Lind v. Florida Civil Commitment Center
Filing
24
ORDER denying 11 motion to dismiss; denying 19 motion to dismiss. Defendant shall file an answer within 21 days of this Order. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 9/13/2016. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
EDWARD LIND,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:16-cv-3-FtM-29MRM
DIRECTOR,
FLORIDA
CIVIL
COMMITMENT CENTER, sued in
official capacity,
Defendant.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon the following:
Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint by
Defendant Florida Civil Commitment Center
(Doc. 11, filed April 29, 2016);
Second Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint
by Defendant Florida Civil Commitment Center
(Doc. 19, filed July 28, 2016); and
Plaintiff’s Response to the motions to dismiss
(Doc. 23, filed August 15, 2016).
For the reasons set forth in this Order, Defendant’s motions
to
dismiss
are
denied.
Defendant
shall
answer
Plaintiff’s
complaint within twenty-one days from the date on this Order.
Complaint
On January 4, 2016, Plaintiff, a resident at the Florida Civil
Commitment Center (FCCC) in Arcadia, Florida filed a pro se civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1). Plaintiff
asserts that he has both an abdominal hernia and a groin hernia.
Id. at ¶ 4.
He claims to suffer a great deal of pain from the
hernias, and that Defendant refuses to provide hernia surgery to
correct his condition. Id. at ¶¶ 5-7.
Plaintiff seeks an order
from this Court compelling Defendant to provide hernia surgery.
Id. at ¶ 9.
Motions to Dismiss
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on April 29, 2016 pursuant
to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Doc.
11).
In the motion, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff’s complaint
is moot because hernia surgery was performed after Plaintiff filed
his complaint (Doc. 11 at 2).
Defendant also argues that Plaintiff
sued the incorrect defendant. Id. at 5. 1
The Court ordered Plaintiff to respond to the motion to
dismiss
(Doc.
attempted
to
12).
file
Plaintiff
an
amended
did
not
comply.
complaint
raising
Instead
a
he
litany
of
additional claims against numerous additional defendants (Doc.
16).
The amended complaint was stricken for Plaintiff’s failure
to seek leave to file an amended complaint (Doc. 17).
Thereafter,
Defendant
filed
a
second
motion
to
dismiss
pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(Doc. 19).
Defendant asserts that dismissal of the complaint is
1
Defendant later withdrew his challenge to the propriety of
naming the FCCC director as a defendant since Plaintiff seeks only
injunctive relief (Doc. 20). Therefore, this argument will not be
further addressed.
- 2 -
warranted due to Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the first motion
to dismiss (Doc. 19).
At this Court’s direction, Plaintiff filed
a response claiming that he has received surgery for his groin
hernias, but has not yet received surgery to correct his abdominal
hernia (Doc. 22).
Legal Standards
On a motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all the
allegations in the complaint and construes them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372
F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004).
Further, this Court favors
the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations
in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901
F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990) (“On a motion to dismiss, the
facts stated in [the] complaint and all reasonable inferences
therefrom are taken as true.”).
a.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
The United Supreme Court has explained the pleading standards
a Plaintiff must meet to survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6):
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the grounds of his entitlement to
relief
requires
more
than
labels
and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.
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Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Further, courts are not
“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
A pro
se complaint is construed more liberally than formal pleadings
drafter by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 596 (1972).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court,
referring
to
its
earlier
decision
in
Bell
Atlantic
Corp.
v.
Twombly, illustrated a two-pronged approach to motions to dismiss.
First, a reviewing court must determine whether a Plaintiff’s
allegation is merely an unsupported legal conclusion that is not
entitled to an assumption of truth.
Next, the court must determine
whether the complaint’s factual allegations state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
b.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b)
In certain situations, a district court may dismiss an action
under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
failure to prosecute or to obey a court order. See Hildebrand v.
Honeywell, Inc., 622 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1980).
The Eleventh
Circuit has explained:
The legal standard to be applied under Rule
41(b) is whether there is a clear record of
delay or willful contempt and a finding that
lesser sanctions would not suffice. Dismissal
of a case with prejudice is considered a
sanction of last resort, applicable only in
extreme circumstances.
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Goforth v. Owens, 766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985) (quotations
and citation omitted).
Analysis
As an initial matter, this Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint under Rule 41(b) for failure to comply with this Court’s
order for a response to the first motion to dismiss.
There is no
indication that Plaintiff’s failure to provide a response was
designed to delay this case or was otherwise willful.
Rather,
Plaintiff appeared to believe that his amended complaint, which
was ultimately stricken, responded to the motion.
Defendant has
suffered no prejudice from Plaintiff’s failure to comply, and
Plaintiff eventually filed a response (Doc. 22).
Accordingly,
Defendant’s second motion to dismiss (Doc. 19) is denied.
In the first motion to dismiss, Defendant does not argue that
Plaintiff has not stated a claim; rather, the motion asserts that
Plaintiff’s
complaint
is
moot
because,
subsequent
to
filing,
Plaintiff received the relief requested (Doc. 11). In response,
Plaintiff asserts that the FCCC treated only one of his two hernias
and that he still suffers from abdominal pain due to the FCCC’s
failure to provide surgery on the second hernia (Doc. 22).
To state a § 1983 claim for denial of medical care, a
plaintiff must show more than that he suffered from a serious
medical condition and was not provided care.
The complaint must
allege sufficient facts to show that the federal employee being
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sued acted with “deliberate indifference” to this serious medical
need.
Plaintiff must show that the defendant was both: (1) aware
of a serious risk of harm if medical treatment was not immediately
provided; and (2) disregarded the risk of serious harm through
conduct that was more than mere negligence. Wilson v. Seiter, 501
U.S. 294, 297 (1991); Cagle v. Sutherland, 334 F.3d 980, 987 (11th
Cir. 2003). 2
A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a
physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a
lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834
F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987).
At this stage of litigation,
Plaintiff need only make factual allegations that allow the Court
to draw a reasonable inference that he suffered from a serious
medical need. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
2
Based on Plaintiff’s
Because he is civilly committed, Plaintiff is afforded a
higher standard of care than if he were criminally confined.
Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1041 (11th Cir. 1996); Lavender
v. Kearney, 206 F. App’x 860 (11th Cir. 2006). Plaintiff’s right
to be free from cruel and unusual punishment exists under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which “require[s] the
State to provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to
ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint,” Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 319 (1982), instead of under the Eighth
Amendment.
Nonetheless, his “claims are subject to the same
Eighth Amendment scrutiny as if they had been brought as deliberate
indifference claims under the Eighth Amendment.” McDowell v.
Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1290 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (citations
omitted).
- 6 -
allegation that he was diagnosed with two hernias, the Court will
assume that Plaintiff’s hernias constitute a serious medical need.
It is clear that Plaintiff believes he needs additional hernia
surgery and that Defendant believes he has received all the care
to which he is entitled (Doc. 1; Doc. 22).
To the extent Plaintiff
is receiving treatment and pain relief for his abdominal hernia,
but prefers different treatment from the medical staff at the FCCC,
he does not state a deliberate indifference claim.
See Hamm v.
DeKalb County, 774 F.2d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Although
Hamm may have desired different modes of treatment, the care the
jail
provided
did
not
amount
to
deliberate
indifference.”);
Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988) (“Although the
Constitution does require that prisoners be provided with a certain
minimum level of medical treatment, it does not guarantee to a
prisoner the treatment of his choice.”).
However, Plaintiff
alleges that he is receiving no treatment for his abdominal hernia.
A prison official may act with deliberate indifference by delaying
the treatment of a serious medical need, “though the reason for
the delay and the nature of the medical need is relevant in
determining what type of delay is constitutionally intolerable.”
McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999).
In
addition, the deliberate withholding of pain treatment can rise to
the level of a deliberate indifference claim. See Murphy v. Walker,
51 F.3d 714, 719 (7th Cir. 1995) (prisoner suffering severe pain
- 7 -
after head injury who was told by guard to “stop being a baby” and
learn to live with the pain was entitled to go forward with a
deliberate indifference claim against that guard).
Construing
Plaintiff’s
pro
se
complaint
liberally,
and
accepting his factual allegations as true, Plaintiff’s complaint
states a deliberate indifference claim.
Therefore, Defendant’s
first motion to dismiss (Doc. 11) is denied.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby ORDERED:
1.
Defendant’s motions to dismiss (Doc. 11; Doc. 19) are
DENIED.
2.
Defendant shall file an answer to Plaintiff’s complaint
within TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS from the date on this Order.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of September, 2016.
SA: OrlP-4
Copies: Edward Lind
Counsel of Record
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13th
day
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