Daniels v. Rambosk

Filing 8

ORDER OF DISMISSAL dismissing claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; dismissing complaint without prejudice to plaintiff filing his negligence-based tort claims in state court. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 10/28/2016. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
DAVID DANIELS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:16-cv-657-FtM-99MRM

KEVIN J. RAMBOSK,
Defendant.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Collier County Jail in Collier
County, Florida, initiated this action by filing a pro se civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 1, filed August
26, 2016).

Along with his complaint, Plaintiff filed a motion to

proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2).
Because Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the
Court

must

review

his

complaint

to

determine

whether

it

is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).

For the

reasons set forth in this Order, the complaint is dismissed without
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
I.

Complaint

Plaintiff alleges the following:

On August 12, 2016, while

incarcerated at the Naples Jail Center, Officer Kelly and two
county maintenance workers removed Plaintiff from his cell (Doc.

1 at 5).

The workers then “grinded and welded the bunks” in

Plaintiff’s cell. Id.

After they were finished working, Plaintiff

was returned to his cell “which smelled of toxins, grinded, and
burnt metal.” Id.

There were no exhaust fans and the inmate’s

complaints were ignored. Id.

Later, the inmates had to eat dinner

in their cells. Id. at 6.
The following day, Plaintiff experienced chest pains and
filled out a sick call request (Doc. 1 at 6).

On August 17, 2016,

a nurse examined Plaintiff, but checked only his vitals, blood
pressure, temperature, and heart rate. Id.

The nurse did not

listen for congestion or look for phlegm in Plaintiff’s throat.
Id.

Instead, the nurse told Plaintiff that he was not congested,

and found nothing wrong with him. Id.
ibuprofen

and

an

allergy

pill.

Id.

She offered Plaintiff
Plaintiff

refused

the

ibuprofen and took the allergy pill even though he never complained
of allergies. Id.
Plaintiff seeks $75,000 in damages for medical negligence,
ordinary negligence, mental anguish, pain and suffering (Doc. 1 at
7).

He also seeks punitive damages and other unspecified monetary

damages. Id.

He bases his claims on the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments to the United States Constitution. 1 Id. at 5.
1

It is unclear from the pleadings whether Plaintiff was a
prisoner or a pre-trial detainee at the Jail at the time of the
incident about which he complains. If Plaintiff was a pre-trial
detainee, his cruel and unusual punishment claims sound properly
in the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law rather
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II.
A

federal

district

Legal Standards
court

is

required

to

review

a

civil

complaint filed in forma pauperis and dismiss any such complaint
that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

The mandatory language

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 applies to all proceedings in forma pauperis.
Section 1915 provides:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
thereof, that may have been paid, the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that(A)

the allegation of poverty is untrue;
or

(B)

the action or appeal(i)

is
frivolous
malicious;

or

(ii)

fails to state a claim on
which
relief
may
be
granted; or

(iii)

seeks
monetary
relief
against a defendant who
is
immune
from
such
relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

than in the Eighth Amendment. See Lancaster v. Monroe County,
Alabama, 116 F.3d 1419, 1425 n.6 (11th Cir. 1997). Nevertheless,
allegations of cruel and unusual punishment are analyzed in
identical fashions regardless of whether they arise under the Due
Process Clause or the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the
United States Constitution. Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1257
n.3 (11th Cir. 2000).
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A

complaint

may

be

dismissed

as

frivolous

under

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

A claim is

frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are
immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly
does not exist. Id. at 327.

In making the above determinations,

all factual allegations in the complaint must be viewed as true.
Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).

Moreover,

the Court must read the plaintiff’s pro se allegations in a liberal
fashion. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
III. Analysis
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on one who, under
color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.

To articulate a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege that: (1) a defendant deprived him of a right secured under
the Constitution or federal law; and (2) such deprivation occurred
under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865,
872 (11th Cir. 1998).

In addition, where a plaintiff seeks to

impose liability on one who is not an active participant in the
alleged constitutional deprivation, that plaintiff must allege and
establish an affirmative causal connection between the defendant’s
conduct and the constitutional deprivation. Williams v. Bennett,
689 F.2d 1370, 1380–1381 (11th Cir. 1982).

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It is clear that, in his official capacity as the Sheriff of
Collier County, Defendant Rambosk is a state actor.

There is also

no question that the right of which Plaintiff alleges he has been
deprived—the right to safe conditions and medical treatment while
confined by the Collier County Sheriff’s Department—is encompassed
within the “liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.

See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)

(personal security is a “liberty” interest protected by the Due
Process Clause).
Rambosk

engaged

The only remaining question is whether Defendant
in

unconstitutional

conduct

that

deprived

Plaintiff of this right. This Court concludes that he did not.
A.

Plaintiff’s negligence claim is not properly brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

The

gravamen

of

Plaintiff’s

complaint

is

that

Defendant

Sheriff Rambosk at the Naples Jail Center negligently failed to
shut down the portion of the jail in which bunks were being
repaired, resulting in the inmates being required to breathe
unpleasant

fumes

that

resulted

from

the

welding

process.

Plaintiff also asserts that the jail’s nurse was negligent for
failing to offer him a more extensive exam after he complained of
chest pains.

Notably, Plaintiff does not assert that he suffered

damage other than discomfort from either instance of negligence.
Section 1983 cannot be used as a tool to bring a generalized
negligence-based tort suit in federal court. Instead, it remedies
errors of constitutional dimensions.

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In order to state an Eighth

Amendment

prisoner

conditions

suit

relating

to

the

welding,

Plaintiff would have to show: (1) that the alleged failure to
properly exhaust the welding fumes was, “objectively, sufficiently
serious” and resulted “in the denial of the minimal civilized
measure of life’s necessities,” and (2) that officials charged
with performing the welding were deliberately indifferent to “an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety[.]” Farmer v. Brennan,
511 U.S. 825, 834, (1994).

A constitutional violation of the type

most analogous to Plaintiff’s claim would require considerably
more than the mere negligence alleged here. See Goebert v. Lee
County, 510 F.3d 1312, 1326 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that the
subjective component of the deliberate indifference test requires
more than even gross negligence). Instead, Plaintiff must show
that an “official kn[ew] of and disregard[ed] an excessive risk to
inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Likewise, not every claim by a prisoner that he received
inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eight
Amendment.

Estelle

v.

Gamble,

429

U.S.

97,

105

(1976).

“[A]

complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or
treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of
medical

mistreatment

under

the

Eighth

Amendment.

Medical

malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely
because the victim is a prisoner.” Id. at 106. “In order to state
a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions

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sufficiently

harmful

to

serious medical needs.

evidence

deliberate

indifference

to

It is only such indifference that can

offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts indicating that
Sheriff Rambosk knew that the welding would cause unpleasant fumes
that resulted in Plaintiff experiencing chest pains and then
callously and deliberately chose to disregard that risk. Rather,
Plaintiff claims only that the inmates should have been evacuated
until the smell dissipated.

Consequently, Plaintiff’s negligence-

based claim based upon the Naples Jail’s failure to evacuate after
welding fails as a matter of law. See Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986) (prison official’s negligence in failing to protect
inmate from harm does not give rise to a cause of action under §
1983); Taylor v. Adams, 221 F.3d 1254, 1259 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“[F]ailure to follow procedures does not, by itself, rise to the
level of deliberate indifference because doing so is at most a
form of negligence.”).
Plaintiff’s

medical

claim

fares

no

better.

He

has

not

alleged that the jail nurse knew that Plaintiff was in serious
need of medical care, but refused to provide medical treatment.
See Mandel v. Doe, 888 F.2d 783, 788 (11th Cir. 1989) (noting that
“knowledge of the need for medical care and intentional refusal to
provide that care constitute deliberate indifference”). Indeed,

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Plaintiff has not even alleged that he was in need of serious
medical care or that the nurse was anything other than merely
disagreeable when he went to see her.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s

negligence

under

claims

are

dismissed

28

U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
B.

Plaintiff has not stated a claim for respondeat superior
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Plaintiff makes no specific allegations against Defendant
Rambosk in the body of his complaint.
reading

of

the

complaint

indicates

Indeed, even a liberal

that

the

Sheriff

personally participate in any alleged wrongdoing.

did

not

To the extent

Plaintiff urges that the Sheriff is liable under § 1983 for the
negligence or deliberate indifference of the staff members of the
Naples Jail under a theory of supervisory liability, he does not
state a claim.

It is well established in the Eleventh Circuit

that “supervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the
unconstitutional

acts

of

their

subordinates

on

the

basis

of

respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Hartley v. Parnell,
193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691 & 694 n.58 (1978).

Likewise, supervisors, employers, and

private contractors cannot be sued under § 1983 simply on a theory
of respondeat superior.

See Kruger v. Jenne, 164 F. Supp. 2d

1330, 1333–34 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (citing Powell v. Shopco Laurel,
Co., 678 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1982)) (explaining that [supervisor]

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who provided medical care for state inmates could not be sued under
§ 1983 on respondeat superior theory).

Instead, supervisory

liability under § 1983 occurs when the supervisor personally
participates in the alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there
is

a

causal

connection

between

the

actions

of

a

supervising

official and the alleged constitutional violation. Cottone v.
Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003).

Although Monell

liability can be predicated upon the Sheriff’s Office having an
official

policy

or

custom

that

caused

the

violation

of

the

plaintiff’s rights, 2 Plaintiff does not allege that a faulty policy
or regulation led the welding fumes or to the nurse’s inadequate
examination.
Because they are based solely upon a theory of respondeat
superior, and because Plaintiff does not allege a sufficient causal
connection between Defendant Rambosk and the welding fumes or the
alleged

inadequate

medical

treatment

afterwards,

Plaintiff’s

claims against Defendant Rambosk are due to be dismissed pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
III. Conclusion
Plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint fails to state a claim
on which relief can be granted.

Section 1983 cannot be used as a

2

See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 60-61 (2011)
(“Plaintiffs who seek to impose liability on local governments
under § 1983 must prove that ‘action pursuant to official municipal
policy’ caused their injury.”) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691).
- 9 -

tool to bring a generalized negligence-based tort suit in federal
court.

In

addition,

Plaintiff

supervisory liability.

has

not

stated

a

claim

for

The Court notes that the dismissal is

without prejudice to Plaintiff raising his negligence-based claims
in state court. 3
1.
claim

Accordingly, it is now ORDERED:

Plaintiff’s claims are dismissed for failure to state a
upon

which

relief

may

be

granted.

28

U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
2.

The

complaint

is

DISMISSED

without

prejudice

to

Plaintiff filing his negligence-based tort claims in state court.
3.

The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate all

pending motions, close this case, and enter judgment accordingly.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this

28th

day

of October, 2016.

SA: OrlP-4
Copies: David Daniels

3

The Court takes no position on the timeliness or the merits
of Plaintiff’s state law claims or his likelihood of success in
state court.
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