Lovett v. Commissioner of Social Security
OPINION AND ORDER affirming the decision of the Commissioner. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. See Opinion and Order for details. Signed by Magistrate Judge Mac R. McCoy on 3/7/2018. (JTM)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
Case No: 2:16-cv-696-FtM-MRM
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
OPINION AND ORDER
This cause comes before the Court on Plaintiff Tameka Lovett’s Complaint (Doc. 1) filed
on September 12, 2016. Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner
of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her claims for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits. The Commissioner filed the Transcript of the proceedings
(hereinafter referred to as “Tr.” followed by the appropriate page number), and the parties filed
legal memoranda in support of their positions. For the reasons set out herein, the decision of the
Commissioner is AFFIRMED pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
Social Security Act Eligibility, Procedural History, the ALJ’s Decision, and
Standard of Review
The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason
of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in
death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505. 1 The impairment must be
severe, making the claimant unable to do her previous work, or any other substantial gainful
activity that exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505 404.1511. Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion through step four, while the burden shifts to
the Commissioner at step five. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).
On September 10, 2014, Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits with an alleged onset date of August 13, 2013. (Tr. at 182). The
onset date was later amended to July 27, 2014. (Tr. at 40). Plaintiff’s application was denied
initially on February 2, 2015 and upon reconsideration on April 29, 2015. (Tr. at 116, 136). A
hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) William G. Reamon on November
18, 2015. (Tr. at 37-101). The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision on January 8, 2016. (Tr. at
15-36). The ALJ found Plaintiff not to be under a disability from August 13, 2016 through the
date of the decision. (Tr. at 30).
On July 8, 2016, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (Tr. at 1-4).
Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) in this Court on September 12, 2016. Defendant filed an
Answer (Doc. 13) on December 5, 2016. The parties filed a memoranda in support. (Docs. 2425). The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all
proceedings. (See Doc. 18). This case is ripe for review.
The Court notes that the Social Security regulations were recently revised. See Revisions to
Rules Regarding the Evaluation of Medical Evidence, 82 Fed. Reg. 5844-01 (Jan. 18, 2017).
Unless otherwise specified, the Court refers to the regulations in effect at the time of the
Administrative Law Judge’s decision.
Summary of the ALJ’s Decision
An ALJ must follow a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine if a claimant
has proven that she is disabled. Packer v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 542 F. App’x 890, 891 (11th Cir.
2013) (citing Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir. 1999)). 2 An ALJ must determine
whether the claimant: (1) is performing substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment;
(3) has a severe impairment that meets or equals an impairment specifically listed in 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform her
past relevant work; and (5) can perform other work of the sort found in the national economy.
Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237-40 (11th Cir. 2004). The claimant has the burden of
proof through step four and then the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five. Hines-Sharp
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 511 F. App’x 913, 915 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013).
As an initial matter, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements
through December 31, 2019. (Tr. at 20). At step one of the sequential evaluation, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 13, 2013, the alleged
onset date. (Id.). At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe
impairments: “left knee degenerative disc disease (status-post ACL reconstruction), lumbosacral
radiculitis, lumbar degenerative disc disease, anxiety disorder, right ulnar neuropathy, right
shoulder AC joint degenerative joint disease, and an affective disorder.” (Id.). At step three, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that
Unpublished opinions may be cited as persuasive on a particular point. The Court does not rely
on unpublished opinions as precedent. Citation to unpublished opinions on or after January 1,
2007 is expressly permitted under Rule 31.1, Fed. R. App. P. Unpublished opinions may be
cited as persuasive authority pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit Rules. 11th Cir. R. 36-2.
meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404,
Subpart. P, Appendix 1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526). (Tr. at 21).
Based on the evidence, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform “less
than the full range of light work” such that:
[Plaintiff] may lift up to twenty pounds occasionally and lift and carry up to ten
pounds frequently. Claimant is able to stand and or walk for up to six hours in an
eight-hour workday and sit for up to six hours in an eight-hour workday with
normal breaks. Claimant may never engage in pushing or pulling or the use of foot
controls with the left lower extremity. The right lower extremity has no limitations.
Claimant may only occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, stoop, and crouch.
She may never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, kneel, or crawl. Claimant may
never engage in overhead reaching with either extremity. She is limited to frequent
gross manipulation and handling objects with her right upper extremity. She is not
limited in reaching otherwise, in fingering or fine manipulation, or in feeling.
Claimant must avoid concentrated exposure to fumes, odors, dusts, gases, poorly
ventilated areas, and hazards such as dangerous moving machinery and unprotected
heights. Psychologically, claimant retains the ability to understand, remember, and
carry out simple instructions. Claimant may have only occasional interaction with
the public, co-workers and supervisors.
(Tr. at 22).
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff cannot perform any past relevant work.
(Tr. at 29). Specifically, the ALJ noted the vocational expert’s (“VE”) testimony that Plaintiff
has past relevant work as a Semi Truck Driver (civilian equivalent to Army Motor Transport
Operator), DOT #904.383-010, which is performed at the medium exertional level and has an
SVP of 4; and as an Admin Clerk, DOT #219.3262-010, which is performed at the light
exertional level and has an SVP of 4. (Id.). 3 The VE testified that this work exceeds Plaintiff’s
RFC. (Id.). Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to perform past relevant work.
“DOT” is an acronym for the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. “SVP” is an acronym for
Specific Vocational Preparation.
At step five, considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ
found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff
can perform. (Tr. at 29). Specifically, the ALJ asked the VE whether jobs exist in the national
economy for an individual with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC. (Tr. at
30). The VE testified that someone with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC
would be able to perform the requirements of representative occupations, such as:
1. Checker I, DOT #226.687-010, which is performed at the light exertional level,
is unskilled with an SVP of 2, and of which there are 14,865 jobs in the national
2. Surveillance System Monitor, DOT #368.367-010, which is performed at the
sedentary exertional level, is unskilled with an SVP of 2, and of which there are
14,701 jobs in the national economy; and
3. Marker, DOT #209.587-034, which is performed at the light exertional level, is
unskilled with an SVP of 2, and of which there are 315,016 jobs in the national
(Tr. at 30).
Pursuant to Social Security Ruling 00-4p, the ALJ determined that the VE’s testimony
was consistent with the information contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles. (Id.).
Based on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is capable of making a successful
adjustment to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. (Id.). As a
result, the ALJ determined that a finding of “not disabled” was appropriate. (Id.).
Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not under a disability from August 13,
2013 through the date of decision. (Id.).
Standard of Review
The scope of this Court’s review is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the
correct legal standard, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether
the findings are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390
(1971). The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial
evidence. 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla; i.e., the evidence
must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such
relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion.
Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835,
838 (11th Cir. 1982); Richardson, 402 U.S. at 401).
Where the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district
court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and
even if the reviewer finds that “the evidence preponderates against” the Commissioner’s
decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932
F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking
into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560;
accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that the court must
scrutinize the entire record to determine reasonableness of factual findings).
Plaintiff raises several issues on appeal, which can be summarized as follows:
Whether the ALJ erred in assessing Plaintiff’s credibility,
Whether the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical opinion evidence, and
Whether the ALJ erred in determining Plaintiff’s RFC.
(See Doc. 24 at 22-30). The Court evaluates these issues in turn below.
The ALJ’s Credibility Determination
The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ erred in evaluating her
credibility. In looking at the ALJ’s credibility determination, the Court notes that to establish
disability based on testimony of pain and other symptoms, a plaintiff must satisfy two prongs of
the following three-part test: “(1) evidence of an underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a)
objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively
determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.”
Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225 (citing Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.3d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991)). After
an ALJ has considered a plaintiff’s complaints of pain, the ALJ may reject them, and that
determination will be reviewed to determine if it is based on substantial evidence. Moreno v.
Astrue, 366 F. App’x 23, 28 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Marbury v. Sullivan, 957 F.2d 837, 839
(11th Cir. 1992)). If an ALJ discredits the subjective testimony of a plaintiff, then he must
“articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so. Failure to articulate the reasons for
discrediting subjective testimony requires, as a matter of law, that the testimony be accepted as
true.” Wilson, 284 F.3d at 1225 (internal citations omitted). Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit
has stated that “[t]he question is not . . . whether [the] ALJ could have reasonably credited [the
claimant’s] testimony, but whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to discredit it.” Werner v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 421 F. App’x 935, 939 (11th Cir. 2011).
The factors an ALJ considers in evaluating a plaintiff’s subjective symptoms include:
The individual’s daily activities;
The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms;
Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;
The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an
individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms;
Treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has received for
relief of pain or other symptoms;
Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve
pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15
to 20 minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and
Any other factors concerning an individual’s functional limitations and
restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.
SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *3; see also SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029, at *7 (factors
nearly identical to SSR 96-7p); Moreno, 366 F. App’x at 28 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)).
“A clearly articulated credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in the record will
not be disturbed by a reviewing court.” Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562.
Plaintiff takes issue with the ALJ’s credibility determination in two separate sections of
First, in one section of her briefing, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ misinterpreted her
function reports; failed to consider the amendment of her alleged onset date from August 2013 to
July 2014; and failed to consider that her “impairments have not remained static and have
worsened over time.” (Doc. 24 at 24). Other than these conclusory arguments, Plaintiff failed to
point out any error actually committed by the ALJ in reviewing Plaintiff’s credibility. (See Doc.
24 at 23-24). Plaintiff’s conclusory statements, without further support, are wholly insufficient
for Plaintiff to meet either her burden of persuasion or her burden of proof. See Yuckert, 482
U.S. at 146 n.5; Hines-Sharp, 511 F. App’x at 915 n.2.
Similarly, in another section of her briefing, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in
considering her pain. (Id. at 29-30). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that “[p]ain is subjective” and
that Plaintiff “has consistently reported the same pain complaints for years.” (Doc. 24 at 30). A
review of the ALJ’s decision, however, shows that while he consistently noted Plaintiff’s
subjective reports of pain, the ALJ nonetheless cited substantial objective medical reports of
record that did not support Plaintiff’s reports. (See Tr. at 27-28). As stated above, ALJs are
required to review objective medical evidence in making a credibility finding. See Wilson, 284
F.3d at 1225. Moreover, Plaintiff does not contest the ALJ’s review of the objective medical
evidence. (See Doc. 24 at 29-30). Instead, while conceding that her neck and back pain “may be
mild to moderate on paper,” Plaintiff argues that, “to a depressed, anxious, fearful woman,” her
pain “is amplified and severe.” (Doc. 24 at 30 (emphasis added)).
The question is not whether the ALJ could have reasonably credited Plaintiff’s testimony,
but whether the ALJ was clearly wrong to discredit it. See Werner, 421 F. App’x at 939. Upon
review, the Court finds that the ALJ articulated explicit and adequate reasons for discounting
Plaintiff’s credibility with substantial supporting evidence of record. See Wilson, 284 F.3d at
1225; Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562. Indeed, the ALJ cited to substantial objective medical evidence of
record in discounting Plaintiff’s credibility and reports of pain, both as to her musculoskeletal
conditions as well as her mental impairments. (Tr. at 27-28). Based on the ALJ’s extensive
citations to the medical evidence of record, the Court cannot find that the ALJ was wrong to
discredit Plaintiff’s reports of pain. See Werner, 421 F. App’x at 939.
In sum, the Court finds that the ALJ’s credibility determination is supported by
substantial evidence of record and, therefore, the Court affirms the ALJ’s decision in that regard.
The ALJ’s Review of the Medical Opinion Evidence
Next, the Court addresses Plaintiff’s arguments that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the
The Social Security regulations define medical opinions as statements from physicians,
psychologists, or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and
severity of impairments, including symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what a claimant can still
do despite impairments, and physical or mental restrictions. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2). When
evaluating a medical opinion, the ALJ considers various factor, including: (1) whether the
doctor has examined the claimant; (2) the length, nature, and extent of a treating doctor’s
relationship with the claimant; (3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the doctor’s
opinion; (4) how consistent the doctor’s opinion is with the record as a whole; and (5) the
doctor’s specialization. Denomme v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 518 F. App’x 875, 877 (11th
Cir. 2013) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c)).
An ALJ is required to consider every medical opinion. Bennett v. Astrue, No. 308-cv646-J-JRK, 2009 WL 2868924, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d),
416.927(d)). Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that an ALJ must state with
particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor. Winschel v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). Otherwise, the Court has no way to
determine whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, and the Court will not
affirm simply because some rationale might have supported the ALJ’s conclusion. See id.
Nonetheless, an incorrect application of the regulations will result in harmless error if a correct
application of the regulations would not contradict the ALJ’s ultimate findings. Denomme, 518
F. App’x at 877-78 (citing Diorio v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 726, 728 (11th Cir. 1983)).
The Eleventh Circuit has further held that the opinion of a treating physician must be
given substantial or considerable weight unless “good cause” is shown to the contrary. Phillips,
357 F.3d at 1240-41 (citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997)). Good
cause exists when: (1) the treating physician’s opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) the
evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) the treating physician’s opinion was conclusory or
inconsistent with the doctor’s own medical records. Id. Moreover, an “ALJ may reject any
medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding.” Lacina v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.
Admin., 606 F. App’x 520, 526 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 280
(11th Cir. 1987)).
Upon careful review of Plaintiff’s arguments, the Court cannot ascertain precisely how
Plaintiff alleges the ALJ erred in reviewing the opinion evidence. Therefore, the Court examines
below each of Plaintiff’s contentions as they are recited in two sections of her brief.
First, Plaintiff entitles one section of her brief as “[t]he ALJ Erred in the Evaluation of
the Treating Physicians’ Opinions.” (Doc. 24 at 24). Upon review of this section, however,
Plaintiff provides no argument, analysis, or support as to what part(s) of the ALJ’s consideration
of the opinion evidence was in error. (See Doc. at 24-26). In fact, a review of the ALJ’s
decision shows that the ALJ gave “significant weight to the observations of [Plaintiff’s] treating
psychological examiners as their observations appeared true and consistent with the totality of
the record.” (Tr. at 29).
Moreover, a closer look at the briefing appears to show that Plaintiff is arguing that the
content of the medical evidence of record is incorrect. (See Doc. 24 at 26). Specifically,
Plaintiff points to a statement in the ALJ’s summary of the medical evidence where the ALJ
noted that the Plaintiff’s “complaint of having not slept at all in three days was not considered
credible as her physical presentation did not match this allegation.” (Tr. at 24 (citing Tr. at
251)). From this, Plaintiff argues that “[l]ogically, a person who has been dealing with PTSD,
repeatedly seeing psychiatrist, psychologists, and therapists for examinations which ask the same
questions and ask the individual to relive the trauma each time, there should be no surprise that
the person knows what are her issues without having to reflect.” (Doc. 24 at 26). Additionally,
Plaintiff states that “[i]t is also not illogical to believe that such a person may become angry and
frustrated with the circumstances.” (Id.). At best, Plaintiff’s arguments appear to contest the
ALJ’s characterization of the medical evidence of record. (See Tr. at 24). In any event,
Plaintiff’s arguments do not explain to this Court how, according to Plaintiff, the ALJ erred in
evaluating her treating physicians’ opinions.
On this point, for an ALJ’s decision to be supported by substantial evidence regarding
any medical opinion, the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical
opinions and the reasons therefor. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. Here, the ALJ specifically stated
the weight given to the opinions of the treating physicians and a reason for giving the opinion
that weight. (See Tr. at 29). Plaintiff does not coherently argue any error as to the weight the
ALJ assigned to the opinions or the ALJ’s reasons for giving the opinions the assigned weight.
(See Doc. 24 at 24-26). As a result, the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ erred in reviewing
the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physicians.
Second, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ Erred in the Evaluation of the Non-Examining
Agency Opinions.” (Id. at 26). In this section, Plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ erred by
giving significant weight to the opinions of the consultative physicians over her treating
physicians. (See id. at 26-27). As indicated above, however, the ALJ gave significant weight to
the observations of the treating physicians. (Tr. at 29). Thus, Plaintiff has not even made a
minimal showing that the ALJ gave more weight to the opinions of consultative examiners in the
first instance. Moreover, an ALJ does not err by giving more weight to a non-examining
physician’s opinion when those opinions are better supported by the record. See Huntley v. Soc.
Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F. App’x 830, 833 (11th Cir. 2017). In this case, Plaintiff has not
shown that the non-examining physician’s opinion are not better supported by the record. Thus,
the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ erred in reviewing the opinions of the non-examining
In sum, Plaintiff again has failed to meet either her burden of persuasion or burden of
proof in demonstrating that the ALJ erred in reviewing the opinion evidence of record. See
Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5; Hines-Sharp, 511 F. App’x at 915 n.2. The Court, therefore,
affirms the decision of the Commissioner on this issue.
The ALJ’s RFC Assessment
The final issue raised by Plaintiff pertains to the ALJ’s RFC assessment.
A plaintiff’s RFC is used at step four to determine whether she can do past relevant work
and at step five to determine if she can adjust to other work. Lacina, 606 F. App’x at 526. “RFC
is defined as ‘the most [a claimant] can still do despite [her] limitations.’” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §
416.945(a)(1)). To assess a plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considers “all the relevant medical and
other evidence in [the claimant’s] case record.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e)).
In this case, Plaintiff appears to argue that the ALJ erred by not adopting an alternative
RFC. (See Doc. 24 at 28). Specifically, in her briefing, Plaintiff first recites the RFC ultimately
adopted by the ALJ in his decision. (Id. (citing Tr. at 22)). Plaintiff then recites an alternative
hypothetical RFC posed to the VE by the ALJ at the hearing. (Id. at 27-28 (citing Tr. at 93)).
Finally, Plaintiff notes the VE’s testimony that, based on the restrictions in the alternative
hypothetical RFC, “[t]here would be no work.” (Id. at 28 (citing Tr. at 93)). After noting this
testimony, Plaintiff’s argument ends without further support or argument. (Id.).
It appears from Plaintiff’s briefing that she argues, essentially, that the alternative RFC
posed to the VE – which would have resulted in an award of benefits – should have been adopted
by the ALJ. (See id.). While the Court certainly understands why Plaintiff prefers the alternative
RFC, Plaintiff does not explain what error, if any, the ALJ committed by adopting the RFC he
did. (See id. at 27-28). As a result, the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ erred in reviewing
Plaintiff’s RFC or that the ALJ erred in his finding at step five that jobs exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (See Tr. at 22, 29-30). As noted
above, Plaintiff bears the burden of persuasion and burden of proof through step four. See
Yuckert, 482 U.S. at 146 n.5; Hines-Sharp, 511 F. App’x at 915 n.2. Here, Plaintiff has failed to
meet either. Furthermore, upon consideration of the ALJ’s decision, it appears to the Court that
the ALJ considered all the relevant medical and other evidence of record in making the RFC
determination. See Lacina, 606 F. App’x at 526. Thus, the Court affirms on this issue.
Upon consideration of the submissions of the parties and the administrative record, the
Court finds that the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence and decided upon
proper legal standards.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
The decision of the Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED pursuant to sentence four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any
pending motions and deadlines, and close the case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 7, 2018.
Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
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