Hicks v. The Lee County School District
Filing
23
ORDER denying 21 defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Defendant shall file a responsive pleading within fourteen days of this Order. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 11/4/2015. (AMB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
DEEDARA HICKS,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:15-cv-254-FtM-29DNF
THE
LEE
DISTRICT,
COUNTY
SCHOOL
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of defendant’s
Renewed Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #21) filed on July 8, 2015.
Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. #22) on July 13,
2015.
For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
I.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a Complaint
must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
This obligation “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not
do.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(citation omitted).
To survive dismissal, the factual allegations
must be “plausible” and “must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.”
Id. at 555.
See also Edwards v.
Prime Inc., 602 F.3d 1276, 1291 (11th Cir. 2010).
This requires
“more
than
an
accusation.”
unadorned,
Ashcroft
v.
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
Iqbal,
556
U.S.
662,
678
(2009)
(citations omitted).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must
accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take
them in the light most favorable to plaintiff, Erickson v. Pardus,
551 U.S. 89 (2007), but “[l]egal conclusions without adequate
factual support are entitled to no assumption of truth,”
v.
Berzain,
omitted).
654
F.3d
1148,
1153
(11th
Cir.
2011)
Mamani
(citations
“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
consistent
with
a
facially plausible.”
“Factual allegations that are merely
defendant’s
liability
fall
short
of
being
Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333,
1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
Thus, the Court engages in a two-step approach: “When
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume
their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
“Generally, the existence of an affirmative defense will not
support a motion to dismiss,” Quiller v. Barclays American/Credit,
Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir. 1984), aff’d on reh'g, 764
F.2d 1400 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (per curiam) (reinstating
panel opinion), because plaintiffs are not required to negate an
affirmative defense in their complaint.
2
La Grasta v. First Union
Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).
A complaint may
be dismissed, however, when the existence of an affirmative defense
“clearly appears on the face of the complaint.” Quiller, 727 F.2d
at 1069.
II.
On July 27, 2011, plaintiff Deedara Hicks (plaintiff) was
hired by the Lee County School District (the “School District” or
defendant) to serve as the School District’s Director of Secondary
Operations.
(Doc. #18, ¶ 7.)
On May 1, 2013, plaintiff filed a
charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”) alleging that she was continuously subjected
to disparate treatment and harassment due to her debilitating
health conditions, race, and age.
(Id. ¶¶ 7-8; Doc. #8-1.)
Shortly
charge
after
plaintiff
filed
the
of
discrimination,
defendant informed plaintiff that she would not be reappointed to
her position.
After learning of her termination, plaintiff filed
another charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging that she
was
retaliated
discrimination.
against
for
filing
her
first
charge
of
(Doc. #8-2; Doc. #18, ¶ 8.)
During the course of the EEOC’s investigation, the parties
agreed to attend a preliminary mediation with the EEOC on July 27,
2013.
parties
(Doc. #18, ¶¶ 9-10.)
signed
an
As a pre-condition to mediation, the
Agreement
to
Mediate
and
Confidentiality
Agreement stating that “[t]he parties agree that all matters
discussed during the mediation are confidential, unless otherwise
3
discoverable, and cannot be used as evidence in any subsequent
administrative or judicial proceeding.”
(Doc. #1-1, p. 7.)
On
October 10, 2013, the parties attended a final mediation where
they reached a settlement. (Doc. #18, ¶ 10.)
plaintiff
“Release”).
also
executed
a
General
On October 10, 2013,
Release
of
Claims
(the
(Doc. #6, pp. 9-10.)
On September 24, 2013, prior to the formal and final mediation
and plaintiff’s execution of the Release, Jeanne Dozier (Dozier),
a
member
of
the
School
District,
allegedly
breached
the
Confidentiality Agreement by making a number of remarks regarding
plaintiff’s claims at a public and televised Lee County School
District action meeting.
(Doc. #18, ¶ 12.)
Specifically, Dozier
addressed plaintiff’s claims of discrimination and disclosed the
details of the confidential settlement negotiations, such as those
to be discussed and finalized at the October 10, 2013 formal and
final mediation, including plaintiff’s willingness to accept a
lesser amount than originally demanded. (Id. ¶¶ 11-12.) Plaintiff
claims that Dozier violated the Confidentiality Agreement in order
to adversely affect plaintiff’s credibility, character, and future
employment.
(Id. ¶ 14.)
Plaintiff alleges that Dozier and other
employees of defendant continued to retaliate against plaintiff
after the board meeting.
(Id. ¶ 12.)
On November 19, 2013, Plaintiff informed the EEOC of Dozier’s
“retaliatory” conduct by filing another charge of discrimination.
(Doc.
#8-3.)
The
EEOC
dismissed
4
plaintiff’s
charge
of
discrimination on February 19, 2015, and informed plaintiff that
she had 90 days to file a lawsuit against the School District.
(Doc. #1-1, p. 2.)
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, filed March 16,
2015, sets forth the following three claims against the School
District: (I) retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII); (II) retaliation in violation of
the Florida Civil Rights Act (FCRA); and (III) discrimination and
retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
(Doc. #18.)
III.
Defendant
asserts
that
the
Amended
Complaint
should
be
dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
(Doc. #21.)
Specifically, defendant argues that: (1) plaintiff
has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for
retaliation and (2) even if plaintiff has sufficiently stated a
claim for retaliation, plaintiff’s claims are barred by the October
10, 2013 Release. (Id.)
A. Sufficiency of Title VII Claim
Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiff’s Amended Complaint on
the basis that plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to
show
that
the
alleged
employment decision.
retaliatory
(Id. at 5-7.)
actions
caused
an
adverse
Plaintiff asserts that she
has adequately alleged facts sufficient to state a claim for
retaliation. (Doc. #22.)
Title VII prohibits retaliation against employees—including
former
employees—when
the
employee
5
has
filed
a
charge
of
discrimination against the employer.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a);
Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
anti-retaliation
provision,
in
contrast
to
its
“Title VII’s
substantive
provision, must be construed to cover a broad range of employer
conduct.”
Underwood v. Dep’t of Fin. Servs. State of Fla., 518 F.
App’x 637, 641 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe
R.R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67 (2006)).
In order to state a
claim for retaliation under Title VII, 1 plaintiff must allege that
(1)
she
engaged
in
protected
activity;
(2)
she
suffered
a
materially adverse action; and (3) the adverse action was causally
related to the protected activity.
Id. (citing Dixon v. The
Hallmark Cos., 627 F.3d 849, 856 (11th Cir. 2010)).
In
response
to
the
Court’s
previous
order
dismissing
plaintiff’s claim for retaliation for failure to allege an adverse
employment action (Doc. #14), plaintiff amended her Complaint to
include the following allegations:
Had HICKS known that she would have been banned,
ostracized, or “black listed” from her profession by the
actions of LEE COUNTY, DOZIER, MOORE and other agents,
employees, representatives of LEE COUNTY she would have
been dissuaded from filing any charges of discrimination
against LEE COUNTY and dissuaded from engaging in the
EEOC process with or against LEE COUNTY. As a direct
result of the retaliatory actions and conduct of LEE
COUNTY, JEANNIE DOZIER, RANICE MOORE, and other agents,
employees and representatives of LEE COUNTY, HICKS
1Claims
under the FCRA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are subject to
the same analysis as Title VII claims.
See Valenzuela v.
GlobeGround North Am., LLC, 18 So.3d 17, 21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009);
Phillips v. Aaron Rents, Inc., 262 F. App’x 202, 207 (11th Cir.
2008).
6
suffered adverse employment actions as she was denied
and informed that she would not be hired because of the
statements, comments, rumors, remarks, and actions to
the following (but not exhaustive or only) employment
opportunities and positions:
1. Orange County Public Schools-Principal-August 2013
2. Orange County Public Schools-Director-January 2014
3. Orange
County
Public
Schools-Resource
TeacherFebruary 2014
4. District of Columbia Public Schools-Principal-April
2014
5. Seminole County Public Schools-Principal-December 2014
(Doc. #18, ¶ 16.)
After reviewing the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the
Court finds that plaintiff has sufficiently alleged facts to state
a claim for retaliation.
Plaintiff has alleged that she engaged
in protected activity (Id. ¶¶ 8-10, 20), that she suffered a
materially adverse action (Id. ¶¶ 16, 21), and that the adverse
action was causally related to plaintiff engaging in protective
activity. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 16, 21.)
alleged
in
plaintiff’s
The post-employment retaliation
Complaint,
namely
blacklisting,
is
precisely the type of conduct that the Title VII anti-retaliation
provision
protects
against.
See
Robinson,
519
U.S.
337.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges that defendant’s retaliatory
statements, comments, rumors, remarks, and actions were made to
future employers to prevent plaintiff from obtaining prospective
employment opportunities.
Further, plaintiff alleges that as a
result of defendant’s statements, comments, rumors, remarks, and
actions,
plaintiff
was
denied
7
prospective
employment
opportunities.
This
sufficiently
alleges
a
material
adverse
action under Rule 12(b)(6). 2
B. October 10, 2013 Release
Defendant asserts that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the
October 10, 2013 Release.
(Doc. #21, p. 7.)
In response,
plaintiff argues that defendant’s motion should be denied because
the
Release
does
not
govern
the
allegations
contained
in
plaintiff’s Complaint and the School District is attempting to
expand the breadth of the settlement agreement. (Doc. #22, pp. 812.)
The defendant raises the defense of the Release in the form
of a 12(b)(6) motion.
A general release is an affirmative defense
and generally not appropriate to raise on a motion to dismiss.
The Court may review an affirmative defense on a motion to dismiss
if the existence of the affirmative defense “clearly appears on
the face of the complaint.” Quiller, 727 F.2d at 1069.
Here, the
Complaint does not attach the Release to it nor contain any
references
to
the
Release.
(Doc.
#18.)
As
such,
it
is
inappropriate to review the affirmative defense at this stage of
the proceedings.
2
The Court’s determination that plaintiff has sufficiently
stated a claim for retaliation under Title VII is equally
applicable to plaintiff’s claim for retaliation under the Florida
Civil Rights Act. Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d
1385, 1389-90 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[D]ecisions construing Title VII
guide the analysis of claims under the Florida Civil Rights Act.”).
8
ORDERED:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #21) is DENIED.
2. Defendant shall file a responsive pleading within FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS of this Opinion and Order.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
November, 2015.
Copies:
Counsel of record
9
4th
day of
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