Sheets v. Prummell et al

Filing 43

ORDERED: Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Claims One and Two are DISMISSED with prejudice against Deputy Williams in his official capacity only. Claims Three and Four are DISMISSED with prejud ice against Sheriff Prummell in his individual capacity only. Claims Three and Four are DISMISSED without prejudice against Sheriff Prummell in his official capacity with leave to Amend. Claim Five is DISMISSED with prejudice. On or before March 1 9, 2025, Plaintiff may file a second-amended complaint to address the Court's holdings as to Claims Three and Four against Sheriff Prummell in his official capacity. Failure to do so will cause the Court to deem those claims abandoned. Signed by Judge Sheri Polster Chappell on 3/5/2025. (AEH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
FORT MYERS DIVISION
ANDREW BRYANT SHEETS,
Plaintiff,
v.

Case No.: 2:24-cv-943-SPC-NPM

SHERIFF BILL PRUMMELL and
DEPUTY CHRISTOPHER SCOTT
WILLIAMS, in their individual and
official capacities;
Defendants.

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OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court are Sheriff Bill Prummell and Deputy Christopher
Scott Williams’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22) and Plaintiff Andrew Bryant
Sheets’ Response (Doc. 34). For the below reasons, the Court grants the motion
in part.
Background
Plaintiff, proceeding without a lawyer, brings this action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (Doc. 15). In his amended complaint, he alleges as follows. 1 On
October 20, 2020, he visited the Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office to file an

1 The Court “accept[s] the allegations in the complaint as true and constru[es] them in the

light most favorable to” Plaintiff. Belanger v. Salvation Army, 556 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th
Cir. 2009).

internal affairs complaint while wearing a body camera. (Doc. 15 ¶¶ 10–12).
His complaint included allegations that Sheriff Prummell had an extra-marital
affair and that a SWAT team doctor was illegally distributing steroids. (Id. ¶
12).

After requesting to speak with someone from the internal affairs

department, Plaintiff was met by Deputy Williams, who issued him a trespass
warning. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 15). Plaintiff incessantly asked Deputy Williams the
reason for the trespass warning, but Deputy Williams did not provide one. (Id.
¶¶ 15–17). Deputy Williams warned Plaintiff that failure to exit the building
would result in his arrest. (Id. ¶ 18). Plaintiff then exited the building. (Id.
¶ 19).
The trespass warning cites Florida Statute § 810.09 as the reason for the
issuance, includes prohibitions from visiting multiple Charlotte County
Sheriff’s Office locations for one year, and does not provide notice of the
availability of an appeals process. (Doc. 15-1). A local news station released a
statement from Sheriff Prummell saying that Plaintiff had “on a repeated basis
. . . come into the various sheriff’s office locations and berated, belittled, and
cursed at [his] staff.” (Doc. 15 ¶ 27). He stated that he sought to “protect [his]
staff from [Plaintiff’s] constant abuse.” (Id.).
Plaintiff alleges other incidents of “viewpoint discrimination,” including
a 2018 Facebook incident where the Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office hid his
comments on their post. (Id. ¶ 30). Other allegations include a May 25, 2021,
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incident where he was “[k]icked off the sidewalk during a 1st Amendment
protest” and a November 14, 2022, incident where he was trespassed while
directing profane and aggressive language toward a Charlotte County Sheriff’s
Office employee. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 34, 35).
Plaintiff sues Sheriff Prummell and Deputy Williams in their individual
and official capacities under various § 1983 theories. In Claim One, Plaintiff
alleges that his First Amendment rights were violated through viewpoint
discrimination. (Id. at 11). In Claim Two, he alleges that the trespass warning
issued by Deputy Williams was retaliation for exercising his First Amendment
rights. (Id. at 11–12). Claim Three is a Monell claim for failure to train. (Id.
at 12). Claim Four is a Monell claim for violation of procedural due process.
(Id. at 13). And in Claim Five, Plaintiff alleges that the trespass warning was
a prior restraint violating the First Amendment. (Id. at 14). Defendants move
to dismiss. (Doc. 22 at 2–3).
Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547
(2007)). If courts can draw reasonable inferences of a defendant’s liability from
the facts pled, then the claim is “facially plausible.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
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“[L]abels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause
of action” are simply not enough. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Analysis
The Court starts with the claims against Deputy Williams. Defendants
argue that the claims against Deputy Williams in his official capacity are
effectively claims against the governmental entity and should be dismissed
because they are duplicative of the claims against Sheriff Prummell. (Doc. 22
at 5). “[W]hen an officer is sued under Section 1983 in his or her official
capacity, the suit is simply another way of pleading an action against an entity
of which an officer is an agent.” Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776
(11th Cir. 1991). Also of note, “a municipality cannot be held liable under
§ 1983 on a respondeat superior theory[,] rather they are only liable “when
execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury[.] Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691–94 (1978). Claims
One, Two, and Five against Deputy Williams in his official capacity are thus
dismissed, as the proper vehicle for those claims is a Monell claim—two of
which have already been pled.
Defendants argue the Court should dismiss the individual-capacity
claims against Deputy Williams as well. They raise the same two arguments
against both Plaintiff’s viewpoint-discrimination and retaliation claims, so the
Court addresses them together.
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“A restriction on speech constitutes viewpoint discrimination ‘when the
specific motivating ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the
rationale for the restriction.’” Jackson v. McCurry, 762 F. App’x 919, 930 (11th
Cir. 2019) (quoting Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Vir., 515 U.S.
819, 829 (1995)). A restriction on speech in a sheriff’s office lobby “must be
viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.”
Hoffman v. Delgado, No. 23-13213, 2025 WL 25856, at *3 (11th Cir. Jan. 3,
2025). To state a First Amendment retaliation claim, on the other hand,
Plaintiff “must establish first, that his speech or act was constitutionally
protected; second, that the defendant’s retaliatory conduct adversely affected
the protected speech; and third, that there is a causal connection between the
retaliatory actions and the adverse effect on speech.” Bennett v. Hendrix, 423
F.3d 1247, 1250 (11th Cir. 2005).
Defendants argue that both the viewpoint-discrimination and retaliation
claims fail because (1) Deputy Williams issued Plaintiff the trespass warning
based on several incidents of harassment at the Sheriff’s Office, not his internal
affairs complaint; and (2) Plaintiff can still submit complaints by email, phone,
and mail. (Doc. 22 at 11–13). 2
2 Defendants’ argument about past incidents of harassment goes to Williams’ rationale for

issuing the trespass warning and the causal connection between the trespass warning and
Plaintiff’s internal affairs complaint. (Doc. 22 at 11–13). Defendants’ argument about other
ways to submit complaints goes to whether the trespass warning adversely affected Plaintiff’s
speech. (Id. at 13). Defendants do not assert any arguments about whether (1) Plaintiff’s
5

The first argument fails. Reading the amended complaint in light most
favorable to Plaintiff, as the Court must at this stage, he has plausibly alleged
that Deputy Williams issued the trespass warning because of his internal
affairs complaint, not other incidents of harassment. Plaintiff alleges that he
politely requested to speak with someone from the internal affairs department.
(Doc. 15 ¶ 26). Then Deputy Williams issued him a trespass warning because
he did not agree with his viewpoint (that is, the critical nature of the internal
affairs complaint). (Id. ¶¶ 26, 41, 42). Deputy Williams baldly cites Florida
Statute § 810.09 on the trespass warning, providing no rationale for the
warning. (Doc. 15-1). Plaintiff does not allege that any intervening events
occurred between him requesting to speak to internal affairs and Deputy
Williams issuing the trespass warning. Given the sequence of events and lack
of explanation for the trespass warning, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s
allegations support a reasonable inference that Deputy Williams issued the
trespass warning because of and in retaliation against Plaintiff’s viewpoint.

internal affairs complaint was constitutionally protected speech, (2) Plaintiff has alleged a
viewpoint rather than merely the content of his speech, or (3) the trespass warning was
reasonable.
The Court finds the internal affairs complaint is protected speech. See Bailey v. Wheeler, 843
F.3d 473, 486 (11th Cir. 2016) (written complaint about inappropriate officer conduct was
protected speech). The Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged a viewpoint (a viewpoint critical
to the Sheriff and SWAT team doctor). And, as alleged, the trespass warning was not
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the Sheriff’s office lobby. See Moms for Liberty Brevard Cnty., FL v. Brevard Pub. Sch., 118 F.4th 1324, 1332 (11th Cir. 2024) (“prohibited
speech must be naturally incompatible with the purposes of the forum”) (quotation omitted).
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Defendants’ second argument also fails.

Defendants argue that

Plaintiff’s rights were not adversely affected because he can still submit
complaints by email, phone, and mail. (Doc. 22 at 11–13). But their argument
on this point is insufficient. They point to caselaw for the general proposition
that Plaintiff’s rights are adversely affected only if the defendant’s conduct
“would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from the exercise of First
Amendment rights.” Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1254. But they provide no authority
suggesting that the availability of other methods to submit a complaint defeats
his claims. (Doc. 22 at 13). So Defendants fail to meet their burden.
In short, Plaintiff has sufficiently stated viewpoint discrimination and
retaliation claims in Claims One and Two of his amended complaint.
Defendants also argue that Deputy Williams is entitled to qualified
immunity. (Id. at 9). “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government
officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223,
231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “In order
to receive qualified immunity, the public official must first prove that he was
acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly
wrongful acts occurred.” Carruth v. Bentley, 942 F.3d 1047, 1054 (11th Cir.
2019) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “When a court
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concludes the defendant was engaged in a discretionary function, ‘the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant is not entitled to qualified
immunity.’”

Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 978 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting

Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1264 (11th Cir. 2004)).
Defendants argue Deputy Williams was acting within the scope of his
discretionary authority when he issued the trespass warning. (Doc. 22 at 9).
Plaintiff does not dispute this. (See generally Doc. 34). The Court finds that
Deputy Williams was acting in his discretionary authority. See Patrick v.
McGuire, No. 8:24-CV-999-MSS-NHA, 2024 WL 4803217, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov.
15, 2024) (officer acted within her discretionary authority when she told the
plaintiff to leave a government office because of the office’s policy against video
recording). So the burden shifts to Plaintiff.
As to Plaintiff’s viewpoint-discrimination and retaliation claims, he has
met his burden to show that Deputy Williams is not entitled to qualified
immunity, at least at this stage. Among other ways, a plaintiff may show that
a right was clearly established by pointing to a “broader, clearly established
principle that should control the novel facts of his situation.” Garcia v. Casey,
75 F.4th 1176, 1185 (11th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). Plaintiff appears to take
this approach. (Doc. 34 at 4) (quoting Moms for Liberty, 118 F.4th at 1332).
The Court agrees that broad principles from Eleventh Circuit caselaw
clearly establish that Deputy Williams’ conduct—alleged as viewpoint
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discrimination and retaliation—was unlawful. See, e.g., Jarrard v. Sheriff of
Polk Cnty., 115 F.4th 1306, 1325 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[T]he law is clearly
established that the state cannot engage in viewpoint discrimination—that is,
the government cannot discriminate in access to the forum on the basis of the
government’s opposition to the speaker’s viewpoint.”); Bennett, 423 F.3d at
1256 (“[I]t is ‘settled law’ that the government may not retaliate against
citizens for the exercise of First Amendment rights[.]”). This Court has already
found a clearly established constitutional violation in a similar case involving
a trespass warning in retaliation to a complaint. See Harris v. Rambosk, No.
2:18-CV-17-FTM-29MRM, 2018 WL 5085721, at *9 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 18, 2018)
(citing Bailey, 843 F.3d at 485; Bennett, 423 F.3d at 1255–56). Claims One and
Two against Deputy Williams in his individual capacity survive.
Plaintiff has not met his burden with respect to Claim Five, his priorrestraint claim against Deputy Williams. For this claim, Plaintiff also relies
on broad principles, rather than caselaw with analogous facts. (Doc. 34 at 6–
7). But he provides only two bare caselaw quotes, without explaining how
these prior-restraint cases apply. (Id.). For this reason alone, Plaintiff has
failed to meet his burden, and qualified immunity defeats this claim. See
Carruth, 942 F.3d at 1062 (affirming a dismissal on qualified immunity
grounds because the plaintiff “failed to offer any argument” on qualified
immunity and thus did not meet his burden).
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The lack of argument is particularly problematic because whether the
trespass warning was an unlawful prior restraint is unclear. “Prior restraints
contrast with subsequent punishments, which regulate a given type of speech
by penalizing the speech only after it occurs.” Barrett v. Walker Cnty. Sch.
Dist., 872 F.3d 1209, 1223 (11th Cir. 2017) (internal quotation omitted).
Supreme Court “decisions have steadfastly preserved the distinction between
prior restraints and subsequent punishments.” Alexander v. United States,
509 U.S. 544, 553–54 (1993). The distinction “is critical to [the Supreme
Court’s] First Amendment jurisprudence.” Id. at 554. As alleged, the trespass
warning issued here was a subsequent punishment for Plaintiff’s speech.
Whether it was also a prior restraint due to its prospective one-year ban is
anything but clearly established.
“[C]lassic examples” of a prior restraint include permitting and licensing
ordinances. Barrett, 872 F.3d at 1223. A court-ordered injunction forbidding
speech can also be a prior restraint. Id. The trespass warning here is none of
these things. And Courts have considered cases involving similar one-year
trespass warnings and found no prior restraint. See, e.g., Sheets v. City of
Punta Gorda, Fla., 415 F. Supp. 3d 1115, 1126 (M.D. Fla. 2019) (holding that
an ordinance prohibiting recording was not a prior restraint either facially or
as applied to the plaintiff, even though enforcement of the ordinance resulted
in a one-year trespass warning).
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The only Eleventh Circuit opinion suggesting that a one-year trespass
warning could be a prior restraint is Wright v. City of St. Petersburg, Fla., 833
F.3d 1291, 1299 (11th Cir. 2016). But there, the court found the trespass
warning was not a prior restraint because it “allowed [the plaintiff] to continue
his expressive activities in other public areas” and “was not imposed on the
basis of an advance determination that [the plaintiff’s] expressive conduct was
prohibited[.]” Id. at 1299 n.5 (citation omitted). Critical to that case, the
trespass warning “had nothing to do with any expressive conduct at all,” as it
was issued because the plaintiff obstructed a police investigation and resisted
arrest. Id.
This case is like Wright in some respects and different in others. On one
hand, Plaintiff alleges that Deputy Williams issued the trespass warning
because of his expressive conduct, making his claim stronger than the claim in
Wright. On the other hand, like Wright, Plaintiff does not allege that Deputy
Williams issued the trespass warning based on an advance determination that
Plaintiff’s future speech at the Sheriff’s property would be prohibited. Nor can
he. Plaintiff emphasizes that the trespass warning provided no rationale at
all. The only reasonable inference supported by Plaintiff’s allegations is that
Deputy Williams issued the trespass warning because of Plaintiff’s past
speech—his attempt to submit an internal affairs complaint just moments
earlier. And the extent to which Plaintiff can continue his expressive activities
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in other public areas is unclear.

He was banned from several Sheriff’s

properties for a year, although Defendants assert that he may submit
complaints by other means.

Given these competing considerations, how

Wright’s holding may apply here is unclear. In other words, Wright did not
clearly establish that the trespass warning issued here is a prior restraint.
In any event, Plaintiff does not cite Wright or explain how any other
prior-restraint authorities apply.

Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden.

Given this failure and having reviewed the caselaw, the Court cannot say that
the issuance of the trespass warning—framed as a prior restraint—violated
clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known. As a result, qualified immunity shields Deputy Williams from
that claim. The Court dismisses Claim Five.
Next, the Court addresses the claims against Sheriff Prummell.

In

Claim Three, Plaintiff brings a Monell claim asserting that Sheriff Prummell
“through [his] procedure, policies, practices, and customs” has violated
Plaintiff’s rights through his “indifference and a failure to train” his employees
properly on viewpoint discrimination. (Doc. 15 ¶¶ 56, 57). “To impose Monell
liability, a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights were violated;
(2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate
indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom
caused the violation.” Underwood v. City of Bessemer, 11 F.4th 1317, 1333
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(11th Cir. 2021) (internal citation omitted). “In limited circumstances, a local
government’s decision not to train certain employees to avoid violating citizens’
rights may rise to the level of an official government policy for purposes of
§ 1983.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1328 (11th
Cir. 2015) (cleaned up and internal citation omitted). “A pattern of similar
constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to
demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick
v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). Plaintiff “must present some evidence
that the municipality knew of a need to train and/or supervise in a particular
area and the municipality made a deliberate choice not to take any action.”
Lewis v. City of W. Palm Beach, Fla., 561 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff’s claim falls short.
Plaintiff fails to allege that Sheriff Prummell was on notice of his
employees’ viewpoint discrimination and deliberately chose not to act. Not
only that, but Plaintiff’s allegations of a pattern of conduct are insufficient.
Plaintiff includes three instances in which he believes the Charlotte County
Sheriff’s Office discriminated against him because of his viewpoint.

One

instance was on Facebook where his comments were hidden on a Charlotte
County Sheriff’s Office post. (Doc. 15 ¶ 30). Another occurred on May 25, 2021,
when Plaintiff was “[k]icked off the sidewalk during a 1st Amendment
protest[.]” (Id. ¶ 31). And the final instance was on November 14, 2022, when
13

Plaintiff was trespassed while directing profane and aggressive language
toward a Charlotte County Sheriff’s Office employee filing an internal affairs
complaint. (Id. ¶¶ 34, 35). The only instance that provides enough facts for
the Court to even consider that viewpoint discrimination occurred is the
Facebook incident where Plaintiff embeds a screenshot of his comments.
(Id. ¶ 30).

The others provide no context regarding Plaintiff’s speech or

viewpoint.

(Id. ¶ 31–35).

Even if the Facebook incident was viewpoint

discrimination, once instance alone does not create a pattern. Thus, the Court
dismisses Claim Three.
Claim Four against Sheriff Prummell is another Monell claim brought
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments’ guarantees of procedural due
process. 3 (Doc. 15 at 13). Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Prummell had a “policy
of allowing its employees to trespass Andrew Sheets for First [A]mendment
activities” and a policy of issuing trespass warnings that “provide[] no
procedural means” for a recipient “to challenge the warning[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 65, 67–
69).
Defendants argue the Court should dismiss this claim because a “single
trespass warning” is not enough to sustain a claim for an alleged
3 Plaintiff cannot bring this claim under the Fifth Amendment because he is not challenging

the actions of the federal government. See Buxton v. City of Plant City, Fla., 871 F.2d 1037,
1041 (11th Cir. 1989) (“The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution restrains the
federal government, and the fourteenth amendment, section 1, restrains the states, from
depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”).
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unconstitutional policy or practice. (Doc. 22 at 19). Plaintiff responds by
pointing out that he cites two trespass warnings in his amended complaint—
the 2020 trespass warning after entering the Sheriff’s office and a similar 2022
incident. (Doc. 15 ¶ 34; Doc. 15-1). Plaintiff does not allege whether the 2022
trespass warning (or any trespass warning other than the 2020 warning)
provided the recipient with a procedural means to challenge the warning.
Plaintiff also broadly alleges that Sheriff Prummell “uses trespass warnings”
to stop his speech and has trespassed Plaintiff “multiple times.” (Doc. 15
¶¶ 62–63).

But Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations, coupled with only two

examples, are insufficient to establish a policy or practice. See Wakefield v.
City of Pembroke Pines, 269 F. App’x 936, 940 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Two incidents,
occurring approximately thirteen months apart, are insufficient to establish a
custom.”). Thus, the Court dismisses Claim Four.
Finally, Defendants also contend that the individual-capacity claims
against Sheriff Prummell should be dismissed because he did not have any
participation in the allegedly unlawful conduct. (Doc. 22 at 6). The only claims
brought against Sheriff Prummell in his individual capacity are Monell claims
(Claims Three and Four). Since “Monell claims do not apply to claims against
individuals[,]” Claims Three and Four are dismissed against Sheriff Prummell
in his individual capacity. Fountain v. City of Lakeland, No. 8:11-CV-52-T17TBM, 2011 WL 3703454, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2011); Wilcox v. Andalusia
15

City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 660 F. Supp. 3d 1167, 1184 (M.D. Ala. 2023) (finding
that a Monell claim is not cognizable against an official in their individual
capacity).
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED:
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 22) is GRANTED in part
and DENIED in part.
1. Claims One and Two are DISMISSED with prejudice against
Deputy Williams in his official capacity only.
2. Claims Three and Four are DISMISSED with prejudice against
Sheriff Prummell in his individual capacity only.
3. Claims Three and Four are DISMISSED without prejudice
against Sheriff Prummell in his official capacity with leave to
Amend.
4. Claim Five is DISMISSED with prejudice.
5. On or before March 19, 2025, Plaintiff may file a secondamended complaint to address the Court’s holdings as to Claims
Three and Four against Sheriff Prummell in his official capacity.
Failure to do so will cause the Court to deem those claims
abandoned.

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DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on March 5, 2025.

Copies: All Parties of Record

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