Handlon v. United States of America et al

Filing 10

ORDER OF DISMISSAL directing the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of defendants, and to close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 5/26/2017. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
QUINTON PAUL HANDLON,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:17-cv-273-FtM-99MRM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
STATE OF FLORIDA, CHARLOTTE
COUNTY, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION,
CHARLOTTE
COUNTY
SHERIFF’S
OFFICE,
SEAN M. DAVOLI, KEVIN T.
CONNOLLY,
JOSEPH
SOUSA,
CHRISTOPHER TISSOT, MICHELLE
A.
THIBEAULT,
BRITTNEY
THIBEAULT, JODIE PAGE, JODY
A. PAGE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S
OFFICE,
TAMA
CALDARONE,
LINDA
MCNAMARA,
JAMES
LAPPAN,
and
MARTIN
DEROVANESIAN,
Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
This matter comes before the Court upon the civil rights
complaint filed by Quinton Paul Handlon (“Plaintiff”), an inmate
at the Coleman Federal Correctional Complex in Coleman, Florida
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) 1 (Doc. 1, filed
May 18, 2017).

1

In Bivens, the United States Supreme Court created a cause
of action against the federal government similar to the one in 42
U.S.C. § 1983 claims against the states.

Plaintiff

seeks

to

proceed

in

forma

pauperis

(Doc.

5).

Therefore, this Court must review his complaint to determine
whether it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)(iii).
state

Upon review, the Court concludes that Plaintiff does not
a

cognizable

defendant.

federal

civil

rights

claim

against

any

Therefore, his complaint is dismissed pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii).
I.

Complaint

Plaintiff asserts, without elaboration, that he raises claims
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution (Doc. 1 at 3).

Plaintiff also asserts that he raises

a claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that
the prosecution must turn over all exculpatory evidence to the
defense).

He names as defendants the United States of America,

the State of Florida, Charlotte County, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Charlotte County Sheriff’s Department, Deputy Sean
Davoli,
Detective

Detective

Kevin

Christopher

Connolly,

Tissot,

Detective

Michelle

A.

Joseph

Thibeault,

Sousa,
Brittney

Thibeault, FBI-TFO Jodie Page, FBI-TFO Jody A. Page, the United
States Attorney General’s Office, U.S. Attorney Tama Caldarone,
U.S.

Attorney

Linda

McNamara,

Federal

Public

Defender

James

Lappan, and Public Defender Martin DerOvanesian (Doc. 1 at 2-5).

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Plaintiff does not actually set forth the substance of his
constitutional civil rights claims in his complaint. 2

Rather, he

directs the Court to numerous attached documents and emails that
he believes prove his innocence of the crimes for which he was
convicted: producing child pornography, coercing and enticing a
minor for the production of child pornography, and possession of
child pornography. See criminal case number 2:13-cr-145-FtM-29CM.
Notably, Plaintiff has already challenged his criminal conviction
by filing a virtually identical pleading and these same supporting
documents in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, which is currently pending
before this Court. See Case Number 2:16-cv-813-FtM-29CM (“Habeas
Petition”).

In

his

Habeas

Petition,

Plaintiff

raises

the

following claims:
In Ground One, Plaintiff asserts that an
illegal search and seizure occurred because
2

Plaintiff’s failure to set forth his claims, standing alone,
justifies
dismissal
of
this
case
under
28
U.S.C.
§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Although the Court is required to liberally
construe a pro se complaint, neither the Court nor the defendants
are required to comb through a virtually incomprehensible pleading
in order to cobble together a claim on Plaintiff’s behalf. See GJR
Investments, Inc. v. County of Escambia, 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th
Cir. 1998) (“[t]his leniency does not give a court license to serve
as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise
deficient pleading in order to sustain an action[.]”) (citations
omitted), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Randall v.
Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 709 (11th Cir. 2010).
Where, as here, a
complaint amounts to a “labyrinthian prolixity of unrelated and
vituperative charges that def[y] comprehension,” dismissal is
appropriate. Prezzi v. Schelter, 469 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1972);
Baron v. Complete Mgt., Inc., 260 F. App’x 399, 400 (2d Cir. 2008)
(affirming dismissal of complaint described as “virtually
unintelligible” and “frivolous and harassing”).

- 3 -

law enforcement had photographs of messages
from two Facebook accounts, but pursued a
Gmail account where none of the photographs
were found in the nearly 300 emails collected.
Plaintiff argues that no effort was made to
trace the IP address for the origin of the
emails. Plaintiff further argues that he tried
to raise the issue earlier but his trial and
appellate attorneys refused to do so.
In Ground Two, Plaintiff argues that there was
a bad faith destruction of relevant evidence
because the real Gmail user deleted the emails
after finding out that law enforcement would
read them, and law enforcement failed to
collect the IP address to prove who really
sent the emails, claiming they only made
printed copies of the emails and not the page
providing the sender’s information. Plaintiff
argues that he tried to raise this earlier but
his trial attorneys refused to raise the
issue.
In Ground Three, Plaintiff asserts that trial
counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective
because they refused to raise certain issues,
or “check alibis, etc.” Plaintiff asserts that
his
attorneys
effectively
aided
the
government, and were parties to a conspiracy
to commit fraud upon the Court. Plaintiff
asserts that he has vital exculpatory evidence
that was kept out of trial and withheld from
the jury.
In Ground Four, Plaintiff asserts a Brady
violation, arguing that there must have been
additional emails with attachments that were
not turned over. Plaintiff argues that there
are at least two emails that were withheld by
the government that would have shown that he
was innocent and not the author of the other
emails.
Habeas Petition at 4-9.

Presumably, these are the same claims

raised in the instant civil rights complaint.

- 4 -

As compensation for his allegedly unconstitutional arrest and
conviction, Plaintiff seeks damages in the amount of $7,826.09 per
minute per defendant, starting from May 8, 2013 at 7:30 a.m. (Doc.
1 at 7). 3
II.
A

federal

district

Legal Standards
court

is

required

to

review

a

civil

complaint filed in forma pauperis and dismiss any such complaint
that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

The mandatory language

of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 applies to all proceedings in forma pauperis.
Section 1915 provides:
Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion
thereof, that may have been paid, the court
shall dismiss the case at any time if the court
determines that(A)

the allegation of poverty is untrue;
or

(B)

the action or appeal(i)

is
frivolous
malicious;

(ii)

fails to state a claim on
which
relief
may
be
granted; or

3

or

Because there are eighteen named defendants, Plaintiff seeks
a total of $202,852,252.80 per day in damages. There were 1463
days between May 8, 2013 and May 10, 2017—the date on which
Plaintiff handed the complaint to the prison authorities for
mailing.
Accordingly, Plaintiff seeks $ 296,772,845,846.00 in
damages.

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(iii)

seeks
monetary
relief
against a defendant who
is
immune
from
such
relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
A

complaint

may

be

dismissed

as

frivolous

under

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i) where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

A claim is

frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are
immune from suit or the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly
does not exist. Id. at 327.

In making the above determinations,

all factual allegations in the complaint must be viewed as true.
Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004).
In the case of a pro se action, the Court should construe the
complaint

more

liberally

than

it

would

pleadings

lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980).

drafted

by

Nevertheless, pro

se litigants are not exempt from complying with the requirements
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including Rule 8(a)(2)’s
pleading standard. Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir.
1989) (stating that pro se litigants are “subject to the relevant
law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure”).
III. Analysis
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 imposes liability on one who, under
color of state law, deprives a person “of any rights, privileges,

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or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws[.]” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.

To articulate a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must

allege that: (1) a defendant deprived him of a right secured under
the Constitution or federal law; and (2) such deprivation occurred
under color of state law. Arrington v. Cobb County, 139 F.3d 865,
872 (11th Cir. 1998).

In addition, where a plaintiff seeks to

impose liability on one who is not an active participant in the
alleged constitutional deprivation, that plaintiff must allege and
establish an affirmative causal connection between the defendant’s
conduct and the constitutional deprivation. Williams v. Bennett,
689 F.2d 1370, 1380–81 (11th Cir. 1982).
a.

Plaintiff has not stated § 1983 or Bivens claims against
Michelle A. Thibeault, Brittney Thibeault, or his public
defenders

Plaintiff sues Michelle A. Thibeault, Brittney Thibeault,
Public

Defender

DerOvanesian.

James

Lappan,

and

Public

Defender

Martin

In order for a private party to be subject to

liability under § 1983, that party must have acted under color of
state law.

This requires that the party’s alleged actions are

“fairly attributable to the State,” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982), and that the party “be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor.” Id.

Plaintiff does not

explain how Michelle Thibeault or Brittney Thibeault violated his
constitutional rights; nor does he assert that these defendants
are state actors.

It is clear from the attachments to his

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complaint that the Thibeaults are merely private citizens who
testified against him in court and with whom Plaintiff disagrees.
Moreover, the actions of defense counsel in representing
Plaintiff are the acts of a private party.

The law is clear that

“when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a
defendant in a criminal proceeding,” a public defender is not a
“state actor” for purposes of § 1983. Polk County v. Dodson, 454
U.S. 312, 325 (1981)(holding that under the facts of this case, a
public defender was not acting “under color of state law” but
declining to hold that a public defender never acts in that role).
To the extent Plaintiff urges that these defendants conspired
with the state or the government to convict him, the allegations
of the complaint are insufficient to establish the existence of a
conspiracy

that

would

support

a

§

1983

or

Bivens

claim.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against the Thibeaults and his
public

defenders

are

dismissed

as

frivolous.

28

U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
b.

Plaintiff cannot sue the United States, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, or the United States Attorney’s
Office under Bivens

Plaintiff names the United States, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation,

and

the

defendants (Doc. 1 at 2-3).

United

States

Attorney’s

Office

as

In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status,

the Court construes his constitutional claims against the United
States, the F.B.I., and the United States Attorney’s Office as

- 8 -

claims under Bivens.

However, a Bivens action must be brought

against federal officers in their individual capacities; actions
directly

against

the

United

States

are

barred

by

sovereign

immunity.
Absent

a

waiver,

sovereign

immunity

Government and its agencies from suit.

shields

the

Federal

Loeffler v. Frank, 486

U.S. 549, 554 (1988); Federal Housing Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S.
242, 244 (1940).

Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature.

Indeed, the “terms of [the United States’] consent to be sued in
any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit.”
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). See also
United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983) (“It is
axiomatic that the United States may not be sued without its
consent and that the existence of consent is a prerequisite for
jurisdiction”).
United

States

Accordingly,
and

its

Plaintiff’s

agencies

are

claims

dismissed.

against
28

the

U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B)(iii)
c.

Plaintiff cannot sue the state of Florida under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983

Plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the State of Florida
(Doc. 1 at 3).
a

state

Congress.

for

The Eleventh Amendment bars a § 1983 action against
monetary

damages

unless

waived

by

the

State

or

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,

97-103 (1984).

The State of Florida has not waived its Eleventh

- 9 -

Amendment immunity, nor has Congress abrogated that immunity in §
1983 cases.
1986).

Zatler v. Wainwright, 802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir.

Plaintiff’s

dismissed.
d.

claims

against

the

State

of

Florida

are

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).

Plaintiff cannot sue Charlotte County or the Charlotte
County Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

To the extent that a plaintiff seeks to assess liability
against a governmental entity in Florida, he is required to bring
an action against the name of the individual who holds the office
responsible for the individual’s alleged wrong-doing. See Dean v.
Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 1992).

Even if the Court

liberally construes the complaint as properly naming the Sheriff
of Charlotte County (as opposed to the County or the Sheriff’s
Office), this defendant must still be dismissed.

It is clear from

the allegations in the complaint that the Sheriff did not in any
way directly participate in the alleged constitutional violations.
Plaintiff attempts to attribute liability against the Sheriff
solely on the basis of his supervisory position, and that, without
more, does not subject him to liability.

Mondell v. Dept. of Soc.

Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–692 (1978); McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d
1283 (11th Cir. 2004); LaMarca v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1526, 1538 (11th
Cir.

1993).

Nor

does

Plaintiff’s

complaint

contain

any

allegations of a policy, custom or practice that was the “moving
force” behind the alleged misconduct so as to render the Sheriff

- 10 -

liable in his official capacities.

Board of County Comm’rs v.

Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997); see also Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d
1271, 1292 (11th Cir. 1999); Tennant v. State, 111 F.Supp.2d 1326
(S.D. Fla. 2000).
Accordingly, all claims against Charlotte County and the
Charlotte

County

Sheriff’s

Office

are

dismissed.

Likewise,

Plaintiff has not stated a claim against the Sheriff of Charlotte
County. 28 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii).
e.

Plaintiff cannot sue prosecutors for their actions while
performing prosecutorial duties

Plaintiff sues two prosecuting attorneys (Doc. 1 at 5).
United

States

Supreme

Court

has

held

that

a

prosecutor

The
is

absolutely immune from a suit for damages while acting within the
scope of his or her prosecutorial duties. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 425 (1976).

The Supreme Court pointed out that without

absolute immunity, such actions “could be expected with some
frequency, for a defendant often will transform his resentment at
being prosecuted into the attribution of improper and malicious
actions to the State’s advocate.” Id. at 425.

“[I]f the prosecutor

could be made to answer in court each time such a person charged
him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be directed
from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law.” Id.

The

Imbler Court recognized that a prosecutor’s immunity extends to

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actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution as well as
actions apart from the courtroom:
A prosecuting attorney is required constantly,
in the course of his duty as such, to make
decisions on a wide variety of sensitive
issues. These include questions of whether to
present a case to a grand jury, whether to
file an information, whether and when to
prosecute, whether to dismiss an indictment
against
particular
defendants,
which
witnesses to call, and what other evidence to
present. Preparation both for the initiation
of the criminal process and for a trial, may
require
the
obtaining,
reviewing,
and
evaluating of evidence.
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431.

The Supreme Court emphasized that it is

the interest in protecting the functioning of the prosecutor’s
office, not its occupant, which is of primary importance. The
Imbler Court did not define the outer limits of the prosecutor’s
absolute

immunity,

but

it

did

recognize

that

some

official

activities would not be encompassed, such as “those aspects of the
prosecutor’s
administrator

responsibility
or

that

investigative

cast

him

officer

in

rather

the

role

than

of

an

that

of

advocate.” Id. at 430–31.
Because Plaintiff’s complaint is generally incoherent, it is
impossible

for

this

Court

to

discern

precisely

what

unconstitutional actions the prosecuting attorneys are alleged to
have taken other than to prosecute Plaintiff based on information
he now alleges was incomplete.

To the extent Plaintiff raises

claims relating to any of the prosecutors’ actions surrounding the

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initiation of criminal charges against him or otherwise performing
traditional prosecutorial functions, the claims are dismissed with
prejudice.

See Rivera v. Leal, 359 F.3d 1350, 1353 (11th Cir.

2004) (“A prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for all
actions he takes while performing his function as an advocate for
the government.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1815(e)(2)(B)(iii).
f.

Plaintiff cannot receive
damages in this action

Plaintiff

seeks

almost

three

compensatory

hundred

or

billion

monetary damages against the defendants (Doc. 1 at 7).

punitive

dollars

in

Plaintiff

was confined at Coleman Correctional when he filed this action.
However, the Prison Litigation Reform Act provides that “[n]o
Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined in a
jail,

prison,

or

other

correctional

facility,

for

mental

or

emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing
of physical injury.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e).

The Eleventh Circuit

has interpreted this provision to mean that the PLRA forbids the
litigation, during a prisoner plaintiff’s period of incarceration,
of a lawsuit challenging a prior arrest and seeking damages for
emotional injury therefrom, with no allegation of physical injury.
Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 532 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The
embarrassment or emotional harm caused by [a] mistaken arrest
occur[s], at the earliest, when [the plaintiff is] arrested—or,
using the Miranda construct, at the moment that a reasonable person

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in his situation would feel unable to leave. Because the harm
complained of by Napier occurred while he was in custody, the PLRA
applies to his claim[.]”).

Likewise, Plaintiff seeks damages for

the

by

mental

stress

caused

his

allegedly

wrongful

arrest,

conviction, and imprisonment; however, these damages accrued, at
the earliest, the moment he was arrested. 4
The Eleventh Circuit has addressed the implications of §
1997e(e) and concluded that “the phrase ‘Federal civil action’
means

all

federal

Napier, 314 F.

claims,

3d at

532

including

(11th Cir.

constitutional
2002)

(citing

claims.”
Harris

Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 984–85 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)).

v.
The

instant § 1983 action is a “Federal civil action” under this
definition.

Further, it is undisputed that Plaintiff filed his

complaint while imprisoned, and that his claims fall under the
purview of § 1997e(e).

Plaintiff seeks damages for the distress

and mental injuries he suffered as a result of the defendants’
conduct in investigating his case, effectuating his arrest, and
ensuring his conviction.

However, he alleges no physical injury.

4

Presumably, Plaintiff was arrested on May 8, 2013 – the
date on which he demands damages be calculated (Doc. 1 at 7).
Plaintiff did not mail the instant complaint to this Court until
May 10, 2017 (Doc. 1-2). Accordingly, even if Plaintiff argues
that some of his claims are based upon conduct that occurred prior
to his custody, these claims would likely be barred by a four-year
statute of limitation. See Omar ex rel. Cannon v. Lindsey, 334
F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003) (“The applicable statute of
limitations in a § 1983 lawsuit is the four-year Florida state
statute of limitations for personal injuries.”).

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Accordingly,

Plaintiff’s

claims

for

compensatory

and

punitive

damages due to the mental anguish caused by a wrongful arrest must
be dismissed with prejudice.
g.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 5

Any remaining claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey

In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), the Supreme Court
held that:
[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment,
or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal
authorized
to
make
such
determination, or called into question by a
federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
512 U.S. at 486–87.

If such a § 1983 action is brought before the

challenged conviction or sentence is invalidated, it must be
dismissed. 6

Id. at 48.

Thus, “the district court must consider

5

If Plaintiff can demonstrate a constitutional injury
associated with the allegedly wrongful arrest and seeks only
nominal damages of one dollar, he is not barred under § 1997e(e).
See Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding
that § 1997e(e) does not bar suits by prisoners who have not
alleged a physical injury if they seek nominal damages—generally
of one dollar); Kyle v. Patterson, 196 F.3d 695, 697 (7th Cir.
1999) (“[N]ominal damages, of which $1 is the norm, are an
appropriate means of vindicating rights whose deprivation has not
caused actual, provable injury.”).
6

A Bivens claim is analogous to a § 1983 claim against a
state or local officer. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Siegelman, 322 F.3d
1290, 1297 n.15 (11th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, Heck applies with

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whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily
imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,
the

complaint

must

be

dismissed

unless

the

plaintiff

can

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff asserts that the defendants either falsified
documents and evidence used in his prosecution, or failed to
discover that certain incriminating emails were actually written
by someone else.

These assertions necessarily implicate the

validity of his underlying federal child pornography convictions.
Absent the invalidation of his convictions, which has not occurred,
Plaintiff’s civil rights claims for monetary damages are barred.
Id; see also Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 536-37 (2011)
(recognizing that Brady claims rank “within the traditional core
of habeas corpus and outside the province of § 1983”) (citing Heck,
512 U.S. at 479, 490). 7

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against

equal force to claims brought pursuant to Bivens. Abella v. Rubino,
63 F.3d 1063, 1065 (11th Cir. 1995).
7

Plaintiff urges, without explanation, that his Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated (Doc. 1 at 3).
Because an
illegal search and seizure may be followed by a valid conviction,
a successful § 1983 claim for a Fourth Amendment search and seizure
violation does not necessarily imply the invalidity of a
conviction.
Therefore, not every Fourth Amendment claim is
precluded by Heck v. Humphrey. See Hughes v. Lott, 350 f.3d 1157,
1160-61 (11th Cir. 2003).
Although Plaintiff raises a general
Fourth Amendment claim, he does not now specify conduct by any
defendant he believes violated the Fourth Amendment’s search and
seizure clause, other than to imply that the searches undertaken

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the remaining defendants must be dismissed without prejudice for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.
IV.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s claims against defendants who are immune from
suit and for monetary damages are dismissed with prejudice. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).
premature

because

overturned.

his

Plaintiff’s remaining claims are

criminal

Accordingly,

convictions

Plaintiff’s

have

Heck-barred

not
claims

been
are

dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

With no

remaining claims or defendants, the Clerk of Court is directed to
terminate any pending motions, close this case, and enter judgment
in favor of the defendants.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on this

26th

day

of May, 2017.

SA: OrlP-4
Copies: Quinton Paul Handlon
by the deputies were insufficient or incomplete because they did
not include a search of his Facebook messages or the IP address of
the sender.
In other words, Plaintiff urges that his Fourth
Amendment right to be free from an unreasonable search was violated
because the defendants’ legal searches did not uncover exculpatory
evidence.
Even if this illogical argument stated a Fourth
Amendment claim, which it does not, success on the claim would
imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s conviction, and therefore, the
claim would be Heck-barred.

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