Frye v. Barbour et al

Filing 19

ORDER OF DISMISSAL dismissing 15 Amended Complaint, 1 Complaint as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. Defendants' motions to dismiss are dismissed without prejudice as moot. The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 9/22/2017. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JAMES ERNEST FRYE, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No:

2:16-cv-832-FtM-29MRM

WILLIAM H. BARBOUR, JR.,
Judge, GREGORY K. DAVIS,
Prosecutor, UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA, and U.S.
DISTRICT COURT, SOUTH
DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff James Ernest Frye, Jr. initiated this action on
November 14, 2016 by filing a pleading entitled “Verified Amended
Complaint Bill in Equity” (Doc. 1).

He subsequently filed another

pleading entitled “Amended Bill in Equity in Exclusive Equity”
(Doc. 15, filed April 24, 2017).

Plaintiff purports to file suit

against the United States of America, the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi, United States
District Judge William H. Barbour, and United States Attorney
Gregory K. Davis.

Id.

Plaintiff proceeds pro se and has paid the

filing fee (Receipt No. FTM010361).

The United States of America

and its District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi
move to dismiss this this case with prejudice as frivolous and
pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (5), and (6) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure (Doc. 14).

They also filed an amended motion to

dismiss after Plaintiff’s amended pleading (Doc. 16).

Plaintiff

filed a response in opposition to the motions to dismiss (Doc.
18).
The

Court

construes

Plaintiff’s

pleadings

liberally

and

concludes that they do not contain any claims upon which relief
can be granted.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s action is dismissed for

failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and as
frivolous.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, 10, and

12(b)(6).

Because this action is dismissed under § 1915A, the

Court will not separately consider the arguments in the defendants’
motions to dismiss, and they are dismissed without prejudice.
I.

Pleadings

Plaintiff asserts that he is a “guest” at the United States
Penitentiary in Coleman, Florida (Doc. 15 at 2). 1

He appears to

argue that he is entitled to monetary relief because he has
satisfied a judgment in his criminal case (Doc. 15 at 4-5).
remainder of Plaintiff’s pleadings make little sense.
that

United

States

birth

certificates

were

The

He asserts

created

by

the

defendants “to rob ‘We the People,’ which includes every individual

1

Plaintiff’s filings are difficult to decipher and contain
completely irrational and wholly incredible allegations. Because
Plaintiff’s pleadings are incomprehensible, it is impossible to
determine whether venue is proper in this Court.

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Private American National Citizen, first of our sovereignty as a
People, then our constitutionally-created status, and ultimately
our lives, fortunes and sacred honor.”

(Doc. 15-3 at 4).

He

further asserts that his birth certificate, functioning as a
business instrument:
has hoodwinked Private American National
Citizen James Ernest Frye Jr., allegedly named
on said certificate, into an unknown and
covert implied contract by operation of law,
placing Affiant and fellow Private American
National Citizens under an alien, foreign and
yet
“temporary,”
de
facto
military
jurisdiction of the United States created at
first by the “Emergency Banking Relief Act,”
its
initial
paragraphs
containing
a
congressionally-amended WWI statute known as
the “Trading with the Enemy Act” codified as
12 USC 95a, and secondly by President Franklin
D.
Roosevelt’s
Emergency
War
Powers
Proclamation 2040 decreed on March 9, 1933.
Id. at 4.

As relief, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages (Doc. 15

at 11).
II.
a.

Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 1915A and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court must review all
civil

complaints

in

which

a

prisoner

seeks

redress

from

a

governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental
entity. See In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1134 (6th Cir. 1997) (“District courts are required to screen
[pursuant to section 1915A] all civil cases brought by prisoners,

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regardless of whether the inmate paid the full filing fee, is a
pauper, is pro se, or is represented by counsel, as the statute
does

not

differentiate

prisoners”).

between

civil

actions

brought

by

Section 1915A provides, in relevant part:

(a)

The court shall review, before docketing,
if feasible or, in any event, as soon as
practicable after docketing, a complaint
in a civil action in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity
or officer or employee of a governmental
entity.

(b)

On review,
cognizable
complaint,
complaint if

the court shall identify
claims
or
dismiss
the
or
any
portion
of
the
the complaint-

(1)

(2)

(c)

is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; or
seeks
monetary
relief
from
a
defendant who is immune from such
relief.

As used in this section, the term
prisoner means any person incarcerated or
detained in any facility who is accused
of, convicted of, sentenced for, or
adjudicated delinquent for, violations
of criminal law or the terms and
conditions
of
parole,
probation,
pretrial
release,
or
diversionary
program.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(c).
A complaint is “frivolous . . . where it lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 325, (1989); Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir.
2001).

Dismissals on this ground should only be ordered when the

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legal theories are “indisputably meritless,” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at
327, or when the claims rely on factual allegations that are
“clearly baseless.”

Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).

Dismissals for failure to state a claim are governed by the same
standard as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Mitchell v.
Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997).

The Court may

dismiss a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if it fails to
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim for relief that is plausible on its face.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
b.

Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
a complaint include a “short and plain statement of the claim”
with “simple, concise, and direct” allegations.
8(a)(2), (d)(1).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

“The point [of Rule 8] is to give the defendant

fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it
rests.” Harrison v. Benchmark Elecs. Huntsville, Inc., 593 F.3d
1206, 1214 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted).

A

“shotgun pleading” where “it is virtually impossible to know which
allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for
relief” does not comply with that standard. See Anderson v. Dist.
Bd. of Trs. of Ctr. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366–67 (11th
Cir. 1996).

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Rule 10 of the Federal Rules further provides that, “[i]f
doing so would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate
transaction or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate
count[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
“‘require

the

pleader

to

Rules 8 and 10 work together and

present

his

claims

discretely

and

succinctly, so that his adversary can discern what he is claiming
and frame a responsive pleading, the court can determine which
facts support which claims and whether the plaintiff has stated
any claims upon which relief can be granted, and, at trial, the
court can determine that evidence which is relevant and that which
is not.’” Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079, 1082 (11th Cir.
1996)

(citation

omitted).

If

the

Court

concludes

that

a

plaintiff’s complaint has failed to meet the requirements of Rule
8(a) or 10(b), it may dismiss the complaint sua sponte for failure
to state a claim.

Driessen ex rel. B.O. v. Florida Dep’t of

Children & Families, No. 09-13149, 2009 WL 3471302 *1 (11th Cir.
2009) (affirming district court’s sua sponte dismissal under Rule
8(a) for failure to state a claim).
Pro se complaints are held to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and can only be dismissed for
failure to state a claim if it appears ‘beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief.’” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
(1979) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972)).

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Nevertheless, pro se litigants are not exempt from complying with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 8(a)(2)’s
pleading standard. GJR Investments, Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, 132
F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Yet even in the case of pro se
litigants this leniency does not give a court license to serve as
de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient
pleading in order to sustain an action[.]” (internal citations
omitted)), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v.
Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 706 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Moon v.
Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating that pro se
litigants are “subject to the relevant law and rules of court,
including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).
III. Analysis
Even
filings

liberally

are

construed,

confusing,

Plaintiff’s

incoherent,

and

“Bill

in

Equity”

unintelligible.

The

pleadings fail to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.
They do not state “simple, concise, and direct” allegations against
any defendant. Plaintiff’s filings also fail to state a claim
against any defendant that is remotely plausible on its face. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
For example, Plaintiff’s pleadings make references to the
“Trading With the Enemy Act” (Doc. 15-2 at 4).

The Trading with

the Enemies Act was enacted to allow allies and non-enemies to
recover property vested with the United States government during

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World War I and World War II. See Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S.
666, 667 (1960).

Plaintiff does not allege facts showing that he

has any right to relief pursuant to the Trading with the Enemies
Act.

See Bechard v. Rios, No. 14-cv-867-wmc, 2014 WL 7366226, *1

(W.D. Wis. Dec. 24, 2014) (dismissing a complaint with prejudice
where the pro se plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim
pursuant to the Trading with the Enemies Act).
Plaintiff also cites to the “Emergency Banking Relief Act”
(Doc. 15-2 at 4, 9).

The National Emergency Banking Relief Act,

codified at 12 U.S.C. § 95, was passed by Congress in 1933 and
deals with the solvency of banks and the operation of the Federal
Reserve

System

during

emergencies.

Plaintiff

offers

no

allegations that could provide him with relief pursuant to the
Emergency Banking Relief Act.

Cearley v. United States, 119 Fed.

Cl. 340, 344 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 8, 2014) (dismissing a pro se complaint
for failing to state a claim pursuant to the Emergency Banking
Relief Act); Hardgrove v. Georgia, No. 5:11-cv-349 (CAR), 2011 WL
4526755, *2 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2011) (dismissing as frivolous a
pro se complaint based on the Emergency Banking Relief Act).
It also appears that Plaintiff may be attempting to raise a
claim that this Court lacks jurisdiction over him and that he is
a sovereign citizen, not subject to the laws of the United States
of America (Doc. 1; Doc. 15; Doc. 15-3).

However, the courts that

have considered such “sovereign citizen” claims have found them to

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be frivolous. See United States v. Sterling, 738 F.3d 228, 233 n.1
(11th

Cir.

2013)

(recognizing

that

courts

routinely

reject

“sovereign citizen” claims as frivolous); United States v. Benabe,
654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Regardless of an individual’s
claimed status of descent, be it as a ‘sovereign citizen,’ a
‘secured-party creditor,’ or a ‘flesh-and-blood human being,’ that
person is not beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. These theories
should be rejected summarily, however they are presented.”); Akbar
v. Clarke, No. 1:15cv338, 2016 WL 4150456, at *7 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1,
2016)

(noting

that

sovereign

citizen

claims

are

“wholly

frivolous”).
Finally, the issuance of Plaintiff’s birth certificate did
not

create

a

fictitious

legal

entity

simply

by

capitalizing

Plaintiff’s name (Doc. 15-3 at 8), and it did not turn such
artificial person into an enemy of the state under the Emergency
Banking Relief Act of 1933 or the Trading with the Enemy Act of
1917.

Moreover, Plaintiff cannot bind the defendants to his

fictitious

notions

and

nonsensical

procedural

documents

by

demanding responses or rebuttals to his self-executed “Notice of
Fault” within 10 or 20 days (Doc. 15 at 5).
repeatedly

rejected

frivolous. 2 See

2

such

Muhammad

The courts have

“redemptionist”

arguments

v.

3:13–cv–760,

Smith,

No.

as

utterly
2014

WL

Redemptionist theory, a tenant of the sovereign citizen

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3670609, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (“Theories presented by
redemptionist and sovereign citizen adherents have not only been
rejected by the courts, but also recognized as frivolous and a
waste of court resources.”) (collecting cases).
Because this action is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A as
frivolous and under Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the Court need not consider the arguments raised in the
defendants’ motions to dismiss.

movement, propounds that:
[A] person has a split personality: a real
person and a fictional person called the
“strawman.” . . . Redemptionists claim that
government has power only over the strawman
and not over the live person, who remains free
[and, thus,] individuals can free themselves
by filing UCC financing statements, thereby
acquiring an interest in their strawman.
Thereafter, [pursuant to this “theory,”] the
real person can demand that government
officials pay enormous sums of money to use
the strawman’s name or, in the case of
prisoners, to keep him in custody. If
government officials refuse, [adherents of
this scheme] file liens against [government
officials]. Adherents of this scheme also
advocate that [they] copyright their names to
justify filing liens against officials using
their names in public records such as
indictments or court papers.
Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2008).
Plaintiff
asserts that equity jurisprudence and the Uniform Commercial Code
requires his release “by means of a duly filed and publicly
recorded ‘Release Without Consideration –Nunc Pro Tunc Ab
Initio.’” (Doc. 15-3 at 6) (emphasis in original).

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IV.

Conclusion

The Court finds that Plaintiff’s pleadings do not provide the
defendants with fair notice of the wrongs they have allegedly
committed and they are dismissed pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court additionally finds that

Plaintiff’s action is frivolous and does not state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.

Amendment is not permitted as it is

apparent from Plaintiff’s pleadings that granting leave to amend
would be futile. Mitchell v. Thompson, 564 F. App’x 452, 456 (11th
Cir. 2014) (affirming denial of pro se plaintiff’s motion for leave
to amend based on futility of amendment).

Because this action is

dismissed, the Court will not consider the arguments raised in the
defendants’ motions to dismiss.
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1.

Plaintiff’s “Verified Amended Complaint Bill in Equity”

(Doc. 1) and “Amended Bill in Equity in Exclusive Equity” (Doc.
15) are DISMISSED as frivolous and for failure to state a claim on
which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(1).

The pleadings

are also dismissed under Rules 8 and 10 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
2.

The defendants’ motions to dismiss (Doc. 14; Doc. 16)

are DISMISSED without prejudice as moot.

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3.

The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate any pending

motions, close this case, and enter judgment accordingly.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this
of September, 2017.

SA: OrlP-4
Copies: James Ernest Frye, Jr.
Counsel of Record

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22nd

day