Dressler v. U.S. Department of Education et al

Filing 186

OPINION AND ORDER granting 178 Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts 7 and 8 in favor of FDE; granting 180 Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count 2 in favor of ECMC. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and pursuant to the 171 Opinion and Order, terminate all pending matters, and close the file. Signed by Judge John E. Steele on 2/15/2022. (RKR)

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 1 of 19 PageID 2254

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
SANDRA K. DRESSLER,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No:

2:18-cv-311-JES-MRM

FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT
OF
EDUCATION,
NAVIENT
SOLUTIONS,
INC.,
and
EDUCATION CREDIT MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION,
Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
This matter comes before the Court on defendant Florida
Department of Education’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #178)
filed on January 7, 2022, and plaintiff’s Opposition (Doc.#184)
filed on January 25, 2022.
Education

Credit

Also before the Court is defendant

Management

Corporation’s

Motion

for

Summary

Judgment (Doc. #180) and plaintiff’s Opposition (Doc. #185) filed
on January 25, 2022.

Summary judgment Notices (Docs. #179, #181)

were provided to the parties as to each motion, which included
special information for a pro se party.

For the reasons set forth

below, the motions are granted.
I.
Summary

judgment

is

appropriate

only

when

the

Court

is

satisfied that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 2 of 19 PageID 2255

fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

“An issue of fact is ‘genuine’ if

the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to
find for the nonmoving party.”

Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us,

Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1314 (11th Cir. 2010).

A fact is “material”

if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

“A

court must decide ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so
one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.’”
Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th
Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views
all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the
non-moving party.

Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Tana

v. Dantanna’s, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir. 2010).

However, “if

reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from
undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment.”
St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America’s Favorite Chicken Co., 198
F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Warrior Tombigbee Transp.
Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 1983)
(finding summary judgment “may be inappropriate even where the
parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the factual
inferences that should be drawn from these facts”)).

2

“If a

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 3 of 19 PageID 2256

reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more
than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces
a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant
summary judgment.”

Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 495 F.3d 1306,

1315 (11th Cir. 2007).
“Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally
construed.” Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th
Cir. 1998); Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003).
When a motion for summary judgment has been
made properly, the nonmoving party may not
rely
solely
on
the
pleadings,
but
by
affidavits,
depositions,
answers
to
interrogatories, and admissions must show that
there are specific facts demonstrating that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Although
we must view factual inferences favorably
toward the nonmoving party and pro se
complaints
are
entitled
to
a
liberal
interpretation by the courts, we hold that a
pro se litigant does not escape the essential
burden under summary judgment standards of
establishing that there is a genuine issue as
to a fact material to his case in order to
avert summary judgment.
Brown v. Crawford, 906 F.2d 667, 670 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation
omitted).
II.
Plaintiff’s

Third

Amended

Complaint

(Doc.

#88)

is

the

operative pleading, and the Florida Department of Education (FDE)
and the Education Credit Management Corporation (ECMC) are the two

3

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 4 of 19 PageID 2257

remaining defendants.

As the result of a July 22, 2021, Opinion

and Order (Doc. #171), only Count 7 and Count 8 remain against the
FDE and only Count 2 remains against the ECMC.

Both defendants

now move for summary judgment as to their respective counts.
A. Florida Department of Education
The Third Amended Complaint alleges that the FDE violated the
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) by calling plaintiff
Sandra Dressler (plaintiff or Dressler) on her cellular phone
without

her

permission

(Count

7)

and

by

using

an

automated

telephone dialing system (robocalls) to do so (Count 8).
#88, pp. 20-21.)

(Doc.

The FDE admits the robocalls were made, but

asserts it was exempt from the TCPA.

The exemption arose, the FDE

asserts, because FDE was involved in the collection of debts owed
to or guaranteed by the federal government when it placed the
robocalls to plaintiff.

During the time period in which the calls

were made, the FDE argues, such robocalls were statutorily exempt
from the application of the TCPA.

(Doc. #178, p. 4.)

The Court previously denied FDE’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings which raised the same contention.

The Court stated:

“Assuming that Florida DOE is collecting a governmental debt based
on its status as a government agency, Barr 1 would prevent plaintiff

Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Pol. Consultants, Inc., 140 S. Ct.
2335, 2353–54 (2020).
1

4

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 5 of 19 PageID 2258

with proceeding with the case. However, without any evidence that
Florida DOE was collecting debts owed to or guaranteed by the
government, the motion cannot be granted.”

(Doc. #171, p. 21.)

The FDE asserts that its summary judgment motion presents such
evidence.

Plaintiff responds that material issues of disputed

facts remain.
(1)

Material Facts In Record

The relevant undisputed evidence in the record establishes
the following:
Plaintiff was a student at Southwest Florida College, n/k/a
Southern

Technical

Institute,

LLC

d/b/a

Southern

Technical

College, from approximately May 2007 until approximately March
2011.

Plaintiff applied for, and received, numerous student loans

to pay for her education and related expenses at the college.

The

two loans relevant to this case are:
•

Loan

#15,

a

federal

Stafford

unsubsidized

loan

for

$3,838.00, which was disbursed in three payments to
Southern Technical College.
•

Loan #16, a federal Stafford subsidized loan for $5,500,
which

was

disbursed

in

three

payments

to

Southern

Technical College.
The lender for both of these Stafford loans was Navient Solutions,
formerly known as Sallie Mae.

Plaintiff graduated with a degree

5

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 6 of 19 PageID 2259

in 2011, but allegedly became delinquent in paying her student
loan debts.
The FDE outlined its status and the relevant loan collection
process, without factual contradiction, as follows: The FDE serves
as a guarantor for the Federal Family Education Loan Program
(FFELP). FDE is a student loan guaranty agency which administers
the

FFELP

Education

through
(USED).

an
When

agreement
a

with

borrower

the

U.S.

defaults

on

Department
a

FFELP

of

loan

guaranteed by the USED’s Office of Student Financial Assistance
(OSFA), the lender files a claim.

After the claim is paid to the

lender and reinsurance is received from USED, OSFA begins federally
regulated collection activities on the defaulted loan(s). OSFA is
required by federal regulations to attempt collection of defaulted
student loans and to observe due diligence, as outlined in the
federal regulations and Florida statutes. When a student loan
borrower

does

not

pay

the

lender,

and

fails

to

cure

the

delinquency, the FDE, as guarantor, purchases the loan from the
lender as a default claim.

Once notified by the lender that a

student loan borrower is delinquent, the FDE sends correspondence
and makes “default aversion” telephone calls seeking a payment
plan from the former student. 2

See also Bennett v. Premiere Credit of N. Am., LLC, 504 F.
App’x 872, 876 (11th Cir. 2013) for a summary of how the process
works.
2

6

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 7 of 19 PageID 2260

Dressler was alleged to have defaulted by not paying loans
#15 or #16.

The FDE, as the guarantor of the two Stafford loans,

became the holder of both loans.

The FDE notified plaintiff of

her delinquent status for the loans, but Dressler disputed the
claim in a July 1, 2017, letter.

In a responsive July 12, 2017,

letter, the FDE notified plaintiff that it had guaranteed sixteen
(16) FFELP Stafford loans under her name and social security
number. Fourteen loans were transferred to the USED, but two loans
remained with the lender, Navient Solutions, who reported that
plaintiff was delinquent in her payments.

(Doc. #178-2, p. 109.)

The FDE made default diversion robocalls to Dressler from August
10, 2017, through September 12, 2017, to collect the amount due on
the Stafford student loans.
(2)

Government Debt Collector Exemption

The federal statute which contains the prohibition against
robocalls and the exemption at issue provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person within the
United States, or any person outside the
United States if the recipient is within the
United States-(A)

to make any call (other than a call made
for emergency purposes or made with the
prior express consent of the called
party) using any automatic telephone
dialing system or an artificial or
prerecorded voice—
. . .

(iii) to any telephone number assigned to a
paging service, cellular telephone service,
7

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 8 of 19 PageID 2261

specialized mobile radio service, or other
radio common carrier service, or any service
for which the called party is charged for the
call, unless such call is made solely to
collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the
United States;
47

U.S.C.

§

227(b)(1)(A)(iii)

(emphasis

added).

“Under

§

227(b)(1)(A)(iii), the legality of a robocall turns on whether it
is ‘made solely to collect a debt owed to or guaranteed by the
United States.’” Barr v. Am. Ass'n of Political Consultants, Inc.,
140

S.

Ct.

invalidated

2335,
the

2346

(2020).

government-debt

In

Barr,

exception

the
on

Supreme

First

Court

Amendment

grounds and severed that exemption from the remainder of the
statute.

Id. at 2349.

The Supreme Court stated in a footnote:

[A]lthough our decision means the end of the
government-debt exception, no one should be
penalized or held liable for making robocalls
to collect government debt after the effective
date of the 2015 government-debt exception and
before the entry of final judgment by the
District Court on remand in this case, or such
date that the lower courts determine is
appropriate. See Reply Brief 24. On the other
side of the ledger, our decision today does
not negate the liability of parties who made
robocalls
covered
by
the
robocall
restriction.”
Id. at 2355, n.12.
(3)

Summary Judgment Resolution

The FDE seeks summary judgment on the basis that, while it
made the robocalls at issue, the calls were made solely to collect
a debt owed to or guaranteed by the United States.

As such, the

FDE argues that the TCPA exemption applied to it, and there can be
8

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 9 of 19 PageID 2262

no liability because the calls were made during the time period
when such calls were legal.
Plaintiff notes that the Court denied a similar contention
when it denied the motion for judgment on the pleadings as to these
counts.

Plaintiff states that FDE “presents a material fact in

controversy as to whether it is exempt from the TCPA statute,”
“leaving several material facts in dispute” which bars summary
judgment.

(Doc. #184, p. 3.)

Plaintiff does not, however, point

to any evidence which supports her position that there are material
disputed facts which preclude summary judgment.
The Court finds that the undisputed facts establish that:
(1) the two loans at issue were Federal Stafford Loans; (2) both
loans were guaranteed by the United States; (3) the FDE was tasked
with collecting the loans; (3) the FDE made the robocalls to
plaintiff between August 10, 2017 and September 12, 2017; (4) the
robocalls were made solely to collect the debt due on the Stafford
loans from plaintiff; and (5) pursuant to Barr, there is no
liability for such calls made for such purposes in that time
period.

The FDE has established that it has no liability for the

robocalls alleged in Counts 7 and 8.

Summary judgment will be

granted on Counts 7 and 8 in favor of FDE.
B. Education Credit Management Corporation
The only remaining count against ECMC is Count 2 of the Third
Amended Complaint.

The viable portion of Count 2 alleges that

9

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 10 of 19 PageID 2263

ECMC violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s2(b),

by

failing

to

conduct

a

meaningful

investigation

of

Dressler's disputed debts when requested to do so by plaintiff.
(Doc. #88, pp. 13-17.)

Plaintiff alleges that ECMC was attempting

to collect debts on accounts she never had with the Department of
Education and the FDE. (Doc. #88, ¶¶ 55, 56.)
The Court previously denied a motion by ECMC for judgment on
the pleadings which raised the same contention.

(Doc. #171, pp.

4-8.)

evidence

ECMC

asserts

it

has

now

submitted

which

demonstrates that a reasonable investigation was conducted.
(1)

Material Facts in Record

ECMC filed the Affidavit of Kerry Klisch (Doc. #182-1, pp. 28), a litigation specialist in the legal department of ECMC Shared
Services Company that provides shared services to the ECMC family
group of companies, including legal services to ECMC.
¶ 1.)

(Id., p. 2,

The Affidavit sets forth the following:

Plaintiff executed four Promissory Notes under which eight
(8) student loan disbursements were made to Plaintiff or Southwest
Florida College on plaintiff’s behalf. (Id., pp. 10-40.) Although
the loans were originally guaranteed by FDE, when plaintiff filed
a Chapter 13 bankruptcy case FDE transferred all right, title and
interest in the loans to ECMC.

(Id., p. 41, Exh. B.)

After the

bankruptcy proceeding concluded, plaintiff’s loans went back to
lenders for repayment, but ECMC retained the guarantee on the

10

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 11 of 19 PageID 2264

loans.

(Id., p. 6, ¶ 9.)

The lenders submitted default claims to

ECMC because Plaintiff failed to maintain repayment of the loans.
ECMC paid the lenders’ claims, and interest in the loans were
transferred back to ECMC.

(Id., ¶ 10.)

On July 1, 2017, plaintiff sent a letter to ECMC disputing
the debt and asking for validation of the debt.
229.)

(Doc. #177-1, p.

Plaintiff stated, among other things, that “I am requesting

proof that I am indeed the party you are asking to pay this debt,
and there is some contractual obligation that is binding on me to
pay this debt.”

(Id.)

Plaintiff requested that ECMC provide her

with eighteen (18) categories of documents.

(Id., p. 234.)

On July 27, 2017, ECMC sent a letter to plaintiff which
“provides the results of our investigation of your dispute.” (Id.,
p. 235.)

The letter provided plaintiff with a loan summary that

listed disbursement dates and amounts, and the dates the default
claims were paid for the loans; the promissory notes which are the
basis of the loans; and the complete transaction histories showing
all activity on the loans since the date of transfer. (Id., pp.
236-237.)

The letter stated: “We have determined that our credit

reporting for the above-referenced loans is accurate or we have
updated

the

information

with

the

national

consumer

reporting

agencies (aka credit bureaus) to make it accurate.” (Id., p. 235.)
The letter continued: “ECMC has requested the national consumer
reporting

agencies

update

the

11

status

of

this

tradelines

to

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 12 of 19 PageID 2265

‘Disputed.’

ECMC is not responsible for and has no control over

whether or how long it takes for the national consumer reporting
agencies to update your consumer credit report.”

(Id.)

ECMC marked plaintiff’s account as ‘disputed’ on its business
system on July 27, 2017.

(Doc. #182-1, p. 7, ¶ 14.)

As a result,

the loans were reported as disputed to the credit bureaus.

(Id.,

p. 7, ¶ 14.) A log indicates that the account dispute was reported,
and credit bureau notification letters were sent to plaintiff on
August 6, 2017.

(Id., p. 61.)

On August 28, 2017, plaintiff sent a letter to the Chief
Financial Officer of ECMC accusing ECMC of fraud which “nullifies
anything I may have signed.”

(Id., p. 47.)

Plaintiff’s letter

stated that “no one answered any of the points in my previous
letter” and again disputed the debt.
she

had

concluded

agreement,”

and

that

ECMC

requested

provided within thirty days.

was

eight

(Id.)
“in

Plaintiff stated that

breach

categories

of

of

the

alleged

information

be

(Id., pp. 47-48.)

On September 15, 2017, ECMC sent a letter to plaintiff stating
it had investigated the evidence she had submitted to support her
belief the debt was not past due or not legally enforceable in the
amount described.

The letter continued: “A thorough review of

your account indicates you are liable for the debt as specified in
the notice.”

The stated reason was:

12

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 13 of 19 PageID 2266

You continue to claim this debt is invalid.
Enclosed is a copy of the correspondence ECMC
originally sent to you on July 27, 2017. This
letter addressed the same issue. Be advised it
is ECMC's position your concerns have already
received a complete and accurate response from
this office.
(Doc. #177-1, p. 242.)
On September 18, 19, and 20, 2017, ECMC received and processed
electronic disputes from Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union.
responded to each as disputed and assigned to collections.
p. 7, ¶ 15; pp. 63-65.)

ECMC
(Id.,

The Equifax results were sent to plaintiff

on September 21, 2017, showing that “Consumer Disputes This Account
Information” while also concluding “This creditor has verified to
OUR company that the current status is being reported correctly.”
(Doc. #177-1, pp. 188, 192, 207.)
On January 23, 2018, plaintiff sent another letter to ECMC
again disputing the claim and seeking validation, arguing that
“ECMC has not properly responded to my letters of dispute by
providing

evidence

Reporting Agencies.”

of

the

alleged

debt

nor

(Doc. #177-1, p. 244.)

to

the

Consumer

Plaintiff requested

sixteen (16) categories of information from ECMC.

(Id., p. 246.)

On February 12, 2018, ECMC responded by letter indicating a
balance of $33,008.85 and stating:
You continue to dispute the loans ECMC holds
[i]n your name and continue to request
validation of the debt. Be advised, ECMC has
already responded to this issue numerous
times. For your reference, enclosed are copies

13

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 14 of 19 PageID 2267

of our previous correspondences. Please note
the highlighted dates of these letters as we
have answered all the correspondences you
submitted. ECMC stands firm that you are
legally obligated to repay the outstanding
balances listed above and will no longer
address this same issue with you.
The burden to prove your dispute is your
responsibility. You must provide ECMC with
documentation clearly indicating you are not
legally
obligated
to
repay
this
debt.
Otherwise, ECMC must comply with federal
regulations and actively pursue the full
recovery of these funds on behalf of the U.S.
Department of Education.
All federal student loan information can be
found at the National Student Loan Data System
(NSLDS), which is the central database for all
federal loans administered by the U.S.
Department of Education (ED). Please be
advised according to NSLDS, you received a
total of eighteen student loans. Seven of
those loans are currently held by ECMC and are
in a default status.
(Id., p. 249) (emphasis in original).
At

her

deposition,

plaintiff

conceded

that

ECMC

had

investigated, but she argued that ECMC had not “validated” the
debt because it failed to provide her with the original promissory
note.
. . . Count two says that we failed to do a
meaningful investigation. So if you look at
our replies to your dispute letters, we
replied that we did, in fact, investigate, and
we made conclusions from those investigations,
so we did investigate.
So do we just have a difference of opinion
where you're saying we didn't investigate and
my client says they are, they did investigate?

14

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 15 of 19 PageID 2268

A. I'm -- you did investigate, but you never
validated it with the original promissory
note.
Q. All right. But it said right in the note,
right here, that a copy is to be acceptable,
just as acceptable as the original.
A. I don't remember or recall reading that.
Q. But just because you don't remember or
recall reading that doesn't mean the term is
not clearly in the agreement.
(Doc. #178-2, pp. 45-46.)
(2)

Fair Credit Report Act

The FCRA does not specify the nature and extent of the
“investigation” a furnisher of information must conduct under §
1681s-2(b). The Eleventh Circuit has held that “reasonableness” is
an appropriate touchstone for evaluating investigations under §
1681s–2(b), so there is a duty to make reasonable efforts to
investigate disputes brought to a furnisher’s attention by the
consumer.
1301–02

Hinkle v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 827 F.3d 1295,

(11th

Cir.

2016).

What

constitutes

a

“reasonable

investigation” will vary depending on the circumstances of the
case and whether the investigation is being conducted by a CRA
under § 1681i(a), or a furnisher of information under § 1681s–
2(b). Id.

at

1302.

“Whether

a

furnisher's

investigation

is

reasonable will depend in part on the status of the furnisher—as
an original creditor, a collection agency collecting on behalf of
the original creditor, a debt buyer, or a down-the-line-buyer—and

15

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 16 of 19 PageID 2269

on the quality of documentation available to the furnisher.” Id.
A

furnisher

may

verify

that

the

information

is

accurate

by

“uncovering documentary evidence that is sufficient to prove that
the information is true,” or by “relying on personal knowledge
sufficient to establish the truth of the information.” Id. at 1303.
When a furnisher ends its investigation by reporting that the
disputed information has been verified as accurate, “the question
of whether the furnisher behaved reasonably will turn on whether
the

furnisher

acquired

sufficient

evidence

conclusion that the information was true.”

to

Id.

support

the

There only need

be an investigation of the factual error which was reported. Losch
v. Nationstar Mortgage LLC, 995 F.3d 937, 945 (11th Cir. 2021).
Plaintiff cannot prevail on her claim against ECMC pursuant
to

§

1681s–2(b)

without

identifying

some

fact

in

the

record

establishing that the information ECMC reported regarding her
account was inaccurate or incomplete.

Felts v. Wells Fargo Bank,

N.A., 893 F.3d 1305, 1312–13 (11th Cir. 2018).
Regardless of the nature of the investigation
a furnisher conducted, a plaintiff asserting
a claim against a furnisher for failure to
conduct a reasonable investigation cannot
prevail on the claim without demonstrating
that had the furnisher conducted a reasonable
investigation, the result would have been
different; i.e., that the furnisher would have
discovered that the information it reported
was inaccurate or incomplete, triggering the
furnisher's
obligation
to
correct
the
information.
Absent
that
showing,
a
plaintiff's
claim
against
a
furnisher

16

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 17 of 19 PageID 2270

necessarily fails, as the plaintiff would be
unable to demonstrate any injury from the
allegedly deficient investigation. And, in
turn, a plaintiff cannot demonstrate that a
reasonable investigation would have resulted
in
the
furnisher
concluding
that
the
information was inaccurate or incomplete
without identifying some facts the furnisher
could have uncovered that establish that the
reported information was, in fact, inaccurate
or incomplete.
Id. at 1313.

“Consumers have no private right of action against

furnishers for reporting inaccurate information to CRAs regarding
consumer

accounts.

See

id.

§

1681s–2(c)(1).”

Id.

at

1312.

“Instead, the only private right of action consumers have against
furnishers is for a violation of § 1681s–2(b), which requires
furnishers to conduct an investigation following notice of a
dispute. See id.” Id.

The “investigations, reviews, and reports”

on information provided to consumer reporting agencies must be
completed “before the expiration of the period under section
1681i(a)(1) of this title.”

15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b)(2).

The

deadline is thus “before the end of the 30-day period beginning on
the date on which the agency receives the notice of the dispute
from the consumer or reseller.”
(3)

15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1).

Summary Judgment Resolution

Plaintiff
arguments

counters

about

the

ECMC’s

failure

summary
to

judgment

produce

evidence

original

with

documents,

asserting that “ECMC has not produced the original Promissory
Note.”

(Doc. #185, p. 2, ¶ 8.)

17

Plaintiff also asserts that

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 18 of 19 PageID 2271

neither ECMC nor the United States has proved a loss, and if there
is a guarantee, the value is the Promissory Note, not anything
ECMC or the United States provided.

(Id. ¶ 9.) 3

Plaintiff cites

no affidavits or other evidence that ECMC failed to investigate
the disputes or that the debts were inaccurate.

Plaintiff states

that after receiving a notice of dispute from a consumer, a
furnisher such as ECMC is required to provide notice of the dispute
to the CRAs within a timely manner, and that ECMC failed to do so
by not placing a “notice of dispute” on Plaintiff’s alleged account
within the thirty (30) day period.

(Doc. #185, pp. 9-13.)

The evidence establishes that plaintiff’s notice of dispute
and the disputes reported to consumer reporting agencies were
reviewed and responded to within 30 days of the receipt of a notice
of dispute.

(Doc. #182-1, pp. 62-65.)

Plaintiff does not dispute

that an investigation occurred, and the record establishes that
ECMC

conducted

a

reasonable

investigation

identified by plaintiff in her correspondence.

of

the

dispute

Plaintiff admitted

at her deposition that she had no evidence of her own to suggest
inaccuracies and she did not know of any documents that would show

Plaintiff’s Opposition to the summary judgment motion refers
to the legal standard and argument regarding a motion to dismiss.
(Doc. #185, pp. 3-7) as well as the legal standard and cases
addressing summary judgment. Given her pro se status, the Court
gives liberal consideration to her Response.
3

18

Case 2:18-cv-00311-JES-MRM Document 186 Filed 02/15/22 Page 19 of 19 PageID 2272

the

loans

were

incorrect.

(Doc.

#177-1,

88:3-13.)

Summary

judgment will be granted in favor of ECMC.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
1. Defendant Florida Department of Education’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (Doc. #178) is GRANTED as to Counts 7 and
8 in favor of FDE.
2. Defendant

Education

Credit

Management

Corporation’s

Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. #180) is GRANTED as to
Count 2 in favor of ECMC.
3. The Clerk shall enter judgment pursuant to the July 22,
2021, Opinion and Order (Doc. #171) 4 and as set forth in
this Opinion and Order, terminate all pending motions and
deadlines as moot, and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED at Fort Myers, Florida, this

15th

day of

February 2022.

Copies: Parties of record

Judgment shall also be entered in favor of FDE on Counts 2,
4, and 9 and in favor of ECMC on Counts 3, 4, 7, and 8.
4

19