Schaffer v. GEO Group Inc. et al
Filing
32
OPINION AND ORDER granting 31 motion to dismiss and the Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim and for failure to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8 and 10. With no remaining defendants or claims, the Clerk shall enter judgment in favor of defendants and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 6/21/2017. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
THOMAS SCHAFFER,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:16-cv-62-FtM-29MRM
GEO GROUP INC., Operator of
GEO, MIKE CARROLL, Secretary
DCF, GEORGE ZOLEY, GEO Group
Inc.,
KRISTIN
KANNER,
Director SVP, DONALD SAWYER,
Dr., Facility Director FCCC,
CHRIS
CATRON,
Security
Director
FCCC,
WILLIAM
PRICE, Health Administrator
FCCC, and REBECCA JACKSON,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon review of the motion
to dismiss filed on behalf of Defendants William Price, Christopher
Catron, Donald Sawyer, and Rebecca Jackson (Doc. #31).
Plaintiff
did not file a response to the motion and the time to do so has
long
expired.
See
Doc.
#14
(warning
Plaintiff
that
when
a
defendant files a motion to dismiss, plaintiff shall have twentyone days to file a response).
This matter is ripe for review.
I.
As background, Plaintiff Thomas Schaffer, who is civilly
committed at the Florida Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”) under
Florida’s
Sexual
Violent
Predator’s
Act,
Florida
Statute
§§
394.910-.913, initiated this action as one of nineteen plaintiffs
by filing a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “sealed Class Action Complaint” (Doc.
#1).
On January 28, 2016, the Court entered an order (Doc. #2)
dismissing the class action, without prejudice, under section 1915
and declining to certify a class.
However, the Court allowed each
plaintiff an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint on or before
February 29, 2016.
Plaintiff timely filed a motion for an enlargement of time,
which the Court granted.
Complaint (Doc. #9).
Plaintiff then timely filed an Amended
Prior to directing Plaintiff to complete
service of process forms, the Court reviewed Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint under section 1915 and entered an order of partial
dismissal. In particular, the Court dismissed one of the named
defendants, Brian Masony, because the Amended Complaint contained
no factual allegations whatsoever as to Masony, and the First
Amendment interference to access to court claim finding failure to
state a claim.
Doc. #13.
Although far from the model of clarity, the Amended Complaint
generally
challenges
Florida’s
Sexual
Violent
Predator’s
Act,
Florida Statute §§ 394.910-.913 (hereinafter “SVP Act”) and argues
that the SVP Act is unconstitutional and suggests ways the Florida
legislators could improve the SVP Act.
Plaintiff also makes vague
and non-specific allegations regarding the treatment provided to
various “class members” at the FCCC and avers that the named
- 2 -
defendants are liable in their individual capacities for adhering
to the unconstitutional statutes.
The Amended Complaint alleges that Florida’s SVP Act is “not
narrowly tailored” because:
(1) it “indisputably [fails]
periodic risk assessments”;
to
require
(2) it fails to provide a “judicial bypass
mechanism”
to
challenge
his
ongoing
commitment;
(3) “the statutory discharge criteria is more
stringent
than
the
statutory
commitment
criteria”;
(4) it authorizes “the burden to petition for
a reduction in custody to impermissibly shift
from the State” to Plaintiff;
(5) it requires civilly committed individuals
to show by clear and convincing evidence that
a less restrictive alternative is appropriate;
and
(6) it does not require the defendants to take
any affirmative action, such as petition for
a reduction in custody when the resident no
longer satisfies the criteria for continued
commitment.
Amended Complaint at 19-21.
Plaintiff also urges that Florida’s
SVP Act is unconstitutional as-applied because:
(7) Defendants Kanner, Zoley, Carroll, Sawyer,
and Jackson do not conduct periodic risk
assessments of civilly committed people at the
FCCC;
(8) the risk assessments that have been
performed since the opening of the FCCC have
not all been done in a constitutional manner;
- 3 -
(9) Plaintiff has remained confined at the
FCCC even though he has completed treatment or
sufficiently reduced his risk of reoffending;
(10) discharge procedures
properly at FCCC;
are
not
working
(11) although the SVP Act expressly allows the
referral of committed individuals to less
restrictive
alternatives,
this
is
not
occurring in practice;
(12)
although
treatment
has
been
made
available, the treatment program’s structure
has been an institutional failure and there is
no
meaningful
relationship
between
the
treatment program and an end to indefinite
detention;
(13) his due process rights were violated when
the probable cause hearing was held outside of
his or his attorney’s presence; and
(14) Plaintiff’s Equal Protection rights were
violated “because his liberty has been
implicated as a result of Fla. Stat. § 394
Part V being unconstitutional on its face
because the defendants use “the statute to
punishing and/or detain ‘Male’ sex offenders
after completion of their prison sentence and
not applying [sic] the same standard to
‘Female’ sex offenders for their past and
present sexual violent offenses.” 1
Id. at 17-26.
In a requested relief section seven pages in length,
Plaintiff requests in pertinent part that “substantial changes be
made to Florida’s sex offender civil commitment scheme,” and two
1The
remainder of the Amended Complaint is confusing and
repetitive and appears to raise claims unrelated to Plaintiff.
To the extent Plaintiff intended to raise claims not addressed
in this Order, they are dismissed for failure to state a claim
on which relief can be granted and as a violation of Rules 8 and
10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
- 4 -
million dollars in punitive and compensatory damages.
Id. at 19-
26.
Defendants move to dismiss arguing that the Amended Complaint
violates Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Motion at 5-7.
In support, Defendants point to substantially
similar civil actions raising similar claims wherein this Court
granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Id. at 4-5.
II.
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court
accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint and construes
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Jackson v.
BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004).
Further, this Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable
inferences from the allegations in the complaint.
Stephens v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir.
1990) (“On a motion to dismiss, the facts stated in [the] complaint
and all reasonable inferences therefrom are taken as true.”).
However, the Supreme Court explains that:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the grounds of his entitlement to
relief
requires
more
than
labels
and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.
- 5 -
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Further, Courts are not
“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.”
Ashcroft
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
v.
referring
Iqbal,
to
its
556
U.S.
earlier
662
decision
(2009),
in
the
Bell
Supreme
Atlantic
In
Court,
Corp.
v.
Twombly, illustrated a two-pronged approach to motions to dismiss.
First, a reviewing Court must determine whether a plaintiff’s
allegation is merely an unsupported legal conclusion that is not
entitled to an assumption of truth.
Next, the Court must determine
whether the complaint’s factual allegations state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Although the Court may hold a pro se litigant to “a less
stringent standard,” the pro se litigant may not rely on conclusory
allegations or legal conclusion in the place of factual allegations
to overcome a motion to dismiss.
Taylor v. Books a Million, Inc.,
296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002).
not
survive
a
motion
to
dismiss
Conclusory allegations will
if
not
constituting a legitimate claim for relief.
supported
by
facts
Municipal Utils. Bd.
of Albertville v. Alabama Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493, 1501 (11th
Cir. 1991).
A pro se litigant is still bound to follow the
pleading requirements set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1161 (11th
Cir. 1993).
- 6 -
On
a
motion
judicially noticed.
to
dismiss,
the
Court
may
consider
matters
La Grasta v. First Union Sec. Inc., 358 F.3d
840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004).
These matters include documents which
are central to a plaintiff’s claim whose authenticity is not
challenged, whether the document is physically attached to the
complaint or not, without converting the motion into one for
summary judgment.
Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 623 F.2d 1371, 1379 (11th
Cir. 2010); SFM Holdings Ltd. v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 600 F.3d
1334, 137 (11th Cir. 2010).
The Court may also take judicial notice of and consider
documents that are public records.
This is based on the fact that
such documents are “public records that [are] ‘not subject to
reasonable dispute’ because they [are] ‘capable of accurate and
ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy [can] not
reasonably be questioned.’” Horne v. Potter, 392 F. App’x 800, 802
(11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)).
Moreover, “a
court may take notice of another court's order . . . for the
limited purpose of recognizing the ‘judicial act’ that the order
represents or the subject matter of that litigation.”
United
States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994).
III.
The Florida legislature enacted the SVP Act, by which a person
determined to be a sexually violent predator is required to be
- 7 -
housed in a secure facility “for control, care, and treatment until
such
time
as
the
person’s
mental
abnormality
or
personality
disorder has so changed that it is safe for the person to be at
large.”
§ 394.917(2).
The SVP Act was promulgated for the dual
purpose “of providing mental health treatment to sexually violent
predators
and
protecting
the
public
from
these
individuals.”
Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 112 (Fla. 2002); Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (holding that the Kansas Sexually
Violent Predator Act did not establish criminal proceedings, and
involuntary confinement pursuant to the Act was not punitive).
Civil commitment under the Act involves several steps.
SVP
Act
requires
a
mental
evaluation
of
any
First, the
person
who
has
committed a sexually violent offense and is scheduled for release
from prison or involuntary confinement.
§ 394.913.
See generally Fla. Stat.
The evaluation is conducted by a multi-disciplinary
team of mental health professionals who must determine whether the
individual meets the definition of a “sexually violent predator.”
After the evaluation, the state attorney may file a petition with
the circuit court alleging that the individual is a sexually
violent predator subject to civil commitment under the Act.
Id.
If
the
the
judge
determines
that
probable
cause
exists
that
individual is a sexually violent predator, then the judge will
order
the
individual
to
remain
in
custody.
§
394.915.
Thereafter, a jury trial, or a bench trial if neither party
- 8 -
requests a jury trial, will commence.
the
individual
is
a
sexually
Id.
violent
If the jury finds that
predator
by
clear
and
convincing evidence, then the individual will be committed to the
custody of the Department of Children and Family Services for
“control, care, and treatment until such time as the person’s
mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that it
is safe for the person to be at large.”
§ 394.917.
This Court takes judicial notice of the Minnesota district
court’s order to which Plaintiff cites, Karsjens v. Piper, 109 F.
Supp.3d 1139 (D. Minn. June 17, 2015).
Complaint at 29.
Most of
the factual allegations in the instant Amended Complaint appear to
actually concern Minnesota’s SVP statutes at issue in Karsjens,
109 F. Supp.3d 1139, and are not an accurate factual recitation of
Florida’s SVP Act.
Instead, it appears Plaintiff merely copies
and paraphrases entire sections of the Minnesota district court’s
conclusions in Karsjens and raises each of the Karsjens district
court’s
stated
conclusions
as
a
claim
in
the
instant
case,
notwithstanding that Minnesota’s SVP statutes are different from
Florida’s SVP Act.
Compare Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d at 1173-74
(reviewing Minnesota’s SVP statutes), with Westerheide, 831 So.2d
at 104-106 (reviewing Florida’s SVP Act).
Also noteworthy, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal subsequently reversed the district
court’s opinion in Karsjens, finding Minnesota’s SVP statutes in
- 9 -
fact comported with the United States Constitution.
845 F.3d 394
(8th Cir. 2017).
Here, the Amended Complaint consists of unsupported legal
conclusions and misstatements of fact concerning Florida’s SVP
Act.
For the reasons that follow, the Court finds Defendants’
motion to dismiss is due to be granted.
1. Florida’s SVP Act provides that a petitioner is entitled
to be present and to be represented by counsel during his
or her probable cause hearing
Initially, the Amended Complaint alleges that Florida’s SVP
Act is unconstitutional because it does not recognize the right of
a person deemed to be a sexually violent predator to be present
and to be represented by counsel at his probable cause hearing.
This
factual
incorrect.
allegation
about
Florida’s
SVP
Act
is
patently
In Florida, a person suspected of being a sexually
violent predator has the right to appear in person at the probable
cause hearing and to be represented by counsel.
See Fla. Stat.
§§ 394.915(2) and (2)(a) (stating that the person against whom the
probable cause hearing is directed “shall be provided with notice
of, and an opportunity to appear in person at, an adversarial
hearing” and has the right to be represented by counsel at the
hearing).
Accordingly,
any
claims
based
upon
allegations
that
the
probable cause hearings as described in Florida’s SVP Act are
unconstitutional (because they are conducted ex parte and without
- 10 -
the benefit of counsel) are dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
Likewise, any claims against
the individual defendants based upon their adherence to the Florida
SVP’s Act as it relates to the probable cause hearing are dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
2. Florida’s SVP Act requires periodic assessments of a civil
detainee’s mental condition and provide for judicial review
of the assessments at the detainee’s request
Plaintiff
alleges
that
the
SVP
Act
is
unconstitutional
because it does not require periodic risk assessments of a civil
detainee’s mental condition.
To the contrary, Florida’s SVP Act
provides for periodic assessments of a civil detainee’s mental
condition and for judicial review at the civil detainee’s request
at
any
time
after
commitment.
Florida
Statute
§
Specifically, Florida Statute § 394.918 provides:
A person committed under this part shall have
an examination of his or her mental condition
once every year or more frequently at the
court’s discretion. The person may retain or,
if the person is indigent and so requests, the
court may appoint, a qualified professional to
examine the person. Such a professional shall
have access to all records concerning the
person. The results of the examination shall
be provided to the court that committed the
person under this part. Upon receipt of the
report, the court shall conduct a review of
the person’s status.
The department shall provide the person with
annual written notice of the person’s right to
- 11 -
394.918
petition the court for release over the
objection of the director of the facility
where the person is housed. The notice must
contain a waiver of rights. The director of
the facility shall forward the notice and
waiver form to the court.
The court shall hold a limited hearing to
determine whether there is probable cause to
believe that the person’s condition has so
changed that it is safe for the person to be
at large and that the person will not engage
in acts of sexual violence if discharged. The
person has the right to be represented by
counsel at the probable cause hearing and the
right to be present. Both the petitioner and
the respondent may present evidence that the
court may weigh and consider. If the court
determines that there is probable cause to
believe it is safe to release the person, the
court shall set a trial before the court on
the issue.
At the trial before the court, the person is
entitled to be present and is entitled to the
benefit of all constitutional protections
afforded the person at the initial trial,
except for the right to a jury. The state
attorney shall represent the state and has the
right
to
have
the
person
examined
by
professionals chosen by the state. At the
hearing, the state bears the burden of
proving, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the person’s mental condition remains
such that it is not safe for the person to be
at large and that, if released, the person is
likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.
Fla. Stat. §§ 394.918(1)-(4) (emphases added).
Florida’s SVP Act
further provides:
A person is not prohibited from filing a
petition for discharge at any time after
commitment under this part. However, if the
person has previously filed such a petition
without the approval of the secretary or the
secretary’s designee and the court determined
- 12 -
that the petition was without merit, a
subsequent petition shall be denied unless the
petition contains facts upon which a court
could find that the person’s condition has so
changed that a probable cause hearing is
warranted.
Fla. Stat. § 394.920 (emphasis added).
Thus, the SVP Act provides
for both mandatory periodic reviews of a civil detainee’s mental
condition and allows for more frequent reviews at the court’s
discretion.
Id.
Florida’s SVP Act also allows a detainee to
petition the court for release over the objection of the facility’s
director and at any time thereafter.
Id.
Accordingly, any claims based upon allegations that Florida’s
SVP Act is unconstitutional because it does not provide for period
assessments of a detainee’s mental condition or a “judicial bypass mechanism” are due to be dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
against
individual
defendants
based
Likewise, any claims
upon
their
adherence
to
Florida Statute § 394.920 are also dismissed for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
3. The statutory discharge criteria under Florida’s SVP Act
comports with due process
Plaintiff asserts that Florida’s SVP Act is unconstitutional
because the statutory discharge criteria for a civilly committed
person are more stringent than the statutory commitment criteria.
- 13 -
Again, the statement is simply untrue as it pertains to Florida’s
SVP Act.
Under the SVP Act, a person is subject to civil commitment as
a sexually violent predator if a court or a unanimous jury finds,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the person is a sexually
violent predator.
Fla. Stat. § 394.917.
A “sexually violent
predator” is any person who has been convicted of a sexually
violent offense as defined by Florida Statute § 394.912(9) and
“[s]uffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if
not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and
treatment.” Fla. Stat. § 394.912(10).
After commitment, the civil
detainee is entitled to a release trial when there is probable
cause to believe that his condition is “so changed that it is safe
for the person to be at large and that the person will not engage
in
acts
of
394.918(3).
by
clear
sexual
violence
if
discharged.”
Fla.
Stat.
§
The State then bears the burden at trial of proving
and
convincing
evidence,
“that
the
person’s
mental
condition remains such that it is not safe for the person to be at
large and that, if released, the person is likely to engage in
acts of sexual violence.”
added).
Fla. Stat. § 394.918(4) (emphasis
These criteria are constitutionally sound.
The United States Supreme Court has clarified that the purpose
of civil commitment “is to treat the individual’s mental illness
- 14 -
and protect him and society from his potential dangerousness.”
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983).
A state may
confine a mentally ill person if it shows that the individual is
both mentally ill and dangerous.
71,
80
(1992).
Accordingly,
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
it
is
axiomatic
that
civilly
committed persons are entitled to release when they have recovered
their sanity or are no longer dangerous.
O’Conner v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975) (noting that an involuntary commitment
cannot constitutionally continue after the basis for it no longer
exists).
Florida’s SVP Act requires the state to prove that a
civil detainee is both still mentally ill and poses a danger to
society
release.
if
released;
otherwise,
the
Fla. Stat. § 394.918(4).
detainee
is
entitled
to
Accordingly, Florida’s SVP
Act comports with due process as it relates to release criteria.
See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (“We have sustained civil commitment
statutes when they have coupled proof of dangerousness with the
proof of some additional factor such as mental illness or mental
abnormality”) (internal quotations omitted).
Any
claims
predicated
upon
the
alleged
facial
unconstitutionality of Florida’s SVP Act as it relates to release
criteria are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief
may
be
granted.
Likewise,
the
claims
against
the
individual defendants based upon their adherence to Florida’s SVP
Act as it relates to release criteria are dismissed for failure to
- 15 -
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
4. Florida’s SVP Act does not impermissibly shift the burden
of proof to the detainee to prove that he is entitled to
release
Plaintiff argues that Florida’s SVP Act is not narrowly
tailored because “the statute impermissibly places the burden on
him and non-committed individuals to demonstrate that they should
be placed in a less restrictive setting.”
To the extent Plaintiff asserts that Florida’s SVP Act places
the burden on the detainee to show his entitlement to release,
this is simply not true.
Under Florida’s SVP Act, “the state
bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence,
that the [detainee’s] mental condition remains such that it is not
safe for the person to be at large and that, if released, the
person is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.” Fla. Stat.
§ 394.918(4) (emphasis added).
Accordingly,
any
claims
challenging
the
facial
constitutionality of Florida’s SVP Act as they relate to the
detainees’ burden of proof are dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Likewise, the claims
against the individual defendants based upon their adherence to
Florida’s SVP Act as it relates to a detainee’s burden of proof
are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
- 16 -
5. The Florida SVP Act requires the Secretary of the
Department of Children and Families or the Secretary’s
designee to authorize a detainee to petition the court for
release if it is determined that the person is not likely
to commit acts of sexual violence if discharged
Plaintiff asserts that the SVP Act does not require Defendants
to take affirmative action, such as petition for a reduction in
custody on behalf of Plaintiff.
Again, this factual allegation
is blatantly contradicted by the language in the SVP Act. Florida’s
SVP Act provides that:
If the secretary or the secretary’s designee
at any time determines that the person is not
likely to commit acts of sexual violence if
discharged, the secretary or the secretary’s
designee shall authorize the person to
petition the court for release. The petition
shall be served upon the court and the state
attorney. The court, upon receipt of such a
petition, shall order a trial before the court
within 30 days, unless continued for good
cause.
Fla. Stat. § 394.919(1) (emphasis added).
By its clear terms, §
394.919(1) requires the state to take affirmative action, in the
form of authorizing the detainee to petition the court for release,
if it is determined that a detainee may be entitled to release.
Accordingly,
constitutionality
any
of
claim
Florida’s
challenging
SVP
Act
as
it
the
relates
facial
to
the
defendants’ requirement to take affirmative action on behalf of
individuals who no longer satisfy the criteria for continued
- 17 -
commitment is dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
6. Plaintiff has not stated an Equal Protection claim
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
The Supreme
Court has expressed that there is “a strong presumption that gender
classifications are invalid” under the Equal Protection Clause.
J.E.B.
v.
ex
asserts
Plaintiff
Alabama
rel.
that
T.B.,
511
defendants
U.S.
violated
127,
152
his
(1994).
Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection because:
[H]is liberty has been implicated as a result
of
Fla.
Stat.
§
394
Part
V.
being
unconstitutional on its face as the result of
Defendants, Kristin Kanner, George Zoley, Mike
Carroll, Dr. Donald Sawyer, and Dr. Rebecca
Jackson, and State Attorney utilizing the
statute to punishing and/or detain “Male” sex
offenders after completion of their prison
sentence and not applying the same standard to
“Female” sex offender for their past and
present sexual violent offenses.
Amended Complaint at 9-10.
Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that
Florida’s SVP Act does not apply the same standards to female sex
offenders
offenders.
who
commit
the
same
types
of
crimes
as
male
sex
Id.
Plaintiff provides no factual assertions to support this
conclusory claim, and his legal conclusion, in terms of the wording
of the statute, is false.
Florida’s SVP Act does not target “men,”
- 18 -
but
rather
394.912(10).
“sexually
violent
predators.”
Fla.
Stat.
§
Sexually violent predators are not a protected class
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
When a
statutory scheme does not specifically classify based on a suspect
class (such as persons of a certain race, alienage, religion,
gender,
or
national
origin),
“uneven
effects
upon”
suspected
classes “are ordinarily of no constitutional concern.”
Personnel
Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).
The
Fourteenth Amendment “guarantees equal laws, not equal results.”
Id. at 273.
Still, “when a neutral law has a disparate impact” on a
suspect class “an unconstitutional purpose may still be at work,”
and the Court does not doubt that Florida’s SVP Act has almost
exclusively affected men.
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273.
However, in
order to state a viable disparate impact claim, a claimant must
prove that the intention of the law was to discriminate against a
suspect class.
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 135 (1996).
If
the impact of a law “could not be plausibly explained on a neutral
ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification
made by the law was in fact not neutral.”
Feeney, 442 U.S. at
275.
As previously stated, the legislature’s intent in creating
Florida’s SVP Act was to “create a civil commitment procedure for
the long-term care and treatment of sexually violent predators.”
- 19 -
Fla. Stat. § 394.910.
The SVP Act’s primary purpose is to protect
the public and treat sexually violent predators.
Id.
These
purposes are entirely rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.
Any assertion that Florida’s SVP Act targets the male
gender with respect to anything other than the proclivity of some
males to be sexually violent predators is untenable.
If a woman
is determined to be a sexually violent predator, the clear terms
of the Florida’s SVP Act would apply to her as well.
Id.
To
imply that the Florida Legislature passed the statutes in order to
fulfill
a
speculative
neutral
discriminatory
and
language
animus
implausible.
in
Florida’s
it
harbors
Furthermore,
SVP
Act,
against
given
men
the
Plaintiff’s
is
gender
Amended
Complaint rests on a legal conclusion, i.e. the statutes (and
defendants) “do not apply the same standard[s] to female sex
offenders,”
but
he
provides
no
facts
in
support
thereof.
Therefore, Plaintiff has not stated an equal protection claim, and
his equal protection claim is dismissed for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. #31) is GRANTED.
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a
claim on which relief can be granted and for failure to comply
with Rules Eight and Ten of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
- 20 -
2.
With no remaining defendants or claims in this action,
the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions,
enter judgment in favor of the defendants, and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of June, 2017.
SA: ftmp-1
Copies: All Parties of Record
- 21 -
21st
day
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?