USAlliance Federal Credit Union v. Rawlings

Filing 17

ORDER granting 14 Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter default judgment in favor of Plaintiff USAlliance Federal Credit Union and against Defendant Jeff A. Rawlings in the following amounts: a. $28,193.83 in damages, plus continuing interest at the per diem rate of $8.54 from January 6, 2018, through the date of entry of judgment; b. $6,906.00 in attorney's fees; and c.$465.00 in costs. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate all pending motions and close the file. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 3/29/2018. (LMF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
USALLIANCE FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:17-cv-612-FtM-38MRM

JEFF A. RAWLINGS,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER1
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment and
Affidavits in Support (Doc. 14) filed on March 7, 2018. No Response was filed and the
time to do so has expired. The Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not required and
will render a decision based on the documents submitted. For the reasons set forth
below, the Motion is granted.
BACKGROUND
This is an action on a promissory note to recover outstanding indebtedness on a
boat loan. On November 8, 2017, Plaintiff USAlliance Federal Credit Union filed a onecount Complaint for breach of a maritime contract. (Doc. 1). Because Defendant Jeff A.
Rawlings failed to respond to the Complaint, a Clerk’s Entry of Default (Doc. 11) was

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entered on January 3, 2018. Plaintiff now seeks the entry of judgment against Rawlings
for the principal balance owed at the time of the default, late fees, interest accrued, and
attorney’s fees and costs.
When a default judgment occurs, a defendant admits the plaintiff’s well-pled
allegations of fact. If liability is well pled, it is established by virtue of a default judgment.
Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987). The mere entry of a default
by the clerk does not in itself warrant the entry of default by the Court. Rather the Court
must find that there is sufficient basis in the pleadings for the judgment to be entered.
GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp. v. Maitland Hotel Assocs., Ltd., 218 F. Supp. 2d 1355,
1359 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (citation omitted). A complaint must state a claim in order for
default judgment to be granted. Id.
Deeming all facts in the Complaint as admitted, on or about March 10, 2015,
Rawlings borrowed $29,943.00 from USAlliance for the purchase of the 32’ M/V ROBIN’S
NEST, Official Number 1102212, HIN: RGMVA334K900.

(Doc. 1, ¶ 6).

The loan

transaction was memorialized by a Loan and Security Agreement executed by Rawlings,
and is attached to the Complaint. (Id.; Doc. 6-1). Rawlings has not made a payment on
the loan since July 12, 2017. (Id., ¶ 8). On October 6, 2017, USAlliance sent Rawlings
a written notice of default and notice of acceleration of the balance due because of his
continuing default. (Id., ¶ 9).
Plaintiff’s Affidavit of Robert Wesler in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Default
Judgment (Doc. 14-3), states that the loan documents attached to the Complaint are true
and correct copies. Also provided is the Affidavit of Non-Military Service (Doc. 14-4) and

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the Affidavit of Timothy P. Shusta, Esq., counsel for USAlliance (Doc. 14-5), to support
the request for attorney’s fees and costs.
DISCUSSION
The elements of a breach of contract cause of action are: (1) a valid contract, (2)
a material breach, and (3) damages. Havens v. Coast Florida, P.A., 117 So. 3d 1179,
1181 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013). Here, USAlliance alleged that Rawlings personally guaranteed
repayment of the debt, that Rawlings breached the loan agreement by refusing to pay
that debt, and that Rawlings owes USAlliance damages as a result. Thus, the Court finds
that Plaintiff has adequately pled a breach of contract, which allegations are deemed
admitted, supporting the entry of a default judgment against Defendant.
A. Damages
Regarding the damages, Plaintiff submitted an Affidavit of Robert Wesler, a
Portfolio Manager for USAlliance. (Doc. 14-3, “Wesler Affidavit”). In the Wesler Affidavit,
USAlliance asserts a claim of $28,193.83 due at the time of the Affidavit, excluding the
attorney’s fees and costs incurred in seeking enforcement of the loan agreement. Plaintiff
seeks damages in the form of the principal balance on the loan, unpaid late fees, and
accrued interest. (Id. at ¶¶ 9-11.) Specifically, as of January 5, 2018, Plaintiff asserts
the following is due and owing:
Principal

$26,539.57

Late Fees

$142.68

Accrued Interest2

$1,511.58

TOTAL

$28,193.83

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Contractual interest continues to accrue on the amount due under the loan agreement at the
daily periodic post-default rate of 0.03216% per day from January 6, 2018 to the date of entry of
judgment (a per diem rate of $8.54). (Doc. 14-3, ¶ 13).

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Defendant has failed or refused to pay the amounts due and owing, and is indebted
to Plaintiff in the amount of $28,193.83 as of January 5, 2018. Therefore, the Court will
grant the requested pre-judgment interest, and apply the continuing per diem rate stated
in the loan agreement of $8.54 from January 6, 2018, through the date of entry of
judgment.
B. Attorney’s Fees
Attorney Shusta, an attorney at the law firm of Phelps Dunbar in Tampa, seeks
fees for attorney work of $6,844.00 and paralegal work of $62.00 for time spent in
pursuing this action.

According to the time sheets submitted to support the fee

application (Doc. 14-5), Attorney Shusta and Paralegal Suzanne Walker commenced
work on this matter in October 2017, and through January of 2018 had performed 21.7
hours of work in categories as set forth in the time sheets. Also in support, the Motion
states that the loan agreement allows a recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees and costs
if a breach occurs. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 10-11; Doc. 1-1, p. 3).
A reasonable attorney fee is calculated by multiplying the number of hours
reasonably expended by the reasonable hourly rate, Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
433 (1983), and a “reasonable hourly rate” is “the prevailing market rate in the relevant
legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills,
experience, and reputation.” Norman v. Housing Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292,
1299 (11th Cir. 1988). The party seeking an award of fees should submit adequate
documentation of hours and rates in support, or the award may be reduced. Hensley,
461 U.S. at 433.

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The time sheets detail the categories of tasks performed representing 21.3
attorney hours and .40 paralegal hours. Without evidence to the contrary, the Court
accepts the itemized billing records as evidence of the reasonableness of the attorney
and paralegal hours billed.
Regarding the hourly rate, the burden is on the fee applicant “to produce
satisfactory evidence” that the rate is in line with those prevailing in the community. Blum
v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 n.11 (1984). It is clear that the applicable prevailing market
is the Fort Myers area, and not Tampa. See Olesen-Frayne v. Olesen, 2:09-cv-49-FTM29DNF, 2009 WL 3048451, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2009) (prevailing market is the Fort
Myers Division). Here, attorney Shusta states he is a member of the Florida Bar, has
practiced law in Tampa since November 1984, and has been primarily engaged in the
practice of maritime law for over 33 years. (Doc. 14-5, ¶ 3). Mr. Shusta holds the title of
“Counsel” at Phelps Dunbar with an hourly rate of $320, which increased late in the
litigation to $330, and the hourly paralegal rate requested is $155. (Id., ¶ 5). The Court
finds that $320 and $330 an hour is slightly higher than the prevailing rates in the Fort
Myers Division, but in its discretion, given Mr. Shusta’s years of experience in maritime
law, the Court will award the requested rate. This Court has held that paralegal fees of
$170 are reasonable for the Southwest Florida area; therefore, the Court will allow the
$155 hourly paralegal rate. See Ford Motor Credit Co. LLC v. Parks, Case No: 2:16-cv105-FtM-99MRM, 2017 WL 218831, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 19, 2017).

C. Costs

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USAlliance seeks $465.00 in filing and services of process fees, submitting the
Affidavit of Attorney Timothy P. Shusta in support. (Doc. 14-6). No further documentation
is submitted, but the Court finds that the costs are allowable because they are not
otherwise limited by the loan agreement to statutory costs.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
(1)

Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (Doc. 14) is GRANTED.

(2)

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter default judgment in favor of

Plaintiff USAlliance Federal Credit Union and against Defendant Jeff A. Rawlings in the
following amounts:
a.

$28,193.83 in damages, plus continuing interest at the per diem rate of

$8.54 from January 6, 2018, through the date of entry of judgment;
b.

$6,906.00 in attorney’s fees; and

c.

$465.00 in costs.

(3)

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to terminate all pending motions and close

the file.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida this 29th day of March, 2018.

Copies: All Parties of Record

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