Jackson National Life Insurance Company v. Tottenham et al

Filing 39

OPINION AND ORDER denying 36 Motion for summary judgment; denying 38 Motion for Interpleader Disbursement (28 U.S.C. Section 1335). Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 1/16/2018. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JACKSON
NATIONAL
INSURANCE COMPANY,

LIFE

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No:

2:16-cv-883-FtM-29MRM

PATRICK J. TOTTENHAM, as
personal representative for
the estate of Teresa A.
Sievers and MARK D. SIEVERS,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on the defendant’s Motion
for

Summary

Judgment

(Doc.

#36)

filed

on

December

14,

2017.

Plaintiff filed an Unopposed Motion for Order of Interpleader (Doc.
#38) on December 28, 2017, in response.

Defendant Mark D. Sievers

is in default.
I.
Summary

judgment

is

appropriate

only

when

the

Court

is

satisfied that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

“An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if the

record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party.”

Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us,

Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010).

A fact is “material”

if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“A

court must decide ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’”
Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
II.
As previously stated, in the Court’s October 30, 2017, Opinion
and Order (Doc. #35):
The
undisputed
facts
in
the
Complaint
establish that Mark D. Sievers (husband of
Teresa A. Sievers) is the primary and only
beneficiary of the attached traditional IRA
annuity contract. (Doc. #1-1.) No contingent
beneficiary is designated in the annuity
contract unless no beneficiary survives, in
which case the proceeds would revert to Teresa
A. Sievers’ estate. (Doc. #1, 8; Doc. #1-1,
pp. 10, 17.)
. . .
On or about June 29, 2015, Teresa A. Sievers
was found dead in her home of blunt force
trauma, and the cause of death was ruled a
homicide. (Doc. #1, ¶ 10.) Upon notification
that Mark D. Sievers was a person of interest,
and upon request of the Lee County Sheriff’s
Office to hold any payment of proceeds,
plaintiff held disbursement of proceeds in
abeyance. (Id., ¶ 11.) Since then, Mark D.
Sievers has been arrested and charged with his
wife’s murder, and is awaiting trial. (Id., ¶
12.)
Plaintiff alleges that Mark D. Sievers has a
valid claim to the benefits as the named

2

beneficiary and it has not yet been determined
if he killed his wife. (Id., ¶ 15.) Plaintiff
also alleges that defendant Patrick J.
Tottenham has a valid claim if Mark D. Sievers
is prohibited from receiving the proceeds
under Fla. Stat. § 732.802(3). (Id., ¶ 16.) No
final judgment of conviction has been entered,
and no other determination has been made as to
whether
the
killing
was
unlawful
and
intentional.
(Doc. #35, pp. 1-3) (emphasis added).

It is Patrick J. Tottenham,

as representative of the Estate of Teresa A. Sievers (the Estate),
who seeks summary judgment in its favor.

The Estate argues that

Sievers no longer has a valid claim because Sievers is in default,
although there has been no formal disclaimer or renouncement of
his rights.

Plaintiff filed a motion stating its non-opposition

to the motion, but asking that it be provided with the protections
against liability of an interpleader action.

Both Jackson and the

Estate invoke the “slayer statute” as a basis for the Estate’s
entitlement to proceeds but have provided no factual support for
their position.
III.
Under Florida law, “[a] named beneficiary of a bond, life
insurance policy, or other contractual arrangement who unlawfully
and intentionally kills the principal obligee or the person upon
whose life the policy is issued is not entitled to any benefit
under the bond, policy, or other contractual arrangement; and it
becomes payable as though the killer had predeceased the decedent.”

3

Fla. Stat. § 732.802(3). “A final judgment of conviction of murder
in any degree is conclusive for purposes of this section. In the
absence of a conviction of murder in any degree, the court may
determine by the greater weight of the evidence whether the killing
was unlawful and intentional for purposes of this section.”
Stat. § 732.802(5).

Fla.

“A party invoking the slayer statute, also

called the Murder Probate Statute, to prevent an unconvicted
killer’s acquisition of property has the burden of proving that
the killing was both intentional and unlawful.”

Congleton v.

Sansom, 664 So. 2d 276, 280 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).

“To prevent a

beneficiary from taking under the Slayer Statute, a party must
prove the decedent was intentionally and unjustifiably killed by
the beneficiary.”

Dougherty v. Cole, 401 Ill. App. 3d 341, 346,

934 N.E.2d 16, 20 (2010).
Although criminal charges were filed and the case is pending,
there has been no final conviction.

Further, no civil action has

been filed by either Jackson National Life Insurance Company
(Jackson) or the Estate to determine if Sievers, by the greater
weight of the evidence, intentionally and unlawfully killed his
wife.

Carter v. Carter, 88 So. 2d 153, 158 (Fla. 1956).

By

defaulting, Sievers may simply be exercising his Fifth Amendment
privilege, which would preclude simultaneously seeking proceeds in
this case.

See New York Life Ins. & Annuity Corp. v. Gerth, No.

8:12-CV-1954-T-30MAP, 2014 WL 12617556, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23,

4

2014) (The Fifth Amendment cannot be used as “a sword and a
shield”) (citing Zabrani v. Riveron, 495 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (Fla.
3d DCA 1986)).
The Court finds that the Estate has not met its burden to
prove the slayer statute precludes Sievers’ interest, and the
Estate does not yet have a vested interest in the proceeds.
Therefore, the Estate is not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. Defendant

Patrick

J.

Tottenham’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment (Doc. #36) is DENIED.
2. Plaintiff’s Unopposed Motion for Order of Interpleader
(Doc. #38) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
January, 2018.

Copies:
Counsel of record

5

16th

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