Diez v. Larson et al
Filing
52
OPINION AND ORDER denying 51 Motion for mailroom privileges; granting 46 Motion for summary judgment and the case is dismissed with prejudice. The Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants, and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 8/1/2017. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
ELADIO N. DIEZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:16-cv-1-FtM-29MRM
KATHLEEN LARSON, Sergeant,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Kathleen
Larson’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 46, filed March 31,
2017). 1
Plaintiff has not filed a response in opposition to
Defendant Larson’s motion, and his time to do so has passed.
Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment is ripe for review.
For the reasons given in this Order, Defendant Larson’s motion
for summary judgment is granted, and this case is dismissed with
prejudice.
I.
Background and Procedural History
Plaintiff initiated this action against Defendants Sergeant
Kathleen Larson, Warden John Willis, and Florida Department of
Corrections Secretary Julie Jones on January 4, 2016 (Doc. 1).
1
In
Defendant Larson filed an amended motion on April 2, 2017
(Doc. 47).
However, the amended version was not docketed as a
motion, and corrected only minor scrivener’s errors. Accordingly,
to avoid confusion in the docket, the Court will refer to the
original motion.
his
complaint,
Plaintiff
generally
asserted
that,
while
incarcerated at Charlotte Correctional Institution, he got into a
physical altercation with Defendant Larson that resulted in a
broken necklace and damage to his lower front teeth.
Id.
Upon review of the complaint, the Court determined that
Plaintiff had not stated a claim against Defendants Jones or
Willis, and these defendants were dismissed from the action (Doc.
13).
Plaintiff was given leave to amend his complaint, and he was
cautioned that, should he fail to file an amended complaint, this
case would “proceed solely upon Plaintiff’s excessive force claim
against Defendant Larson.”
Id.
Plaintiff did not file an amended
complaint, and Defendant Larson filed an answer and affirmative
defenses to Plaintiff’s complaint on August 5, 2016 (Doc. 23).
The parties were directed to conduct discovery (Doc. 24), and
thereafter, Defendant Larson filed her motion for summary judgment
(Doc. 66).
Plaintiff was directed to file a response to the motion
(Doc. 48).
He was cautioned that: (1) failure to respond to a
motion for summary judgment indicates that the motion is unopposed;
(2) all material facts asserted in the motions would be considered
admitted unless controverted by proper evidentiary materials; and
(3) Plaintiff could not rely solely on the allegations of his
pleadings to oppose the motion (Doc. 35) (citing Griffith v.
Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822, 825 (11th Cir. 1985)).
- 2 -
Despite the
warnings, Plaintiff did not respond to Defendant Larson’s motion
for summary judgment. 2
On July 26, 2017, four and a half months after the close of
discovery and three months after he was directed to respond to
Defendant Larson’s motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff filed a
“Motion for Mailroom Privileges,” complaining that he has no money
for stamps to “get the officer involved in my lawsuit” (Doc. 51).
Plaintiff has not sought an extension of the time to conduct
discovery, nor did he request an extension of time to respond to
Defendant Larson’s motion for summary judgment.
To the extent
Plaintiff attempts to now assert a motion to compel, the motion is
denied as untimely.
pro
se,
is
Moreover, a plaintiff, even one proceeding
responsible
for
his
2
own
costs
of
discovery,
and
Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, if a party fails to properly address another party’s
assertion of fact, the court may consider the fact undisputed for
purposes of the motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(e)(2). It was explained to Plaintiff in the Summary Judgment
Notice (Doc. 35) that a properly supported motion for summary
judgment results in the inability of the plaintiff to rely on his
complaint alone.
Plaintiff was provided an opportunity for
discovery, but offers no evidence or statement in opposition to
the defendant’s evidence or properly supported statement of
material facts. See Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
161 (1970) (“It has always been perilous for the opposing party
[in a motion for summary judgment] neither to proffer any
countering
evidentiary
materials
nor
file
[an
opposing
affidavit.]”); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257
(1986) (“[T]he plaintiff must present affirmative evidence in
order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment.
This is true even where the evidence is likely to be within the
possession of the defendant, as long as the plaintiff has had a
full opportunity to conduct discovery.”).
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Plaintiff’s “Motion for Mailroom Privileges” is denied on that
ground as well.
Wright v. United States, 948 F. Supp. 61, 62
(M.D. Fla. 1996).
II.
Pleadings
Complaint
Plaintiff does not provide much detail in his complaint.
He
asserts that, on January 27, 2013, he was roughly grabbed by the
neck and pulled into the “CBS” by Defendant Larson because he
refused to acknowledge her after she “disrespected” him (Doc. 1 at
5).
As
a
result,
Afterwards,
Plaintiff’s
Defendant
Larson
neck
chain
questioned
was
broken.
Plaintiff,
and
Id.
then
“rushed” him while holding an identification card, which caused an
injury to Plaintiff’s lower teeth. Id. at 6.
Plaintiff seeks reimbursement for the damage to his necklace,
the repair of his teeth, and monetary damages for mental anguish
(Doc. 1 at 6-7).
He also asks to be separated from Defendant Larson
because she “is bi-polar and very dangerous.” Id. at 7. 3
Defendant Larson’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant
Larson
asserts
that
she
is
entitled
to
summary
judgment because: (1) Plaintiff suffered only a de minimis injury;
(2) she is entitled to qualified immunity because her actions were
reasonable; (3) even if a constitutional violation is shown, Plaintiff
3
Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief has already been
dismissed (Doc. 13).
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would be entitled to only nominal damages; and (4) there is no
evidence to support a claim for punitive damages (Doc. 46 at 1).
To support her motion for summary judgment, Defendant Larson
attaches a statement of undisputed facts (Doc. 47-2); Plaintiff’s
Deposition
(Doc.
46-2,
“Diez
Depo.”);
Defendant
Larson’s
Interrogatory Responses (Doc. 46-3, “Larson Answers”); Officer Kendra
Edison’s Deposition (Doc. 47-3, “Edison Depo.”); an affidavit of
Leslie
Rodes
(46-5,
“Rodes
Aff.”);
Nurse
Dorothy
C.
Woolley’s
Deposition (Doc. 46-4, “Woolley Dep.”); an affidavit from Dentist
Thomas
Shields
(Doc.
46-7,
“Shields
Aff.”);
and
Plaintiff’s
Department of Corrections dental records (Doc. 46-7 at 8-80).
III. Standards of Review
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate only if it is shown “that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard as
follows:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the
entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party
who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential
to that party’s case, and on which that party
will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such
a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to
any material fact, since a complete failure of
proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all
other facts immaterial.
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Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
may
meet
this
burden
by
presenting
evidence
that
The movant
would
be
admissible at trial indicating there is no dispute of material
fact or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present
evidence in support of some elements of its case on which it bears
the ultimate burden of proof.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–324.
If the party seeking summary judgment meets the initial burden
of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact,
the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to come forward with
sufficient evidence to rebut this showing with affidavits or other
relevant and admissible evidence. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572,
1577 (11th Cir. 1991).
Summary judgment is mandated “against a
party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322, (1986).
Excessive Force Standard
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on one who, under
color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.
To articulate a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege that: (1) a defendant deprived him of a right secured under
the Constitution or federal law; and (2) such deprivation occurred
under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865,
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872 (11th Cir. 1998).
Court
is
Plaintiff’s
The only constitutional claim before this
allegation
that
Defendant
Larson
used
excessive force against him.
To state an Eighth Amendment claim for the excessive use of
force, a plaintiff must allege: (1) conduct by the defendant that
was objectively “harmful enough” to establish a constitutional
violation;
and
(2)
facts
suggesting
that
that
the
defendant
“act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind[,]” i.e., she
acted “maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson v.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).
A significant injury is not required to state an excessive
force claim because the “core judicial inquiry” is “whether the
force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline,
or
maliciously
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
not, however, irrelevant.
and
sadistically
to
cause
harm.”
The extent of a plaintiff’s injuries is
The extent of the plaintiff’s injuries
is a factor that suggests whether an officer believed the force
necessary in a particular situation, and it provides an indication
of the amount of force applied.
See Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S.
34, 37 (2010) (An “inmate who complains of a ‘push or shove’ that
causes no discernible injury almost certainly fails to state a
valid excessive force claim.”)(citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9;
Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
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As noted by the Supreme Court in Hudson, “not . . . every
malevolent touch by a prison guard gives rise to a federal cause
of action.”
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
Rather, a court must consider
the following factors in determining whether force was applied
“maliciously and sadistically” to cause harm: (1) the need for the
application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and
the amount of force used; (3) the extent of the injury inflicted
upon the prisoner; (4) the threat to the safety of staff and
inmates posed by the prisoner; and (5) any efforts made to temper
the severity of a forceful response.
Fennell v. Gilstrap, 559
F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 2009).
IV.
Analysis
Undisputed Facts
Based upon the pleadings and the evidence before this Court,
the following facts are undisputed:
On January 27, 2013, Plaintiff was waiting in
the pill line outside the Multipurpose
Building
at
Charlotte
Correctional
(Plaintiff’s Dep. at 66; Larson Answers);
Defendant Larson was monitoring the pill line
(Larson Answers);
Plaintiff was leaning against a column and
Defendant
Larson
ordered
him
to
stop
(Plaintiff’s Depo. at 9, Larson Answers);
Plaintiff
did
not
acknowledge
Defendant
Larson, and she ordered him to go inside the
Multiservice Building (Plaintiff’s Dep. at 6869; Larson Answers at 3);
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Plaintiff was either escorted by Defendant
Larson into the building, or entered the
building on his own (Plaintiff’s Depo. at 69;
Larson Answers; Edison Dep. at 5, 7);
Officer Kendra Edison witnessed the entire
altercation between Plaintiff and Defendant
Larson (Edison Dep. at 5, 16);
Inside the Multipurpose Building, Defendant
Larson
asked
Plaintiff
to
show
his
identification card (“I.D.”) several times,
but he refused her orders, and asked her
“why?” Edison noticed that Plaintiff’s I.D.
was
not
visible
when
he
entered
the
multipurpose building (Edison Dep. at 9, 10);
Because Plaintiff was being “disorderly” and
refused to comply with her orders, Defendant
Larson ordered Plaintiff to “get on the wall”
so that she could put handcuffs on him (Edison
Dep. at 11);
When Defendant Larson ordered Plaintiff to
“cuff up” he became hostile and aggressive and
refused to place his hands behind his back
(Edison Dep. at 13);
Defendant Larson repeatedly told Plaintiff to
“stop being disorderly” and the two continued
to argue. Defendant Larson attempted to grab
Plaintiff’s arm to place behind his back and
he continued to refuse (Edison Dep. at 14);
After Defendant Larson told Plaintiff several
times that he was being disorderly, she used
chemical agents on him and Officer Edison
immediately called for back-up (Edison Dep. at
14); 4
The responding officers were able to force
Plaintiff into handcuffs and escort him to his
pre-confinement physical (Edison Dep. at 18);
4
In his complaint, Plaintiff does not mention Defendant
Larson’s use of chemical agents, and he does not assert that he
predicates any excessive force claim on the use of chemical agents.
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Officer Edison never saw Defendant Larson
punch Plaintiff or shove an I.D. card in his
mouth even though she witnessed the entire
altercation that caused chemical agents to be
administered (Edison Dep. at 19);
Officer Edison feared for Defendant Larson’s
personal safety during the incident because
Plaintiff was much larger and taller than
Defendant Larson (Edison Dep. at 14-17);
After Plaintiff showered to rinse off the
chemical agents, he was taken to the medical
department for a post use-of-force physical
where he was examined by Nurse Dorothy Woolley
(Rodes Aff. at 20-21; Woolley Dep. at 13);
Nurse
Woolley
observed
no
bleeding
on
Plaintiff—only redness to the skin of his
right knee.
She did not see injuries to
Plaintiff’s neck and noted “zero” injuries or
bleeding in Plaintiff’s mouth (Woolley Dep. at
44-45);
Nurse Woolley determined that Plaintiff needed
no further treatment (Woolley Dep. at 20);
Plaintiff received a disciplinary report for
disobeying Defendant Larson’s orders. He was
found guilty and sentenced to thirty days in
disciplinary confinement (Doc. 46-5 at 9;
Rodes Aff.);
Plaintiff never declared a dental emergency,
nor requested dental sick call regarding the
incident complained of in his complaint.
Although he was treated by dental staff on
four occasions in the year following the
incident, none of the providers noted any
evidence of injury to Plaintiff’s mouth
(Shield’s Aff. at ¶¶ 25, 26);
Plaintiff’s teeth do not presently show
evidence of tooth fracture or bone damage, nor
do the teeth or gums show evidence of former
trauma to the front bottom teeth (Shield’s
Aff. at ¶¶ 31-36, 41-42, 45).
- 10 -
Due Process
It is unclear from the pleadings and the summary judgment
evidence
when
or
how
Plaintiff’s
necklace
was
broken.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not stated a constitutional claim in
this regard because he has an adequate post-deprivation remedy
under state law.
See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984);
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (overruled on other grounds
by Daniels v. Williams, 47 U.S. 327 (1986)).
Under Florida law,
Plaintiff can sue the officer for the conversion of his personal
property. See Case v. Eslinger, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir.
2009) (citing E.J. Strickland Constr., Inc. v. Dep’t of Agric. &
Consumer Servs. of Fla., 515 So.2d 1331, 1335 (Fla. 5th DCA
1987)).
Accordingly, Defendant Larson is entitled to summary
judgment on any due process claim based upon Plaintiff’s broken
necklace.
Excessive Force
To determine whether the force used by Defendant Larson when
she struck Plaintiff with his I.D. card was such that it “shocks
the conscious,” and violated Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights,
the
Court
will
address
the
factors
set
forth
in
Fennell
v.
Gilstrap.
i.
The need for the application of force
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Larson “rushed” him while
holding his I.D. card and that she stuck the card in between
- 11 -
Plaintiff’s front bottom teeth (Doc. 1 at 6).
The undisputed
evidence shows that, after Defendant Larson told Plaintiff he would
receive a disciplinary report due to his failure to obey her
orders, he began to argue with her (Larson Int. at 2; Plaintiff
Depo. at 10;
Edison Depo. at 11). Plaintiff became hostile and
physically aggressive towards Defendant Larson when she attempted
to put him into restraints (Edison Depo. at 11-14; Larson Int. at
3; Plaintiff Depo. at 10, 80).
larger
than
Defendant
Defendant
Larson’s
Larson,
safety
Plaintiff was much taller and
and
(Edison
Officer
Depo.
Edison
at
feared
15-16).
for
After
struggling with Plaintiff, Defendant Larson employed the use of
chemical agents to subdue him (Edison Depo. at 14; Larson Int. at
2-3).
Under the undisputed facts presented here, it was reasonable
for Defendant
Larson
to
believe
that
force
was
necessary
to
restrain Plaintiff after he became hostile and aggressive when she
tried to handcuff him.
See Tate v. Rockford, 497 F. App’x 921,
924 (11th Cir. 2012) (prisoner’s threats coupled with his refusal
to obey prison guard’s order made use of force necessary); Bennett
v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1533 (11th Cir. 1990) (when prisoner
created a disturbance by failing to following the prison guard’s
instructions and shouting obscenities, it was not unreasonable for
prison guard to grab the prisoner by his throat and shove him
against the prison bars).
- 12 -
ii.
The relationship between the need and the amount
of force used
As noted, the undisputed evidence shows that after being
informed he would receive a disciplinary report for disobeying
Defendant Larson’s orders, Plaintiff became hostile and struggled
with Defendant Larson while she attempted to apply handcuffs.
Defendant Larson was holding Plaintiff’s I.D. card in her hand
during the struggle.
When Defendant Larson was unable to subdue
Plaintiff, she deployed chemical agents. 5
The undisputed facts
suggest that the particular force at issue in this complaint—
grabbing Plaintiff’s arm to force him into handcuffs—was neither
malicious nor sadistic, but rather “a good faith effort to maintain
or restore discipline in a difficult situation.”
Fennell v.
Gilstrap, 559 F.3d 1212, 1219 (11th Cir. 2009) (citing Cockrell v.
Sparks, 510 F.3d 1307, 1312 (11th Cir. 2007)).
Moreover, immediately after force was used against Plaintiff,
a response team was called, Plaintiff was decontaminated, and a
physical
exam
Accordingly,
performed
any
force
eight
used
minutes
was
later
short-lived;
(Doc.
46-6).
suggesting
a
conclusion that the force was appropriately calibrated to the
threat posed by Plaintiff.
5
As noted, only the alleged excessive force used by Defendant
Larson when she allegedly used Plaintiff’s I.D. card as a weapon,
not Defendant Larson’s decision to use chemical agents when
Plaintiff refused to submit to handcuffs, is at issue in this
action.
- 13 -
iii. The extent of the injury inflicted
Defendant Larson has offered undisputed evidence that the
only injury noted during Plaintiff’s post use-of-force exam was
some skin redness on his lower legs (Doc. 46-6 at 45; Woolley Depo.
at 11).
Id.
Plaintiff was not bleeding, and he required no bandage.
Nurse Woolley did not observe any injury to Plaintiff’s mouth
(Woolley Depo. at 21).
In fact, Nurse Wooley wrote in her notes,
“Dental check, zero injury noted, opens and closes mouth without
discomfort, all teeth appear intact, zero bleeding noted to his
mouth or to the gums.” Id. at 37.
Moreover, Defendant Larson has shown that no medical evidence
suggests that Plaintiff has suffered any past trauma to his front
teeth.
Defendant
evidence.
Dr.
does
Shields
not
dispute
attests
Defendant
that
trauma
to
Larson’s
teeth
medical
does
not
generally contribute to bone or tooth loss unless the trauma caused
a fracture of the bone or displacement of a tooth (Shield’s Aff.
at ¶ 17).
However, Dr. Shields attests that “there is no evidence
of any type of alveolar fracture (tooth fracture), or damage to
[Plaintiff’s]
disease.”
bone
Id.
other
at
¶
than
34.
bone
Dr.
loss
Shields
due
to
further
periodontal
notes
that
Plaintiff’s “teeth and gums do not show any sign of blunt force
trauma to the lower front aspect; nor was any trauma noted by any
treating dentist.”
the
incident
Id. at ¶ 42.
alleged
in
the
Dr. Shields concludes that, had
Complaint
- 14 -
occurred
as
Plaintiff
described,
“Inmate
Diez
would
likely
experience
bleeding
and
swelling of the gingiva and significant looseness of his mandibular
anterior teeth.” Id. at 44.
Attached to Dr. Shields’ affidavit are Plaintiff’s dental
records (Doc. 46-7 at 8-80).
The records show that Plaintiff has
never complained of tooth trauma to any treating dentist, despite
having visited dentists on several occasions since the alleged
incident.
Specifically, in the year after the incident, Plaintiff
submitted one sick call slip and three inmate requests, “none of
which contained any mention of trauma to the gums, bone, or teeth,
nor looseness of the front lower teeth.”
(Shields Aff. at ¶ 25).
Neither of the dentists who treated Plaintiff in the year after
the incident noted any evidence of injury to Plaintiff’s mouth.
Id. at ¶ 26.
As noted, the core inquiry in an excessive force claim is not
the quantum of injury sustained; however, the extent of an injury
provides an indication of the amount of force applied.
559 U.S. at 37.
Wilkins,
In the instant case, the lack of any detectable
dental injury by Plaintiff suggests that only a modicum of force
was used.
iv.
The extent of the threat to the safety of staff and
inmates
Plaintiff has not disputed the deposition statements from
Officer Edison that he became disorderly after Defendant Larson
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ordered him to cuff up. 6
Kendra Edison attests that Defendant
Larson was alone with Plaintiff in the multi-purpose building, and
he is much larger than she is (Edison Depo. at 15).
He resisted
with physical force Defendant Larson’s attempts to restrain him.
Id. at 14.
When watching the altercation, Edison believed that
Plaintiff posed a threat to Defendant Larson’s safety.
Id. at 15.
The undisputed facts offered by Defendant Larson suggest that it
was reasonable for Defendant Larson to believe that Plaintiff posed
a threat to her safety if he remained unrestrained and that she
used reasonable force to restrain him.
v.
Any efforts made
forceful response
Immediately
after
Plaintiff
to
was
temper
the
ultimately
severity
of
restrained
a
by
Defendant Larson with the use of a chemical agent, officers were
summoned to escort Plaintiff to a post use-of-force medical exam
(Edison
Depo.
determined
that
at
19).
the
fact
In
Cockrell,
that
officers
the
Eleventh
immediately
6
Circuit
summoned
When asked to explain what she meant when she described
Plaintiff as “disorderly,” Edison stated:
Disorderly as in still asking why, still
refusing to show the ID, you know, refusing to
get on the wall as Sergeant Larson told him
to. And he, he, I mean once she put him, when
he finally got on the wall, she directed him
to put his, you know, when we put him on the
wall, spread your arms out, spread your feet,
you know, and he refused those orders.
(Edison Depo. at 11).
- 16 -
medical assistance for an injured inmate was strong evidence that
there was no malicious or sadistic purpose in the use of force.
510 F.3d at 1312.
Likewise, the immediate offer of medical
assistance to Plaintiff shows an effort to temper the severity of
the force used by Defendant Larson.
See Fennell, 559 F.3d at
1220.
The undisputed evidence shows that the force used against
Plaintiff was akin to the “push or shove” described in Wilkins and
held to be insufficient to support an excessive force claim. 559
U.S. at 37.
No rational juror could find that the force used
against Plaintiff by Defendant Larson shocked the conscience or
was not applied in a good faith effort to maintain discipline.
Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
Accordingly Defendant Larson is entitled
to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
Because
this conclusion disposes of the case, the Court will not address
Defendant Larson’s remaining arguments regarding her entitlement
to summary judgment.
V.
Conclusion
In accordance with the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.
Plaintiff’s “Motion for Mailroom Privileges” (Doc. 51)
is DENIED.
2.
Defendant Larson’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. 46)
is GRANTED.
With no remaining defendants or claims, this case is
dismissed with prejudice.
- 17 -
2.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending
motions, close this case, and enter judgment in favor of the
defendants.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of August, 2017.
SA: OrlP-4
Copies: All Parties of Record
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1st
day
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