Hicks v. The Lee County School District

Filing 14

OPINION AND ORDER granting 6 Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. The Complaint is dismissed without prejudice to filing an Amended Complaint within 14 days of this Opinion and Order. See Opinion and Order for details. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 5/21/2015. (MAB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
DEEDARA HICKS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:15-cv-254-FtM-29DNF

THE
LEE
DISTRICT,

COUNTY

SCHOOL

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #6) filed on April 20, 2015.

Plaintiff

filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #8) on April 21, 2015.
I.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

This obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.”

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)

(citation omitted).

To survive dismissal, the factual allegations

must be “plausible” and “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.”

Id. at 555.

See also Edwards v.

Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010).
“more

than

an

unadorned,

This requires

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.”

Ashcroft

v.

Iqbal,

556

U.S.

662,

678

(2009)

(citations omitted).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must
accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take
them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without adequate
factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth,”
v.

Berzain,

omitted).

654

F.3d

1148,

1153

(11th

Cir.

2011)

Mamani

(citations

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
consistent

with

a

facially plausible.”

“Factual allegations that are merely

defendant’s

liability

fall

short

of

being

Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333,

1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).

Thus, the Court engages in a two-step approach: “When

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume
their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
II.

On July 27, 2011, plaintiff Deedara Hicks (plaintiff) was
hired by the Lee County School District (the “School District” or
defendant) to serve as the School District’s Director of Secondary
Operations.

(Doc. #1, ¶ 7.)

On May 1, 2013, plaintiff filed a

charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) alleging that she was continuously subjected to
2

disparate treatment and harassment due to her debilitating health
conditions, race, and age.

(Id.)

Shortly after plaintiff filed

the charge of discrimination, defendant informed plaintiff that
she would not be reappointed to her position.

After learning of

her termination, plaintiff filed another charge of discrimination
with the EEOC alleging that she was retaliated against for filing
her first charge of discrimination.

(Id. ¶ 8.)

During the course of the EEOC’s investigation, the parties
agreed to attend a preliminary mediation with the EEOC on July 27,
2013.

(Id. ¶ 9.)

signed

an

As a pre-condition to mediation, the parties

Agreement

to

Mediate

and

Confidentiality

Agreement

stating that “[t]he parties agree that all matters discussed during
the mediation are confidential, unless otherwise discoverable, and
cannot be used as evidence in any subsequent administrative or
judicial proceeding.”

(Doc. #1-1, p. 7.)

The parties settled the

matter at the July 27, 2013 mediation, and on October 10, 2013,
plaintiff executed a General Release of Claims (the “Release”).
(Doc. #1, ¶ 10.)
Prior to the execution of the Release, Jeanne Dozier (Dozier),
a

member

of

the

School

District,

allegedly

breached

the

Confidentiality Agreement by making a number of remarks regarding
plaintiff’s claims at a public and televised Lee County School
District

action

meeting.

(Id.

¶

12.)

Specifically,

Dozier

addressed plaintiff’s claims of discrimination and disclosed the
details of the confidential settlement negotiations, including
3

plaintiff’s willingness to accept a lesser amount than originally
demanded.

(Id. ¶ 11.)

Plaintiff claims that Dozier violated the

Confidentiality Agreement in order to adversely affect plaintiff’s
credibility, character, and future employment.

(Id. ¶ 14.)

Plaintiff informed the EEOC of Dozier’s “retaliatory” conduct
on November 19, 2013, by filing another charge of discrimination.
(Doc. #1-1, p. 7.)

The EEOC dismissed plaintiff’s charge of

discrimination on February 19, 2015, and informed plaintiff that
she had 90 days to file a lawsuit against the School District.
(Id. at 2.)

Plaintiff’s Complaint, filed March 16, 2015, sets

forth the following three claims against the School District: (I)
retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII); (II) retaliation in violation of the Florida
Civil Rights Act (FCRA); and (III) discrimination and retaliation
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

(Doc. #1.)

III.
Defendant asserts that the Complaint should be dismissed
because plaintiff’s claims are barred by the Release executed on
October 10, 2013.

In response, plaintiff argues that defendant’s

motion should be denied because the School District is attempting
to expand the breadth of the settlement agreement.

The Court need

not resolve this issue at this time because plaintiff has failed
to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Title VII prohibits retaliation against employees-including
former

employees-when

the

employee
4

has

filed

a

charge

of

discrimination against the employer.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a);

Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).

In order to

state a claim for retaliation under Title VII, 1 plaintiff must
allege that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression;
(2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) the adverse
action was causally related to the protected activity.

Webb-

Edwards v. Orange Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 525 F.3d 1013, 1028 (11th
Cir. 2008) (citing Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453,
1454 (11th Cir. 1998)).

After reviewing the allegations in the

Complaint, the Court finds that plaintiff has failed to allege
that she was subjected to an adverse employment action.
In order to satisfy the adverse employment action element,
the employee must show either an ultimate employment decision,
such as termination, failure to hire, or demotion, or, for conduct
that falls short of an ultimate employment decision, “serious and
material

changes

employment.”

in

the

terms,

conditions,

or

privileges

of

Hall v. Dekalb Cnty. Gov’t, 503 F. App’x 781, 787

(11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961, 97071 (11th Cir. 2008)).

The asserted adverse employment action

cannot be speculative: “it must at least have a tangible adverse

1Claims

under the FCRA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are subject to
the same analysis as Title VII claims.
See Valenzuela v.
GlobeGround North Am., LLC, 18 So.3d 17, 21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009);
Phillips v. Aaron Rents, Inc., 262 F. App’x 202, 207 (11th Cir.
2008).

5

effect on the plaintiff’s employment.”

Waters v. Home Depot

U.S.A., Inc., 159 F. App’x 943, 944 (11th Cir. 2005).
Here, plaintiff alleges that the School District continued to
harass and retaliate against her in an effort to defame her
character and prevent her from obtaining future employment.
#1, ¶ 15.)

(Doc.

Plaintiff, however, has failed to allege that Dozier’s

statements actually worked a serious and material change in the
terms and conditions of her current or prospective employment.
Because plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege that she suffered
an adverse employment action, dismissal is warranted.

See Waters,

159 F. App’x at 944.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #6) is GRANTED and the
Complaint is dismissed without prejudice to filing an Amended
Complaint within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of this Opinion and Order.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
May, 2015.

Copies:
Counsel of record

6

21st

day of