Martin v. Huapilla et al
Filing
24
OPINION AND ORDER denying as moot 15 motion to dismiss complaint; denying 20 motion to dismiss amended complaint. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 1/10/2017. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
TAYLOR MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:16-cv-537-FtM-99MRM
MIGUEL
HUAPILLA,
DAYTON
GASTON, JOSEPH PEAKS, and
MIKE SCOTT, as the Sheriff
of Lee County,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff initiated this action on July 6, 2016 by filing a
complaint
against
Defendants
Dayton
Gaston,
Miguel
Huapilla,
Joseph Peaks, and Sheriff Mike Scott raising both civil rights and
state law claims based upon injuries he received while incarcerated
at the Lee County Jail (Doc. 1).
The defendants filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint (Doc. 15).
Thereafter, Plaintiff filed
the amended complaint before the Court (Doc. 18).
The following
are currently under consideration:
Defendant Sheriff Mike Scott’s Motion to
Dismiss Count Five of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint (Doc. 20, filed August 24, 2016);
and
Plaintiff’s
Response
in
Opposition
to
Defendant Scott’s Motion to Dismiss Count Five
of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 22,
filed September 7, 2016).
For the reasons set forth in this Order, Defendant Scott’s
Motion to Dismiss Count Five of the amended complaint is denied.
Because Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the defendants’
motion to dismiss the original complaint (Doc. 15) is denied as
moot. See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1219 (11th Cir.
2007) (“[A]n amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint
and becomes the operative pleading in the case.”).
I.
Pleadings
a. Amended Complaint
On or about September 12, 2014, Plaintiff was arrested and
incarcerated in the Lee County Jail (Doc. 18 at ¶ 15).
On
September 24, 2014, Plaintiff was relocated from one portion of
the jail to Dormitory 5 South (D5S), a specialized housing unit
typically used to house inmates with known mental health issues.
Id. at ¶ 20.
D5S contained approximately eight to ten nine-foot-
square cells with glass walls and a glass door with a center food
tray slot. Id. at ¶¶ 27-29.
Each cell faced a central observation
desk. Id. at ¶ 30.
Defendants Gaston and Huapilla escorted Plaintiff to D5S, and
Defendant Peaks was there when they arrived (Doc. 18 at 31-33).
Plaintiff was ordered to change into a thin Velcro jumpsuit with
nothing underneath—the typical uniform of a direct observation
unit. Id. at ¶ 34.
Plaintiff observed another inmate (“Inmate
Doe”), naked in one of the direct observation cells. Id. at ¶ 35.
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Inmate Doe was agitated and defiant and did not comply with the
orders of Defendant Peaks. Id. at ¶ 37.
Inmate Doe appeared to
have orange residue on his body, and Plaintiff could smell pepper
spray in the air. Id. at ¶ 39.
Plaintiff expressed concern about
being placed into Inmate Doe’s cell due to Doe’s agitated and
defiant
state.
Id.
at
¶
40.
However,
Defendant
Peaks
told
Plaintiff to be quiet and directed him into Doe’s cell. Id. at ¶¶
41-42.
At the time, Plaintiff had not been diagnosed with mental
illness. Id. at ¶ 43.
Inmate Doe was six feet tall and weighed
250 pounds, whereas Plaintiff weighed only 130 pounds.
46-47.
Id.at ¶¶
There was at least one unoccupied cell in D5S. Id. at ¶
48.
Plaintiff sat on a mattress on the floor of the cell, but
within moments, Inmate Doe began taunting and challenging him to
a fight (Doc. 18 at ¶¶ 50-51).
Plaintiff banged on the glass
window to summon help, and Defendant Huapilla told Plaintiff to
ignore Inmate Doe.
Id.at ¶¶ 52-53.
Defendant Huapilla told
Plaintiff that he and the other deputies would “handle it” if
Inmate Doe continued. Id. at ¶ 53.
Inmate Doe persisted, and hit
Plaintiff with his mattress. Id. at ¶ 55.
Plaintiff was again
rebuffed by Defendant Huapilla. Id. at ¶¶ 55-56.
Inmate Doe continued to hit Plaintiff with his mattress,
ramble incoherently, and challenged him to fight (Doc. 19 at ¶
57).
Defendant Huapilla told Inmate Doe to Stop, but he continued
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to harass and batter Plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 58-59.
Defendant
Huapilla then sprayed pepper spray into the cell at Inmate Doe
while Plaintiff was still inside.
Id. at ¶ 61.
his
Doe
aggressive
conduct,
Inmate
striking Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 63-64.
became
Instead of ceasing
enraged
and
began
Defendant Huapilla then
fogged the cell with pepper spray. Id. at ¶ 65.
Inmate Doe grabbed Plaintiff and placed him in a choke hold
(Doc. 19 at ¶ 67).
stop the attack.
No defendant attempted to enter the cell to
Id. at ¶ 68.
Instead, Defendant Huapilla
attempted to use a taser on Inmate Doe, firing through the food
tray slot. Id. at ¶ 69.
The taser caused Inmate Doe to increase
his violence, and he began striking Plaintiff with closed fists.
Id.
Defendant Huapilla tried using the taser again. Id. at ¶ 70.
Thereafter, Plaintiff was able to escape Inmate Doe’s grasp
(Doc. 18 at ¶ 71).
Defendant Huapilla then ordered Plaintiff to
go to the cell door, place his hands behind his back, and put his
hands through the food tray slot. Id. at ¶ 72.
Plaintiff complied,
and Defendant Huapilla handcuffed Plaintiff while he was still
inside the cell with Inmate Doe; however, Defendant Huapilla did
not open the cell door to remove Plaintiff from the cell. Id. at
¶ 74.
At that point, Inmate Doe lunged at Plaintiff who was still
handcuffed. Id. at ¶ 77.
Inmate Doe grabbed Plaintiff’s testicles
and began forcefully pulling and tearing Plaintiff’s scrotum.
at ¶ 78.
Plaintiff could not protect himself. Id. at ¶ 79.
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Id.
No defendant or any other corrections officer made an effort
to enter the cell (Doc. 18 at ¶ 80).
attempted
to
use
pepper
spray
Instead Defendant Huapilla
again.
Id.
When
that
was
unsuccessful, Defendant again Huapilla tried to use his taser
against Inmate Doe. Id. at ¶ 82.
When that did not work, deputies
entered the cell to restrain Inmate Doe. Id. at ¶ 83.
However,
by that time, Inmate Doe had ripped Plaintiff’s testicles from his
scrotal sac. Id.
Plaintiff required emergency surgery to repair
his scrotum. Id. at 84-85.
In Count Five of the amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts
that
Defendant
Scott
was
aware
that
“effective
training
necessarily required, among other things, a component specifically
geared
at
properly
educating
corrections
officers
on
crisis
intervention and de-escalation techniques during confrontations
with inmates with mental illness or disorder.” (Doc. 18 at ¶ 129).
Plaintiff also asserts that Defendant Scott made a decision, prior
to the subject incident, to train employees of the Lee County
Sheriff’s Office (LCSO) how to handle inmates in specialized
housing units. Id. at ¶ 131.
generally
negligent
for
He alleges that Defendant Scott was
failing
to
properly
implement
such
training. Id. at ¶¶ 132-140.
b.
Motion to Dismiss and Response in Opposition
Defendant Scott moves to dismiss Count Five of the amended
complaint (Doc. 20).
Specifically, he claims that Count Five is
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based upon his alleged negligence in failing to properly train the
defendant
deputies
and
that
“how
or
whether
[he]
trains
his
deputies . . . is a planning level decision that is protected from
judicial scrutiny by sovereign immunity.” Id. at 6.
Plaintiff
argues that Defendant Scott is not entitled to immunity because
Count Five is based “upon Scott’s failure to properly implement
already existing policies, which constitutes an operational-level
function[.]” (Doc. 22 at 2) (emphasis in original).
II.
Standard of Review for Motions to Dismiss
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court
accepts as true all the allegations in the complaint and construes
them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jackson v.
BellSouth Telecomms., 372 F.3d 1250, 1262-63 (11th Cir. 2004).
Further, this Court favors the plaintiff with all reasonable
inferences from the allegations in the complaint. Stephens v. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., 901 F.2d 1571, 1573 (11th Cir. 1990)
(“On a motion to dismiss, the facts stated in [the] complaint and
all
reasonable
inferences
therefrom
are
taken
as
However, the Supreme Court explains that:
While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss does not need detailed
factual allegations, a plaintiff’s obligation
to provide the grounds of his entitlement to
relief
requires
more
than
labels
and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level.
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true.”).
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
Further, courts are not
“bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986).
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court,
referring
to
its
earlier
decision
in
Bell
Atlantic
Corp.
v.
Twombly, illustrated a two-pronged approach to motions to dismiss.
First, a reviewing court must determine whether a Plaintiff’s
allegation is merely an unsupported legal conclusion that is not
entitled to an assumption of truth.
Next, the court must determine
whether the complaint’s factual allegations state a claim for
relief that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
III. Analysis
In Claim Five of the amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts
that Defendant Scott is liable for Inmate Doe’s attack because the
attack was a probable and foreseeable consequence of Defendant
Scott’s
negligent
failure
to
implement
training
directed
at
ensuring that the deputies at the Lee County Jail knew how to
handle inmates with mental illness or behavioral problems (Doc. 19
at ¶¶ 130-32).
Plaintiff specifically states that Defendant Scott
made a decision to implement such training “prior to and/or during
the course of [the deputy defendants’] employment and, certainly,
at times sufficiently in advance of the subject incident.” Id. at
131.
Plaintiff argues that, “by affirmatively undertaking the
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duty to train, [Defendant Scott] owed a duty to officers and
inmates, including [Plaintiff], to exercise reasonable care in the
training which was provided so as to avoid unnecessary risk of
harm.” Id. at ¶ 133.
Defendant Scott argues that Claim Five must be dismissed
because a government entity’s decision on how to train its officers
and
the
subject
matter
to
include
in
the
training
is
a
discretionary function which is exempt from tort liability (Doc.
20 at 8).
Defendant Scott notes that Plaintiff appears to allege
that he should have trained his deputies differently, or should
have included specific topics in the training regime, and that
“[t]he decision on whether or not to train his deputies on a
certain subject or how to train his deputies [on certain topics],
is a discretionary function of the Sheriff.” Id. at 10.
Generally, the State of Florida and its subsidiaries are
immune from tort liability. See Fla. Const. Art. X, § 13.
However,
Florida has waived this immunity “under circumstances in which the
state or such agency or subdivision, if a private person, would be
liable to the claimant, in accordance with the general laws of
this state.” Fla. Stat. § 768.28(1).
Nevertheless, even if a
claim would subject a private person to liability, the waiver of
sovereign immunity still applies if the challenged acts of the
state
agent
were
“discretionary”
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government
acts
rather
than
“operational” ones.
Lewis v. City of St. Petersburg, 260 F.3d
1260, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001).
A discretionary function is one in which “the governmental
act in question involved an exercise of executive or legislative
power such that, for the court to intervene by way of tort law, it
inappropriately would entangle itself in fundamental questions of
policy and planning.” Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So.2d 532, 538 (Fla.
1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
An act is
“discretionary” when all of the following conditions are met:
(1) the action involves a basic governmental
policy, program, or objective; (2) the action
is
essential
to
the
realization
or
accomplishment of that policy, program, or
objective; (3) the action require[s] the
exercise
of
basic
policy
evaluation[s],
judgment[s], and expertise on the part of the
governmental agency involved; and (4) the
governmental agency involved possess [es] the
requisite
constitutional,
statutory,
or
lawful authority and duty to do or make the
challenged act, omission, or decision.
Lewis,
260
original). 1
F.3d
at
1264
(citations
omitted)
(alterations
in
On the other hand, an “operational” function is one
1
In Lewis, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of a negligent training claim because it challenged
“discretionary” governmental functions immune from tort liability.
260 F.3d at 1266. The Eleventh Circuit explained:
Lewis does not challenge the implementation or
operation of the City’s police training
program as it relates to the officers involved
in the shooting, but rather Lewis challenges
the City’s policy decisions regarding what to
include in the training of its police
officers. A city’s decision regarding how to
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“not necessary to or inherent in policy or planning[ ] that merely
reflects a secondary decision as to how those policies or plans
will be implemented.” Id.
Therefore, for Plaintiff to state a
claim for negligent training, he must show that Defendant Scott
was negligent in the implementation or operation of a training
program already in effect. See Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407
F.3d 1152, 1162 (11th Cir. 2005) (“For Mercado to state a claim
for negligent training, he must show that Orlando was negligent in
the implementation or operation of the training program.”).
Here Plaintiff argues that “[i]mplementing the particularized
training which [Defendant Scott] had previously undertaken to
provide, and exercising reasonable care in the provision of that
training, are operational-level functions for which [Defendant
Scott] is not immune and is subject to liability.” (Doc. 18 at
134).
Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that Defendant Scott was
negligent in the implementation or operation of a training program
already in effect.
the
implementation
Thus, to the extent Plaintiff’s claim regards
of
an
existing
training
program,
sovereign
train its officers and what subject matter to
include in the training is clearly an exercise
of
governmental
discretion
regarding
fundamental questions of policy and planning.
Id.
Therefore, because Lewis challenged the reasonableness of
basic policy decisions made by the City, the “discretionary”
function exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity applied and
barred his claim. Id. at 1266–67.
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immunity does not bar the claim, and it is not subject to dismissal.2
Therefore, Defendant Scott’s motion to dismiss is denied.
Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:
1.
Defendant Scott’s Motion to Dismiss Count V of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint (Doc. 20) is DENIED.
2.
Because
Plaintiff
filed
an
amended
complaint,
the
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 15) is
DENIED as moot.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
10th
day
of January, 2017.
SA: OrlP-4
Copies: Counsel of Record
2
Plaintiff asserts that he challenges only the operation of
an existing training program (Doc. 22). Defendant Scott suggests
that Plaintiff actually alleges that he should have trained his
deputies differently or included different topics in his training
regimen (Doc. 20 at 9). At this stage of litigation, the Court
accepts as true the factual assertions made in a complaint. See
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). However, to the
extent Plaintiff uses the terms “operate” or “implement” as
synonyms for “establish,” Defendant Scott would be entitled to
sovereign immunity on the failure to train claim as a matter of
law.
Accordingly, the denial of Defendant Scott’s motion to
dismiss is without prejudice to Defendant Scott re-raising the
instant sovereign immunity argument at trial or in a motion for
summary judgment.
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