USA v. Simoneau

Filing 14

OPINION AND ORDER granting 8 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. See Opinion and Order for details. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, send a copy of this Opinion and Order and the Judgment to Defendant at his last known address, terminate all pending motions and deadlines as moot, and close the file. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 8/13/2015. (MAW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:15-cv-207-FtM-29MRM

KEITH A. SIMONEAU,
Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. #8) filed on June 24, 2015.

Defendant, who

is proceeding pro se, filed a Response (Doc. #12) on July 22, 2015
in

which

he

explained

to

the

Court

that

he

had

previously

corresponded with Plaintiff’s counsel in an attempt to resolve
this matter.

On July 24, 2015, the Court issued an Order (Doc.

#13) explaining to Defendant that his Response did not address the
legal question at issue: whether Plaintiff is entitled to a
judgment on defaulted student loans.

The Court granted Defendant

an additional fourteen days to supplement the Response.

Defendant

has made no additional filings and the time to do so has expired.
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is granted.
I.
Plaintiff the United States of America has filed a Complaint
(Doc. #1) against Defendant Keith A. Simoneau (Simoneau) to recover
on

a

promissory

note.

The

relevant

undisputed

facts,

as

established by a Certificate of Indebtedness (Doc. #8-1) provided
by the U.S. Department of Education (the Department) are as
follows:
On or about August 22, 1994, Simoneau executed a promissory
note (the Note) to secure student loans from Citizens Bank Warwick,
RI.

(Id.)

The loans were guaranteed by the RI Higher Education

Assistance Authority (the Guarantor) and reinsured by the U.S.
Department of Education (the Department) under Title IV of the
Higher Education Act of 1965 (the Higher Education Act).

(Id.)

The holder of the Note demanded payment according to the terms of
the Note, and Simoneau defaulted on the obligation on July 30,
2002.

(Id.)

Due to the default, the Guarantor paid a claim in

the amount of $10,855.40.

(Id.)

The Guarantor was reimbursed for

that claim payment by the Department.

(Id.)

Ultimately, the

Guarantor was unable to collect the debt from Simoneau and assigned
its right and title to the Note to the Department.

(Id.)

As of

September 4, 2014, Simoneau owed $10,855.40 in principal and
$5,856.88 in interest for a total debt of $16,712.28.

(Id.)

Interest continues to accrue on the unpaid principal amount at a
rate of 3.13 % per annum through June 30, 2015 and thereafter at
the rate established by the Department pursuant to the Higher
Education Act.
pay,

inter

(Id.)

alia,

In the Note, Simoneau further promised to
“reasonable

collection

costs,

including

attorney’s fees, court costs and collection fees” if he failed to
make his required payments.

(Doc. #8-4.)
2

II.
Summary

judgment

is

appropriate

only

when

the

Court

is

satisfied that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

“An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if

the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party.”

Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us,

Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010).

A fact is “material”

if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“A

court must decide ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’”
Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views
all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Tana

v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010).

However, “if

reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from
undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment.”
St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America’s Favorite Chicken Co., 198
F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Warrior Tombigbee Transp.
Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 1983)
(finding summary judgment “may be inappropriate even where the
3

parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the factual
inferences that should be drawn from these facts”)).

“If a

reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more
than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces
a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant
summary judgment.”

Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 495 F.3d 1306,

1315 (11th Cir. 2007).
III.
Plaintiff seeks money damages in the amount owed on the Note.
The Court has original jurisdiction over this civil action pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1345.
government

must

show

“To recover on a promissory note, the
(1)

the

defendant

signed

it,

(2)

the

government is the present owner or holder, and (3) the note is in
default.”
Cir. 2013).

United States v. Carter, 506 F. App'x 853, 858 (11th
Here, via the Certificate of Indebtedness and the

Note itself, Plaintiff has established that Simoneau executed the
Note, that Plaintiff was assigned all rights to the Note, and that
the Note is in default.

Plaintiff does not contest or otherwise

contradict this evidence.

To the contrary, his Response (Doc.

#12) concedes that a debt is owed.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is

entitled to a money judgment in the full amount owed on the Note,
$16,712.28 as of September 4, 2014.

From that date until June 30,

2015, Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the unpaid principal
amount at a rate of 3.13% per annum.

From June 30, 2015 until the

entry of judgment, Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the unpaid
4

principal amount at the rate established by the Department pursuant
to the Higher Education Act.

Following the entry of judgment,

interest shall accrue at the statutory post-judgment interest rate
prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
In addition to the amount owing on the Note, Plaintiff is
also entitled to recover the $80.00 cost of serving Simoneau with
the Complaint.

28 U.S.C. § 1921(a)(1).

Furthermore, the Higher

Education Act provides that in addition to the terms of the
promissory note, the borrower is required to pay “reasonable
collection costs.”

20 U.S.C. § 1091a(b)(l).

The Higher Education

Act’s implementing regulations specify that this includes “[c]ourt
costs and attorneys fees.”
pursuant

to

collection

the

costs,

Note,

34 C.F.R. § 30.60(a)(8).

Simoneau

including

promised

attorney’s

to

fees,

pay
court

Likewise,
“reasonable
costs

and

collection fees” if he failed to make his required payments. (Doc.
#8-4.) Here, Plaintiff’s counsel has provided an affidavit stating
that he spent a total of 5.1 hours associated with this case at an
hourly rate of $200, for a total of $1,020 in attorneys’ fees.
The Court finds that both the hours expended and counsel’s hourly
rate are reasonable.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1.
GRANTED.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #8) is
Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiff and against

Defendant in the amount of $17,812.28, consisting of:
5




$5,856.88 in interest through September 4, 2014;



$80.00 for service of process; and


2.

$10,855.40 in unpaid principal;

$1,020.00 in attorneys’ fees.

From September 4, 2014 through June 30, 2015, Plaintiff

is entitled to additional interest on the unpaid principal amount
at a rate of 3.13% per annum.

From June 30, 2015 until the entry

of Judgment, Plaintiff is entitled to additional interest on the
unpaid principal amount at the rate established by the U.S.
Department of Education pursuant to the Higher Education Act.

The

Judgment shall bear interest at the rate prescribed by 28 U.S.C.
§ 1961.
3.

The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly, send a copy

of this Order and the Judgment to Defendant at the last known
address

of

1967

Coco

Plum

St.

NE,

Palm

Bay,

Florida

32905,

terminate all pending motions and deadlines as moot, and close the
file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
August, 2015.

Copies: Counsel of record

6

13th

day of