Rawls v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 23

OPINION AND ORDER adopting 20 Report and Recommendations; overruling 21 objections. The Decision of the Commissioner is affirmed. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and close the file. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 3/8/2019. (RKR)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
JAMES STEVEN RAWLS, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No:

COMMISSIONER
SECURITY,

OF

2:17-cv-523-FtM-99PDB

SOCIAL

Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
This

matter

is

before

the

Court

on

consideration

of

Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale’s Report and Recommendation
(Doc. #20), filed on February 6, 2019, recommending that the
Decision

of

the

Commissioner

be

affirmed.

Plaintiff

filed

Objections (Doc. #21) on February 20, 2019, and the Commissioner
filed a Response (Doc. #22) on February 26, 2019.

For the reasons

set forth below, the objections are overruled, the Report and
Recommendation is accepted and adopted, and the Decision of the
Commissioner is affirmed.
I.

Standard of Review

After conducting a careful and complete review of the findings
and recommendations, a district judge may accept, reject or modify
the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation.
636(b)(1).

28 U.S.C. §

A district judge “shall make a de novo determination

of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations
636(b)(1).

to

which

objection

is

made.”

28

U.S.C.

§

Despite plaintiff’s statement to the contrary (Doc.

#21, p. 1), failure to raise objections forfeits plaintiff’s right
to a de novo review in the district court and appellate review by
any standard other than plain error.

See Doc. #20, n.23 (citations

omitted).
The Court reviews the Commissioner’s decision to determine if
it is supported by substantial evidence and based upon proper legal
standards.

Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158

(11th Cir. 2004)(citing Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1439
(11th Cir. 1997)).

Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla

but less than a preponderance, and is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005)(citing
Crawford,

363

F.3d

at

1158-59).

Even

if

the

evidence

preponderates against the Commissioner’s findings, the Court must
affirm

if

evidence.

the

decision

Crawford,

363

reached
F.3d

is
at

supported
1158-59

by

(citing

Sullivan, 894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990)).

substantial
Martin

v.

The Court does

not decide facts anew, make credibility judgments, reweigh the
evidence, or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.
Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211 (citing Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d
1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)); Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206,
1210 (11th Cir. 2005)(citing Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232,

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1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)).

The Court reviews the Commissioner’s

conclusions of law under a de novo standard of review.
Comm’r

of

Soc.

Sec.

Admin.,

496

F.3d

1253,

1260

Ingram v.
(11th

Cir.

Report

and

2007)(citing Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529).
II.
Plaintiff

raises

Recommendation.

Plaintiff’s Objections
two

objections

to

the

Plaintiff objects to the finding that plaintiff

did not become disabled prior to August 19, 2013, and the finding
that the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) properly rejected the
opinion of Dr. Suniti Kukreja-Barua.
A. Disability Onset Dates
Plaintiff was born on November 30, 1976.

On August 19, 2013,

petitioner filed an application for disability benefits under
three federal programs:

Child’s insurance benefits, disability

insurance benefits, and supplemental security income benefits.
Plaintiff’s claim to benefits under all three programs asserted he
had

become

disabled

on

October

30,

1998

due

to

a

learning

disability.
Each of the three benefits programs has a different onset
date requirement.

To be eligible for child’s insurance benefits,

plaintiff had to have become disabled before November 30, 1998,
i.e., before he became 22 years old.

To be eligible for disability

insurance benefits, plaintiff had to have become disabled by
September 30, 2002, the last date on which he was insured.

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To be

eligible for supplemental security income (SSI), plaintiff had to
have been disabled by August 19, 2013, the date he filed the SSI
application.
The ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, concluding
that plaintiff was disabled when he filed the application for SSI
benefits, but was not disabled as of either of the relevant dates
for the other benefits.

More specifically, applying the five-step

sequential analysis, the ALJ determined as follows:

At step one,

plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity from the
alleged onset date of October 30, 1998 until the date of the ALJ’s
decision.

At step two, plaintiff had the severe impairment of

“borderline intellectual functioning” since October 30, 1998, and
the severe impairments of “borderline intellectual functioning and
dependent personality disorder” on August 19, 2013.

At step

three, the ALJ found that before plaintiff turned 22 (November 30,
1998) and before the date he was last insured (September 30, 2002)
plaintiff had no impairment or combination of impairment which met
or medically equaled the severity of any impairment in the Listing
of Impairments.
for

SSI

For the period for which plaintiff was eligible

benefits

(beginning

August

19,

2013,

the

date

an

application was filed), the ALJ found that plaintiff satisfied
Listing 12.05 and therefore was disabled as of that date for SSI
benefit purposes.

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The

ALJ

then

determined

plaintiff’s

residual

functional

capacity (RFC) for the two time periods which remained at issue,
concluding plaintiff had the RFC to perform a full range of work
at all exertional levels with certain non-exertional limitations
(performing simple, routine tasks; occasional interactions with
coworkers and supervisors, but no public interaction; occasional
changes in work routine.)

At step four, the ALJ found plaintiff

had no past relevant work for either relevant time periods.

At

step five, the ALJ found that for both relevant time periods there
were jobs in significant numbers in the national economy that
plaintiff could perform, and therefore he was not disabled as of
the cutoff dates for either category of benefits.
The magistrate judge found substantial evidence supported the
ALJ’s findings as to onset dates, to which plaintiff has objected.
After a de novo review, the Court agrees with the magistrate judge.
Substantial evidence supports that ALJ’s findings that plaintiff
was not disabled as of the dates required to be eligible for
child’s

insurance

benefits

or

disability

insurance

benefits.

Plaintiff’s objection is overruled.
B. Dr. Kukreja-Barua
Plaintiff disagrees with the weight given to Dr. KurejaBarua’s opinion by the ALJ, and objects to the findings and
conclusions by the magistrate judge that substantial evidence to

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support the ALJ.

After de novo review, the Court agrees with the

magistrate judge.
Dr. Kureja-Barua found that plaintiff had a mild restriction
of activities of daily living, mild difficulties in maintaining
social

functioning,

concentration,

mild

persistence,

difficulties
or

pace,

and

decompensation, each of extended duration.

in
no

maintaining
episodes

of

On a form, Dr. Kureja-

Barua opined that plaintiff had no restriction in the ability to
remember simple instructions and carry out simple instructions,
with mild restrictions in the ability to make judgments on simple
work-related decisions.

Dr. Kureja-Barua later stated, however,

that a person such as plaintiff would have marked restrictions in
activities

of

concentration,

daily

living

persistence,

and

and

marked

pace

and

restrictions

that

anyone

in

with

a

personality disorder would have marked difficulties in social
functioning.
The ALJ gave Dr. Kureja-Barua’s opinion little weight.

The

ALJ found that Dr. Kureja-Barua’s opinion was “not well supported
or explained, generally consisting of one-sentence conclusions
with

no

explanation.

Her

opinion

is

internally

inconsistent,

finding both only mild "b" criteria and moderate to significant
limitations. Her opinions reflected in testimony were likewise
overbroad and unsupported.”

(Doc. #15-2, Tr. 30.)

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The Court has reviewed the testimony, Doc. #15-2, Tr. 80-97,
and finds that the ALJ’s decision to give Dr. Kureja-Barua’s
opinion

little

weight

is

supported

by

substantial

evidence.

Therefore the objection is overruled.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1.

The

overruled.

Objections

(Doc.

#21)

filed

by

plaintiff

are

The Report and Recommendation (Doc. #20) is accepted

and adopted by the Court.
2.

The Decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is

affirmed under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
3.

The Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment accordingly

and close the file.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
March, 2019.

Copies:
Hon. Patricia D. Barksdale
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Counsel of Record

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8th

day of