St. Victor v. Rambosk

Filing 8

ORDER OF DISMISSAL dismissing case for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and otherwise dismissing without prejudice to filing negligence-based tort claims in state court. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 8/12/2016. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
DESIRA JEFFREY ST. VICTOR,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:16-cv-571-FtM-99MRM

KEVIN J. RAMBOSK,
Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, a detainee at the Collier County Jail in Collier
County, Florida, initiated this action by filing a pro se civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1, filed July
20, 2016).

Along with his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to

proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2).
Because Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the
Court

must

review

his

complaint

to

determine

whether

it

is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

For the

reasons set forth in this Order, the complaint is dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I.
Plaintiff

alleges

Complaint

the

following:

On

March

28,

2016,

Plaintiff was sitting on the bottom bunk of Cell Nine at the

Collier County Jail when the top bunk collapsed and landed on his
lower back (Doc. 1 at 5).

He wrote a grievance, about the bunk’s

collapse, but the grievance was returned to Plaintiff with its
front page missing. Id. at 6.

Plaintiff did not seek medical

attention

told

because

happened. Id.

the

deputies

the

nurses

that

nothing

The inadequate medical attention caused Plaintiff

to fall down the stairs on April 29, 2016. Id.
On June 16, 2016, Plaintiff was placed in Cell Eight of the
Collier County Jail which was not inspected for Plaintiff’s safety,
and the top bunk is “unstable and detached from the hinges on the
wall.” Id.

He has written three grievances about Cell Eight. Id.

Plaintiff asserts that “[d]ue to negligence, I was placed in
uninspected cells that were safety hazards and poorly, negligently
maintained by jail maintenance.” (Doc. 1 at 6).

He asserts that

the accident in Cell Nine indicates that it “was a condemned and
hazardous cell that was neglectfully maintained and was never
inspected for my (safety or entry) which is a serious Florida Jail
model standard violation.” Id. at 5-6.

Plaintiff urges that “[i]f

I was sleeping in the bunk [it] would’ve landed on my head and
smashed my skull. Due to negligence.” Id. at 6.
Plaintiff
traumatized him.
at 6).

asserts

that

the

March

23,

2016

incident

He now has nightmares and cannot sleep (Doc. 1

He is nervous when sleeping on the bottom bunk, and mental

health has done nothing for him. Id.

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Plaintiff asks for $50,000

in punitive damages; $50,000 in compensatory damages; $50,000 in
unspecified monetary damages; declaratory and injunctive relief;
$50,000 for the deprivation of due process; $50,000 for ordinary
negligence; $50,000 for cruel and unusual punishment; and $50,000
for mental anguish. Id. at 6-7.
Eighth,

and

Fourteenth

He bases his claims on the Fifth,

Amendments

to

the

United

States

Constitution. 1 Id. at 5.
II.
A

federal

district

Legal Standards
court

is

required

to

review

a

civil

complaint filed in forma pauperis and dismiss any such complaint
that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

The mandatory language

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 applies to all proceedings in forma pauperis.
Section 1915 provides:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
thereof, that may have been paid, the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that-

1

It is unclear from the pleadings whether Plaintiff was a
prisoner or a pre-trial detainee at the Collier County Jail at the
time of the incident about which he complains. If Plaintiff was
a pre-trial detainee, his cruel and unusual punishment claims sound
properly in the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law
rather than in the Eighth Amendment. See Lancaster v. Monroe
County, Alabama, 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997).
Nevertheless, allegations of cruel and unusual punishment are
analyzed in identical fashions regardless of whether they arise
under the Due Process Clause or the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the United States Constitution. Taylor v. Adams, 221
F.3d 1254, 1257 n.3 (11th Cir. 2000).

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(A)

the allegation of poverty is untrue;
or

(B) the action or appeal(i)

is
frivolous
malicious;

or

(ii)

fails to state a claim on
which
relief
may
be
granted; or

(iii)

seeks
monetary
relief
against a defendant who
is
immune
from
such
relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A

complaint

may

be

dismissed

as

frivolous

under

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

A claim is

frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are
immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly
does not exist. Id. at 327.

In making the above determinations,

all factual allegations in the complaint must be viewed as true.
Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).

Moreover,

the Court must read the plaintiff’s pro se allegations in a liberal
fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
III. Analysis
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on one who, under
color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.

To articulate a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

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allege that: (1) a defendant deprived him of a right secured under
the Constitution or federal law; and (2) such deprivation occurred
under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865,
872 (11th Cir. 1998).

In addition, where a plaintiff seeks to

impose liability on one who is not an active participant in the
alleged constitutional deprivation, that plaintiff must allege and
establish an affirmative causal connection between the defendant’s
conduct and the constitutional deprivation. Williams v. Bennett,
689 F.2d 1370, 1380–1381 (11th Cir. 1982).
It is clear that, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of
Collier County, Defendant Rambosk is a state actor.

There is also

no question that the right of which Plaintiff alleges he has been
deprived—the right to safe conditions while confined by the Collier
County Sheriff’s Department—is encompassed within the “liberty”
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

See

Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (personal security is
a “liberty” interest protected by the Due Process Clause).

The

only remaining question is whether Defendant Rambosk engaged in
unconstitutional conduct that deprived Plaintiff of this right.
This Court concludes that he did not.
A.

Plaintiff’s negligence claim is not properly brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The

gravamen

of

Plaintiff’s

complaint

is

that

Defendant

Sheriff Rambosk at the Collier County Jail negligently failed to

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follow “Florida Jail Model Standards” by inadequately inspecting
the

bunk

in

Cell

Nine

(Doc.

1

at

6).

Defendant

Rambosk’s

negligence led to the bunk’s collapse and Plaintiff's injury.
Section 1983 cannot be used as a tool to bring a generalized
negligence-based tort suit in federal court. Instead, it remedies
errors of constitutional dimensions.

In order to state an Eighth

Amendment prisoner conditions suit relating to the faulty bunk,
Plaintiff would have to show: (1) that the alleged failure in
maintenance was, “objectively, sufficiently serious” and resulted
“in

the

denial

of

the

minimal

civilized

measure

of

life’s

necessities,” and (2) that officials charged with performing the
maintenance were deliberately indifferent to “an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834,
(1994).

That is, a constitutional violation of the type most

analogous to Plaintiff’s claim would require considerably more
than the mere negligence alleged here. See Goebert v. Lee County,
510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that the subjective
component of the deliberate indifference test requires more than
even gross negligence). Instead, Plaintiff must show that an
“official kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to inmate
health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that
Sheriff Rambosk knew the bunk would (or was likely to) fall, and
then callously and deliberately chose to disregard that risk.

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Rather, Plaintiff claims only that the bunks should have been
routinely inspected and that Defendant Rambosk negligently failed
to do so.

Consequently, Plaintiff’s negligence-based claim fails

as a matter of law. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)
(prison official’s negligence in failing to protect inmate from
harm does not give rise to a cause of action under § 1983); Taylor
v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[F]ailure to
follow procedures does not, by itself, rise to the level of
deliberate indifference because doing so is at most a form of
negligence.”); Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir.
2002) (“While the violation of state law may (or may not) give
rise to a state tort claim, it is not enough by itself to support
a claim under section 1983.”).

Plaintiff’s negligence claims are

dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B.

Plaintiff has not stated a claim for respondeat superior
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff makes no specific allegations against Defendant
Rambosk in the body of his complaint.
reading

of

the

complaint

indicates

Indeed, even a liberal

that

the

Sheriff

personally participate in any alleged wrongdoing.

did

not

To the extent

Plaintiff urges that the Sheriff is liable under § 1983 for the
negligence or deliberate indifference of the staff members of the
Collier County Jail under a theory of supervisory liability, he
does not state a claim.

It is well established in the Eleventh

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Circuit that “supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983
for the unconstitutional acts of their subordinates on the basis
of

respondeat

superior

or

vicarious

liability.”

Hartley

v.

Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S.

658,

691

&

694

n.58

(1978).

Likewise,

supervisors,

employers, and private contractors cannot be sued under § 1983
simply on a theory of respondeat superior. See Kruger v. Jenne,
164 F.Supp.2d 1330, 1333–34 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (citing Powell v.
Shopco Laurel, Co., 678 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1982)) (explaining that
[supervisor] who provided medical care for state inmates could not
be sued under § 1983 on respondeat superior theory).

Instead,

supervisory liability under § 1983 occurs when the supervisor
personally participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or
when

there

is

a

causal

connection

between

the

actions

of

a

supervising official and the alleged constitutional violation.
Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).

Although

Monell liability can be predicated upon the Sheriff’s Office having
an official policy or custom that caused the violation of the
plaintiff’s rights, 2 Plaintiff does not allege that a faulty policy
or regulation led to the Cell Nine bunk failure.

2

Instead, he

See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011)
(“Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments
under § 1983 must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal
policy’ caused their injury.”) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).

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argues that it was the officers’ negligent failure to follow an
existing policy that caused his harm (Doc. 1 at 6).
Because they are based solely upon a theory of respondeat
superior, and because Plaintiff does not allege a sufficient
causal connection between Defendant Rambosk and the faulty bunk
or the alleged lack of medical treatment afterwards, Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendant Rambosk are due to be dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
C.

Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief is unavailable
in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action

As part of his compensation, Plaintiff seeks “declaratory and
injunctive relief” (Doc. 1 at 7).

It is unclear why Plaintiff

believes he is entitled to this relief or even the exact relief
requested. Plaintiff does not assert that the Collier County
Sheriff’s Office has an ongoing policy of engaging in conduct that
violates federal law; therefore, there is no alleged continuing
violation of federal law to enjoin in this case, and an injunction
under § 1983 is not available. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64,
73 (1985) (recognizing that when there is no claimed continuing
violation

of

injunction).

federal

law,

there

is

no

occasion

to

issue

an

Any claim for injunctive relief is dismissed under

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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D.

Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause

In order to establish a claim cognizable under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, Plaintiff must, at a minimum,
demonstrate that: (1) he is situated similarly to other prisoners
who have received more favorable treatment; and (2) the state
engaged in invidious discrimination against him based on race,
religion,

national

origin,

or

some

other

constitutionally

protected basis. Sweet v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311,
1318–1319 (11th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff has not stated a claim that he has suffered unequal
treatment in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Any order

by Defendant Rambos that Plaintiff be kept in a cell was based
upon his status as a detainee, not upon Plaintiff’s race, religion,
national origin, or any other constitutionally protected basis,
and Plaintiff has not alleged otherwise.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.

620, 631 (1996) (unless a challenged classification burdens a
fundamental right or targets a suspect class, the Equal Protection
Clause requires only that the classification be rationally related
to a legitimate state interest).

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to

state a viable equal protection claim, and his equal protection
claims are dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

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III. Conclusion
Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint fails to state a claim
on which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 cannot be used as a

tool to bring a generalized negligence-based tort suit in federal
court.

In

addition,

Plaintiff

has

not

stated

claims

for

supervisory liability, injunctive relief, or a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.

The Court notes that the dismissals are

without prejudice to Plaintiff raising his negligence-based claims
in state court. 3
1.
claim

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed for failure to state a
upon

which

relief

may

be

granted.

28

U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
2.

The

complaint

is

DISMISSED

without

prejudice

to

Plaintiff filing his negligence-based tort claims in state court.
3.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate all

pending motions, close this case, and enter judgment accordingly.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this

12th

day

of August, 2016.

SA: OrlP-4
Copies: Desira Jeffrey St. Victor
3

The Court takes no position on the timeliness or the merits
of Plaintiff’s state law claims or his likelihood of success in
state court.

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