Freeze v. Sawyer et al
Filing
9
OPINION AND ORDER dismissing 1 Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Clerk shall enter judgment and close the case. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 12/17/2018. (RKR)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
TERRY LEE FREEZE,
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No:
2:18-cv-251-FtM-29MRM
DONALD
SAWYER,
Facility
Administrator,
CHRISTOPHER
CATRON, Facility Security
Director,
DOTTY
RIDDLE,
Facility Grievance Examiner,
MIKE CARROLL, Secretary of
DCF, and KRISTEN KANNER,
Clinical
Director
SVP
Program,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court upon initial review of the
file.
Plaintiff Terry Freeze initiated this action by filing a
pro se Complaint Form for FCCC Residents (Doc. #1, “Complaint”),
which the Court construes as a Civil Rights Complaint pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
(Doc. #2).
Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Complaint
is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Background
Plaintiff
Commitment
is
Center
civilly
committed
(“FCCC”)
pursuant
to
to
the
the
Florida
Sexual
Civil
Violent
Predators Act, Fla. Stat. §§ 394.910-.913, by which a person
determined to be a sexually violent predator is required to be
housed in a secure facility “for control, care, and treatment until
such
time
as
the
person’s
mental
abnormality
or
personality
disorder has so changed that it is safe for the person to be at
large.”
§
394.917(2).
The
Complaint
names:
Donald
Sawyer,
Facility Administrator of the FCCC; Christopher Catron, Security
Director of the FCCC; Dotty Riddle, Facility Grievance Director;
and Mike Carroll, Secretary of Florida Department of Children and
Family, as Defendants.
The Complaint alleges violations of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Doc. #1 at 4.
In support,
Plaintiff states that the FCCC implemented a policy that requires
dormitory lighting to remain on from 7:15 a.m. until 10:00 p.m.,
which Plaintiff claims subjects him “to torture or to cruel,
inhuman
or
degrading
treatment
or
punishment.”
Id.
at
13.
Plaintiff includes an August 14, 2017, Memorandum from Defendant
Catron that was distributed to “All Residents” at the FCCC within
his Complaint, which states:
In an effort to increase the safety of all
residents and staff and to improve the
security in the dorms the facility will be
implementing a change to the times the lights
will be on in the dorms.
Effective
immediately the lights will be turned on at
7:15 am and will remain on until 10:00 pm.
Id. at 6.
As relief, Plaintiff asks the Court to order the arrest
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and conviction of each Defendant for terrorism and obstruction of
justice, award Plaintiff $10,000 per day, and close the FCCC “for
willfully terrorizing a citizen.”
Id. at 15.
Legal Standard
Since Plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court
is to review the complaint sua sponte to determine whether it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii).
Although
Plaintiff is considered a non-prisoner due to his civil commitment
status, he is still subject to § 1915(e)(2).
See Troville v.
Venz, 303 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding “no error in
the district court’s dismissal of [a non-prisoner’s] complaint”
under § 1915(e)(2)).
The standard that governs dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6)
applies
to
dismissals
under
§
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
Montford, 517 F. 3d 1249, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008).
Alba
v.
However, pro se
complaints are held to “less stringent standards” than those
drafted and filed by attorneys.
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89,
94 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint is subject to dismissal if the
claim alleged is not plausible on its face.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
Bell Atlantic v.
All pleaded facts are deemed
true for the purposes of Rule 12(b)(6), but a complaint is still
insufficient without adequate facts.
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Id.
The plaintiff must
assert enough facts to allow “the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
The asserted facts
must “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence” in favor of the plaintiff’s claim.
at 556.
Twombly, 550 U.S.
Overall, “labels . . . conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are not enough to
meet the plausibility standard.
Id. at 555.
Ordinarily, a pro
se litigant must be given an opportunity to amend his complaint.
Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1349 (11th Cir. 2004).
However,
if an amendment would be futile, the district court may deny leave
to amend.
Bryant v. Dupree, 252 F.3d 1161, 1163 (11th Cir. 2001).
The Court, nonetheless, must read a pro se plaintiff’s complaint
in a liberal fashion.
Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th
Cir. 2003).
At the outset, Plaintiff cannot plead a cause of action under
§ 1983 for an alleged violation of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights because § 1983 only provides litigants with a cause
of action based on “the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
1983.
42 U.S.C. §
The rights promulgated under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (“UDHR”) are not federal rights.
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734 (2004).
See Sosa v. Alvarez-
Consequently, Plaintiff cannot
base a § 1983 action on an alleged violation of the UDHR.
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Moore
v.
McLaughlin,
569
F.
App’x
656,
659
(11th
Cir.
2014).
Consequently, the Court will review the Complaint as brought
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Further, because Plaintiff is civilly confined and not a
prisoner
his
Amendment.
rights
emanate
from
the
Fourteenth
not
Eighth
See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 312 (1982).
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, an individual who has been civilly
committed has liberty interests that “require the state to provide
minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and
freedom from undue restraint.”
319.
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. at
Like pretrial detainees, FCCC residents are afforded a
higher standard of care than those who are criminally committed.
Id. at 321-22; Dolihite v. Maughon, 74 F.3d 1027, 1041 (11th Cir.
1996) (“[P]ersons subjected to involuntary civil commitment are
entitled
to
more
considerate
treatment
and
conditions
of
confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish.”).
restriction
In evaluating whether a condition or
accompanying
detention
is
violative
of
a
civil
detainee’s constitutionally protected rights, the Court considers
whether the condition amounts to punishment.
U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
Bell v. Wolfish, 441
Whether a condition is intended to punish
or merely is incidental to some other legitimate governmental
purpose
turns
on
whether
the
restriction
or
condition
“is
reasonable related to a legitimate goal-if it is arbitrary or
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purposeless-a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the
governmental action is punishment.”
Id.
at 639.
In doing so,
the Court must be mindful that matters of administration of a
facility are better suited to administrators and not the courts.
Id. at 532.
Analysis
The gravamen of the Plaintiff’s Complaint is that the FCCC’s
policy of keeping lights on in the residents’ dormitories from
7:15
a.m.
until
Amendment rights.
10:100
p.m.
violates
Plaintiff’s
Fourteenth
Plaintiff contends that this policy “inflicts
15 hours and 15 minutes of non-stop mental torture” in violation
of the Constitution and Declaration of Human Rights.
Id. at 14.
The Complaint is otherwise devoid of any facts to support his
conclusory allegations of “torture.” 1
Plaintiff
acknowledges,
and
the
August
2017
Memorandum
expressly states, that the FCCC implemented the subject lighting
policy for a specified period of each day “[i]n an effort to
increase the safety of all residents and staff and to improve the
security in the dorms.” (Doc. #1 at 6).
As noted supra, while
Plaintiff as a civil detainee may not be subjected to conditions
1
Notably Plaintiff is not subjected to 24-hour continuous
lighting and does not otherwise claim he is sleep deprived.
Further, to the extent that Plaintiff desires to sleep during the
limited period during which the lights are illuminated, there is
nothing preventing Plaintiff for using a sleep mask or a towel to
cover his eyes.
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that amount to punishment, he may be subjected to conditions within
the bounds of professional discretion that place restrictions on
his
personal
freedoms.
Youngberg, 457
U.S.
at
321–22.
The
Supreme Court has recognized that the “interest in institutional
security” and “internal security” is of “paramount” importance.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528(1984).
Implementing policies
aimed at curtailing potentially violent conduct is an “obligation”
Washington v. Harper,
incumbent upon administration at the FCCC.
494 U.S. 210, 225 (1990)(emphasizing the state has not only an
interest, but an obligation, to combat any danger posed by a person
to himself or others, especially in an environment, which “by
definition is made up of persons with a demonstrated proclivity
for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct.” (internal
quotations and citations omitted)).
Thus, the Court finds that
the FCCC’s lighting policy’s stated goal of resident and staff
safety and security are legitimate purposes.
Next, the Court finds that lighting is reasonably related to
furthering the security interests professed by Mr. Catron.
The
Middle District of Alabama found that prisoners’ “desire for more
subdued lighting” was easily outweighed by “obvious security and
safety” needs.
Reeves v. Jones, No. 2:11-CV-1062-TMH, 2012 WL
1252686, at *1 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 20, 2012), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 2:11CV1062-TMH, 2012 WL 1252644 (M.D. Ala. Apr. 13,
2012).
Moreover,
“continuous
lighting
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has
been
held
to
be
permissible and reasonable in the face of legitimate penological
justifications, like the need for security and the need to monitor
prisoners.”
Fantone v. Herbik, 528 F. App’x 123, 127 (3d Cir.
2013) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s preference for less, or no lighting, may make his
confinement more comfortable, but a “detainee’s understandable
desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little
restraint as possible during conferment does not convert the
conditions or restrictions of detention into ‘punishment’.”
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 537.
finds
that
Plaintiff
has
Bell
Based upon the foregoing, the Court
failed
to
state
a
claim
under
the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED:
1. Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. #1) is DISMISSED pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
2. The
Clerk
shall
terminate
any
pending
motions,
enter
judgment and close this case.
DONE and ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this
of December, 2018.
SA: FTMP-1
Copies: Counsel of Record
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17th
day
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