Bilal v. Fennick et al

Filing 8

ORDER denying 7 Motion for relief of order. Bilal has up to and including May 5, 2017, to pay the $400.00 filing fee. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 4/20/2017. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JAMAAL ALI BILAL,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:16-cv-799-FtM-29CM

FNU FENNICK, FNU CLARKE,
MARK SNYDER, FNU MECHELIS
and RICK SLOAN,
Defendants.
ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon review of Plaintiff,
Jamaal

Ali

Bilal’s,

a

civil

detainee

at

Commitment Center (FCCC) in Arcadia, Florida, 1

1

the

Florida

Civil

Motion for Relief

The Florida legislature enacted the Sexually Violent
Predators Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 394.910-.913, by which a person
determined to be a sexually violent predator is required to be
housed in a secure facility “for control, care, and treatment until
such time as the person’s mental abnormality or personality
disorder has so changed that it is safe for the person to be at
large.” Fla. Stat. § 394.917(2). The Act was promulgated for the
dual purpose “of providing mental health treatment to sexually
violent
predators
and
protecting
the
public
from
these
individuals.”
Westerheide v. State, 831 So. 2d 93, 112 (Fla.
2002); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (holding that the
Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act did not establish criminal
proceedings, and involuntary confinement pursuant to the Act was
not punitive). Civil commitment under the Act involves several
steps. First, the Act requires a mental evaluation of any person
who has committed a sexually violent offense and is scheduled for
release from prison or involuntary confinement.
See generally
Fla. Stat. § 394.913.
The evaluation is conducted by a multidisciplinary team of mental health professionals who must
determine whether the individual meets the definition of a

of Order construed as a Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. #7), filed
on December 5, 2016.

No response in opposition has been filed.

Bilal filed a four count Complaint (Doc. #1) on October 28,
2016,

alleging:

Count

I,

Defamation

of

Character

and

False

Imprisonment by Captain Fennick; Count II, Illegal Search and
Seizure

by

Discrimination

Clarke

and

Mechelis;

by

Chaplain

Sloan;

Count
and

III,

Count

IV,

Religious
Illegal

Confiscation of Flash Drives and MP3 Player by Defendant Synder.
Bilal also filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (IFP) (Doc.
#2) on the same day.
On November 21, 2016, the District Court denied Bilal’s Motion
to proceed IFP relying on a Filing Injunction entered against Bilal
by the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Florida enjoining him from proceeding IFP. 2

Although the Filing

“sexually violent predator.”
After the evaluation, the state
attorney may file a petition with the circuit court alleging that
the individual is a sexually violent predator subject to civil
commitment under the Act.
Id.
If the judge determines the
existence of probable cause that the individual is a sexually
violent predator, then he or she will order the individual to remain
in custody. Id. at § 394.915.
Thereafter, a jury trial, or a
bench trial if neither party requests a jury trial, will commence.
Id.
If the jury finds the individual to be a sexually violent
predator by clear and convincing evidence, then the individual
will be committed to the custody of the Department of Children and
Family Services for “control, care, and treatment until such time
as the person’s mental abnormality or personality disorder has so
changed that it is safe for the person to be at large.” Id. at §
394.917.
2

The injunction at issue was originally filed in N.D. Fla.

2

Injunction was issued by the District Court for the Northern
District of Florida, it has been recognized by this Court. (Doc.
#6, at 2).

The Filing Injunction states, “[l]eave to proceed in

forma pauperis will not be granted unless the magistrate judge
determines that plaintiff has credibly alleged that he is in
imminent danger of serious physical injury.” (Doc. #1, Appendix
One, at 1).
In denying Bilal’s Motion to proceed IFP, this Court held
that

his

“[c]omplaint

alleges

a

litany

of

constitutional

violations stemming from Plaintiff’s civil confinement at the
FCCC. The Complaint is devoid of any allegations that Plaintiff is
in imminent danger of serious physical injury.” (Doc. #6, at 2).
Bilal now moves the Court to reconsider its Order enforcing the
Filing Injunction.
Reconsideration

of

a

court’s

previous

order

is

an

extraordinary remedy and, thus, is a power which should be used
sparingly.

Carter

v.

Premier

Restaurant

Management,

2006

WL

2620302 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2006) (citing Am. Ass’n of People
with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (M.D. Fla.
2003)).

The

courts

have

justifying

reconsideration:

“delineated
(1)

an

Bilal v. Moore, 3:99-cv-456-LAC-SMN.

3

three

intervening

major

grounds

change

in

the

controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence; (3) the
need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Susman
v. Salem, Saxon & Meilson, P.A., 153 F.R.D. 689, 904 (M.D. Fla.
1994).

“A motion for reconsideration should raise new issues, not

merely readdress issues litigated previously.” Paine Webber Income
Props. Three Ltd. Partnership v. Mobil Oil Corp., 902 F. Supp.
1514, 1521 (M.D. Fla. 1995).

The motion must set forth facts or

law of a strongly convincing nature to demonstrate to the court
the reason to reverse its prior decision. Carter, 2006 WL 2620302
at *1 (citing Taylor Woodrow Constr. Corp. v. Sarasota/Manatee
Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1072, 1072-1073 (M.D. Fla. 1993)).

A motion

for reconsideration does not provide an opportunity to simply
reargue—or argue for the first time—an issue the Court has already
determined.

Carter, 2006 WL 2620302 at *1.

The Court’s opinions

“are not intended as mere first drafts, subject to revision and
reconsideration at a litigant’s pleasure.” Id. (citing Quaker
Alloy Casting Co. v. Gulfco Indus., Inc., 123 F.R.D. 282, 288 (N.D.
Ill. 1988)).

“The burden is upon the movant to establish the

extraordinary circumstances supporting reconsideration.” Mannings
v. School Bd. of Hillsboro County, Fla., 149 F.R.D. 235, 235 (M.D.
Fla. 1993).

“Unless the movant’s arguments fall into the limited

categories outlined above, a motion to reconsider must be denied.”
Carter, 2006 WL 2620302 at *1.

4

As grounds to reconsider the Court’s Order denying him IFP
because of the Filing Injunction, Bilal avers that he was a
prisoner in the Department of Corrections at the time the Filing
Injunction was issued, and claims the Filing Injunction no longer
applies to him because now he is a civil detainee.
Bilal’s argument lacks merit.

According to the District

Court for the District of Northern Florida, Bilal was a civil
detainee at the FCCC when the Filing Injunction was issued. In the
Order

issuing

the

Filing

Injunction,

the

Court

expressly

recognized that Plaintiff was “no longer a prisoner, but rather a
civil detainee[.]”Bilal v. Moore, 3:99-cv-456-LAC-SMN, (Doc. #3,
at 3).

The Court continued that had Bilal been a prisoner, 28

U.S.C. § 1915(g) would have precluded him from filing civil cases
in forma pauperis absent a showing of imminent danger, and a civil
filing injunction would have been unnecessary. Id. Thus, the Motion
to Reconsider the Order denying Bilal IFP because of the Filing
Injunction is due to be denied.
Further, in its November 21, 2016 Order, the District Court
directed Bilal to pay the Court’s filing fee of $400.00 on or
before December 7, 2016, or have his case dismissed.

To date

Bilal has not paid his $400.00 filing but instead filed the instant
Motion.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby

5

ORDERED:
Plaintiff, Jamaal Ali Bilal's Motion for Relief of Order (Doc.
#7) is DENIED.

Bilal has up to and including May 5, 2017, to pay

the $400.00 filing fee.

Failure to comply with this Order will

result in his case being dismissed without further notice.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of April, 2017.

Copies:
Jamaal Ali Bilal
Counsel of record
SA: FtMP-2

6

20th

day