Sheets v. Presseller et al

Filing 110

ORDER denying 102 Plaintiff's Motion to Compel; denying as moot 109 the City's Motion to Strike. The Court didn't consider the "clarification" filed by Sheets when considering the motion to compel because it was unnecessary. Signed by Magistrate Judge Kyle C. Dudek on 3/11/2025. (CGW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
ANDREW BRYANT SHEETS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 2:24-CV-495-JLB-KCD

v.
JERRY PRESSELLER, IN THEIR
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITY; OFFICER DAVID
JOSEPH LIPKER, IN THEIR
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL
CAPACITY; CITY OF PUNTA
GORDA, IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL
AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY; AND
PUNTA GORDA DOWNTOWN
MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION,
INC.,
Defendants,
/

ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff Andrew Bryan Sheets’ Motion to Compel
Discovery Responses from Defendant City of Punta Gorda. (Doc. 102.)1 The
City responded. (Doc. 107.) For the reasons below, the motion is denied.
Sheets sues under the First Amendment to challenge his trespass from
a local farmers market. (See Doc. 97.) According to Sheets, he had an

Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and
alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.
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irrevocable right to conduct “journalistic activities” on the public property
where the farmers market was held. (Id. ¶ 56.)
Sheets served two requests for production on the City:
All communications, emails, texts, videos, and documents related to
Ian McGuire’s filming activities at the Farmers Market and
government buildings from 2019 to the present.
Any and all emails, memos, text messages, video, and audio
referencing Plaintiff’s name from 2019 to the present.

(Doc. 102 at 2.)2
Rule 26 allows discovery of “any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case[.]”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Information within Rule 26’s scope “need not be
admissible in evidence to be discoverable.” Id. The presiding court, however,
“on motion or on its own” must limit discovery when: “(i) the discovery sought
is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some
other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii)
the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the
information by discovery in the action; or (iii) the proposed discovery is
outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C); see
also Pinehaven Plantation Properties, LLC v. Mountcastle Fam. LLC, No.
1:12-CV-62 WLS, 2013 WL 6734117, at *1 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 19, 2013)) (“In

Sheets’ motion isn’t paginated, so the Court uses the page numbers generated by the
electronic filing system.
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short, a district court may limit discovery when the burden of compliance
outweighs its likely benefit or relevance.”).
The City argues that responding to the discovery will impose an “undue
burden.” (Doc. 107 at 8.) The Court agrees. Requests for production that
request any and all communications are generally considered improper. See,
e.g., Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1309-10
(11th Cir. 2011) (finding a request for “[a]ny and all documents that support,
evidence, prove or relate to the allegations made” in an amended complaint to
be overbroad); Goodbys Creek, LLC v. Arch Ins. Co., No. 3:07-CV-947-J34HTS, 2008 WL 4279693, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2008) (holding that such
a request for all communications is overbroad); Great Lakes Transp. Holding
LLC v. Yellow Cab Serv. Corp. of Fla., No. 10-80241-CIV, 2010 WL 5093746,
at *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2010).

Sheets seeks every document, record, or

communication containing “Andrew Sheets” for the past six years. Literally
construed, this request calls for every record related to Sheets—no matter
how irrelevant to his underlying claims—spanning over six years.
The request for documents related to Ian McGuire suffers the same
problem. But even setting aside any breadth issues, relevancy has not been
shown. See Moss v. GEICO Indem. Co., No. 5:10-CV-104-OC-10TBS, 2012 WL
682450, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 2, 2012) (“[W]hen relevancy is not apparent,
the burden is on the party seeking discovery to show the relevancy of the
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discovery request.”); Suncast Techs., L.L.C. v. Patrician Prods., Inc., No. 0780414-CIV, 2008 WL 179648, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2008) (“[B]ecause the
relevancy of the discovery request was not readily apparent, the party
seeking the discovery ... had the burden to show the relevancy[.”). Sheets
claims that records related to Ian McGuire are relevant to establish
“unconstitutional selective enforcement.” (Doc. 102 at 2.) But as best the
Court can discern, the complaint does not allege such a claim. Indeed, that
term is nowhere in the latest pleading. What is more, Sheets seeks
documents about Ian McGuire’s activities at all government buildings, not
just the farmers market. There is no explanation for why this scope is
appropriate, considering Sheets’ claims target the farmers market. Forcing
Defendants to search for such expansive records about Ian McGuire when the
relevancy is not plain would also create an undue burden. See, e.g., Hoffman
v. T. Smith, No. 2:24-CV-111-SPC-KCD, 2024 WL 5111899, at *2 (M.D. Fla.
Dec. 13, 2024) (holding that tangential issues are irrelevant and improper
discovery grounds).
Finally, the City claims that Sheets relied on generative AI to draft
discovery, emails, and pleadings rather than conferring in good faith. (Doc.
107 at 2.) Apparently, Sheets’ correspondence with defense counsel included
cases that did not support his position and one case that the City could not
find. (Id. at 2-3.) The Court won’t delve into any disagreement on the
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conclusions of the cited caselaw, and Sheets did not present the non-existent
case citation to the Court to support his motion to compel. Still, Sheets must
verify all future sources in correspondence with opposing counsel and in any
motions filed with the Court. If Sheets relies on any non-existent cases
moving forward, the Court may consider sanctions.3
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel (Doc. 102) is DENIED.
The City’s Motion to Strike (Doc. 109) is also DENIED AS MOOT. The Court
didn’t consider the “clarification” filed by Sheets when considering the motion
to compel because it was unnecessary.
ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 11, 2025.

3 Sheets’ pro se status does not absolve him of the responsibility to abide by a duty of candor

to the Court. See Kendrick v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep't of Corr., No. 21-12686, 2022 WL 2388425, at
*3 (11th Cir. July 1, 2022) (“While it is true pro se pleadings are held to a less strict
standard than counseled pleadings and are liberally construed ... [pro se litigants] also owe
the same duty of candor to the court as imposed on any other litigant.”). The imposition of
sanctions against parties who submit fake citations is common. See, e.g., Thomas v.
Pangburn, No. CV423-046, 2023 WL 9425765, at *4-5 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2023) (“Plaintiff did
not explain what sources he relied on during his research or where he found the sham
cases.”). And pro se litigants are not immune from such sanctions. See, e.g., Morgan v.
Cmty. Against Violence, No. 23-CV-353-WPJ/JMR, 2023 WL 6976510, at *7 (D.N.M. Oct.
23, 2023) (explaining that although courts make “some allowances for [a] pro se Plaintiff’s
failure to cite to proper legal authority, courts do not make allowances for a Plaintiff who
cites to fake, nonexistent, misleading authorities.”).

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