Joiner et al v. Gasparilla Island Bridge Authority

Filing 32

OPINION AND ORDER directing the Clerk to remand the case to the Charlotte County Circuit Court, to transmit a certified copy of this Opinion and Order to the Clerk of that court, to terminate all deadlines and motions, and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 12/20/2016. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
CAPPY
JOINER
JOINER,

and

SALLY

Plaintiffs,
v.

Case No: 2:16-cv-467-FtM-99CM

GASPARILLA
ISLAND
BRIDGE
AUTHORITY,
an
authority
created
by
the
Florida
Legislature,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on review of plaintiffs’
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #2) filed on June 15, 2016, and
defendant’s Response to Show Cause Order (Doc. #31).

For the

reasons set forth below, this cause is remanded for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction.
I.
On

June

15,

2016,

this

case

was

removed

by

defendant

Gasparilla Island Bridge Authority (defendant or GIBA) based upon
federal-question

jurisdiction

from

the

Circuit

Court

Twentieth Judicial Circuit in and for Charlotte County. 1

1

of

the

(Doc.

Plaintiffs initially filed suit in county court on December
10, 2014. (Doc. #1-1, p.p. 128-32.) Because the circuit courts
of the State of Florida are the courts of exclusive jurisdiction
to determine the legality of a bridge toll, Fla. Stat. §
26.012(2)(e), the cause was transferred to the Circuit Court of
Charlotte County where plaintiffs amended their Complaint on

#1.)

Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint (Doc. #2) seeks both

injunctive and compensatory relief for an uncompensated taking
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
entered

an

Order

to

On December 6, 2016, the Court

Show

Cause

regarding

subject-matter

jurisdiction, citing Williamson County Regional Planning Comm’n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1972), which held that a federal
constitutional takings claim under the Fifth Amendment is not ripe
until the plaintiff has unsuccessfully pursued a compensation
claim in state court proceedings.

(Doc. #30.)

In response, GIBA

states that plaintiffs do not allege that GIBA has taken their
property

in

violation

of

the

Fifth

Amendment.

(Doc.

#31.)

Rather, defendant argues that the crux of plaintiffs’ Second
Amended Complaint is that GIBA violated their substantive and
procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to
the

United

States

Constitution,

which

does

not

require

that

plaintiffs first avail themselves of the remedies available in
state court.
II.
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and “a court
should inquire into whether it has subject matter jurisdiction at

February 4, 2015.
(Id. at pp. 165-67.)
On May 31, 2016,
plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint, which alleged
state, as well as federal constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for purported violations of the plaintiffs’ due process
rights, prompting GIBA to remove the case to federal court. (Docs.
##1, 2.)
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the earliest possible stage in the proceedings.

Indeed, it is

well settled that a federal court is obligated to inquire into
subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”
Univ. S. Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 409, 410 (11th
Cir. 1999) (citations omitted).

“A removing defendant bears the

burden of proving proper federal jurisdiction. . . .

Any doubts

about the propriety of federal jurisdiction should be resolved in
favor of remand to state court.”

Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v.

Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1294 (11th Cir. 2008).
Removal jurisdiction exists only where the district court
would have had original jurisdiction over the action, unless
Congress expressly provides otherwise.

28 U.S.C. § 1441(a);

Darden v. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., Inc., 200 F.3d 753, 755 (11th
Cir. 2000).

As the party seeking federal jurisdiction, the burden

is upon defendant to establish jurisdiction as of the date of
removal.

Sammie Bonner Constr. Co. v. W. Star Trucks Sales, Inc.,

330 F.3d 1308, 1310 (11th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Best Buy Co.,
269 F.3d 1316, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).

In this case, defendant

invoked federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
(Doc. #1.)

A cause of action “arises under” federal law pursuant

to § 1331 only when plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint raises
issues of federal law.
We have long held that “[t]he presence or absence of
federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘wellpleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal
jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is

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presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly
pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482
U.S. 386, 392 (1987); see also Louisville & Nashville R.
Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 474-75 (1998).

See

also Blab T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns, Inc.,
182 F.3d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1999); Whitt v. Sherman Int’l Corp.,
147 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998); Pacheco de Perez v. AT&T
Co., 139 F.3d 1368, 1373 (11th Cir. 1998); Kemp v. Int’l Bus.
Machs.

Corp.,

109

F.3d

708,

712-13

(11th

Cir.

1997).

“In

determining the presence of a federal question, this Court looks
to the substance, not the labels, of the plaintiff’s claims as
contained

in

the

factual

allegations

in

the

complaint.”

Citimortgage, Inc. v. Dhinoja, 705 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1381 (N.D.
Ga. 2010) (citation omitted).

The Court’s responsibility is to

“examine [plaintiff’s] cause of action for what it actually is,
not for what [plaintiff] would have it be.”

McKinney v. Pate, 20

F.3d 1550, 1560 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
In reviewing plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, plaintiffs
allege in pertinent part as follows: Defendant GIBA is a special
purpose taxing district of the State of Florida, created by Chapter
96-507, Laws of Florida.

(Doc. #2, ¶ 1.)

The purpose of GIBA is

to manage and operate the Gasparilla Island Bridge Causeway, which
is the only ingress and egress to and from Gasparilla Island in
Charlotte County, Florida.

The power granted to GIBA is contained

in its enabling legislation, which gave it the power to set bridge

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toll

rates

and

collect

bridge

tolls.

(Id.)

The

enabling

legislation also gave GIBA the power to “fix, modify, charge and
collect toll rates and user fees from persons for the use of the
bridge and causeway system at such levels as the authority deems
appropriate. . . .”

(Id.)

Plaintiffs are residents of the taxing

district under the authority of GIBA, and utilize the Gasparilla
Island Bridge Causeway.
GIBA offers a toll structure for drivers using the Gasparilla
Island Bridge Causeway, which includes a per trip toll or the
option of a pre-paid, discounted pass for either a set number of
trips or an annual pass of unlimited trips.

(Doc. #2, ¶ 2.)

Each

of the prepaid passes expire 12 months from the purchase date
unless the pass holder replenishes the pass prior to the expiration
of the 12-month period.

(Id. at ¶ 3.)

Pursuant to the terms of

the prepaid toll structure, any funds left after one year from the
date of the last purchase would be “forfeited to GIBA.”
¶¶ 6-7.)

(Id. at

Both of plaintiffs’ prepaid toll cards expired with

funds left over that were forfeited to GIBA.

(Id. at ¶¶ 8-11.)

Reactivation requires the individual to purchase another prepaid
toll

pass.

(Id.

at

¶

12.)

The

toll

structure

terms

are

communicated to purchasers on GIBA’s toll pass application form,
on its website, on the back of the prepaid toll pass cards, and
have at times been published in the local newspaper and various
local publications.

(Id. at ¶¶ 5-6.)

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GIBA believes that it

acquires ownership of the money from anyone who purchases the
prepared toll card as of the date the purchaser pays regardless of
whether the purchaser ever uses the cards.

(Id. at ¶ 15.)

The

enabling legislation does not specifically limit GIBA’s right to
unused funds.

GIBA has sold “thousands” of the prepaid toll passes

since the toll structure’s inception in 2012.

(Id. at ¶ 19.)

Plaintiffs allege that GIBA has exceeded the authority of its
enabling legislation as defined in Chapter 96-507, and seeks a
declaratory judgment determining the legality of GIBA’s prepaid
toll

structure.

(Doc.

#2,

¶

20.)

Specifically,

plaintiffs

request that the Court determine whether GIBA has violated the due
process rights of plaintiffs and all other purchasers of the
prepaid toll passes under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States

Constitution

Constitution.

and

Article

(Id. at ¶ 21.)

1,

Section

9

of

the

Florida

In this regard, plaintiffs state

that GIBA did not provide purchasers the opportunity to be heard
prior to the taking of their property, which they allege was at
the time of purchase.

(Id. at 10.)

Plaintiffs additionally

allege that GIBA’s toll structure and its usage terms has exceeded
its powers granted in the enabling legislation and constitutes a
taking without due process of law under both the Florida and United
States Constitutions.

(Id. at ¶21.)

Plaintiffs seek injunctive

relief to enjoin GIBA from selling prepaid toll passes as currently
structured and from deactivating any future prepaid toll passes

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regardless

of

whether

a

year

has

lapsed.

(Id.

at

p.

11.)

Plaintiffs also seek compensatory damages in the amount equal to
the unused funds remaining on the prepaid toll passes at the time
of the forfeiture.

(Id.)

A liberal reading of the Second Amended Complaint frames the
alleged

taking

of

the

property

right

as

both

procedural

and

substantive due process violations, as well as a just compensation
takings claim.

See Villas of Lake Jackson, Ltd. v. Leon Cnty.,

121 F.3d 610, 612 (11th Cir. 1997) (“As distinguished from a just
compensation claim, we stated that a successful due process taking
suit, for instance would ‘result in an invalidation of the local
authority’s application of the regulation and, perhaps, actual
damages, whereas a just compensation claim is remedied by monetary
compensation for the value taken.’”) (quoting Eide v. Sarasota
Cnty., 908 F.2d 716, 721 (11th Cir. 1990).
III.
A. Procedural Due Process
“Procedural due process requires notice and an opportunity to
be heard before any government deprivation of a property interest.”
Zipperer v. City of Fort Myers, 41 F.3d 619, 623 (11th Cir. 1995).
“A § 1983 action alleging a procedural due process clause violation
requires

proof

of

three

elements:

a

deprivation

of

a

constitutionally-protected liberty or property interest; state

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action;

and

constitutionally

inadequate

process.”

Cryder

v.

Oxendine, 24 F.3d 175, 177 (11th Cir. 1994).
Here, assuming plaintiffs have alleged a constitutionallyprotected property interest, their claim still fails for failure
to allege constitutionally inadequate process.

“Only when the

state

to

refuses

to

provide

a

process

sufficient

remedy

the

procedural deprivation does a constitutional violation actionable
under section 1983 arise.”

Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F. 3d 1328,

1330-31 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1557).

In

Cotton, the Eleventh Circuit explained that “[i]t is the state’s
failure to provide adequate procedures to remedy the otherwise
procedurally flawed deprivation of a protected interest that gives
rise to a federal procedural due process claim.”

Id. at 1331.

This rule “recognizes that the state must have the opportunity to
remedy the procedural failings of its subdivisions and agencies in
the appropriate for a — agencies, review boards, and state courts
- before being subjected to a claim alleging a procedural due
process violation.”

Id.

Thus, “[i]f adequate state remedies were

available but the plaintiff failed to take advantage of them, the
plaintiff cannot rely on that failure to claim that the state
deprived him of procedural due process.”

Id.

The court in Cotton

therefore concluded that “because adequate state remedies were
available to provide Plaintiff with the opportunity for a ...
hearing, he has failed to state a procedural due process claim.”

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Id. at 1330.

The Eleventh Circuit has also made clear that after

the district court determines that an adequate state remedy does
exist, the district court must hold that there has been no viable
federal due process claim stated because Florida law provided an
adequate remedy.

Horton v. Bd. of Co. Comm’rs of Flagler Cnty.,

292 F.3d 1297, 1300 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting that if a plaintiff
has an opportunity for procedural due process, that is all the
Fourteenth Amendment requires).

See also Goodman v. City of Cape

Coral, 581 F. App’x 736, 739–40 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that the
Eleventh Circuit has “repeatedly articulated the basic rule that
a procedural due process violation has not occurred when adequate
state remedies are available” and collecting cases that stand for
such a proposition).
Here, an adequate state remedy exists.

Plaintiffs may avail

themselves of the remedies provided by Florida Statute, section
26.012(2)(e), which expressly gives the circuit court jurisdiction
“[i]n all cases involving legality of any tax assessment or toll
or denial of refund . . .”, which would include the power to remedy
deficiencies

or

violations

of

due

process.

With

regard

to

adequacy, “[a]lthough the state remedies may not provide the
respondent with all the relief which may have been available if he
could have proceeded under § 1983, that does not mean that the
state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due
process.

The remedies provided could have fully compensated the

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respondent for the property loss he suffered, and we hold that
they are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.”
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981), overruled on other
grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).

Here, the

Florida courts possess the power to remedy plaintiffs’ losses;
therefore, plaintiffs’ federal procedural due process is barred as
a matter of law and the Court will not consider such a claim when
determining whether plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint raises
issues of federal law.
B. Substantive Due Process and Fifth Amendment Takings
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides: “nor shall
private

property

compensation.”

be

taken

for

U.S. Const. amend. V.

public

use,

without

just

The Fifth Amendment applies

to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001).

See Palazzolo v.

The Due Process Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: “nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.”

U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1.

A taking may result from a

“physical invasion” of the property or may follow a “regulatory
imposition.”

Good v. United States, 189 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed.

Cir. 1999) (citing Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1014–16 (1992)).
In a case discussing the distinction between substantive due
process and Fifth Amendment takings claim, the Eleventh Circuit

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noted that it has “abandoned the distinction between takings claims
and a due process takings theory.”
F.3d at 614.

Villas of Lake Jackson, 121

“In Corn v. City of Lauderdale Lakes, 95 F.3d 1066

(11th Cir. 1996), we noted that the Takings Clause provides the
basis for both just compensation and invalidation of a regulation.
Id. at 1072-73.

In Bickerstaff, we held that the landowner’s

Takings Clause claim subsumes its substantive due process claim
unless it can be said that the Framers of the Bill of Rights, in
addition to providing the substantive rights contained in the
Takings Clause, meant to replicate by implication those same rights
in the Due Process Clause.”

Id. (citing Bickerstaff Clay Products

Co. v. Harris Cnty., Ga., 89 F.3d 1481 (11th Cir. 1996)).

The

court in Villas of Jackson noted that “[t]here is no separate cause
of action under the due process clause of the Constitution” as
there is no substantive due process taking that would protect a
specific property right that is not already protected by the
Takings Clause.

Id. at 614-15.

As previously cited by this Court in its Order to Show Cause,
a Fifth Amendment just compensation claim is not ripe for judicial
review and the district court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to
consider it, until the plaintiff has unsuccessfully pursued a
compensation claim in state court proceedings, which plaintiffs
have not done here. (Doc. #30) (citing Williamson, 472 U.S. 172,
195 (1972); Agripost, LLC v. Miami-Dade Cnty., Fla., 525 F.3d 1049,

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1052 (11th Cir. 2008)).

Therefore, the Court lacks subject-matter

jurisdiction

due

over

any

process

takings

claims

alleged

in

plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint.
IV.
Because the Court has determined that no valid procedural due
process claim that would give rise to a section 1983 suit can be
stated, and that the Court otherwise does not have subject-matter
jurisdiction over the due process takings claims, the Court will
remand this action to state court.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1.

The Clerk is directed to REMAND the case to the Circuit

Court of the Twentieth Judicial Circuit, in and for Charlotte
County, Florida, and to transmit a certified copy of this Opinion
and Order to the Clerk of that court.
2.

The Clerk is directed to terminate all pending motions

and previously scheduled deadlines and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
of December, 2016.

Copies:
Counsel of Record

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20th

day