Prunty v. United States Department of Education et al

Filing 106

OPINION AND ORDER granting 42 motion to dismiss; granting 53 Motion to dismiss and the 43 First Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and deadlines as moot, and close the file. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 2/1/2017. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
ROBERT R. PRUNTY, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:16-cv-577-FtM-99CM

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, THE DESOTO COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT, THE JACK
NICKLAUS MIAMI CHILDREN’S
HOSPITAL, INC., KARYN E.
GARY, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION,
THE
FLORIDA
AGENCY
FOR
HEALTH
CARE
ADMINISTRATION,
ELIZABETH
DUDEK, PAMELA STEWART, ALEX
SOTO, and JOHN KING,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Desoto County
School Board and the Florida Department of Education and Agency
for Health Care Administration’s Motions to Dismiss (collectively
“defendants”) (Docs. ## 42, 53) filed on August 19 and 31, 2016.
Plaintiff filed responses (Docs. ## 52, 56, 57) on August 24 and
September 6, 2016.

For the reasons set forth below, the motions

are granted.
I.
Plaintiff Robert R. Prunty, Jr. (plaintiff or Prunty), is
currently proceeding on a sixteen-count First Amended Complaint
(Doc. #43) alleging violations of his civil and constitutional

rights because defendants denied him the benefits of federal
programs and the right to make and enforce Individualized Education
Program contracts (IEPs) for his five children who have been
diagnosed with Autism.

(Doc. #43, ¶ 1.)

Prunty alleges claims

for violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1985, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as common law claims for
invasion
distress.

of

privacy

and

intentional

infliction

of

emotional

Plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendants from violating the

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (IDEA) procedural
rules and allow parents to participate in the IEP process.
As an initial matter, the Court notes that this is not the
first case Prunty has filed alleging similar violations of his
civil and constitutional rights based upon similar conduct against
many of the same defendants.

See Prunty v. Sibelius et al., No.

2:14-cv-313 and Prunty v. Johnson & Johnson et al., No. 2:15-cv105.

In both of those cases, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s

complaint without prejudice for failure to exhaust the IDEA’s
administrative remedies.

See Prunty v. Sibelius et al., 2014 WL

7066430, at 3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2014); Prunty v. Johnson &
Johnson, Inc. et al., 2015 WL 2019411 (M.D. Fla. May 1, 2015).

In

Johnson v. Johnson, the Court stated: “Thus, the Court emphasizes
that the dismissal here is not premised upon a ‘technicality’ that
Prunty may avoid via refiling or further amendment.

Any future

cases concerning the School Board’s actions in connection with
Prunty’s children’s IEPs will be subject to summary dismissal
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unless Prunty alleges that he has fully exhausted the IDEA’s
administrative remedies.”

Id. at *3.

Defendants move to dismiss on this basis.

(Docs. ## 42, 53.)

Plaintiff concedes that he has not exhausted his administrative
remedies, but alleges in his First Amended Complaint and in his
response papers that he has made a good faith attempt to do so but
that the remedy plaintiff seeks is not available in administrative
proceedings and therefore exhaustion would be futile. 1

(Doc. #43

at 10-13.)
If a student is covered by the IDEA, school officials are
required to create an IEP for that student to facilitate their
academic progress.
516, 519 (2007).

Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S.

Students with Autism, such as Prunty’s children,

are covered by the IDEA.

Id.

As a parent, Prunty has the

statutory right to contribute to the IEP process.

Id.

to Prunty, Defendants deprived him of that right.

See, e.g. Doc.

#43, ¶¶ 4, 24, 30.)

Parents of covered children are “entitled to

prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf.”
at 535.
the

According

Winkelman, 550 U.S.

However, before filing a civil action for a violation of

IDEA,

a

plaintiff

must

first

exhaust

all

available

administrative remedies, including a meeting with school officials

1

Plaintiff also argues that he seeks no relief under the
IDEA. (Doc. ##43 at 10-13; 56 at 3.) Yet the Amended Complaint
clearly seeks relief under the IDEA, stating that the “action is
based upon damages to Plaintiff personally under Title VI, IDEA
and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, respectively” and alleges violations of the
IDEA throughout. (Doc. #43, ¶ 23.)
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and a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.

J.P. v. Cherokee

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 218 F. App’x 911, 913 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The
philosophy of the IDEA is that plaintiffs are required to utilize
the elaborate administrative scheme established by the IDEA before
resorting to the courts to challenge the actions of the local
school authorities.”).

The IDEA’s exhaustion requirements apply

even if a plaintiff seeks relief via a different statute.

Babicz

v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 135 F.3d 1420, 1422 n.10 (11th Cir.
1998) (“[A]ny student who wants relief that is available under the
IDEA must use the IDEA’s administrative system even if he invokes
a

different

statute.”).

“[T]he

exhaustion

of

administrative

process is not required where resort to those remedies would be
futile or inadequate.
exhaustion

of

For example, courts have not required

administrative

remedies

when

the

administrative

procedure is incapable of granting the relief requested.”

Assoc.

for Retarded Citizens of Ala. v. Teague, 830 F.2d 158, 160 (11th
Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).
As

the

basis

for

futility,

plaintiff

alleges

that

the

Administrative Law Judge scheduled a “teleconference” that was
cancelled, deciding that “the defendants petition was sufficient.”
(Doc. #43, ¶ 20.)

Plaintiff also believes that the Administrative

Law Judge is biased and has set his case in “legal limbo” to cause
delay of the proceedings.

(Id.)

Here, there is no indication that the administrative process
is incapable of granting plaintiff the requested relief such that
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plaintiff may bypass the administrative process.

One of the

fundamental goals of the IDEA is the involvement of parents with
disabilities in their children’s education.
U.S. 305, 310 (1988).

See Honig v. Doe, 484

Whether education agencies are providing a

disabled child with adequate educational facilities and programs
to which they are entitled is a “determination [that] will require
extensive

factfinding

and

expert

testimony

about

the

present

facilities and programs and the needs of the handicapped children,
and judicial economy would be well served by having a state hearing
officer develop the record on these questions prior to court
review.”

Teague, 830 F.3d at 161. “[P]ermitting plaintiffs to

bypass the Act’s detailed administrative procedures would run
counter to Congress’ view that the needs of handicapped children
are best accommodated by having the parents and local education
agency work together to formulate an individualized plan for each
handicapped child’s education.”

Id. (quoting Smith v. Robinson,

468 U.S. 992, 1012 (1984)).
Assuming the allegations in the First Amended Complaint are
true, Prunty may have a viable IDEA claim.

However, Prunty cannot

assert that claim (whether characterized as a violation of the
IDEA, Title VI, Section 1981, Section 1983, or any other statutory
or constitutional provision), unless and until he participates in
and

completes

procedures.
plaintiff

the

IDEA’s

administrative

dispute

Babicz, 135 F.3d at 1422 n.10.

alleges

that

he

sought
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a

due

resolution

Here, although

process

hearing

and

administrative review, there is no indication that plaintiff has
completed the administrative review process.

(Doc. #43, 10-13.)

Accordingly, the First Amended Complaint is dismissed without
prejudice

to

refiling

following

exhaustion

of

the

IDEA’s

administrative procedures.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint

(Docs. ##42, 53) 2 are GRANTED and the First Amended Complaint (Doc.
#43) is dismissed without prejudice.
2.

The

Clerk

shall

terminate

all

pending

motions

and

deadlines as moot, and close the file.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this

1st

day of

February, 2017.

Copies:
Plaintiff
Counsel of Record

2

Defendant Jack Nicklaus Miami Children’s Hospital also filed
a motion to dismiss (Doc. #50), but this motion did not raise
exhaustion as a basis for dismissal.
As the case has been
dismissed, the motion will be deemed moot.
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