McGlocklin v. Blankenship et al

Filing 64

OPINION AND ORDER granting 44 Motion for summary judgment; granting 45 Motion for summary judgment; dismissing case with prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 4/26/2017. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
MIKE MCGLOCKLIN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:15-cv-609-FtM-29MRM

FNU
BLANKENSHIP
DURAND,

and

G.

Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon the following:
Defendant Karen Blankenship’s motion for
summary judgment (Doc. 44, filed November 18,
2016);
Defendant Gail Durand’s motion for summary
judgment (Doc. 45, filed November 18, 2016);
Plaintiff’s response in opposition to the
motions for summary judgment (Doc. 62, filed
March 31, 2017); and
Defendant
Blankenship’s
Durand’s Reply (Doc. 63,
2017).

and
filed

Defendant
April 10,

For the reasons given in this Order, the motions for summary
judgment filed by the defendants (Doc. 44; Doc. 45) are GRANTED,
and this case is dismissed with prejudice.
I.

Background and Procedural History

Plaintiff initiated this action on October 2, 2015 by filing
a pro se complaint against Defendants Karen Blankenship and Gail

Durand Clarke (Doc. 1). 1

Plaintiff’s amended complaint (Doc. 16)

is the operative complaint before the Court.

Both Defendants

filed an answer and affirmative defenses to the amended complaint
(Doc. 21; Doc. 22), and on March 4, 2016, the parties were directed
to conduct discovery (Doc. 31).
Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment on April
18, 2016, and attached numerous documents in support of their
motions (Doc. 43; Doc. 44; Doc. 45).
respond to the motions (Doc. 46).

Plaintiff was directed to

Plaintiff was cautioned that:

(1) his failure to respond to the motions would indicate that they
were unopposed; (2) all material facts asserted by the defendants
would

be

considered

admitted

unless

controverted

by

proper

evidentiary materials; and (3) Plaintiff could not rely solely on
the allegations of his pleadings to oppose the motions (Doc. 46)
(citing Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir.
1985)).

Plaintiff

filed

a

response

in

opposition

defendants’ motions on March 31, 2017 (Doc. 62).

to

the

Despite the

aforementioned warning, Plaintiff did not attach any evidentiary
materials to his response.

1

Plaintiff refers to Defendant Gail Durand Clarke as
Defendant Durand in his amended complaint.
Moreover, the
documents submitted by the defendants to support their motions for
summary judgment generally refer to only Defendant Durand.
Accordingly, to avoid confusion, this Defendant will be referred
to as Defendant Durand in this Order.

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II.
a.
The

allegations

Pleadings

Amended Complaint

against

Defendant

Nurse

Blankenship

in

Plaintiff’s amended complaint are directed towards the allegedly
insufficient medical treatment he received after he fell from his
bunk on February 9, 2015 (Doc. 16 at 7-8).

Plaintiff bumped his

head on the back of the toilet when he fell.

Id. at 9.

Plaintiff

asserts that, after he fell, he was taken to the medical department
where

Defendant

treatment.

Blankenship

Id. at 7.

completely

refused

to

provide

He asserts that Defendant Blankenship told

him that she was going to write in Plaintiff’s medical records
that nothing was wrong with him and that she did not care if he
told anybody because they would believe her over him.

Id.

He was

taken back to confinement where he was, once again, assigned a top
bunk.

Plaintiff

asserts

that

he

still

gets

headaches

and

dizziness, and suffers from pain in his left shoulder and left
elbow. Id. at 9.

He gets cramps in his lower back, and suffers

pain in his spine, legs, and feet.

Id.

Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Nurse Durand are less
clear.

He asserts that she does not provide adequate responses

to his numerous medical grievances, and continuously tells him
that the medical professionals who examined him after his fall
from his bunk did not order follow up appointments (Doc. 16 at 9).

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Plaintiff further states that “both nurses” have told him that he
did “bad” on his eye exam and that they would schedule him for
glasses because he failed the eye exam.

Id.

He asserts that,

before he fell from his bunk, he had 20/20 vision, but now it is
difficult for him to see far away or close up.

Id.

He can no

longer see small numbers close-up, and when he tries to read, it
makes his eyes water and turn red.
eyes are in a lot of pain.

Id.

Plaintiff claims that his

Id.

As relief, Plaintiff asks this Court to order Charlotte
Correctional Facility to ensure that he is examined by a qualified
physician and a “neurologist who specializes in the care and
treatment of chiropractic neurology, specialize, CAT scan, MRI.”
(Doc. 16 at 11).

He also asks that the Court arrange for him to

be seen by an eye specialist, and any other follow-up care.

Id.

Plaintiff further demands an indefinite and permanent bottom bunk
pass, a back brace, a knee brace, a walking cane, a CAT scan, and
an MRI.

Id. at 10.

He also wants to be transferred to a different

facility that has better medical care.

Id.

In addition to the requested injunctive relief, Plaintiff
seeks one million dollars for his eye damage; $750,000 from each
defendant due to their refusal to provide medical treatment;
$750,000 from each defendant because of Plaintiff’s emotional

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injuries; and $750,000 from each defendant in punitive damages
(Doc. 16 at 13).
b.

Motions for Summary Judgment

Defendants Blankenship and Duran have filed similar motions
for summary judgment (Doc. 44; Doc. 45).

Both defendants urge

that Plaintiff has not demonstrated an objectively serious medical
need and that, even if Plaintiff was able to demonstrate an
objectively serious medical need, he has not shown that either
defendant was deliberately indifferent to that need.

Id.

In support of their motions, the defendants filed Plaintiff’s
inmate file, consisting of Plaintiff’s medical records and the
medical

grievances

Records”).
of

has

submitted

(Doc.

43-1,

“McGlocklin

They also filed: a document showing the termination

Plaintiff’s

Disciplinary

he

lower

Records

bunk
(Doc.

pass
43-3);

(Doc.

43-2);

Defendant

Plaintiff’s
Blankenship’s

Affidavit (Doc. 43-4, “Blankenship Aff.”); and Defendant DurandClarke’s Affidavit (Doc. 43-5, “Durand Aff.”).
c.

Plaintiff’s Response

In his response to the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 62), Plaintiff appears to completely abandon his arguments
regarding the defendants’ alleged failure to treat his injuries
from the fall from his bunk.

Instead, he posits, for the first

time, that his vision issues may actually be caused by chronic

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high blood pressure and that the defendants have been deliberately
indifferent
pressure.

for
Id.

failing

to

adequately

treat

his

high

blood

He asserts that he has “repeatedly complained

about the lack of proper and adequate treatment for his high blood
pressure and other medical issues and conditions, and to his
argument that the Defendant’s [sic] have repeatedly ignored his
complaints.”

Id. at ¶ 11.

He also urges that the defendants have

over-prescribed ibuprofen. Id. at 12.

Plaintiff neither offers

evidence to support his claims, nor does he cite to the evidence
offered by the defendants. 2
The

defendants

filed

a

reply,

generally

alleging

that

Plaintiff has failed to rebut their record evidence (Doc. 63).
Accordingly, they argue, his response was “insufficient to avoid
summary judgment pursuant to [Rule 56].”

Id.

III. Standards of Review

2

It is well-settled that a plaintiff cannot argue a new
theory of relief for the first time in response to a motion for
summary judgment. See Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d
1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004) (“A plaintiff may not amend her
complaint
through
argument
in
a
brief
opposing
summary
judgment.”)(citing Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 781
(7th Cir. 1996)); Cruz v. Advance Stores Co., Inc., 842 F. Supp.
2d 1356, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (“[A] party may not raise a new
theory for the first time in response to a summary judgment
motion.”). Accordingly, the Court will not address Plaintiff’s new
arguments that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs for not treating his high blood pressure or
for over-prescribing ibuprofen because these arguments are not
properly before the Court.

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a.

Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only if it is shown “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard as
follows:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such
a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to
any material fact, since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
may

meet

this

burden

by

presenting

evidence

that

The movant
would

be

admissible at trial indicating there is no dispute of material
fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present
evidence in support of some elements of its case on which it bears
the ultimate burden of proof.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–324.

If the party seeking summary judgment meets the initial burden
of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,
the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with
sufficient evidence to rebut this showing with affidavits or other
relevant and admissible evidence. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572,

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1577 (11th Cir. 1991).

Summary judgment is mandated “against a

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322, (1986).
b.

Deliberate Indifference Standard

Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act
with deliberate indifference to a plaintiff’s health or safety.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976).

To state an Eighth

Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a serious medical need; (2)
deliberate indifference to that need by the defendants; and (3)
causation between the defendants’ indifference and the plaintiff’s
injury. Youmans v. Gagnon, 626 F.3d 557, 563 (11th Cir. 2010).

In

order to establish deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need on the part of a defendant, a plaintiff must show subjective
knowledge of a risk of serious harm and disregard of that risk by
conduct that is more than gross negligence. Townsend v. Jefferson
County, 601 F.3d 1152, 1158 (11th Cir. 2010).
IV.
a.

Analysis

Defendant Blankenship is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims
Plaintiff asserts that he fell from his bunk on February 9,

2015 and that Defendant Blankenship was deliberately indifferent

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for

failing

to

treat

his

injuries.

Specifically,

Plaintiff

asserts that he was “rushed to medical in a wheel chair to only be
refused medical attention and medical treatment by Blankenship.”
(Doc. 16 at 7).
Defendant

Blankenship

has

presented

Plaintiff’s

medical

records showing that Plaintiff went to the infirmary at 8:30 on
February 9, 2015 complaining of pain in his left side due to a
fall from his bunk (Doc. 43-1 at 229-20).
by

non-defendant

Nurse

LaRosa

who

He was first examined

documented

deformity, bleeding, tingling, or numbness.

Id.

no

swelling,

Nurse LaRosa

also noted that Plaintiff asked for a low bunk pass at that time.
Id.

Plaintiff was told to keep his arm elevated, and Defendant

Blankenship was notified at 8:45.
Plaintiff was acting disobediently.

Id.

Nurse LaRosa noted that

Id. at 230.

At 9:15, Plaintiff was examined by Defendant Blankenship
(Doc. 43-1 at 231-32).

Defendant Blankenship noted in Plaintiff’s

medical chart that Plaintiff complained of pain in his left arm,
shoulder, and hip, but did not grimace or complain of discomfort
upon palpitation.

Id.

Defendant Blankenship gave Plaintiff

ibuprofen to alleviate pain and a two-week lower bunk pass.

Id.

Defendant Blankenship determined that an x-ray was not required
and that further treatment was unnecessary.

Id.

Plaintiff was

instructed to contact “sick call” if his pain worsened or if he

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needed additional pain relievers.

Id.

Defendant Blankenship

recommended that Plaintiff be seen by the mental health providers
at

Charlotte

uncooperative

Correctional
during

Nurse

Institution.
Blankenship’s

contacted security for assistance.

Id.

Id.

Plaintiff

examination,

and

was
she

Thereafter, Plaintiff

was placed in administrative confinement for disobeying orders
(Doc. 43-4).
The

medical

records

do

not

indicate

that

Defendant

Blankenship examined Plaintiff for his fall on any other occasion. 3
Three weeks after his consultation with Defendant Blankenship,
Plaintiff was examined by non-defendant Nurse Nies, after he
complained of pain in his lower back and left side (Doc. 43-1 at
95, 235-36).

Nurse Nies gave Plaintiff ibuprofen and a topical

balm to ease his pain, but did not recommend any further treatment.
Id. at 235-36.
Plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy or authenticity of
the medical records offered by the defendants.
undisputed

that

Plaintiff

was

promptly

Therefore, it is

treated

by

Defendant

Blankenship and provided with pain reliever after his fall from

3

Defendant Blankenship attests that Plaintiff filed an inmate
request on June 2, 2015, stating that he did not want to be seen
by Defendant Blankenship at his scheduled clinic appointment
(Blankenship Aff. at ¶ 8; Durand Aff. at ¶ 16). Plaintiff was
advised that he could not chose the medical provider with whom he
consults (Durand Aff. at ¶ 16). Plaintiff, thereafter, refused
to attend his medical appointment.

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his bunk.

Defendant Blankenship filed an affidavit in which she

attested that, based upon her medical judgment and background, she
saw no sign that Plaintiff needed additional care (Blankenship
Aff. at ¶ 6).

Defendant Blankenship’s diagnosis was supported by

Nurse Nies’ subsequent evaluation at which Nurse Nies did not
recommend further treatment (Doc. 43-1 at 235-36).

Although

Plaintiff urges that he wanted x-rays, a CAT scan, and an MRI, he
has presented no evidence indicating that such tests were necessary
or that Defendant Blankenship’s diagnosis was incorrect, much less
deliberately indifferent.
that

additional

Blankenship’s

tests

failure

Even if Plaintiff could demonstrate
were

to

warranted,

order

at

most,

Defendant

additional

tests

was

mere

negligence which is not a constitutional violation. Estelle, 429
U.S. at 106 (“Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.”).
The

defendants’

evidence

shows

that

treatment and pain relief after his fall.

Plaintiff

received

Although he clearly

preferred different treatment, he does not state a deliberate
indifference claim. See Hamm v. DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575
(11th Cir. 1985) (“Although Hamm may have desired different modes
of

treatment,

the

care

the

jail

provided

did

not

amount

to

deliberate indifference.”); Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817
(1st Cir. 1988) (“Although the Constitution does require that

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prisoners be provided with a certain minimum level of medical
treatment, it does not guarantee to a prisoner the treatment of
his choice.”).

That Plaintiff would have preferred x-rays, an

MRI, and a CAT scan is merely a disagreement with the care he
received.
To the extent Plaintiff urges that Defendant Blankenship was
deliberately indifferent because he (Plaintiff) did not have a
current lower bunk pass when he fell, Defendant Blankenship is
entitled to summary judgment.

Defendant Blankenship has presented

evidence that Plaintiff’s bunk pass was expired at the time of the
fall (Doc. 43-2).

She also presented evidence that David Reddick,

not she, was the person who issued the pass.
not

even

alleged

that

Defendant

Id.

Blankenship

Plaintiff has

was

the

person

responsible for re-issuing the pass or that she ever refused to do
so.

In fact, Defendant Blankenship issued a lower-bunk pass to

Plaintiff when he asked for it (Doc. 43-1 at 231-32).

To impose

liability under § 1983 on an individual defendant, the defendant’s
act or omission must cause the deprivation of the plaintiff’s
constitutional rights. Porter v. White, 483 F.3d 1294, 1306 n. 10
(11th Cir. 2007)(“Congress did not intend for § 1983 liability to
attach where causation is absent,” and as such “[a] § 1983 claim
requires proof of an affirmative causal connection between the
defendant’s

acts

or

omissions

and

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the

alleged

constitutional

deprivation.”); Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir.
1986) (“[S]ection 1983 requires proof of an affirmative causal
connection between the official’s acts or omissions and the alleged
constitutional deprivation.”).
Defendant

Blankenship

was

Here, Plaintiff has not shown that
responsible

for

ensuring

that

Plaintiff’s low-bunk pass was up-to-date or that she refused to
issue such a pass when necessary.

The evidence before this Court

shows the opposite.
Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendant Blankenship was
responsible

for

any

constitutional

violation.

Based

on

the

evidence on the record before the Court, the Court concludes that
no rational jury could find that Defendant Blankenship acted with
the requisite deliberate indifference necessary to support a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Therefore, Defendant Blankenship is entitled

to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims.
b.

Defendant Durand is entitled to summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims

Plaintiff’s first claim against Nurse Durand appears to be
predicated upon this defendant’s unsatisfactory responses to his
grievances (Doc. 16 at 9).

Specifically, he asserts that, when

Defendant Durand responded to Plaintiff’s grievances, “when all
the requests clearly states that I need medical attention medical
treatment from a doctor for my injuries I receive on 2-9-15 when

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I fell off the top bunk, the responses would be denied or the
response was no follow up was order [sic].” Id.
Defendant

Durand

attests

that

she

denied

Plaintiff’s

grievances on March 4, 2015 and March 13, 2015 with a note pointing
to Nurse Nies’ examination on March 3, 2015 in which Nurse Nies
issued ibuprofen and no follow-up with a physician was ordered
(Duran Aff. at ¶¶ 12, 13).

After Plaintiff filed his April 29,

2015 and May 15, 2015 grievances, he was directed to access “sick
call” if he required an evaluation from a physician. Id. at ¶¶ 1415.

Defendant Durand attaches copies of these grievances and

responses to her motion for summary judgment (Doc. 43-1 at 95, 96,
99).

Defendant Durand attests that on June 8, 2015, the Warden

of Charlotte Correctional Institution denied Plaintiff’s formal
grievance

on

this

issue,

“relying

on

the

assessment

Nurse

Blankenship performed of the Plaintiff on February 9, 2015 wherein
she issued a two-week low-bunk pass; the March 3, 2015 assessment
wherein [Plaintiff] was prescribed ibuprofen and analgesic balm;
and his June 1, 2015 clinic appointment that he refused because he
did not want to be evaluated by Nurse Blankenship.” Id. at ¶ 18.
The Warden also noted that Plaintiff had not visited sick call
since

his

consultation

with

Nurse

Nies

(Doc.

43-1

at

102).

Plaintiff does not dispute the accuracy or authenticity of the

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records relied upon by Defendant Durand; nor does he assert that
he accessed sick call at any time after his visit with Nurse Nies.
Other than expressing dissatisfaction with Defendant Durand’s
responses

to

his

grievances,

Plaintiff

does

not

explain

how

Defendant Durand is responsible for, or caused, his alleged harm.4
Filing a grievance with a supervisory person does not automatically
make the supervisor liable for the allegedly unconstitutional
conduct brought to light by the by the grievance, even when the
grievance is denied. See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069
(10th Cir. 2009) (“[D]enial of a grievance, by itself without any
connection to the violation of constitutional rights alleged by
plaintiff,

does

not

establish

personal

participation

under

§

1983.”); Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 576 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The
‘denial of administrative grievances or the failure to act’ by
prison officials does not subject supervisors to liability under
§ 1983.”) (quoting Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F. App’x 295, 300 (6th
Cir. 1999)); Lomholt v. Holder, 287 F.3d 683, 683 (8th Cir. 2002)
(holding that defendants’ denial of plaintiff’s grievances did not
state a substantive constitutional claim); see also Rickerson v.

4

To the extent Plaintiff urges that Defendant Durand should
have ordered the x-rays, CAT scan, and MRI he desired without
requiring him to access sick call, Plaintiff is not entitled to
the treatment of his choice. See discussion supra Defendant
Blankenship.
Moreover, Plaintiff has not even asserted that
Defendant Durand had the authority to order the care to which
Plaintiff feels he was entitled.

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Gills, No. 5:11cv279/MP/GRJ, 2012 WL 1004733, at *3 (N.D. Fla.
Feb. 8, 2012) (finding prisoner failed to state § 1983 claim
against prison official whose sole involvement was to review and
deny plaintiff’s administrative grievance.).
Given that Plaintiff refused to return to sick call for
further evaluation, as directed by both Defendant Durand and the
Warden,

and

given

that

Plaintiff

refused

to

be

examined

by

Defendant Blankenship, the plausibility of subjecting Defendant
Durand to liability for medical deliberate indifference, is even
more attenuated.

Based on the evidence before the Court (which

Plaintiff has not disputed), the Court concludes that no rational
jury could find that Defendant Durand acted with the requisite
deliberate indifference necessary to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim when she evaluated Plaintiff’s grievances.

Defendant Durand

is entitled to summary judgment on any deliberate indifference
claim based upon her denial of Plaintiff’s grievances.
Next, Plaintiff urges that Defendant Durand is liable for
deliberate indifference based upon her failure to ensure that he
received adequate vision care after he fell from his bunk (Doc. 16
at

9).

Defendant

Durand

has

attached

evidence

showing

that

Plaintiff had an eye examination with non-defendant Nurse Williams
on September 2, 2015, showing Plaintiff’s vision to be 20/40, both
with and without glasses (Doc. 43-1 at 241; Duran Aff. at ¶ 13).

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On November 23, 2015, Plaintiff had another eye examination with
the Chief Health Officer at Charlotte Correctional (Dr. Wetterer),
showing Plaintiff’s vision to be 20/30 (Doc. 43-1 at 32; Duran
Aff. at ¶ 14).

Plaintiff filed a grievance on November 23, 2015,

in which he complained of blurred and double vision and requested
additional eye examinations (Doc. 43-1 at 119; Duran Aff. at ¶
15).

Dr. Wetterer denied the grievance, noting that an inmate

must have vision of 20/60 to be referred to an eye doctor (Doc.
43-1 at 120, Durand Aff. at ¶ 16).

Nevertheless, on February 15,

2016,

optometrist

Plaintiff

was

examined

by

Dr.

Furnari,

in

response to Plaintiff’s claims of double vision (Doc. 43-1 at 33839; Durand Aff. at ¶ 18).

The exam showed that Plaintiff had

20/30 vision and no “deviations consistent with double vision.”
(Doc. 43-1 at 338-39; Durand Aff. at ¶ 18).

Plaintiff wrote a

grievance about Dr. Furnari, complaining that the doctor was rude
to him, and Defendant Durand denied the grievance based upon Dr.
Furnari’s

finding

that

Plaintiff

did

not

have

any

symptoms

indicative of double vision (Doc. 43-1 at 130; Durand Aff. at ¶
20).

As noted, the denial of a grievance cannot subject a party

to constitutional liability.
Defendant

Durand

has

presented

evidence

that

Plaintiff

received eye care on three separate occasions after he complained
of vision problems.

Plaintiff has not presented his own evidence

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showing that more examinations were necessary, nor has he asserted
that

the

exams

performed

by

the

prison

were

unreliable.

Plaintiff’s argument, raised for the first time in response to the
defendants’ motions for summary judgment, that Defendant Durand
should

have

checked

his

blood

pressure

or

prescribed

less

ibuprofen, are not properly before the Court. See discussion supra
n. 2. Nor has Plaintiff presented evidence that his alleged vision
difficulties are actually caused by high blood pressure or by too
much ibuprofen.
Plaintiff has not supported his assertions of deliberate
indifference based on Defendant Durand’s failure to provide eye
care with any evidence.

No rational jury could find that Defendant

Durand acted with the requisite deliberate indifference necessary
to support a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Defendant Durand is entitled

to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims
related to Plaintiff’s eye care.
V.

Conclusion

Because summary judgment is granted in favor of the defendants
on each of Plaintiff’s claims, this Court will not address the
defendants’ assertion that Plaintiff does not suffer from an
objectively serious medical condition.
In accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED:

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1.

The motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants

Blankenship and Durand (Doc. 44; Doc. 45) are GRANTED.
remaining

defendants

or

claims,

this

case

is

With no

dismissed

with

prejudice.
2.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending

motions, close this case, and enter judgment in favor of the
defendants.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of April, 2017.

SA: OrlP-4
Copies: Mike McGlocklin
Counsel of Record

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26th

day