Mraz v. I.C. Systems, Inc.

Filing 89

ORDERED: Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Article III Jurisdiction (Doc. 86) is DENIED. Defendant's Motion to Stay Case Pending Resolution of its Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Article III Jurisdiction (Doc. 87) is DENIED as moot. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 12/4/2020. (AEH)

Case 2:18-cv-00254-SPC-NPM Document 89 Filed 12/04/20 Page 1 of 5 PageID 1450

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
VICTOR MRAZ,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.: 2:18-cv-254-FtM-38NPM

I.C. SYSTEMS, INC.,
Defendant.
/
ORDER1
Before the Court is Defendant I.C. Systems, Inc.’s (“ICS”) Motion for
Reconsideration (Doc. 86) and Plaintiff Victor Mraz’s response in opposition
(Doc. 88). The Court denies the Motion.
“A motion for reconsideration must show why the court should reconsider
its prior decision and ‘set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to
induce the court to reverse its prior decision.’” Fla. Coll. of Osteopathic Med.,
Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1306, 1308 (M.D. Fla. 1998)
(citation omitted). Courts generally recognize three bases for reconsidering an
order: “(1) an intervening change in controlling law; (2) the availability of new

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evidence; and (3) the need to correct clear error or manifest injustice.” Id. “The
burden is upon the movant to establish the extraordinary circumstances
supporting reconsideration.” U.S. ex rel. Mastej v. Health Mgmt. Assocs., Inc.,
869 F. Supp. 2d 1336, 1348 (M.D. Fla. 2012).

And district courts have

discretion to grant it. Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006).
ICS contends there was an intervening change in law. Recently, the
Eleventh Circuit issued a behemoth opinion on standing—Muransky v. Godiva
Chocolatier, Inc., 979 F.3d 917 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc). Where relevant, says
ICS, reconsideration is necessary because Muransky held Twiqbal applies to
standing allegations. And according to ICS, Mraz’s allegations on emotional
distress were conclusory and implausible. Yet Muransky isn’t a change in law
because the Eleventh has already applied Twiqbal to standing. E.g., Trichell
v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 964 F.3d 990, 996 (11th Cir. 2020). To be sure,
Muransky bore the en-banc stamp prior decisions lacked. But as relevant to
Mraz’s alleged injury, the decision was a simple application and explanation of
this Circuit’s law on standing in statutory cases.
Leaving that aside, the Court need not reconsider because Muransky
does not change the Court’s conclusion. Again, Mraz does not allege a risk-ofharm injury. Rather, in Muransky parlance, Mraz alleged a direct intangible
injury of emotional distress.

And as the Court already decided, “Mraz’s

allegations of emotional harms gave him Article III standing to file this suit.”

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(Doc. 70 at 4). While ICS conflates the pleading necessary for direct and riskof-harm injuries, Muransky goes to great lengths to clarify the differences
between the two.
Mraz alleged he suffered emotional distress (i.e., “anger, anxiety,
emotional distress, fear, frustration, humiliation, and embarrassment”) from
ICS’ collection attempt.

(Doc. 1-3 at 4).

Contrary to ICS’ assertion, the

Complaint makes a factual allegation of an intangible injury, not a bare legal
conclusion. Put simply, Mraz alleged the how and why of his injury by telling
ICS the distress he felt from the letter saying the doctor sent him to a collection
agency for a debt. At the pleading stage, the Court must take that as true.
And it is more than plausible that Mraz would feel scared, mad, embarrassed,
and frustrated upon reading the false dunning letter. Because the injury
alleged was sufficiently concrete, Mraz had standing when he sued.
As the briefing wears on, ICS eventually makes its position clear that it
expected Mraz to plead his emotional distress in detail. Yet ICS has not
pointed to anything supporting the notion that plaintiffs must plead emotional
distress with particularity.2 Instead, ICS cites cases in which courts held
plaintiffs failed to state claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
The pleading requirements for that tort, however, are not coterminous with

In fact, the Rules prescribe otherwise. Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) (stating “conditions of a person’s
mind may be alleged generally”).
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minimal Article III standing allegations for emotional distress suffered from
FDCPA

violations.

Likewise,

ICS

suggests

Mraz

needed

physical

manifestations or severe distress to make out a concrete injury. Obviously, the
extent of emotional distress is central to the ultimate recovery for those
damages. Goodin v. Bank of Am., N.A., 114 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1211-13 (M.D.
Fla. 2015). But severe harm is not the sine qua non of Article III standing.
Muransky, 979 F.3d at 927 (explaining “very nearly any level of direct injury
is sufficient to show a concrete harm”). Even if Mraz’s injury were just an
“identifiable trifle,” such a direct harm is enough to be concrete. E.g., Salcedo
v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1167 (“A concrete injury need be only an identifiable
trifle.” (cleaned up)). Again, Mraz simply needed to allege a plausible, concrete
injury. Because he did, the Court declines ICS’ invitation to weigh the severity
of harm.
This Court has an obligation to determine its jurisdiction. And this case
went to summary judgment, when the proof required for standing is greater
than it is at the pleading stage. So even though the parties didn’t address it,
the Court again reviewed the summary judgment record sua sponte. Once
more, it “found nothing that belies Mraz’s damages allegations.” (Doc. 70 at 4
n.3). In fact, the Court found just the opposite. The only evidence offered on
Mraz’s emotional distress was his own unrebutted affidavit. Mraz explained
he was “extremely offended and agitated” by the letter because it was untrue.

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(Doc. 25-1 at 2). What is more, he was worried about licensure for his job,
which had “strict reporting requirements” for defaulted debts. (Doc. 25-1 at 23). And there was the added concern about going “through the ordeal of
clearing everything up.” (Doc. 25-1 at 3). These were specific, sworn facts
supporting the allegations for emotional distress.
Essentially, ICS wants the Court to find no standing because it thinks
minor emotional injuries are not enough. Yet this Court cannot do so. Neither
the parties nor Court found any controlling law for the proposition that courts
can discount emotional distress allegations as not concrete unless they are
severe. Given this conclusion, ICS’ Motion to Stay (Doc. 87) is denied as moot.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
(1) Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Article III Jurisdiction (Doc. 86) is DENIED.
(2) Defendant’s Motion to Stay Case Pending Resolution of its
Reconsideration of Order Denying Motion to Dismiss for Lack of
Article III Jurisdiction (Doc. 87) is DENIED as moot.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on December 4, 2020.

Copies: All Parties of Record

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