Zola v. Commissioner Social Security

Filing 24

OPINION AND ORDER affirming the decision of the Commissioner. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with this opinion, terminate all deadlines, and close the case. Signed by Magistrate Judge Douglas N. Frazier on 8/1/2022. (brh)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
RONI ZOLA,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.: 2:21-cv-196-DNF

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Roni Zola seeks judicial review of the final decision of the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying her claim for
a period of disability and disability insurance benefits. The Commissioner filed the
Transcript of the proceedings (hereinafter referred to as “Tr.” followed by the
appropriate page number), and the parties filed a joint legal memorandum setting
forth their respective positions. As explained below, the decision of the
Commissioner is AFFIRMED pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g).

I.

Social Security Act Eligibility, Standard of Review, Procedural
History, and the ALJ’s Decision
A.

Social Security Eligibility

The law defines disability as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity
by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(i), 423(d)(1)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a). The impairment must be
severe, making the claimant unable to do her previous work, or any other substantial
gainful activity which exists in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A),
1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505–404.1511, 416.905–416.911.
B.

Standard of Review

The Commissioner’s findings of fact are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence is more than a
scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Even if the evidence preponderated against the
Commissioner’s findings, we must affirm if the decision reached is supported by
substantial evidence.” Crawford v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th
Cir. 2004). In conducting this review, this Court may not reweigh the evidence or
substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ, but must consider the evidence as a whole,
taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision.

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Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citation
omitted); Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); Martin v. Sullivan,
894 F.2d 1520, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990). Unlike findings of fact, the Commissioner’s
conclusions of law are not presumed valid and are reviewed under a de novo
standard. Keeton v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir.
1994); Maldonado v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-14331, 2021 WL 2838362, at *2
(11th Cir. July 8, 2021); Martin, 894 F.2d at 1529. “The [Commissioner’s] failure
to apply the correct law or to provide the reviewing court with sufficient reasoning
for determining that the proper legal analysis has been conducted mandates
reversal.” Keeton, 21 F.3d at 1066.
The ALJ must follow five steps in evaluating a claim of disability. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. At the first step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant
is

currently

engaged

in

substantial

gainful

employment.

20

C.F.R.

§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i), (b); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i), (b). At step two, the ALJ must
determine whether the impairment or combination of impairments from which the
claimant allegedly suffers is “severe.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c); 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii), (c). At step three, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant’s
severe impairments meet or medically equal a listed impairment. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iii), (d); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii), (d). If the ALJ finds the
claimant’s severe impairments do not meet or medically equal a listed impairment,

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then the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) to perform her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv),
(e)–(f); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iv), (e)–(f).
If the claimant cannot perform past relevant work, the ALJ must determine at
step five whether the claimant’s RFC permits her to perform other work that exists
in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g), 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g).
At the fifth step, there are two ways in which the ALJ may establish whether the
claimant is capable of performing other work available in the national economy. The
first is by applying the Medical Vocational Guidelines, and the second is by the use
of a vocational expert. Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1239-40 (11th Cir.
2004); Atha v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 616 F. App’x 931, 933 (11th Cir. 2015).
The claimant bears the burden of proof through step four. Atha, 616 F. App’x
at 933. If the claimant meets this burden, then the burden temporarily shifts to the
Commissioner to establish the fifth step. Id.; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v), (g); 20
C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(v), (g). If the Commissioner presents evidence of other work
that exists in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant is able
to perform, only then does the burden shift back to the claimant to prove she is unable
to perform these jobs. Atha, 616 F. App’x at 993.

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C.

Procedural History

Plaintiff filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance
benefits on June 27, 2019, alleging disability beginning August 15, 2014. (Tr. 98,
182-84). Plaintiff later amended the alleged onset date to March 31, 2019. (Tr. 4950). The application was denied initially and on reconsideration. (Tr. 98, 114).
Plaintiff requested a hearing and a hearing was held on August 3, 2020, before
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Mario Silva. (Tr. 42-84). On September 1, 2020,
the ALJ entered a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled from August 15, 2014,
through the date of the decision. (Tr. 16-36). 1
Plaintiff requested review of the hearing decision, but the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request on January 7, 2021. (Tr. 1-6). Plaintiff initiated the instant
action by Complaint (Doc. 1) filed on March 8, 2021, and the case is ripe for review.
The parties consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge for all
proceedings. (Doc. 19).
D.

Summary of ALJ’s Decision

In this matter, the ALJ found Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements
of the Social Security Act through March 31, 2022. (Tr. 18). At step one of the

1

While not material to the analysis, the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff alleged an amended onset
date of March 31, 2019 at the outset of the decision, accepted this amendment, and adjudicated the
claim from the amended alleged onset date. (Tr. 16). Nonetheless, in the conclusion, the ALJ found
Plaintiff not under a disability from the original onset date of August 15, 2014. (Tr. 16, 36).
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sequential evaluation, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since March 31, 2019, the amended alleged onset date. (Tr. 18). At
step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments:
“degenerative disc disease of the thoracic and lumbar spine, psoriatic arthritis,
morbid obesity, sleep apnea, and degenerative joint disease of the bilateral hands
and lower extremities.” (Tr. 18). At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have
an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the
severity of any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1 (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, and 404.1526). (Tr. 23).
Before proceeding to step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following
RFC:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the
undersigned finds that the claimant has the residual functional
capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 [C.F.R.
§] 404.1567(b) except lift and carry 20 pounds occasionally,
lift and carry 10 pounds frequently; standing or walking limited
to about six hours, sitting for up to six hours for a combined
total of eight hours per day with normal breaks; never climb
ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; occasionally climb ramps or stairs;
occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; use of the
upper extremities is limited to frequent handling and fingering;
no more than occasional bilateral use of foot controls; avoid all
exposure to extreme temperatures, extreme heat, or extreme
cold; no more than occasional exposure to no more than
moderate levels of environmental irritants such as fumes,
odors, dusts, or gases; and avoid all exposure to unprotected
heights.

(Tr. 26).

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At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to perform her past relevant
work as a director of research development, vice president of operations,
administrative assistant, and supervisor, real estate. (Tr. 35). The ALJ determined
that this work does not require the performance of work-related activities precluded
by the RFC. (Tr. 35). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a
disability from August 15, 2014, through the date of the decision. (Tr. 36).
II.

Analysis
On appeal, Plaintiff raises two issues: (1) whether the ALJ’s reasons for

finding Dr. Hiester’s opinion to be unpersuasive are supported by substantial
evidence; and (2) whether the ALJ’s reasons for finding Dr. Kibria’s opinion to be
unpersuasive are supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 21, p. 11, 21).
The same legal standard applies to both opinions. The regulations for
disability cases filed after March 27, 2017 – such as this one – changed and an ALJ
no longer defers or gives any specific evidentiary weight to a medical opinion. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a), 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Thus, an ALJ no longer uses the
term “treating source” and does not defer or give specific evidentiary weight,
including controlling weight, to any medical opinion or prior administrative medical
finding. Torres v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:19-cv-1662-ORL-PDB, 2020 WL
5810273, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 30, 2020) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)).

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Instead, an ALJ assesses the persuasiveness of a medical source’s opinions
given the following five factors, with the first two being the most important: (1)
supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the claimant, including the
length, frequency, and purpose of the examining and any treatment relationship; (4)
specialization; and (5) other factors, such as the source’s familiarity with other
evidence concerning the claim, that tend to support or contradict the medical
opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)-(c); 20 C.F.R. § 404.920c(a)-(c). An ALJ may
but is not required to explain how he considers factors other than supportability and
consistency, unless two or more opinions are equally persuasive on the same issue.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2); 20 C.F.R. 416.920c(b)(2).
For supportability, the revised rules provide: “The more relevant the objective
medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to
support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the
more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will
be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(1); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). For consistency, the
revised rules provide: “The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources
and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or
prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2); 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2).

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The new regulations also differentiate between medical opinions and “other
medical evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2)-(3). “A medical opinion is a
statement from a medical source about what you can still do despite your
impairment(s) and whether you have one or more impairment-related limitations or
restrictions” in the abilities listed in paragraphs (a)(2)(i) through (iv). 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1513(a)(2). “Other medical evidence is evidence from a medical source that
is not objective medical evidence or a medical opinion, including judgments about
the nature and severity of your impairments, your medical history, clinical findings,
diagnosis, treatment prescribed with response, or prognosis.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1513(a)(3).
A.

Dr. Hiester’s Opinion

Plaintiff’s primary care provider, Erik Hiester, DO., treated Plaintiff from
March 2017 and diagnosed her with psoriatic arthritis, depression, hypertension,
chronic fatigue, memory loss, speech difficulties, fibromyalgia, rheumatoid arthritis,
low back pain – disc pathology, obesity, and allergies. (Tr. 684). He noted Plaintiff’s
symptoms as extreme fatigue, chronic low back pain, hand pain, foot pain, sweating,
cognitive impairments, dry eye, depressed mood, and anxiety. (Tr. 684). The ALJ
generally summarized Dr. Hiester’s treating records and his Physical Medical
Source Statement. (Tr. 28-30, 33-34). Of import in the Physical Medical Source
Statement, the ALJ noted that Dr. Hiester found Plaintiff: could walk less than one

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city block without rest or severe pain; could sit or stand for 5 to 10 minutes at one
time, and sit, stand, or walk for less than 2 hours each in an 8-hour workday; required
shifting of positions at will; needed to include periods of walking around every 5 to
10 minutes for 5 minutes; required unscheduled breaks after 5 to 10 minutes of
working for 2 to 3 hours; could rarely lift less than 10 pounds and never more weight;
could never twist, stoop, crouch, squat, or climb; could perform bilateral grasping 0
percent of the time, 50 percent of the time bilateral fine manipulation, 5 percent of
the time reaching bilaterally, and 0 percent of the time reaching overhead; would be
off task 25 percent or more per workday; was incapable of even low stress work;
would likely have no good days; and would miss work more than 4 days per month.
(Tr. 33, 684-87).
The ALJ did not find Dr. Hiester’s opinion persuasive. (Tr. 33). He
determined that Dr. Hiester’s opinion was markedly unsupported by his own
objective findings and markedly inconsistent with the overall evidence of record,
and then provided these examples and reasons for each.
Unsupported
• Dr. Hiester’s “opinion is markedly unsupported by his own objective
examinations as evidenced by his generally essentially normal objective
examinations except for findings related to her lumbar spine and obesity with
pertinent findings such as no focal neurologic deficits, intact sensory exam,
normal motor strength, normal upper and lower extremities, 2+ deep tendon
reflexes, decreased range of motion with her lumbar spine in mid-2019.”

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• Dr. Hiester’s “opinion is also markedly unsupported by his October 2019
examination [in] which he found that the claimant was essentially normal in
all aspects including a normal gait, normal motor strength, no tenderness, and
normal ranges of motion, as above.”
• “Further, his opinion is markedly unsupported by his June 2020 examination
which he again found that the claimant was essentially normal in all aspects
except for findings related to her lumbar spine, as above.”
• “To the extent that Dr. Hiester’s opinion is based, at least in part, on the
physical therapy examinations in late 2019, the undersigned does not find
this support persuasive because it was only an isolated and very brief period
and not based on a longitudinal review of the claimant’s objective records
performed by an unacceptable medical source.”

Inconsistent
• “His opinion is also generally inconsistent with the opinions of the state
agency reviewing medical consultants which the undersigned finds more
persuasive because they reviewed the claimant’s longitudinal objective
evidence.”
• “Moreover, his opinion is generally inconsistent with the findings by the
consultative neurologist Dr. Kibria, who found, in part, that the claimant had
5/5 motor strength in all extremities including handgrips, normal gait, normal
station, no evidence of weakness in any muscle group, and no difficulty using
her hands, as more detailed above, with overall findings generally consistent
with the performance of light work rather than an inability to perform any
work at all.”
• “His opinion is generally inconsistent with the essentially normal objective
examination by pulmonologist Dr. Valle Giler.”
• “Furthermore, his opinion is generally inconsistent with the objective
examination by neurosurgeon Dr. Valle Giler who found that the claimant
had 5/5 bilateral upper and lower extremity strength, intact sensation, and
normal tenant gait, 2+ reflexes, and a negative bilateral straight raise test.”
• “His opinion is also generally inconsistent with the objective examinations
by the claimant’s treating rheumatologist nurse practitioner Ms. Smith, who
generally found that the claimant was in no acute distress, did not appear

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uncomfortable, was well appearing, had a normal gait and stance, normal
spine, normal bilateral upper extremities, essentially normal lower bilateral
extremities except that her bilateral feet were indicated, and otherwise
essentially normal throughout a few visits from March to April 2020.”
• “Further, his opinion is generally inconsistent with the medical imaging of
the claimant’s bilateral lower extremities that are nonetheless consistent with
her ability to perform light work pursuant to the residual functional capacity
finding, as detailed above, rather than an inability to perform all work as
opined.”
• “His opinion is generally inconsistent with the claimant’s bilateral hand xrays from 2020 and lumbar spine imaging from 2019 that generally indicate
mild to no more than moderate degenerative changes.”
• “Finally, his opinion is generally inconsistent with the claimant’s high
functioning activities of daily living like riding a bike, driving alone, cooking
at least simple meals, watching television, reading, and swimming.”

(Tr. 33-34).
Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by determining the objective examination
findings were not markedly inconsistent with Dr. Hiester’s opinion. (Doc. 21, p. 12).
Plaintiff then cites some objective testing that may support her position. (Doc. 21, p.
12-13). But the issue is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.
Here, the ALJ determined that Dr. Hiester’s own objective findings and
examinations, which showed generally normal findings, did not support the extreme
limitations in his opinion. The ALJ provided many substantial reasons supported by
the evidence, as shown above, why he found Dr. Hiester’s opinion unsupported by
his own treatment records.

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Next Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in finding Dr. Hiester’s opinion
unpersuasive by comparing it to the state-agency medical consultants who found
Plaintiff capable of performing a range of light work. (Doc. 21, p. 13). Plaintiff
argues that neither of these consultants examined Plaintiff, and they did not have the
opportunity to review the most recent evidence in the record. (Doc. 21, p. 13).
Plaintiff thus claims it was improper for the ALJ to rely on these opinion when he
rejected Dr. Hiester’s opinion. (Doc. 21, p. 13). Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the
new regulations do not give specific evidentiary weight to a treating source and also
task an ALJ with considering other medical and nonmedical sources. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520c(a). And the more consistent these other sources are with the opinion at
issue the more persuasive the medical opinion will be. Id. The ALJ properly
considered the consistency of the state-agency consultants’ findings with Dr.
Hiester’s opinion when determining Dr. Hiester’s opinion lacked persuasiveness.
Lastly, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by drawing a negative inference
from Plaintiff’s daily activities. (Doc. 21, p. 13). Plaintiff claims that her daily
activities were much more limited than the ALJ suggested. (Doc. 21, p. 13-14). She
claims that she could only prepare simple meals and clean only sporadically. (Doc.
21, p. 13-14). In the decision, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff could cook at least simple
meals, but also noted that Plaintiff rode a bike, drove alone, watched television, read

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and swam. (Tr. 34). These activities support the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Hiester’s
opinion was inconsistent with Plaintiff’s high functioning activities of daily living.
Further, even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner’s
decision, the Court must affirm if substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s
decision. Buckwalter v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir.
2021). Plus, the Court may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Mitchell v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec.
Admin., 771 F.3d 780, 782 (11th Cir. 2014). While Plaintiff cites some evidence that
may support finding Dr. Hiester’s opinion persuasive, Plaintiff must do more than
point to evidence in the record that supports her allegations. Sims v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 706 F. App’x 595, 604 (11th Cir. 2017). She must show the absence of
substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion. Id. Here, the ALJ listed many
reasons to support his decision to find Dr. Hiester’s opinion inconsistent with his
own records and unsupported by medical and other evidence of record. These
reasons constitute substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s determination that
Dr. Hiester’s opinion is unpersuasive. Further, the ALJ applied the correct legal
standard in consideration of this opinion.
B.

Dr. Kibria’s Opinion

Neurologist Eshan M Kibria, DO, performed a consultative examination of
Plaintiff on September 23, 2019. (Tr. 547-551). The ALJ did not find Dr. Kibria’s

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opinion persuasive as to his findings that Plaintiff could not multitask anymore and
had occasional word-finding difficulties. (Tr. 34). The ALJ provided these examples
and reasons for finding Dr. Kibria’s opinion unsupported by his own examination
findings and inconsistent with the other medical and nonmedical sources.
Unsupported
• The terms “cannot do multitasking anymore” and “has occasional word
finding difficulty” were “not phrased in vocationally relevant terms.”
• Dr. Kibria’s “opinion is generally unsupported by his own objective findings
when he found that the claimant was informative, pleasant, cooperative, and
had intact work[-]related mental activities understanding, memory,
concentration, social interaction, and adaptation, as well as that she related
historical events in a coherent and organized manner with a normal fund of
general information and normal speech pattern.”

Inconsistent
• “His opinion is also generally inconsistent with the opinions of the state
agency reviewing psychologists at initial and reconsideration [who] opined
that the claimant did not have a severe mental impairment.”
• “His opinion is also generally inconsistent with the objective psychiatric
findings by Dr. Hiester, who generally found that she was essentially normal
psychiatrically.”
• “His opinion is further generally inconsistent with the findings by the
claimant’s treating psychiatrist Dr. Madia, who generally found that the
claimant was essentially normal psychiatrically except for findings like
mildly depressed mood and mildly constricted affect and that her depression
was in partial to full remission.”
• “Finally, his opinion is generally inconsistent with the claimant’s high
functioning activities of daily living like riding a bike, driving alone, cooking
at least simple meals, shopping online, watching television, reading, and
swimming.”

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(Tr. 34-35).
Plaintiff quibbles with the ALJ’s statement that Dr. Kibria did not use
“vocationally relevant terms.” (Doc. 21, p. 22). Dr. Kibria found Plaintiff could not
multitask anymore and had occasional word finding difficulties. As the ALJ noted,
these terms do not easily translate into what exactly Plaintiff can do despite these
alleged impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2). As a result, they may not
constitute an opinion. But even if the ALJ erred with this statement, the ALJ
provided many other reasons and examples in finding Dr. Kibria’s opinion
unpersuasive.
As with Dr. Hiester’s opinion, Plaintiff cites some records that might support
Dr. Kibria’s opinion. (Doc. 21, p. 22-23). But again the issue is whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. Here, the ALJ determined that Dr. Kibria’s
own objective findings and examinations – which showed Plaintiff had a generally
normal memory, was coherent, and had organized speech, as well as other findings
– did not support his finding that she could not multitask and had occasional word
finding difficulty. These reasons bolster the ALJ’s finding that Dr. Kibria’s opinion
is not supported by his own examination records.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ erred in suggesting that Plaintiff’s daily
activities were inconsistent with Dr. Kibria’s opinion. (Doc. 21, p. 23). Plaintiff
claims that none of her daily activities contradicted Dr. Kibria’s findings as to

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multitasking. (Doc. 21, p. 23). Arguably, at least some of her activities, such as bike
riding and driving, do require multitasking. But even if her daily activities were not
inconsistent with Dr. Kibria’s findings, the ALJ supplied many other reasons for
finding Dr. Kibria’s opinion inconsistent with other evidence of record. These
reasons included Dr. Kibria’s opinion being generally inconsistent with state agency
reviewing psychologists’ opinions, Dr. Hiester’s objective psychiatric findings, and
records from Plaintiff’s treating psychiatrist Brandon A. Madia, DO. (Tr. 34-35).
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ evaluated Dr. Kibria’s opinion in an
inconsistent way. (Doc. 21, p. 23). Plaintiff claims that he cited Dr. Hiester’s
findings or report – which he found unpersuasive – in support of finding Dr. Kibria’s
opinion unpersuasive. (Doc. 21, p. 23). The Court finds no error. The ALJ relied on
certain normal physical findings by Dr. Kibria in finding Dr. Hiester’s opinion
unpersuasive and likewise relied on certain normal mental findings by Dr. Hiester
in finding Dr. Kibria’s opinion unpersuasive.
As with the ALJ’s evaluation of Dr. Hiester’s opinion, even if the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, the Court must affirm if
substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision. Buckwalter v. Acting
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2021). While Plaintiff cites some
evidence that supports finding Dr. Kibria’s opinion persuasive, Plaintiff must do
more than point to evidence in the record that supports her allegations. Sims v.

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Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 706 F. App’x 595, 604 (11th Cir. 2017). She must show the
absence of substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s conclusion. Id. Here, the ALJ
listed many reasons to support his decision to find Dr. Kibria’s opinion as to
multitasking and difficulty finding words inconsistent with his own evaluation and
unsupported by medical and other evidence of record. And these reasons constitute
substantial evidence in support of the ALJ’s determination to find Dr. Kibria’s
opinion unpersuasive. In addition, the ALJ applied the correct legal standard in
consideration of this opinion.
III.

Conclusion

For the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the decision of the
Commissioner is supported by substantial evidence and the Commissioner applied
the correct legal standard. The decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED. The
Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment consistent with this opinion, terminate
all deadlines, and close the case.
DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on August 1, 2022.

Copies furnished to:
Counsel of Record
Unrepresented Parties
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