Witowski v. Achieva Credit Union

Filing 18

ORDER granting 16 Defendant Achieva Credit Union's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Achieva Credit Union must file an amended answer to the Complaint on or before October 18, 2018. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 10/5/2018. (LMF)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
BARBARA WITOWSKI, an individual
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:18-cv-428-FtM-38CM

ACHIEVA CREDIT UNION,
Defendant.
/
OPINION AND ORDER1
Before the Court is Defendant Achieva Credit Union’s Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (Doc. 16), and Plaintiff Barbara Witowski’s opposition (Doc. 17). For the
following reasons, the Court denies the motion.
BACKGROUND2
This case involves an employment dispute under the Family Medical and Leave
Act (“FMLA”). Achieva hired Witowski as a branch manager in April 2016. (Doc. 1 at
¶ 7). She succeeded in that role for nearly two years. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 8-10). But that
changed when Witowski went on FMLA leave for a knee replacement. (Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 11-

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not affect the opinion of the Court.
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The facts recited in this Order have been taken from the Complaint and considered to
be true for purposes of Achieva’s motion only.

12). On Witowski’s first day back to work in April 2018, Achieva fired her. (Doc. 1 at
¶ 14).
Witowski thus brings this two-count suit against Achieva for interfering with her
FMLA rights and retaliating against her for taking FMLA leave. (Doc. 1). As to the
interference claim, Witowski alleges that Achieva “was obligated, but failed, to allow [her]
to take FMLA leave and to return . . . to her former position or an equivalent position with
the same pay, benefits, and working conditions when she tried to return to work under 29
U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1); 29 CFR § 825.215(a).” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 30). Achieva has answered the
FMLA retaliation claim but has moved for judgment on the pleadings as to the interference
claim. (Doc. 16).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“After the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may
move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings
is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301
(11th Cir. 2001). In deciding whether judgment is appropriate, the court accepts all
material facts alleged in the complaint as true and views those facts in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. See Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1335
(11th Cir. 2014). “A complaint may only be dismissed under Rule 12(c) if ‘it is clear that
the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be proved
consistent with the allegations.’” Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs,
Ga., 831 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Horsley v. Rivera, 292 F.3d 695, 700
(11th Cir. 2002)).

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DISCUSSION
The FMLA prohibits employers from interfering with employees’ ability to exercise
their substantive rights under the statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). Reinstatement is
a right to which the FMLA grants an employee upon returning from leave. See id.
§ 2614(a)(1)(A) (stating an employee has the right to “be restored by the employer to the
position of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced”); see also
Martin v. Brevard Cty. Pub. Sch., 543 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 2008) (“An employee
has the right following FMLA leave ‘to be restored by the employer to the position of
employment held by the employee when the leave commenced’ or to an equivalent
position.” (citations omitted)); Ponce v. City of Naples, No. 2:17-CV-137-FTM-99CM,
2017 WL 2692829, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 22, 2017) (“The right to FMLA leave and the
right to return to an equivalent position post-leave are both FMLA benefits.”). To state an
interference with FMLA rights claim, an employee need only show that she was entitled
to a benefit her employer denied. See Strickland v. Water Works and Sewer Bd. of City
of Birmingham, 239 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2001); Schaaf v. Smithkline Beecham
Corp., 602 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 2010). Because “the employer’s motives are
irrelevant,” the employee does not have to allege that her employer intended to deny the
benefit. Strickland, 239 F.3d at 1208.
Achieva claims Witowski’s interference claim fails as a matter of law because firing
an employee for taking FMLA leave is retaliation, not interference. (Doc. 16). It continues
that the Complaint alleges no facts that Achieva denied Witowski any benefit to which the
FMLA entitled her. (Doc. 16 at 5). Witowski responds that Achieva’s refusal to reinstate

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her was the company interfering with her FMLA right to be returned to her position (or an
equivalent one) upon returning from leave. (Doc. 17).
As stated, the FMLA gives employees the right to be restored to their same position
following FMLA leave. And according to Witowski, Achieva fired her “upon her arrival for
her first day back at work on April 23, 2018.” (Doc. 1 at ¶ 14). Having to draw all
reasonable inferences in Witowski’s favor, the Court reads this allegation to mean that
Achieva did not allow Witowski to return to any position after her leave. And that is
enough to state an FMLA interference claim at this stage of litigation. The Court thus
denies Achieva’s motion for judgment on the pleadings.
Accordingly, it is now
ORDERED:
(1) Defendant Achieva Credit Union’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (Doc.
16) is DENIED.
(2) Achieva Credit Union must file an amended answer to the Complaint on or
before October 18, 2018.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida this 5th day of October 2018.

Copies: All Parties of Record

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