Brown v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 25

ORDER.The Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner's decision and directs the Clerk to enter judgment for the Commissioner and close the file. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kyle C. Dudek on 9/18/2022. (Dudek, Kyle)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
REBECA BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No: 2:21-cv-326-KCD

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
/
ORDER1
Rebeca Brown sues under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the Commissioner
of Social Security’s decision denying her application for disability benefits.
(Doc. 1.) The procedural history, administrative record, and law are
summarized in the joint memorandum (Doc. 23) and not repeated here.
Brown presses one issue on appeal: the administrative law judge erred
in finding her mental impairments were not severe. (Doc. 23 at 12.)
Specifically, Brown contends the evidence “compels a finding that [she] had at
least a moderate limitation in the area of interacting with others.” (Id. at 13.)
The Commissioner argues that Brown failed to meet her burden and

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substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s findings. (Id. at 16-24.) The Court
agrees with the Commissioner.
A court’s review of a decision by the Commissioner is limited to whether
substantial evidence supports the factual findings and whether the correct
legal standards were applied. Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1221 (11th
Cir. 2002). Substantial evidence means “such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill,
139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). The “threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is
not high.” Id.2
The court must view the record as a whole, considering evidence
favorable as well as unfavorable to the Commissioner, when determining
whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Foote v. Chater, 67
F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995). The court may not reweigh evidence or
substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. And even if the evidence
preponderates against the Commissioner’s decision, the reviewing court must
affirm if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Bloodsworth v.
Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983).

Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations have
been omitted in this and later citations.
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An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove he
or she is disabled. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005).
This inquiry proceeds under a five-step process:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in
substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant
has a severe impairment or combination of
impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or
equals the severity of the specified impairments in the
Listing of Impairments; (4) based on a residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) assessment, whether the
claimant can perform any of his or her past relevant
work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there
are significant numbers of jobs in the national
economy that the claimant can perform given the
claimant’s RFC, age, education, and work experience.”
Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011).
Brown’s argument is directed at step two of the evaluation process. (Doc.
23 at 12.) There, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant’s medical
impairment is severe. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). An impairment’s severity
is “measured in terms of its effect upon ability to work, and not simply in terms
of deviation from purely medical standards of bodily perfection or normality.”
Lucas v. Berryhill, No. 8:17-cv-2246, 2019 WL 968401, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 28,
2019).
When the claimant alleges a mental impairment, as here, the ALJ must
apply the Psychiatric Review Technique (“PRT”) at step two. Moore, 405 F.3d
at 1213-14. This technique requires separate evaluations of how the

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claimant’s mental impairment impacts four functional areas: “activities of
daily living; social functioning; concentration, persistence, or pace; and
episodes of decompensation.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a. The ALJ’s decision “must
include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the functional
areas” identified. Id. § 404.1520a(e)(4); Moore, 405 F.3d at 1214 (“[S]ocial
security regulations require the ALJ to complete a PRT [form] and append it
to the decision, or incorporate its mode of analysis into his findings and
conclusions.”).
If, after applying the PRT, the ALJ rates the functional limitations
caused by the claimant’s mental impairment to be “none” or “mild,” then the
ALJ will generally conclude that the impairment is not severe. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520a(d)(1). The ALJ must specifically explain his opinion, including the
degree of limitation found in the functional areas. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(c)(4),
(e)(4).
Here, the ALJ properly applied the PRT and found that Brown’s mental
impairments of PTSD and alcohol use, considered apart or in combination,
caused no more than a minimal limitation in her ability to perform basic
mental work activities, and were therefore non-severe. (Tr. 24.) The ALJ
concluded that Brown had no more than mild limitations in understanding,
remembering, or applying information; interacting with others; concentrating,
persisting, or maintaining pace; and adapting or managing oneself. (Tr. 27-28.)

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Related to Brown’s ability to interact with others, which is where she
claims error, the ALJ relied on record evidence that: 1) Brown interacted
normally with treating and examining practitioners, and treatment notes
provide that Brown was pleasant, cooperative, in no distress, and showed no
deficiencies in eye contact, speech, or conversation; 2) Brown did not report
serious problems of interpersonal interactions to treating or examining
physicians; 3) Brown reported socializing and generally maintained good
relationships with family members; 4) despite certain reports of difficult
interactions with others, Brown nevertheless reported going dancing once a
week, and volunteer work which “likely required some social interaction.” (Tr.
27-28.) The ALJ also underscored that Brown’s PTSD symptoms were
generally stable on medication, many of Plaintiff’s mental status examinations
and treatments notes show “essentially normal psychiatric[]” findings, and
Brown generally presented as stable, alert, orientated, and in no acute distress.
(Tr. 24-28, 409, 432, 435-36, 442, 449, 459, 464, 467, 471, 475, 485, 645, 649,
710, 727-28, 779, 785, 787, 791, 796, 830, 847, 860-61, 863, 937.)
Brown argues the record compels a finding that she had at least a
moderate limitation in the area of interacting with others, and points to her
mental status examination notes showing an anxious mood or a restricted and
irritable affect. (Doc. 23 at 13.) Brown also relies on Dr. Marcellino’s 2019
examination report, which notes that she does not “get along with people

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sometimes,” that her relationships with co-workers and supervisors are “not
the best,” that she experiences excessive irritability, and that her selfdescribed mood was “sad.” (Tr. 626, 629-30, 634-36.)
Brown is essentially asking the Court to reweigh the evidence, which is
something it cannot do. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005).
Contrary to Brown’s contention, there was substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s conclusion that she has no more than a mild limitation in the area of
interacting with others. The ALJ relied on objective medical findings, Brown’s
interactions with her treating and examining physicians, and Brown’s reported
ability to “go out in public” and “go out alone,” including socializing with family,
going dancing, and volunteering. (Tr. 27-28.) While Dr. Marcellino’s report
does include notes related to Brown’s reported social struggles, she also
reported to Dr. Marcellino that she “was okay, average” in getting along with
fellow service members and described her relationships to her father, mother,
siblings, and daughter as “good” and “okay.” (Tr. 626, 629-30, 634-36.)
In his behavioral observations, Dr. Marcellino further noted that Brown
was “cooperative and polite” and there “was no affective flattening, alogia, or
avolition observed,” and while Brown’s “[c]urrent mood appeared to be serious
. . . [i]n relation to context, [her] mood was appropriate” and her “[a]ffective
expression was stable.” (Tr. 645.) Brown’s mood, affect, and ability to interact
with examiners was similarly noted as appropriate, normal, and calm by other

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medical providers. (Tr. 409, 432, 435-36, 442, 449, 459, 464, 467, 471, 475, 485,
649, 710, 727-28, 779, 785, 787, 791, 796, 830, 847, 860-61, 863, 937.)
The ALJ’s detailed discussion of Brown’s treatment records, evaluation
of various opinion evidence in the record, and consideration of Brown’s own
statements and activities reflect that the ALJ properly considered the
combined effects of Brown’s impairments. See Nichols v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
679 F. App’x 792, 797 (11th Cir. 2017).
At bottom, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
conclusions, and thus the ALJ did not err by treating Brown’s mental
impairments as non-severe. The Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s decision
and directs the Clerk to enter judgment for the Commissioner and close the
file.
ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida this September 18, 2022.

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