Moore v. San Carlos Park Fire Protection & Rescue
Filing
67
ORDER denying 60 Plaintiff Colleen Moore's Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion and Order. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 12/21/2018. (LMF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
COLLEEN MOORE, an individual
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No: 2:17-cv-546-FtM-38MRM
SAN CARLOS PARK FIRE
PROTECTION & RESCUE,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER1
Before the Court is Plaintiff Colleen Moore’s Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion
and Order (Doc. 60), and Defendant San Carlos Park Fire Protection & Rescue’s
response in opposition (Doc. 65). For the reasons below, the Court denies her motion.
Moore sued San Carlos for workplace harassment, retaliation, and constructive
discharge because of her sex.2 (Doc. 1, Doc. 21, Doc. 34, Doc. 44). She had four
attempts to plead her claims against San Carlos. None succeeded. The Court dismissed
her final complaint on several grounds: (1) the hostile work environment and retaliatory
harassment claims were time-barred, (2) the sexual harassment claim duplicated the
hostile work environment claim, and (3) the constructive discharge claim was not plausibly
1
Disclaimer: Documents filed in CM/ECF may contain hyperlinks to other documents or websites. These
hyperlinks are provided only for users’ convenience. Users are cautioned that hyperlinked documents in
CM/ECF are subject to PACER fees. By allowing hyperlinks to other websites, this Court does not endorse,
recommend, approve, or guarantee any third parties or the services or products they provide on their
websites. Likewise, the Court has no agreements with any of these third parties or their websites. The
Court accepts no responsibility for the availability or functionality of any hyperlink. Thus, the fact that a
hyperlink ceases to work or directs the user to some other site does not affect the opinion of the Court.
2
A full review of the underlying facts is unnecessary. The Court has set forth the facts and procedural
history at length in previous orders. (Doc. 31, Doc. 54).
pleaded. (Doc. 54). Before issuing its ruling, the Court held oral argument where Moore
and her counsel were present. (Doc. 53; Doc. 57). Moore’s motion for reconsideration
focuses on the Court’s dismissal order following oral argument. (Doc. 60).
A district court has considerable discretion in deciding whether to grant a motion
for reconsideration. See Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006). In
exercising its discretion, the court balances two competing interests: the need for finality
and the need to render just rulings based on all the facts. Finality typically prevails
because reconsidering an order is an extraordinarily remedy that courts use sparingly.
See Am. Ass’n of People with Disabilities v. Hood, 278 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (M.D. Fla.
2003); Lamar Adver. of Mobile, Inc. v. City of Lakeland, 189 F.R.D. 480, 489 (M.D. Fla.
1999). Along this line, “a motion for consideration is not a vehicle for rehashing arguments
the [c]ourt has already rejected or for attempting to refute the basis for the [c]ourt’s earlier
decision.” Parker v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1359 (M.D. Fla.
2012).
“A motion to reconsider should raise new issues, not merely redress issues
previously litigated.” PaineWebber Income Props. Three Ltd. P’ship v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
902 F. Supp. 1514, 1521 (M.D. Fla. 1995); see also Ludwig v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
No. 8:03-cv-2378, 2005 WL 1053691, at *11 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 30, 2005) (stating “a motion
for reconsideration is not the proper forum for [a] party to vent dissatisfaction with the
Court’s reasoning”). Such motions “must demonstrate why the court should reconsider
its prior decision and set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the
court to reverse its[elf].” Fla. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
2
Because courts disfavor motions for reconsideration, they recognize only three
grounds to reconsider prior orders: (1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the
availability of new evidence; and (3) the need to correct a clear error or manifest injustice.
See McCreary v. Brevard Cnty, Fla., No. 6:09-cv-1394, 2010 WL 2836709, at *1 (M.D.
Fla. July 19, 2010). “The burden is upon the movant to establish the extraordinary
circumstances supporting reconsideration.” Mannings v. Sch. Bd. of Hillsboro Cnty., Fla.,
149 F.R.D. 235, 235 (M.D. Fla. 1993). “Unless the movant’s arguments fall into the limited
categories outlined above, a motion to reconsider must be denied.” Carter v. Premier
Rest. Mgmt., No. 2:06-cv-212, 2006 WL 2620302, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2006). Here,
Moore raises the availability of new evidence (i.e., statements to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) as part of the agency’s investigation into her Charge
of Discrimination) and “new issues supporting the existence of facts necessary to meet
or exceed required pleadings standards” as grounds for reconsideration. (Doc. 60 at 34).
As stated, Moore had four opportunities to plead a case against San Carlos. And
the final complaint fared no better than those before it. Moore withdrew dates and the
offending supervisors’ names from the last pleading, making the allegations more
convoluted and the claims’ timeliness more problematic. But, in an abundance of caution,
the Court wanted to hear from Moore before deciding whether to dismiss her case with
prejudice. It set a hearing, at which all parties appeared with counsel. (Doc. 53; Doc.
57).
Among the matters discussed, the Court asked Moore questions about the
timeliness of her hostile work environment and retaliatory hostile work environment
3
claims. The Court specifically asked what act, discrete or otherwise, occurred during the
limitations period to “bootstrap everything else from 20 years into what would be a viable
complaint in this case.” (Doc. 57 at 10). All Moore noted was an overturned 2010
demotion that led to her work environment becoming “more retaliatory and more hostile.”
(Doc. 57 at 16-17). This demotion, however, occurred outside the limitations period.
Moore could not identify a single act falling within the limitations period. The Court thus
was required to dismiss the claims as time-barred. (Doc. 54).
On the constructive discharge claim, the Court asked Moore why it should not
dismiss the claim as implausible (notably, Moore did not even address San Carlos’
argument to dismiss the claim in her response). Moore vaguely responded, “the facts
that are within the complaint, the third amended complaint, draw to the conditions that
she was facing throughout 20 years, even after the arbitration decision the conditions got
even worse. So the facts are in the actual complaint.” (Doc. 57 at 23-24). Because
Moore offered nothing to defend the constructive discharge claim, the Court dismissed it
too.
Moore now wants this Court to reconsider its dismissal order. As to the hostile
work environment and retaliation claims, she says “[t]he Court was factually incorrect to
hold that Plaintiff MOORE failed to plead any acts of discrimination and/or harassment
within Its [sic] defined statutory period in Its [sic] Opinion and Order (DE 54).” (Doc. 60
at 1). Not so. Moore pled no act contributing to her claims within the filing period despite
several opportunities to do so. To correct that deficiency, Moore argues the Court needed
to consider all four complaints, the attachments to it, and the EEOC public file into her
Charge of Discrimination (i.e., her new evidence) to find timely and plausible claims
4
against San Carlos. This argument is a nonstarter. In our adversarial system, a plaintiff
must plead her case to the court. It is not a court’s job to sypher through several versions
of pleadings and attachments to ascertain if a claim exists. See, e.g., United States v.
Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles
buried in briefs.”). And the liberal pleading standard has limits, especially when parties
are represented by counsel like here. Moore had several opportunities to plead timely
claims against San Carlos, which she did not do. It is not the Court that erred.
Moore’s argument that this Court needed to consider all four complaints and the
attachments is perplexing. Amended complaints supersede previous pleadings. See
Varnes v. Local 91, Glass Bottle Blowers Ass’n of U.S. and Canada, 674 F.2d 1365, 1370
n.6 (11th Cir. 1982) (“As a general rule, an amended complaint supersedes and replaces
the original complaint unless the amendment specifically refers to or adopts the earlier
pleading.”).
After a court accepts an amended pleading, “the original pleading is
abandoned by the amendment, and is no longer a part of the pleader’s averments against
his adversary.” Pintando v. Miami-Dade Hous. Agency, 501 F.3d 1241, 1243 (11th Cir.
2007). The Court did not have to (nor could it) consider the previous pleadings in
dismissing the last complaint, and Moore offers nothing to suggest otherwise other than
her say so.
Finally, Moore’s reliance on the EEOC public file as new evidence to warrant
reconsideration goes nowhere. Her EEOC public file includes these documents: (1) two
letters Moore’s then-attorney wrote to the EEOC investigator dated September 12, 2014
and October 31, 2014; (2) Moore’s EEOC Intake Questionnaire; and (3) a letter from the
EEOC to San Carlos dated March 4, 2014, that requested certain information for the
5
agency’s investigation. (Doc. 60-1). Newly discovered evidence for reconsideration
purposes must be “evidence that could not have been raised prior to the entry of
judgment.” Michael Linet, Inc. v. Vill. of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir.
2005). The first flaw in Moore’s new evidence argument is that she had the EEOC public
file a week before the Court’s decision. Even setting aside this hurdle, she makes no
argument that the “substantive information contained in the documents upon which she
relies was unavailable earlier.” M.G. v. St. Lucie Cnty. Sch. Bd., 741 F.3d 1260, 1262
(11th Cir. 2014).
At bottom, Moore presents no argument or evidence to persuade the Court to
reconsider its prior decision. See Carter, 2006 WL 2620302, at *1 (“Court opinions are
not intended as mere first drafts, subject to revision and reconsideration at a litigant's
pleasure.”). Moore is trying to rehash arguments that the Court has rejected or that should
have been brought earlier. Because Moore fails to present an intervening change in the
controlling law, new evidence, or the need to correct or prevent manifest injustice, the
Court denies her Motion for Reconsideration.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
Plaintiff Colleen Moore’s Motion for Reconsideration of Opinion and Order (Doc.
60) is DENIED.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida this 21st day of December 2018.
Copies: All Parties of Record
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?