there
is
no
indication
that
McQuiggin
ever
presented his actual innocence claim to the state courts. Id. at
*3.
In
contrast,
Petitioner's
state
post-conviction
court
considered his actual innocence assertion when it was raised in
his third Rule 3.850 motion as a claim of newly discovered evidence
(Ex. 40).
In rejecting this claim, the state post-conviction
court found, “[t]hat the detective allegedly behaved improperly
in an unrelated matter 11 years after Defendant's trial is not in
any way proof, as Defendant alleges, that the detective behaved
improperly in investigating this case.” (Ex. 41 at 3). 5
As noted in the discussion of § 2244(d)(1)(D), Detective
Buissereth’s
alleged
coercion
of
witnesses
was
the
crux
of
Petitioner's defense at trial, and the jurors were well aware of
Petitioner’s
witnesses
defense
into
theory
identifying
that
Buissereth
Petitioner
discussion supra Part II(A)(2).
as
strong-armed
the
assailant.
the
See
Even so, all twelve jurors voted
5
Although this Court concludes that AEDPA deference to the
state court’s findings on this issue is not required (because the
entire purpose of a gateway review is to consider whether the
petitioner is entitled to have the federal courts review his claim
under the AEDPA), the state court’s reasoning and conclusions are
helpful when considering whether any juror, “acting reasonably,
would have voted to find [Petitioner] guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329.
- 15 -
to convict him.
Given the unanimous jury finding at trial,
Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that no reasonable juror could
now conclude that Petitioner was guilty of the crimes of which he
was charged – even when considering Petitioner's new evidence of
Buissereth’s disciplinary proceedings in a completely unrelated
matter thirteen years after the crimes at issue.
Petitioner has
failed to satisfy McQuiggin’s actual innocence exception to the
AEDPA statute of limitation, and this petition must be dismissed
as untimely.
B.
Certificate of Appealability 6
Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability.
A
prisoner
seeking
a
writ
of
habeas
corpus
has
no
absolute
entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his petition.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1).
Rather, a district court must first issue
a certificate of appealability (“COA”).
“A [COA] may issue . . .
only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make such
a showing, Petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists
would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional
6
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts, the “district court
must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters
a final order adverse to the applicant.” Id. As this Court has
determined that Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief,
it must now consider whether Petitioner is entitled to a
certificate of appealability.
- 16 -
claims debatable or wrong,” Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282
(2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or
that “the issues presented were ‘adequate to deserve encouragement
to proceed further.’” Miller–El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335–36
(2003). Petitioner has not made the requisite showing in these
circumstances.
Because
Petitioner
is
not
entitled
to
a
certificate
of
appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1.
The Florida Attorney General is DISMISSED as a named
Respondent.
2.
The petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Jose
Figueroa is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as time-barred.
3.
Petitioner is DENIED a certificate of appealability.
4.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending
motions, enter judgment accordingly, and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of July, 2016.
SA: OrlP-4
Copies: Jose Figueroa
Counsel of Record
- 17 -
21st
day
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?