Brown v. GEO Group Inc. et al
Filing
32
OPINION AND ORDER re: granting 31 MOTION to Dismiss Amended Complaint. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted and for failure to comply with Rules Eight and Ten of the Fed eral Rules of Civil Procedure. With no remaining defendants or claims in this action, the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate all pending motions, enter judgment in favor of the defendants, and close this case. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 6/21/2017. (SLU)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
KENYATA BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:16-cv-74-FtM-38CM
GEO GROUP INC., MIKE
CARROLL, GEORGE ZOLEY,
KRISTIN KANNER, DONALD
SAWYER, CHRIS CATRON,
WILLIAM PRICE and REBECCA
JACKSON,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER1
This matter comes before the Court upon review of the Motion to Dismiss filed on
behalf of Defendants William Price, Christopher Catron, Donald Sawyer, and Rebecca
Jackson (Doc. #31). Plaintiff did not file a response to the Motion and the time to do so
has long expired. See Doc. #14 (warning Plaintiff that when a defendant files a motion
to dismiss, plaintiff shall have twenty-one days to file a response). This matter is ripe for
review.
1
Disclaimer: Documents filed in CM/ECF may contain hyperlinks to other
documents or Web sites. These hyperlinks are provided only for users’ convenience.
Users are cautioned that hyperlinked documents in CM/ECF are subject to PACER fees.
By allowing hyperlinks to other Web sites, this court does not endorse, recommend,
approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services or products they provide on their
Web sites. Likewise, the court has no agreements with any of these third parties or their
Web sites. The court accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any
hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user to some
other site does not affect the opinion of the court.
I.
As background, Plaintiff Kenyata Brown, who is civilly committed at the Florida
Civil Commitment Center (“FCCC”) under Florida’s Sexual Violent Predator’s Act, Florida
Statute §§ 394.910-.913, initiated this action as one of nineteen plaintiffs by filing a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 “sealed Class Action Complaint” (Doc. #1). On January 28, 2016, the
Court entered an order (Doc. #2) dismissing the class action, without prejudice, under
section 1915 and declining to certify a class. However, the Court allowed each plaintiff
an opportunity to file an Amended Complaint on or before February 29, 2016.
Plaintiff timely filed a motion for an enlargement of time, which the Court granted.
Plaintiff then timely filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. #9). Prior to directing Plaintiff to
complete service of process forms, the Court reviewed Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint
under section 1915 and entered an order of partial dismissal. In particular, the Court
dismissed one of the named defendants, Brian Masony, because the Amended Complaint
contained no factual allegations whatsoever as to Masony, and the First Amendment
interference to access to court claim finding failure to state a claim. Doc. #13.
Although far from the model of clarity, the Amended Complaint generally
challenges Florida’s Sexual Violent Predator’s Act, Florida Statute §§ 394.910-.913
(hereinafter “SVP Act”) and argues that the SVP Act is unconstitutional and suggests
ways the Florida legislators could improve the SVP Act. Plaintiff also makes vague and
non-specific allegations regarding the treatment provided to various “class members” at
the FCCC and avers that the named defendants are liable in their individual capacities
for adhering to the unconstitutional statutes.
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The Amended Complaint alleges that Florida’s SVP Act is “not narrowly tailored”
because:
(1) it “indisputably [fails] to require periodic risk assessments”;
(2) it fails to provide a “judicial bypass mechanism” to
challenge his ongoing commitment;
(3) “the statutory discharge criteria is more stringent than the
statutory commitment criteria”;
(4) it authorizes “the burden to petition for a reduction in
custody to impermissibly shift from the State” to Plaintiff;
(5) it requires civilly committed individuals to show by clear
and convincing evidence that a less restrictive alternative is
appropriate; and
(6) it does not require the defendants to take any affirmative
action, such as petition for a reduction in custody when the
resident no longer satisfies the criteria for continued
commitment.
Amended Complaint at 6-12.
Plaintiff also urges that Florida’s SVP Act is
unconstitutional as-applied because:
(7) Defendants Kanner, Zoley, Carroll, Sawyer, and Jackson
do not conduct periodic risk assessments of civilly committed
people at the FCCC;
(8) the risk assessments that have been performed since the
opening of the FCCC have not all been done in a
constitutional manner;
(9) Plaintiff has remained confined at the FCCC even though
he has completed treatment or sufficiently reduced his risk of
reoffending;
(10) discharge procedures are not working properly at FCCC;
(11) although the SVP Act expressly allows the referral of
committed individuals to less restrictive alternatives, this is not
occurring in practice;
(12) although treatment has been made available, the
treatment program’s structure has been an institutional failure
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and there is no meaningful relationship between the treatment
program and an end to indefinite detention;
(13) his due process rights were violated when the probable
cause hearing was held outside of his or his attorney’s
presence; and
(14) Plaintiff’s Equal Protection rights were violated “because
his liberty has been implicated as a result of Fla. Stat. § 394
Part V being unconstitutional on its face because the
defendants use “the statute to punishing and/or detain ‘Male’
sex offenders after completion of their prison sentence and
not applying [sic] the same standard to ‘Female’ sex offenders
for their past and present sexual violent offenses.”2
Id. at 17-28. In a requested relief section seven pages in length, Plaintiff requests in
pertinent part that “substantial changes be made to Florida’s sex offender civil
commitment scheme,” and two million dollars in punitive and compensatory damages.
Id. at 21-27.
Defendants move to dismiss arguing that the Amended Complaint violates Rules
8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Motion at 5-7. In support, Defendants
point to substantially similar civil actions raising similar claims wherein this Court granted
Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Id. at 4-5.
II.
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court accepts as true all
the allegations in the complaint and construes them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Jackson v. BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004).
Further, this Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable inferences from the allegations
2The
remainder of the Amended Complaint is confusing and repetitive and appears
to raise claims unrelated to Plaintiff. To the extent Plaintiff intended to raise claims not
addressed in this Order, they are dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can
be granted and as a violation of Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573
(11th Cir. 1990) (“On a motion to dismiss, the facts stated in [the] complaint and all
reasonable inferences therefrom are taken as true.”). However, the Supreme Court
explains that:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief
requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level.
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). Further, Courts are not “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986). In
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court, referring to its earlier decision
in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, illustrated a two-pronged approach to motions to
dismiss. First, a reviewing Court must determine whether a plaintiff’s allegation is merely
an unsupported legal conclusion that is not entitled to an assumption of truth. Next, the
Court must determine whether the complaint’s factual allegations state a claim for relief
that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Although the Court may hold a pro se litigant to “a less stringent standard,” the pro
se litigant may not rely on conclusory allegations or legal conclusion in the place of factual
allegations to overcome a motion to dismiss. Taylor v. Books a Million, Inc., 296 F.3d
376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002). Conclusory allegations will not survive a motion to dismiss if
not supported by facts constituting a legitimate claim for relief. Municipal Utilities Bd. of
Albertville v. Alabama Power Co., 934 F.2d 1493, 1501 (11th Cir. 1991). A pro se litigant
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is still bound to follow the pleading requirements set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Goldsmith v. City of Atmore, 996 F.2d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 1993).
On a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider matters judicially noticed. La
Grasta v. First Union Sec. Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004). These matters
include documents which are central to a plaintiff’s claim whose authenticity is not
challenged, whether the document is physically attached to the complaint or not, without
converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Speaker v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
and Human Services Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 623 F.2d 1371, 1379
(11th Cir. 2010); SFM Holdings Ltd. v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, 600 F.3d 1334,
137 (11th Cir. 2010).
The Court may also take judicial notice of and consider documents that are public
records. This is based on the fact that such documents are “public records that [are] ‘not
subject to reasonable dispute’ because they [are] ‘capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy [can] not reasonably be questioned.’”
Horne v. Potter, 392 Fed. App’x 800, 802 (11th Cir. 2010)(quoting Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)).
Moreover, “a court may take notice of another court's order . . . for the limited purpose of
recognizing the ‘judicial act’ that the order represents or the subject matter of that
litigation.” United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir.1994).
III.
The Florida legislature enacted the SVP Act, by which a person determined to be
a sexually violent predator is required to be housed in a secure facility “for control, care,
and treatment until such time as the person’s mental abnormality or personality disorder
has so changed that it is safe for the person to be at large.” § 394.917(2). The SVP Act
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was promulgated for the dual purpose “of providing mental health treatment to sexually
violent predators and protecting the public from these individuals.” Westerheide v. State,
831 So. 2d 93, 112 (Fla. 2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (holding that
the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act did not establish criminal proceedings, and
involuntary confinement pursuant to the Act was not punitive). Civil commitment under
the Act involves several steps. First, the SVP Act requires a mental evaluation of any
person who has committed a sexually violent offense and is scheduled for release from
prison or involuntary confinement. See generally Fla. Stat. § 394.913. The evaluation
is conducted by a multi-disciplinary team of mental health professionals who must
determine whether the individual meets the definition of a “sexually violent predator.”
After the evaluation, the state attorney may file a petition with the circuit court alleging
that the individual is a sexually violent predator subject to civil commitment under the Act.
Id. If the judge determines that probable cause exists that the individual is a sexually
violent predator, then the judge will order the individual to remain in custody. § 394.915.
Thereafter, a jury trial, or a bench trial if neither party requests a jury trial, will commence.
Id.
If the jury finds that the individual is a sexually violent predator by clear and
convincing evidence, then the individual will be committed to the custody of the
Department of Children and Family Services for “control, care, and treatment until such
time as the person’s mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that it is
safe for the person to be at large.” § 394.917.
This Court takes judicial notice of the Minnesota district court’s order to which
Plaintiff cites, Karsjens v. Piper, 109 F. Supp.3d 1139 (D. Minn. June 17, 2015).
Complaint at 29.
Most of the factual allegations in the instant Amended Complaint
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appear to actually concern Minnesota’s SVP statutes at issue in Karsjens, 109 F. Supp.3d
1139, and are not an accurate factual recitation of Florida’s SVP Act. Instead, it appears
Plaintiff merely copies and paraphrases entire sections of the Minnesota district court’s
conclusions in Karsjens and raises each of the Karsjens district court’s stated conclusions
as a claim in the instant case, notwithstanding that Minnesota’s SVP statutes are different
from Florida’s SVP Act. Compare, e.g., Karsjens, 109 F.Supp.3d at 1173-74 (reviewing
Minnesota’s SVP statutes), with, e.g., Westerheide, 831 So.2d at 104-106 (reviewing
Florida’s SVP Act). Also noteworthy, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal subsequently
reversed the district court’s opinion in Karsjens, finding Minnesota’s SVP statutes in fact
comported with the United States Constitution. 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017).
Here, the Amended Complaint consists of unsupported legal conclusions and
misstatements of fact concerning Florida’s SVP Act. For the reasons that follow, the
Court finds Defendants’ motion to dismiss is due to be granted.
1. Florida’s SVP Act provides that a petitioner is entitled to be present and
to be represented by counsel during his or her probable cause hearing
Initially, the Amended Complaint alleges that Florida’s SVP Act is unconstitutional
because it does not recognize the right of a person deemed to be a sexually violent
predator to be present and to be represented by counsel at his probable cause hearing.
This factual allegation about Florida’s SVP Act is patently incorrect. In Florida, a person
suspected of being a sexually violent predator has the right to appear in person at the
probable cause hearing and to be represented by counsel. See Fla. Stat. §§ 394.915(2)
and (2)(a) (stating that the person against whom the probable cause hearing is directed
“shall be provided with notice of, and an opportunity to appear in person at, an adversarial
hearing” and has the right to be represented by counsel at the hearing).
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Accordingly, any claims based upon allegations that the probable cause hearings
as described in Florida’s SVP Act are unconstitutional (because they are conducted ex
parte and without the benefit of counsel) are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. Likewise, any claims against the individual defendants
based upon their adherence to the Florida SVP’s Act as it relates to the probable cause
hearing are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
2.
Florida’s SVP Act requires periodic assessments of a civil detainee’s
mental condition and provide for judicial review of the assessments at the
detainee’s request
Plaintiff alleges that the SVP Act is unconstitutional because it does not require
periodic risk assessments of a civil detainee’s mental condition.
To the contrary,
Florida’s SVP Act provides for periodic assessments of a civil detainee’s mental condition
and for judicial review at the civil detainee’s request at any time after commitment.
Florida Statute § 394.918
Specifically, Florida Statute § 394.918 provides:
A person committed under this part shall have an examination
of his or her mental condition once every year or more
frequently at the court’s discretion. The person may retain or,
if the person is indigent and so requests, the court may
appoint, a qualified professional to examine the person. Such
a professional shall have access to all records concerning the
person. The results of the examination shall be provided to
the court that committed the person under this part. Upon
receipt of the report, the court shall conduct a review of the
person’s status.
The department shall provide the person with annual written
notice of the person’s right to petition the court for release over
the objection of the director of the facility where the person is
housed. The notice must contain a waiver of rights. The
director of the facility shall forward the notice and waiver form
to the court.
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The court shall hold a limited hearing to determine whether
there is probable cause to believe that the person’s condition
has so changed that it is safe for the person to be at large and
that the person will not engage in acts of sexual violence if
discharged. The person has the right to be represented by
counsel at the probable cause hearing and the right to be
present. Both the petitioner and the respondent may present
evidence that the court may weigh and consider. If the court
determines that there is probable cause to believe it is safe to
release the person, the court shall set a trial before the court
on the issue.
At the trial before the court, the person is entitled to be present
and is entitled to the benefit of all constitutional protections
afforded the person at the initial trial, except for the right to a
jury. The state attorney shall represent the state and has the
right to have the person examined by professionals chosen by
the state. At the hearing, the state bears the burden of
proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the person’s
mental condition remains such that it is not safe for the person
to be at large and that, if released, the person is likely to
engage in acts of sexual violence.
Fla. Stat. §§ 394.918(1)-(4) (emphases added). Florida’s SVP Act further provides:
A person is not prohibited from filing a petition for
discharge at any time after commitment under this part.
However, if the person has previously filed such a petition
without the approval of the secretary or the secretary’s
designee and the court determined that the petition was
without merit, a subsequent petition shall be denied unless the
petition contains facts upon which a court could find that the
person’s condition has so changed that a probable cause
hearing is warranted.
Fla. Stat. § 394.920 (emphasis added). Thus, the SVP Act provides for both mandatory
periodic reviews of a civil detainee’s mental condition and allows for more frequent
reviews at the court’s discretion. Id. Florida’s SVP Act also allows a detainee to petition
the court for release over the objection of the facility’s director and at any time thereafter.
Id.
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Accordingly, any claims based upon allegations that Florida’s SVP Act is
unconstitutional because it does not provide for period assessments of a detainee’s
mental condition or a “judicial by-pass mechanism” are due to be dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Likewise, any claims against individual
defendants based upon their adherence to Florida Statute § 394.920 are also dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
3.
The statutory discharge criteria under Florida’s SVP Act comports
with due process
Plaintiff asserts that Florida’s SVP Act is unconstitutional because the statutory
discharge criteria for a civilly committed person are more stringent than the statutory
commitment criteria. Again, the statement is simply untrue as it pertains to Florida’s SVP
Act.
Under the SVP Act, a person is subject to civil commitment as a sexually violent
predator if a court or a unanimous jury finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
person is a sexually violent predator. Fla. Stat. § 394.917. A “sexually violent predator”
is any person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense as defined by Florida
Statute § 394.912(9) and “[s]uffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder that
makes the person likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure
facility for long-term control, care, and treatment.” Fla. Stat. § 394.912(10).
After
commitment, the civil detainee is entitled to a release trial when there is probable cause
to believe that his condition is “so changed that it is safe for the person to be at large and
that the person will not engage in acts of sexual violence if discharged.” Fla. Stat. §
394.918(3). The State then bears the burden at trial of proving by clear and convincing
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evidence, “that the person’s mental condition remains such that it is not safe for the
person to be at large and that, if released, the person is likely to engage in acts of sexual
violence.” Fla. Stat. § 394.918(4) (emphasis added). These criteria are constitutionally
sound.
The United States Supreme Court has clarified that the purpose of civil
commitment “is to treat the individual’s mental illness and protect him and society from
his potential dangerousness.” Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983). A
state may confine a mentally ill person if it shows that the individual is both mentally ill
and dangerous.
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992).
Accordingly, it is
axiomatic that civilly committed persons are entitled to release when they have recovered
their sanity or are no longer dangerous. O’Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575
(1975) (noting that an involuntary commitment cannot constitutionally continue after the
basis for it no longer exists). Florida’s SVP Act requires the state to prove that a civil
detainee is both still mentally ill and poses a danger to society if released; otherwise, the
detainee is entitled to release. Fla. Stat. § 394.918(4). Accordingly, Florida’s SVP Act
comports with due process as it relates to release criteria. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at
358 (“We have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of
dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor such as mental illness or mental
abnormality”) (internal quotations omitted).
Any claims predicated upon the alleged facial unconstitutionality of Florida’s SVP
Act as it relates to release criteria are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. Likewise, the claims against the individual defendants based
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upon their adherence to Florida’s SVP Act as it relates to release criteria are dismissed
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
4. Florida’s SVP Act does not impermissibly shift the burden of proof to
the detainee to prove that he is entitled to release
Plaintiff argues that Florida’s SVP Act is not narrowly tailored because “the statute
impermissibly places the burden on him and non-committed individuals to demonstrate
that they should be placed in a less restrictive setting.”
To the extent Plaintiff asserts that Florida’s SVP Act places the burden on the
detainee to show his entitlement to release, this is simply not true. Under Florida’s SVP
Act, “the state bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the
[detainee’s] mental condition remains such that it is not safe for the person to be at large
and that, if released, the person is likely to engage in acts of sexual violence.” Fla. Stat.
§ 394.918(4) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, any claims challenging the facial constitutionality of Florida’s SVP Act
as they relate to the detainees’ burden of proof are dismissed for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. Likewise, the claims against the individual defendants
based upon their adherence to Florida’s SVP Act as it relates to a detainee’s burden of
proof are dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
5.
The Florida SVP Act requires the Secretary of the Department of
Children and Families or the Secretary’s designee to authorize a detainee
to petition the court for release if it is determined that the person is not
likely to commit acts of sexual violence if discharged
Plaintiff asserts that the SVP Act does not require Defendants to take affirmative
action, such as petition for a reduction in custody on behalf of Plaintiff. Again, this factual
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allegation is blatantly contradicted by the language in the SVP Act. Florida’s SVP Act
provides that:
If the secretary or the secretary’s designee at any time
determines that the person is not likely to commit acts of
sexual violence if discharged, the secretary or the secretary’s
designee shall authorize the person to petition the court for
release. The petition shall be served upon the court and the
state attorney. The court, upon receipt of such a petition, shall
order a trial before the court within 30 days, unless continued
for good cause.
Fla. Stat. § 394.919(1) (emphasis added). By its clear terms, § 394.919(1) requires the
state to take affirmative action, in the form of authorizing the detainee to petition the court
for release, if it is determined that a detainee may be entitled to release.
Accordingly, any claim challenging the facial constitutionality of Florida’s SVP Act
as it relates to the defendants’ requirement to take affirmative action on behalf of
individuals who no longer satisfy the criteria for continued commitment is dismissed for
failure to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
6.
Plaintiff has not stated an Equal Protection claim
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o
State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
The Supreme Court has expressed that there is “a strong presumption that gender
classifications are invalid” under the Equal Protection Clause. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994). Plaintiff asserts that defendants violated his Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection because:
[H]is liberty has been implicated as a result of Fla. Stat. § 394
Part V. being unconstitutional on its face as the result of
Defendants, Kristin Kanner, George Zoley, Mike Carroll, Dr.
Donald Sawyer, and Dr. Rebecca Jackson, and State
Attorney utilizing the statute to punishing and/or detain “Male”
sex offenders after completion of their prison sentence and
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not applying the same standard to “Female” sex offender for
their past and present sexual violent offenses.
Amended Complaint at 23. Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that Florida’s SVP Act does not
apply the same standards to female sex offenders who commit the same types of crimes
as male sex offenders. Id.
Plaintiff provides no factual assertions to support this conclusory claim, and his
legal conclusion, in terms of the wording of the statute, is false. Florida’s SVP Act does
not target “men,” but rather “sexually violent predators.”
Fla. Stat. § 394.912(10).
Sexually violent predators are not a protected class under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause. When a statutory scheme does not specifically classify based
on a suspect class (such as persons of a certain race, alienage, religion, gender, or
national origin), “uneven effects upon” suspected classes “are ordinarily of no
constitutional concern.” Personnel Adm’r of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256,
272 (1979). The Fourteenth Amendment “guarantees equal laws, not equal results.” Id.
at 273.
Still, “when a neutral law has a disparate impact” on a suspect class “an
unconstitutional purpose may still be at work,” and the Court does not doubt that Florida’s
SVP Act has almost exclusively affected men. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 273. However, in
order to state a viable disparate impact claim, a claimant must prove that the intention of
the law was to discriminate against a suspect class. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 135
(1996). If the impact of a law “could not be plausibly explained on a neutral ground,
impact itself would signal that the real classification made by the law was in fact not
neutral.” Feeney, 442 U.S. at 275.
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As previously stated, the legislature’s intent in creating Florida’s SVP Act was to
“create a civil commitment procedure for the long-term care and treatment of sexually
violent predators.” Fla. Stat. § 394.910. The SVP Act’s primary purpose is to protect
the public and treat sexually violent predators.
Id.
These purposes are entirely
rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Any assertion that Florida’s SVP Act
targets the male gender with respect to anything other than the proclivity of some males
to be sexually violent predators is untenable. If a woman is determined to be a sexually
violent predator, the clear terms of the Florida’s SVP Act would apply to her as well. Id.
To imply that the Florida Legislature passed the statutes in order to fulfill a discriminatory
animus it harbors against men is speculative and implausible. Furthermore, given the
gender neutral language in Florida’s SVP Act, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint rests on a
legal conclusion, i.e. the statutes (and defendants) “do not apply the same standard[s] to
female sex offenders,” but he provides no facts in support thereof. Therefore, Plaintiff
has not stated an equal protection claim, and his equal protection claim is dismissed for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. #31) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted and for
failure to comply with Rules Eight and Ten of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. With no remaining defendants or claims in this action, the Clerk of Court is
directed to terminate all pending motions, enter judgment in favor of the defendants, and
close this case.
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DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this 21st day of June, 2017.
FTMP-1
Copies: All Parties of Record
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