Prunty et al v. Desoto County School Board and District et al

Filing 65

OPINION AND ORDER granting 27 motion to dismiss; granting 28 motion to dismiss; granting 39 motion to dismiss and the 25 First Amended Complaint is dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions (terminating 64 Motion) and deadlines and close the file. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 9/22/2017. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
ROBERT R. PRUNTY,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No:

2:17-cv-291-FtM-99CM

AGENCY
FOR
HEALTHCARE
ADMINISTRATION,
ELIZABETH
DUDEK, Director, THE JACK
NICKLAUS MIAMI CHILDREN’S
HOSPITAL,
THE
SCHOOL
DISTRICT OF DESOTO COUNTY &
BOARD OF DIRECTORS, and ALEX
SOTO, & Board of Directors,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Docs. ## 27, 28, 39), and
plaintiff pro se Robert R. Prunty’s Responses (Docs. ## 35, 43,
44).

For the reasons set forth below, the motions are granted.
I.
Plaintiff Robert R. Prunty (plaintiff or Prunty), who is

African-American, is currently proceeding on a twelve-count First
Amended Complaint (Doc. #25) alleging violations of his civil and
constitutional rights because defendants denied him the benefits
of federal programs and the right to be involved in the formation
of

Individualized

Education

Program

contracts

children who have been diagnosed with Autism.

(IEPs)

for

his

Prunty alleges that

defendants’ unconstitutional practices are not being applied to
Caucasian parents.

(Id. at § 13.)

He claims violations of his

“fundamental constitutional rights,” 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and 42
U.S.C. § 1983 1, as well as common law claims for invasion of privacy
and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Plaintiff seeks

to enjoin defendants from following Florida Statute § 1003.57 and
Florida Department of Education Rule 6A-6.034111 et seq. because
the statute and rule are unconstitutional and deny plaintiff’s
parental rights to be involved in the IEP process under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (IDEA) procedural
rules, and discriminate against plaintiff based on his race.

(Id.

at ¶¶ 12-13.)
II.
Once again, the Court notes as an initial matter that this
is not the first case Prunty has filed alleging similar violations
of his civil and constitutional rights based upon similar conduct
against many of the same defendants.

See Prunty v. Sibelius et

al., No. 2:14-cv-313; Prunty v. Johnson & Johnson et al., No. 2:15cv-105; and Prunty v. DeSoto Cnty. Sch. Dist. et al., No. 2:16cv-577.

In these cases, the Court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint

1

Plaintiff alleges that his First, Fifth, Thirteenth, and
Fourteenth Amendment right to control the care, custody,
upbringing, and education of his children has been denied because
defendants have precluded him from participating in the IEP process
for his children. (Doc. #25, ¶ 23(a).)

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without prejudice for failure to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative
remedies.

See Prunty v. Sibelius et al., 2014 WL 7066430, at 3

(M.D. Fla. Dec. 12, 2014); Prunty v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc. et
al., 2015 WL 2019411 (M.D. Fla. May 1, 2015); Prunty v. DeSoto
Cnty. Sch. Dist. et al., 2017 WL 435696 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2017).
In Johnson & Johnson, the Court stated: “Thus, the Court emphasizes
that the dismissal here is not premised upon a ‘technicality’ that
Prunty may avoid via refiling or further amendment.

Any future

cases concerning the School Board’s actions in connection with
Prunty’s children’s IEPs will be subject to summary dismissal
unless Prunty alleges that he has fully exhausted the IDEA’s
administrative remedies.”

Id. at *3.

In DeSoto Cnty. Sch. Dist.,

the Court stated:
Assuming the allegations in the First Amended Complaint
are true, Prunty may have a viable IDEA claim. However,
Prunty cannot assert that claim (whether characterized
as a violation of the IDEA, Title VI, Section 1981,
Section 1983, or any other statutory or constitutional
provision), unless and until he participates in and
completes the IDEA’s administrative dispute resolution
procedures.
2017 WL 435696, at *2.
Defendants move to dismiss, in part, on this basis that the
Amended Complaint fails to exhaust IDEA’s administrative remedies
and should otherwise be dismissed as duplicative of Prunty v.
DeSoto Cnty.

Sch.

Dist.

et

al.,

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No.

2:16-cv-577.

Plaintiff

responds

that

exhaustion

is

not

required

for

claims

brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
III.
If a student is covered by the IDEA, school officials are
required to create an IEP for that student to facilitate their
academic progress.
516, 519 (2007).

Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S.

Students with Autism, such as Prunty’s children,

are covered by the IDEA.

Id.

As a parent, Prunty has the

statutory right to contribute to the IEP process.
to Prunty, defendants deprived him of that right.
#25, ¶¶ 7, 15-19.

the

According

See, e.g., Doc.

Parents of covered children are “entitled to

prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf.”
at 535.

Id.

Winkelman, 550 U.S.

However, before filing a civil action for a violation of

IDEA,

a

plaintiff

must

first

exhaust

all

available

administrative remedies, including a meeting with school officials
and a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge.

J.P. v. Cherokee

Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 218 F. App’x 911, 913 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The
philosophy of the IDEA is that plaintiffs are required to utilize
the elaborate administrative scheme established by the IDEA before
resorting to the courts to challenge the actions of the local
school

authorities.”).

The

IDEA’s

broad

complaint

provision

affords the “opportunity to present complaints with respect to any
matter relating to the identification, evaluation, or educational

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placement of the child, or the provision of a free appropriate
public education [FAPE] to such child.”

20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6).

The IDEA’s exhaustion requirements apply even if a plaintiff
seeks relief via a different statute.

Babicz v. Sch. Bd. of

Broward Cnty., 135 F.3d 1420, 1422 n.10 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[A]ny
student who wants relief that is available under the IDEA must use
the IDEA’s administrative system even if he invokes a different
statute.”).
required

“[T]he exhaustion of administrative process is not

where

inadequate.

resort

to

those

remedies

would

be

futile

or

For example, courts have not required exhaustion of

administrative

remedies

when

the

administrative

incapable of granting the relief requested.”

procedure

is

Assoc. for Retarded

Citizens of Ala. v. Teague, 830 F.2d 158, 160 (11th Cir. 1987)
(citations omitted).
The Court notes plaintiff’s argument that the United States
Supreme Court has held that the exhaustion of state administrative
remedies is not required as a prerequisite to bring an action
pursuant to Section 1983.

See Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of State

of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982).

Yet the Eleventh Circuit has

found that a parent may not proceed with a Section 1983 claim for
violations of the IDEA without first exhausting administrative
remedies afforded by the IDEA if the parent is requesting relief
that the administrative authorities could grant.

N.B. by D.G. v.

Alachua Cnty. Sch. Bd., 84 F.3d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1996); M.T.V.

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v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 1153, (11th Cir. 2006)
(finding that parent must first exhaust administrative remedies
before seeking relief for violations of the ADA, Section 504, the
IDEA, the First Amendment, and Section 1983).
Here, plaintiff’s Amended Complaint demonstrates that the
relief sought is a vindication of Prunty’s right to be involved in
the IEP process for his children under IDEA, and Prunty continually
references that defendants’ actions are in violation of the statue
throughout his Amended Complaint. 2

See Doc. #25, ¶¶ 2, 4, 7, 16,

19, 28, 31, 37, 43, 52, 58, 59, 61, 67, 73, 83, 90, 103.

Although

Prunty argues that he is challenging the constitutionality of
Florida

Statute

§

1003.57

regarding

exceptional

student

instruction, in reality he is claiming that the defendants did not
follow the procedures as set forth in the statute, in contravention
of the IDEA.
is in place.

This is exactly why the IDEA’s administrative process
See N.B., 84 F.3d at 1379 (exhaustion requirement

in place to prevent deliberate disregard and circumvention of
agency procedures established by Congress).
As the Court has previously noted, before Prunty may assert
a claim (whether characterized as a violation of the IDEA, Title

2

And there is otherwise no indication that plaintiff has
exhausted his administrative remedies since the Court’s dismissal
of his 2016 case, nor that the administrative process is incapable
of granting plaintiff the requested relief such that plaintiff may
bypass the administrative process.

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VI,

Section

1981,

Section

1983,

or

any

other

statutory

or

constitutional provision), unless and until he participates in and
completes the IDEA’s administrative dispute resolution procedures.
See Babicz v. Sch. Bd. of Broward Cnty., 135 F.3d 1420, 1422 n.10
(11th Cir. 1998) (“[A]ny student who wants relief that is available
under the IDEA must use the IDEA’s administrative system even if
he invokes a different statute.”).
Therefore, the First Amended Complaint is dismissed without
prejudice

to

refiling

following

exhaustion

of

the

IDEA’s

administrative procedures.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint (Docs. ##
27, 28, 39) are GRANTED and the First Amended Complaint (Doc. #25)
is dismissed without prejudice.
2. The Clerk shall terminate all pending motions and deadlines
as moot, and close the file.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
of September, 2017.

Copies:
Plaintiff
Counsel of Record

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22nd

day